307 Ga. 168
FINAL COPY
S19A0597. RICKS v. THE STATE.
PETERSON, Justice.
This appeal has a complicated procedural history. Ultimately,
it is an appeal of an order on several motions that were either
nullities, untimely, or some combination of both. Either way, the
trial court should have dismissed them. But because the trial court
decided the motions on the merits instead, we vacate the trial court’s
order and remand with instructions to dismiss.
On May 4, 2012, while represented by counsel, Ashleigh Elaine
Ricks pleaded guilty to felony murder in Baldwin County. That same
day, the trial court entered a conviction and sentence of life
imprisonment. Later that month, during the same term of court,
Ricks filed two pro se motions, as well as a letter to the trial court,
arguing that her plea was involuntary and that her plea counsel was
ineffective; one motion asked “to appeal” the trial court’s sentencing
order and the other asked the trial court to “reduce her charge to
involuntary manslaughter and sentence her accordin[g]ly.” In June
2012, Ricks filed a motion asking the court to give her permission to
proceed pro se and to allow her plea counsel to withdraw. The next
term of court in Baldwin County Superior Court began on the second
Monday in July — July 9, 2012. See OCGA § 15-6-3 (28) (A) (fixing
the starting dates for the terms of the Superior Court in Baldwin
County as the “[s]econd Monday in January, April, July, and
October”). In August 2012, Ricks filed pro se a motion for new trial
— asserting ineffective assistance of counsel — and a motion for
change of venue.
The record contains no written order on Ricks’s motion seeking
permission for her plea counsel to withdraw and to proceed pro se.
But new counsel (“motion-to-withdraw counsel”) represented Ricks
at an October 5, 2012 hearing on her pro se motions. Motion-to-
withdraw counsel did not file a new or amended motion seeking
withdrawal of Ricks’s plea, but cross-examined plea counsel at the
hearing and argued that Ricks should be allowed to withdraw her
guilty plea.
2
In its order filed on November 20, 2012, the trial court said it
was treating “a series of filings” by Ricks as requests to withdraw
her plea and for a reduction of sentence; the trial court denied those
motions on the merits. Motion-to-withdraw counsel filed a notice of
appeal of the trial court’s ruling, and Ricks is pursuing this appeal
through new appellate counsel.1 Ricks makes several arguments
before this Court as to why the trial court erred in denying her
request to withdraw her plea.2 But we do not reach those claims of
error.
To the extent Ricks’s May 2012 pro se filings were a request to
1 The notice of appeal filed by motion-to-withdraw counsel on October 25,
2012, was premature, because it was filed before the trial court entered its
written order. See Gillen v. Bostick, 234 Ga. 308, 310-311 (1) (
215 SE2d 676)
(1975) (prematurity of notice of appeal does not divest appellate court of
jurisdiction). Ricks’s counsel also filed a motion to withdraw as counsel, which
the trial court granted in an order entered on October 30, 2012. Six years later,
in August 2018, the appeal of the November 20, 2012 order was docketed in
this Court, with motion-to-withdraw counsel still listed as counsel of record.
On October 18, 2018, because no brief had been filed for Ricks and motion-towithdraw counsel had informed this Court that she no longer represented
Ricks, this Court entered an order striking the case from the docket and
remanding to the trial court for a determination of whether new counsel should
be substituted or appointed. On December 3, 2018, the trial court entered an
order approving the appointment of appellate counsel.
2 The only error that Ricks enumerates is the denial of her motion to
withdraw her guilty plea. Therefore, the denial of her motion for a reduction
in her sentence is not before us.
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withdraw her guilty plea, those filings were nullities that presented
nothing for the trial court to decide. Here, the trial court entered a
judgment of conviction and sentence on May 4, 2012, and Ricks’s pro
se filings entered later that month came well before the next term of
court began in July 2012. See OCGA § 15-6-3 (28) (A). Given that
the record contains no order allowing plea counsel to withdraw
before she submitted her pro se filings in May 2012, Ricks was still
represented by counsel when she submitted them, such that her pro
se motions were legal nullities. Dos Santos v. State, 307 Ga. ___, ___
(2), (3) (___ SE2d ___) (decided October 21, 2019) (“Dos Santos’s pro
se motion to withdraw her pleas was unauthorized and without
effect, because she had no right to represent herself at the same time
she was represented by a lawyer.”). And although motion-to-
withdraw counsel argued at the October 2012 hearing that Ricks
should be allowed to withdraw her guilty plea, that “could not
breathe life into [Ricks’s] inoperative pleading[s].”
Id. at __ (3) n.4.
The trial court therefore should have dismissed Ricks’s May 2012
pro se motions, rather than denied them.
Id. at 9 __ (3); see also
4
White v. State, 302 Ga. 315, 319-320 (2) (
806 SE2d 489) (2017).
The trial court’s order also appears to have disposed of the
August 2012 filings, as well. It is not clear from the record whether
Ricks was represented by counsel when she submitted those filings,
as the record contains neither an order relieving plea counsel of his
duties nor an order appointing motion-to-withdraw counsel.3 If
Ricks were represented at the time she purported to make filings on
her own behalf, those filings also would be legal nullities. See Dos
Santos, ___ Ga. at ___ (2), (3). But those filings were entered after
the term of court in which she was convicted and sentenced had
ended and after the period for filing a timely notice of appeal had
expired, so we do not presume that Ricks was represented by counsel
when she purported to make filings on her own behalf. See id. at ___
(2), ___ (5). And yet, regardless of whether Ricks was represented
when she submitted the purportedly pro se August 2012 filings, they
were submitted after the expiration of the term of court during
3 The record indicates that the trial court sent a notice of the hearing on
Ricks’s motions to plea counsel in September 2012, but new counsel
represented her at that hearing.
5
which Ricks entered her guilty plea. Therefore, the trial court no
longer had jurisdiction to grant a motion to withdraw a guilty plea.
See id. at ___ (4) n.5; White,
302 Ga. at 320 (2); Brooks v. State,
301
Ga. 748, 751 (2) (
804 SE2d 1) (2017). To the extent that the trial
court construed either of the August 2012 filings as a motion to
withdraw a guilty plea and thereby disposed of them in its
November 2012 order, the trial court should have dismissed, rather
than denied, the motion. White,
302 Ga. at 320 (2); Brooks
301 Ga.
at 752 (2).
In short, whether Ricks’s filings were nullities or merely
untimely, the trial court should have dismissed them. But instead,
the trial court considered them on the merits, stating that it found
“no evidence of either sub-standard performance from her trial
counsel or prejudice arising from his actions” and “no grounds to
adjust or reduce the Defendant’s sentence.” We therefore vacate the
trial court’s order and remand with instructions to dismiss Ricks’s
May 2012 pro se filings, and, at least to the extent that it construed
them as a motion to withdraw a guilty plea, Ricks’s August 2012 pro
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se filings. See Dos Santos, 307 Ga. at __ (3) (“The trial court should
have dismissed Dos Santos’s pro se motion rather than ruling on its
merits. We therefore vacate the trial court’s judgment and remand
the case with direction to dismiss the motion.” (citation and footnote
omitted)); Brooks, 301 Ga. at 752 (2) (“[B]ecause the court’s order
plainly shows that it denied Brooks’s untimely motion on the merits
. . . . we vacate the trial court’s order and remand with instructions
to dismiss.”).
Judgment vacated and case remanded. All the Justices concur.
DECIDED OCTOBER 31, 2019.
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Murder. Baldwin Superior Court. Before Judge George, Senior
Judge.
Bentley C. Adams III, for appellant.
Stephen A. Bradley, District Attorney, Tammy G. Coffey,
Assistant District Attorney; Christopher M. Carr, Attorney General,
Patricia B. Attaway Burton, Deputy Attorney General, Paula K.
Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Vanessa T. Sassano,
Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
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