State v. Bolds

                                  121

Submitted August 2, 2019; supplemental judgment vacated in part, remanded
           for resentencing, otherwise affirmed August 19, 2020


                    STATE OF OREGON,
                     Plaintiff-Respondent,
                               v.
                      DONALD BOLDS,
                    aka Donald Lee Bolds,
                     aka Donald R. Bolds,
                     Defendant-Appellant.
               Multnomah County Circuit Court
                     17CR80615; A167828
                              

  Gregory F. Silver, Judge.
  Ernest G. Lannet, Chief Defender, Criminal Appellate
Section, and Anna Belais, Deputy Public Defender, Office of
Public Defense Services, filed the brief for appellant.
   Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman,
Solicitor General, and Kirsten M. Naito, Assistant Attorney
General, filed the brief for respondent.
  Before Ortega, Presiding Judge, and Shorr, Judge, and
James, Judge.
  PER CURIAM
   Supplemental judgment vacated in part; remanded for
resentencing; otherwise affirmed.
122                                                           State v. Bolds

           PER CURIAM
         Following his conviction for driving under the influence of intoxicants, defendant raises a single assignment of
error challenging the method the trial court used in calculating the amount of restitution ordered. The state concedes
that error, and we accept that concession.
          During the incident underlying defendant’s conviction, defendant damaged the victim’s vehicle, a 2012
Fiat 500, rendering it “totaled.” The victim purchased a
2015 Nissan Leaf as a replacement vehicle for $11,120. At
the time of the incident, the Fiat was valued at somewhere
between $4,320 to $5,382, and it had a scrap value of $500.
The trial court imposed $7,300 in restitution to compensate
the victim for the loss of the Fiat.1 The trial court arrived
at that figure by determining—based on its own research—
the reasonable market value to be $7,800 for a Nissan Leaf
with the same approximate mileage as the one purchased
by the victim. After subtracting $500—the scrap value for
the Fiat—the court imposed $7,300 in restitution. The trial
court also stated that the value of a car goes beyond its monetary value and includes “its transportation value, its reliability, … [and] the fact that you … know how the car
operates.”
         We agree with the parties and accept the state’s
concession that the trial court erred in imposing restitution
based on the market value of the replacement vehicle—the
Leaf—and not the reasonable market value of the damaged
vehicle—the Fiat—at the time of the crash. See State v.
De Verteuil, 

, 

 (2020) (“[A]s
a general rule, when a defendant has been convicted of a
crime that results in the destruction of personal property,
the amount of restitution is the reasonable market value of
the property at the time and place of the criminal conduct
causing the destruction, plus interest from that time forward.”). To the extent the court believed it could impose restitution in an amount equal to the value of the replacement
vehicle because the diminished value of the Fiat would not
constitute just compensation, see Hall v. Work, 

,
    1
      The trial court also ordered defendant to pay the victim $109.98 to replace
two car seats, which is not challenged on appeal.
Cite as 

 (2020)                              123

360-62, 

 (1960) (acknowledging an exception
to the general rule for measuring damages when the market value of a good will not provide “ ‘just compensation’ ”
because the “goods … are not ordinarily objects of commerce and have no market value”), that was error. See 

 (concluding that vehicles fall within the general rule
for measuring damages because “automobiles have a well
established market value”). Therefore, the trial court erred,
the restitution award is vacated, and the case is remanded
for resentencing. See State v. Moreno-Hernandez, 

, 

 (2019) (“[W]here we have concluded
that the trial court committed legal error [in ordering restitution], and that there may be other permissible options that
the trial court could adopt on resentencing, the appropriate
disposition is to remand to the trial court for resentencing.”).
         Supplemental judgment vacated in part; remanded
for resentencing; otherwise affirmed.