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307 Ga. 147

Causey v. State

Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided October 21, 2019

Supreme Court of Georgia · decided 2019-10-21

Cited by 2 later decisions — most recently August 2023

2 state decisions

Relies on Jackson v. Virginia · Miranda v. State of Arizona Vignera · Jackson v. Denno

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Decided 2019-10-21

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307 Ga. 147
FINAL COPY

                 S19A0957. CAUSEY v. THE STATE.


      BENHAM, Justice.

      Appellant Frank Don Causey was convicted of malice murder

and sentenced to life in prison without parole in relation to the fatal

strangulation and drowning of Lydia Ivanditti.1              We affirm his

conviction.

      1. Causey alleges the evidence was insufficient to convict him

because there was no evidence placing him at Ivanditti’s home at

the time of her death. In a light most favorable to upholding the




      1 The crime occurred on or about December 2, 2016.   On March 20, 2017,
a Putnam County grand jury returned an indictment charging Causey with
malice murder, felony murder, and aggravated assault. The trial took place
before a jury between November 6 and 15, 2017. The jury returned verdicts of
guilty on all charges, and the trial court sentenced Causey to serve life in
prison without parole for malice murder. The conviction for felony murder was
vacated as a matter of law, and the charge of aggravated assault merged into
malice murder for sentencing purposes. Causey moved for a new trial on
November 20, 2017, and amended the motion on October 8, 2018. On October
9, 2018, the trial court held a hearing on the motion as amended, and denied
the motion by order on January 22, 2019. Causey filed a timely notice of appeal
on February 13, 2019. Upon receipt of the record, the case was docketed to the
April 2019 term of this Court and submitted for a decision on the briefs.
jury’s verdict of guilty, the evidence at trial was as follows. On

December 1, 2016, Ivanditti left her mother’s house around 8:30 p.m.

When Ivanditti’s mother and daughter had not heard from her by

the afternoon of December 2, Ivanditti’s mother went to her house

to check on her. The mother discovered Ivanditti deceased in her

bathtub and called police. Ivanditti had been deceased for at least

four to six hours prior to discovery because her body was in full rigor

mortis. Ivanditti had bruising on her neck and on her forehead. The

medical examiner testified that Ivanditti died from manual

strangulation and drowning.

     Inside the bathtub with Ivanditti’s body was an unplugged foot

massager with some blood on it.2 Next to the bathtub was a broken

glass pipe with traces of marijuana in it, a broken cell phone, and a

cell phone case. Authorities identified the blood on the battery of

the broken cell phone and the cell phone screen protector as

belonging to Causey. Some blood-spotted bath towels recovered



     2  The test of the DNA from the blood on the foot massager was
inconclusive.
                                  2
from the scene also tested positive for Causey’s DNA. The police

believed items in the bathroom had been arranged to make the scene

look like an accident, in particular the placement of the unplugged

foot massager on top of Ivanditti’s foot and the placement of the

components of the broken cell phone.

     Causey had once lived with Ivanditti, who was known to allow

various people to live in a downstairs bedroom inside her Putnam

County house. A forensic review of Ivanditti’s phone records and

Causey’s phone records revealed that Causey, using a method to

block the identity of his phone number, contacted Ivanditti several

times on the night she was killed. Police confirmed that Causey

sometimes drove his partner’s blue Dodge Durango. The Durango

was seen at Ivanditti’s house around 8:00 p.m. on December 1. That

vehicle was also recorded by a nearby hardware store’s video

surveillance camera. The recording showed the vehicle leaving from

the direction of Ivanditti’s house around midnight on December 2.

Ivanditti’s neighbor testified that, at about 2:00 a.m. on December

2, she saw a person, whom she believed to be male, walk out of

                                3
Ivanditti’s house and over to a maroon SUV that was parked on

Ivanditti’s property.   The evidence at trial showed that Causey

owned a maroon SUV, which he had left at Ivanditti’s house when

he had previously lived there.

     After his arrest, Causey made inculpatory statements to police,

admitting that he saw Ivanditti on the night of her death, became

angry with her, “broke out in [a] rage,” and grabbed her by the neck

with his hands for 15 to 20 seconds. Causey said after he let go of

her neck, Ivanditti fell into the tub and was unresponsive.      In

addition to these inculpatory statements, the State introduced

evidence pursuant to OCGA § 24-4-404 (b), showing that Causey had

fought with past girlfriends, and, during those altercations, he

choked the women and either disabled their cell phones or took their

cell phones away from them.

     The evidence described above was sufficient for a reasonable

trier of fact to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Causey was

guilty of the crime for which he was convicted. See Jackson v.

Virginia, 
443 U. S. 307
 (
99 SCt 2781
, 61 LE2d 560) (1979).

                                 4
     2.   Causey alleges the trial court erred when it admitted

custodial statements he made after he allegedly invoked his right to

remain silent.

     Police must scrupulously honor a suspect’s right to
     remain silent if the person clearly and unambiguously
     states that he wants to end a custodial interrogation.
     Berghuis v. Thompkins, 
560 U. S. 370, 381-382
 (
130 SCt 2250
, 176 LE2d 1098) (2010); Perez v. State, 
283 Ga. 196, 197
 (
657 SE2d 846
) (2008). “But if a defendant
     equivocates in asserting the right, a police officer is under
     no obligation to clarify or to stop questioning.” Ridley v.
     State, 
290 Ga. 798, 802
 (4) (
725 SE2d 223
) (2012) (citation
     omitted).

Brown v. State, 
304 Ga. 435
 (2) (b) (
819 SE2d 14
) (2018). The record

in this case does not support Causey’s assertion that he clearly and

unambiguously invoked his right to remain silent.

     Causey submitted to two custodial interviews.           The first

custodial interview took place on December 20, 2016, the day of

Causey’s arrest, at the Eatonton Police Department (EPD) with GBI

Special Agent David Peebles, who was the lead investigator on the

case, EPD Investigator Lenwood Pickens, and, toward the end of the

interview, GBI Special Agent in Charge Joe Wooten. The second


                                  5
custodial interview, which was partially video-recorded and fully

audio-recorded,3 took place on December 21 at the Putnam County

Sheriff’s office with GBI Special Agents Michael Maybin and

Peebles.

      Upon holding a Jackson-Denno4 hearing and reviewing the

recordings of the custodial interviews, the trial court concluded that

Causey did not unequivocally invoke his right to remain silent

during the first custodial interview.        Our review of the record

supports this conclusion. Immediately prior to commencing the first

custodial interview, authorities read Causey the                 Miranda5

warnings, and he agreed to talk without an attorney present.

Throughout the first custodial interview, Causey denied having

anything to do with Ivanditti’s murder.             He also questioned

investigators about what evidence connected him to the crime. Just


      3 The audio recording of the second custodial interview was played for

the jury at trial.

      4 See Jackson v. Denno, 
378 U. S. 368
 (III) (
84 SCt 1774
, 12 LE2d 908)

(1964).

      5 See Miranda v. Arizona, 
384 U. S. 436
 (
86 SCt 1602
, 16 LE2d 694)

(1966).
                                     6
under an hour into the interview, after being admonished several

times that he could not go home because he was under arrest, but

also reminded that he was not required to talk to police, Causey told

agents to put the handcuffs on and take him to jail. At that point,

Agent Peebles and Investigator Pickens stepped out of the room.

Agent Wooten came in to tell Causey that they were getting ready

to book him and take him to jail. Agent Wooten advised Causey that

the authorities would only talk to him if he re-initiated the

interview.   Causey asked for Agent Wooten’s business card and

requested a cigarette. Agent Wooten advised Causey that he could

smoke his cigarette and take five minutes to decide if he was

finished talking to police. Rather than taking five minutes to think,

Causey asked Agent Wooten to sit down. Once Agent Wooten sat

down, Causey started talking again and continued to ask more

questions about the evidence against him. Agent Peebles re-entered

the room as Causey continued speaking. At the end of the interview,

Causey told Agent Peebles he would talk to him “tomorrow at noon.”

     Agent Maybin testified that, after the first custodial interview

                                 7
had ended, he was on guard in the EPD booking area while Causey

was being booked. Agent Maybin testified Causey asked to speak to

him, and, during their brief exchange, Causey told Agent Maybin he

wanted to speak to the agent alone the next day at noon. In addition,

Causey gave Agent Maybin a handwritten note memorializing this

request.6 As Causey was being escorted from EPD to a transport

vehicle that would take him to the county jail, he said, in front of the

state trooper escorting him, “I did it, I did it.”

     The next day, per Causey’s request, Agents Maybin and

Peebles interviewed Causey at the Putnam County Sheriff’s office.

Before this second custodial interview commenced, the officers again

reminded Causey of his rights pursuant to Miranda, and Causey

agreed to talk.     During the second custodial interview, Causey

admitted to choking Ivanditti and leaving her unresponsive in her

bathtub.

     The trial court’s determination that Causey did not clearly and

unambiguously invoke his right to remain silent during the first


     6 The note was admitted into evidence at trial.

                                     8
custodial interview is consistent with the record evidence. In spite

of making statements to the effect that he wanted to leave the police

station, Causey never stopped engaging officers in conversation,

even after being told repeatedly that he did not have to talk to

authorities. See Cook v. State, 
274 Ga. 891
 (4) (
561 SE2d 407
) (2002)

(where defendant said he did not want to talk, but nevertheless

continued to do so, request to remain silent was equivocal). Once

the first custodial interview was over, Causey affirmatively told

officers he wanted to speak to them the next day at noon, indicating

that he had no intent to exercise his right to remain silent. See 
id. at 896
 (the defendant’s initiation of further dialogue “evinced his

intent not to remain silent”); Johnson v. State, 
301 Ga. 707
 (III) (
804 SE2d 38
) (2017) (statements a defendant made in a conversation he

initiated by asking to speak to officer were admissible). Causey also

made spontaneous utterances between the two custodial interviews

that he “did it.” Inasmuch as these utterances were unsolicited and

not responsive to any interrogation by authorities, they were

admissible. See Johnson, 
301 Ga. at 711
. Accordingly, there was no

                                  9
reversible error regarding the admission of any statements Causey

made while in custody.

     Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur, except Warren, J.,

not participating.




                  DECIDED OCTOBER 21, 2019.
     Murder. Putnam Superior Court. Before Judge Burleson.
     Keri F. Thompson, for appellant.

                                10
     Stephen A. Bradley, District Attorney, T. Wright Barksdale,
Assistant District Attorney; Christopher M. Carr, Attorney General,
Patricia B. Attaway Burton, Deputy Attorney General, Paula K.
Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Matthew B. Crowder,
Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.




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