307 Ga. 140
FINAL COPY
S19A0953. HENRY v. THE STATE.
BOGGS, Justice.
After a jury trial in 2016, Tyron Henry was acquitted of malice
murder but found guilty of felony murder and possession of a firearm
during the commission of a felony in connection with the death of Michael
Johnson.1 His amended motion for new trial was denied, and he appeals,
asserting as his sole enumeration of error the trial court’s refusal to give
his requested jury instructions on the affirmative defense of justification.
In light of this Court’s recent decision in McClure v. State, __ Ga. __ (___
SE2d ___) (2019), we conclude that the trial court erred in refusing to
1 The crimes occurred on the night of July 10, 2015. On November 24,
2015, a Chatham County grand jury indicted Henry for malice murder, felony
murder, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime. At a
trial on October 24 to 27, 2016, a jury found Henry not guilty of malice murder
but guilty of felony murder and possession of a firearm during the commission
of a felony. The trial court sentenced Henry to life imprisonment on the felony
murder count and to five years to serve consecutively on the firearm count. On
October 28, 2016, Henry’s trial counsel filed a motion for new trial, which
subsequent counsel amended on June 15, 2017. Henry’s amended motion for
new trial was heard by the trial court on August 16, 2018, and the motion was
denied on January 10, 2019. Henry’s notice of appeal was filed on January 22,
2019, and the case was docketed in this Court for the April 2019 term and
submitted for decision on the briefs.
give the requested instructions on justification by self-defense or the
defense of others. Because we cannot say that it is highly probable that
this error did not contribute to the jury’s verdicts, we reverse.
The evidence presented at trial showed that at around 10:00 p.m.
on July 10, 2015, Henry and two friends, Nikki Miller and Jamonie “Jay”
Williams, were on Montgomery Street in Savannah. Henry and Miller
were walking, and Williams was riding his bicycle. When they reached
the intersection with Victory Drive, a car on Victory was stopped at the
intersection, even though the traffic light on its side was green. The three
waited for the light to change, and as they crossed the street on the light,
the driver of the car, later identified as Johnson, “obnoxiously” honked
his horn at them and turned to follow them “real close,” making them feel
unsafe. After Williams asked Johnson why he was “following alongside
of us,” and if he knew them, Johnson abruptly braked, put his car in
reverse, and pulled directly in front of Miller and Henry, almost hitting
them.
According to Williams, Henry and Johnson exchanged some words,
which Williams could not hear. Williams testified that Johnson then tried
to knock Williams off his bicycle with his car, and Williams avoided him
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by jumping the curb. At that point, Johnson reached into his console,
causing Williams to believe that he might have retrieved a firearm.
Williams testified that Johnson then got out of his car and confronted
Miller and Henry “eye to eye.” Williams testified that he was scared, that
he believed “there may be shooting coming,” and that he believed his “life
was in danger,” so he took shelter behind a nearby truck. At that point,
according to Williams, he saw Henry take off his backpack and retrieve
a pistol. When the prosecutor asked during direct examination, “And
then what happened?” Williams responded, “He shoots [sic] him,” but
when asked to describe what happened, he testified that he “just heard
gunshots” and “instantly blank[ed] out,” then jumped on his bike and
fled.2 Williams testified that, after changing clothes, he returned to the
scene to, he said, borrow some money for a drink.
Miller, on the other hand, testified that after Williams and Johnson
exchanged words, Miller attempted to defuse the situation, but Williams
“ended up saying some more things. And I was telling him to be quiet,
2 Henry and Miller fled the scene as well, and none of the three called
police. A police investigator eventually identified Williams through
surveillance camera footage, and Williams identified Miller and Henry. Both
Williams and Miller testified for the State.
3
but he wouldn’t listen.” According to Miller, Johnson turned around and
came back up the street toward Williams; when Miller saw how close
Johnson was to Williams, she asked Henry to “go grab Jay” and Henry
did so but told her to “keep going.” She continued to walk, heard
gunshots, and then ran. She did not see Williams again, but when she
turned to look for Henry, he “was beside [her].” Henry and Miller ran to
his house. Miller testified that later, in the middle of the night, she woke
up and felt Henry shaking and heard him “saying that he think[s] he shot
— that he think[s] he killed a guy.”3 Miller testified that she had seen
Henry with a silver revolver in the past, and that Henry had a book bag
that night, but she did not testify that he had a firearm in the bag or that
she saw him pull one out.
The medical examiner testified that Johnson sustained two bullet
wounds, one to the chest and one to the head, either of which could have
been fatal. The medical examiner also testified that Johnson’s blood
alcohol content was 0.147, and that he had cocaine in his system at a
concentration of .25 mg/L. The police also found packaged powder cocaine
3 Later, Henry urged Miller to claim she knew nothing, and he fled the
state when he learned the police were looking for him.
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in Johnson’s wallet. The medical examiner testified that these levels of
alcohol and cocaine would generally enhance aggressiveness and poor
judgment.
1. Though Henry has not challenged the sufficiency of the evidence
to support his convictions, as is this Court’s practice in murder cases, we
have reviewed the record to determine the legal sufficiency of the
evidence. We conclude that the evidence, when viewed in the light most
favorable to the verdicts, was sufficient to enable a rational trier of fact
to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Henry was guilty of the
crimes for which he was convicted. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307,
319 (III) (
99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979).
2. Henry’s sole enumeration of error is the trial court’s refusal to
give his requested jury instructions on justification by self-defense and
the defense of others. In his opening statement, Henry’s trial counsel
was candid about asserting two apparently inconsistent defenses. He
asserted that the evidence would show that Williams lied to the police
and was actually the person who exchanged words with Johnson leading
up to the shooting, and that — as the State acknowledged in its opening
statement — Williams fled, changed clothes, and was on Facebook a day
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or two after the incident trying “to get rid of a .38 with a body on it.”
Henry’s counsel also pointed out that Johnson was drunk and high, and
repeatedly threatened Williams, Henry, and Miller. Henry’s counsel
added that the police officer sitting at counsel table with the prosecutor
was going to testify that “part of her training is she doesn’t have to wait
until a suspect who’s been told to stop, to stop approaching her, she
doesn’t have to wait till he beats the c**p out of her and takes her weapon
to defend herself. So let’s go with that set of facts. Self defense.” Henry’s
counsel concluded his opening statement:
Do I know which one it is? No, but I don’t have to prove
that. They [the prosecutors] do. Same set of facts. One set of
facts, it can be self defense. Other set of facts, some other dude
did it. Doesn’t happen very often. But this is one of those cases
where take your pick. It’s undisputed. Most of the facts, he’s
right, are undisputed. I’m standing here telling you that now.
...
It’s a confluence of the perfect storm. And it doesn’t
happen very often. But no matter which set of facts you choose
to believe, all of these facts can point two different directions.
Jamonie Williams did get on Facebook and brag. There’s no
question about that. He did it. He has to own it. But see, here’s
the thing. The funny part about it is Jamonie Williams lied to
the police. Jamonie Williams makes the threats. And then
they choose to believe Jamonie Williams . . . .
During his cross-examination of Williams, who testified for the
State, Henry’s counsel asked, “Did it ever dawn on you that this may have
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been self defense?” but the State’s objection to the question was sustained
before Williams answered. After the State rested its case, Henry elected
not to testify. At the brief charge conference held immediately thereafter,
Henry’s counsel objected to the trial court’s refusal to give his requested
jury instructions on justification.4 The State then argued that because
Henry elected not to testify, he had abandoned his affirmative defenses,
and moved for the trial court to prohibit defense counsel from making
any argument to the jury on those points. The trial court agreed and
instructed defense counsel, “[Y]ou can’t say that the jury can speculate
about whether or not he was frightened or that he acted in self defense.
That will definitely require me to rebuke you vigorously.” Henry’s trial
counsel then asked if he would be allowed to argue from Williams’
testimony that Williams was afraid of getting shot, and the trial court
said it would allow it but added, “Be careful.” Henry’s counsel asked,
4 Henry submitted photocopies of Georgia Suggested Pattern Jury
Instructions, Vol. II: Criminal Cases (4th Ed.) §§ 3.00.00 - 3.10.13, including
an instruction that, once an affirmative defense is raised, the State has the
burden to disprove it beyond a reasonable doubt; a general charge on
justification; instructions on the use of force in defense of self or others,
including that the State has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt
that the defendant was not justified; an instruction on the doctrine of
reasonable belief; and an instruction that there is no duty to retreat in order
to be justified.
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“How’s that?” and the trial court repeated, “Right. Be very careful.”
Henry renewed his objection to the omission of his requested charges
after the trial court instructed the jury. In denying Henry’s motion for
new trial, the trial court relied on the fact that Henry did not testify, and
the absence of testimony about the substance of any words spoken
between Henry and Johnson before the shooting, to conclude that “there
was a lack of slight evidence to authorize instructing the jury on
justification.”
(a) The trial court’s refusal of Henry’s requested instructions was
error in light of our subsequent decision in McClure. There, this Court
granted certiorari after the Court of Appeals, over a vigorous dissent,
affirmed the trial court’s refusal to instruct the jury on justification in
defense of self and justification in defense of habitation, reasoning that
in order to obtain those instructions the defendant was required to admit
the elements of aggravated assault as charged. See McClure v. State, 347
Ga. App. 68 (2) (
815 SE2d 313) (2018). On certiorari, this Court
considered the following questions: “What, if anything, must a criminal
defendant admit in order to raise an affirmative defense? Must the
defendant make any such admissions for all purposes or only for more
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limited purposes?” We answered those questions as follows:
A criminal defendant is not required to “admit”
anything, in the sense of acknowledging that any particular
facts are true, in order to raise an affirmative defense. To the
extent a defendant in raising an affirmative defense accepts
for the sake of argument that he committed the act alleged in
a charge, the defendant may do so only for the limited purpose
of raising the affirmative defense at issue.
McClure, 306 Ga. at 857. We reiterated that “(t)o authorize a requested
jury instruction, there need only be slight evidence supporting the theory
of the charge.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Id. at ___ (1). And if
the State’s case raises the issue, the defendant need not present evidence.
Id. Moreover, the defendant may pursue apparently contradictory
defenses “so long as some evidence support[s] each theory.” (Citation
omitted.) Id. at __ (1). Thus, we vacated the judgment and remanded to
the Court of Appeals to determine whether the requested instructions
were supported by slight evidence and, if so, whether the error in refusing
to give the requested instructions was harmful. See id. at __ (2).5
We now turn to those questions in the case before us, considering
whether slight evidence supported Henry’s requested jury instructions,
5 See also Pennington v. State, __ Ga. __ (__ SE2d __) (2019) (holding that
Court of Appeals erred in affirming trial court’s denial of request to charge on
affirmative defense solely because defendant did not admit underlying crime).
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and, if so, whether the trial court’s failure to give those charges was
harmful error. We answer both questions in the affirmative.
(b) The State presented more than slight evidence to support
Henry’s requested jury instructions. Both Williams and Miller testified
that Johnson was behaving aggressively and irrationally, causing them
to feel unsafe and to fear that violence might occur. Their testimony was
corroborated by evidence that Johnson’s blood alcohol content was nearly
twice the legal limit and that he had .25 mg/L of cocaine in his system.
After blowing his horn for no apparent reason, following Henry and his
companions in a manner that made both Williams and Miller fearful,
engaging in an extended argument with Williams or Henry, pulling
suddenly in front of Henry and Miller, and attempting to run over
Williams, Johnson then reached into his console before getting out of his
car to confront Henry and Miller “eye to eye.” Assuming, for the sake of
argument, that Henry was the shooter, only after this escalating series
of events did Henry remove a weapon from his backpack and shoot
Johnson. The testimony of the State’s witnesses established more than
the slight evidence necessary to support the requested charges on
justification, and we therefore conclude that the trial court erred in
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refusing to give them. See McClure, __ Ga. at __ (1).
(c) “The test for determining nonconstitutional harmless error is
whether it is highly probable that the error did not contribute to the
verdict.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Shah v. State, 300 Ga. 14,
21 (2) (b) (
793 SE2d 81) (2016). And in determining whether such an error
is harmless, we assess the evidence from the viewpoint of reasonable
jurors, not in the light most favorable to the verdicts. See Thompson v.
State,
302 Ga. 533, 542 (III) (A) (
807 SE2d 899) (2017). In the context
presented here, we cannot say that the trial court’s instructional error
was harmless. Henry laid out his theory of the case — including
justification — during opening statement but then was refused jury
instructions on those points. The trial court’s refusal to give these
requested instructions deprived the jury of the necessary tools to
evaluate the charges against Henry and to reach a verdict; jury
instructions are the “lamp to guide the jury’s feet in journeying through
the testimony in search of a legal verdict.” (Citation and punctuation
omitted.) Chase v. State,
277 Ga. 636, 639 (2) (
592 SE2d 656) (2004).
Moreover, the trial court refused to allow Henry even to argue to
the jury that the evidence presented at trial showed that he was justified
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in defending himself and his companions, agreeing with the State that
Henry’s failure to testify constituted abandonment of his affirmative
defenses. As a result, Henry’s closing argument was truncated and
limited to arguing that Williams was the actual shooter and relying upon
the State’s burden to prove its case. In effect, Henry was forced to choose
between his right not to testify and the assertion of affirmative defenses
supported by the State’s evidence. As a result, he was deprived of
significant defenses that he had outlined for the jury in his opening
statement. Under these circumstances, we cannot say that it is highly
probable that the trial court’s instructional error did not contribute to the
verdicts against Henry, and we therefore must reverse Henry’s
convictions.6
Judgment reversed. All the Justices concur.
6 Because, as noted above, the evidence in the record was legally
sufficient to support the jury’s guilty verdicts, the State may choose to retry
Henry on the offenses for which the jury returned a guilty verdict. See Johnson
v. State, 302 Ga. 188, 199 (3) (d) n. 14 (
805 SE2d 890) (2017).
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DECIDED OCTOBER 21, 2019.
Murder. Chatham Superior Court. Before Judge Abbot.
Robert L. Persse, for appellant.
Meg E. Heap, District Attorney, Jennifer L. Parker, Abigail B. Long,
Greg McConnell, Assistant District Attorneys; Christopher M. Carr,
Attorney General, Patricia B. Attaway Burton, Deputy Attorney General,
Paula K. Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Katherine D.
Emerson, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
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