307 Ga. 37
FINAL COPY
S19A1042. SCOTT v. THE STATE.
PETERSON, Justice.
Corduray Keith Scott appeals from his convictions for felony
murder and cruelty to children in the second degree in connection
with the death of his three-month-old son, Corduray Scott Jr.1 Scott
challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his convictions
and also argues that the trial court erred in admitting statements
he gave during his second interview with law enforcement because,
1 The crimes occurred in January 2010. In August 2012, a Richmond
County grand jury indicted Scott for malice murder, felony murder (predicated
on cruelty to children in the second degree), and four counts of cruelty to
children in the second degree. Following a jury trial held later that month,
Scott was found guilty of felony murder and one count of cruelty to children in
the second degree. The trial court sentenced Scott to life without parole on the
felony murder count and a ten-year consecutive term for cruelty to children.
On February 5, 2018, Scott was granted an out-of-time appeal after filing a
habeas corpus petition, and he filed a notice of appeal about two weeks later.
We dismissed his appeal for lack of jurisdiction because Scott filed his notice
of appeal in the wrong county. Meanwhile, Scott had filed a separate notice of
appeal in January 2018, but we struck the case from the docket in August 2018
and remanded to the trial court for completion of the record. Upon completion
of the record, Scott’s appeal was redocketed to this Court’s August 2019 term
and submitted for a decision on the briefs.
although he was properly advised of and waived his Miranda rights
before his first interview, he was not reminded of his rights prior to
the start of the second interview. We affirm Scott’s convictions
because the evidence was sufficient to support them and there was
no Miranda violation.
Viewed in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdicts, the
trial evidence showed that the victim was born to Scott and Shakeila
Jones on September 27, 2009. The couple lived together in an
apartment and also had a daughter. The couple alternated taking
care of the victim.
In the early morning hours of January 18, 2010, Jones changed
the victim’s diaper and put the victim in a swing, where the infant
sometimes slept. The victim appeared normal and nothing unusual
happened earlier that day. Jones went to sleep for a few hours, and
Scott was responsible for watching the victim during this time.
When Jones woke up later that day, she checked on the victim
and noticed that he was unresponsive, his feet were shaking, his
arms were stiff, and his eyelids were half-closed. Jones first called a
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nurse hotline and then 911. Jones accompanied the victim to the
hospital, while Scott remained at home with the couple’s other child.
When the victim arrived at the hospital, he was lethargic,
experiencing seizures, and having trouble breathing. Dr. Renuka
Mehta, a pediatric expert, treated the victim at the hospital. Dr.
Mehta observed bruising on the victim’s body and, based on his
symptoms, believed that the victim had bleeding in his brain. A CT
scan confirmed the doctor’s suspicions. The victim also presented
with severe retinal hemorrhaging, which Dr. Mehta explained was
indicative of severe acceleration and deceleration of the victim’s
head. The victim stopped breathing because of substantial swelling
in his brain and was pronounced clinically brain dead within hours
of arrival. He was placed on a ventilator for three days before being
taken off life support. In her examination of the victim, Dr. Mehta
did not observe any congenital or birth defects that would have
caused or contributed to his injuries.
The medical examiner who performed the autopsy observed
blunt force trauma that caused bruising under the scalp and a small
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fracture of the skull, and significant hemorrhaging in the eyes and
some hemorrhaging in the victim’s neck that were consistent with
violent shaking. The medical examiner determined that the victim’s
cause of death was blunt force trauma to the head and violent
shaking. The medical examiner opined that the victim’s fatal head
injuries occurred mere hours before his admission to the hospital,
because the severity of the victim’s injuries would have caused the
seizures to begin within hours, and the victim began seizing soon
after his admission to the hospital.
The medical examiner also observed older injuries to the
victim, including: nine rib fractures at different stages of healing
that were consistent with a very forceful squeezing of the victim’s
chest; a laceration to the liver that could only be caused by a forceful
impact to the abdomen; and old bleeding in the lungs indicative of
instances of asphyxia. The medical examiner closely examined the
victim’s bones and found no evidence of rickets or Vitamin D
deficiency that could have explained why the victim had so many
bone fractures. The medical examiner, Dr. Mehta, and another
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pediatrician specializing in child abuse all opined that the victim’s
injuries were intentionally inflicted and non-accidental.
Police briefly spoke to Jones at the hospital and later brought
Jones and Scott into the police station for questioning on January
18, 2010. An investigator read Scott his Miranda rights at the
beginning of the interview, and Scott agreed to answer questions
after waiving his rights. During the interview, Scott exhibited odd
behavior by smiling and laughing and displayed no emotion when
told that his child might be dead. Scott claimed that the victim was
injured when the swing broke and the baby fell from it.
The investigator re-interviewed Scott the next day after the
investigator talked to the hospital doctors and learned the full
extent of the victim’s injuries, including evidence of chronic abuse.
Before beginning the interview, the investigator reminded Scott of
his Miranda rights, although he testified that he did not go back
over them in detail, and Scott confirmed that he understood his
rights. During the second interview, which was video recorded, Scott
recounted several instances where the victim had been hurt: one
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instance where the victim rolled off the bed; one instance where the
victim was found facedown on the couch; and another instance in
which the victim hit his head against a doorframe while being
carried by Scott. In the instance where the infant victim was found
facedown on the couch, Scott explained that he put the infant in the
corner of the couch, went to use the restroom, and, when he returned
about ten to fifteen minutes later, the infant was facedown and his
face had begun to change colors due to a lack of oxygen.
Using a doll provided by the investigator, Scott also
demonstrated how he played “rough” with the three-month-old
child, which included tossing the infant up into the air, squeezing
the infant, and bouncing with the baby. The medical examiner
reviewed the video-recorded demonstration and concluded that the
actions Scott demonstrated were not “extensive” enough to produce
the amount of force that caused the victim’s injuries. Dr. Mehta
similarly testified that Scott’s self-reported actions would have had
to be more exaggerated than displayed in the video recording in
order to cause the victim’s injuries.
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Scott testified in his own defense at trial. He denied ever
intentionally hurting the victim and claimed that he was telling the
truth when he told the detective that the only thing that happened
on the day of the victim’s death was that the victim fell when the
swing broke. He admitted that he once left the victim unattended on
the couch for about ten to fifteen minutes in order to use the
restroom and found the victim facedown struggling to breathe and
changing color due to a lack of oxygen.
1. Scott argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion
for a directed verdict of acquittal on the counts for which he was
convicted. We disagree.
When reviewing the denial of a motion for directed verdict of
acquittal, we apply the same standard used to evaluate the
sufficiency of the evidence supporting a guilty verdict under Jackson
v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (
99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979). See
Smith v. State,
304 Ga. 752, 754 (
822 SE2d 220) (2018). Under that
standard, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the
verdicts and ask whether any rational trier of fact could have found
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the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes of
which he was convicted. See id. (citing Jackson). Questions
concerning witness credibility, conflicts in the evidence, and the
weight of the evidence are for the jury to resolve. See State v. Cash,
302 Ga. 587, 592 (
807 SE2d 405) (2017). Applying the Jackson
standard, the trial evidence was sufficient to support Scott’s
convictions.
(a) There is sufficient evidence to support the felony murder
conviction. The trial evidence showed that the victim had been
behaving normally prior to being left under Scott’s care. When
Jones, the mother, next checked on the victim, the victim was
unresponsive, his feet were shaking, and his arms were stiff. The
victim was taken to the hospital where he began having seizures,
was soon pronounced brain dead, and was taken off life support
three days later. The medical examiner testified that the victim’s
fatal injuries occurred within several hours before he was admitted
to the hospital, which would have been during the time Scott was
the sole caretaker.
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Although Scott points to the inability of multiple experts to
identify the exact manner in which the victim’s injuries were
inflicted, Scott admitted that he was “rough” with the victim during
the time he took care of him. He also demonstrated in a video
recording played to the jury that he tossed the three-month-old into
the air and squeezed the victim. Despite Scott’s claim that the victim
suffered the fatal injuries when the swing accidentally broke and his
reliance on his own expert’s testimony that it was not possible to
determine whether the trauma was accidental or intentionally
inflicted, the State’s experts concluded that the victim’s injuries
were non-accidental. The jury was authorized to reject Scott’s
evidence and theory and resolve any conflicts in the evidence
adversely to him. See Gomez v. State, 301 Ga. 445, 453 (3) (
801 SE2d
847) (2017) (“The jury also was authorized to reject as unreasonable
Appellants’ hypothesis that [the victim] injured herself in an
accident.”).
(b) There also is sufficient evidence to support the cruelty to
children in the second degree conviction. The indictment alleged
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that Scott left the victim unattended on a sofa, which allowed the
victim to fall between the cushions, thus preventing the victim from
breathing. At trial, the State relied on Scott’s admissions that he left
the victim on the couch for ten to fifteen minutes while he used the
restroom and, when he came back, the victim was facedown and
unable to breathe, causing his face to change colors as a result. Scott
argues that the evidence was insufficient to show that Scott left the
infant completely unsupervised, pointing to his statement to police
that Jones was “there” at the time. But there was evidence from
which the jury could conclude that Scott left the victim unattended,
as Scott and Jones both said that they alternated shifts in caring for
the child.
A conviction for cruelty to children in the second degree
requires proof that the defendant “with criminal negligence cause[d]
a child under the age of 18 cruel or excessive physical or mental
pain.” OCGA § 16-5-70 (c). And “criminal negligence” is “an act or
failure to act which demonstrates a willful, wanton, or reckless
disregard for the safety of others who might reasonably be expected
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to be injured thereby.” OCGA § 16-2-1 (b); see also Daniels v. State,
264 Ga. 460, 464 (2) (b) (
448 SE2d 185) (1994) (“As a basis for
liability, criminal negligence is the reckless disregard of
consequences, or a heedless indifference to the rights and safety of
others, and a reasonable foresight that injury would probably
result.” (citation and punctuation omitted)). Merely leaving a child
unattended for a period of time ⸺ without more ⸺ might not be
enough to show criminal negligence. See, e.g., Corvi v. State,
296 Ga.
557, 560-561 (1) (
769 SE2d 388) (2015) (reversing conviction for
cruelty to children in the second degree based on the drowning of
two five-year-old children while nanny took a 45-minute phone call
because the nanny left children in a bedroom and told them not to
go swimming in pool, the children had not shown a propensity to
disobey, and there was no evidence that the length of phone call
made any difference to the children’s deaths). But there is more
here.
Scott told the police and testified at trial that he placed the
child in the corner of the sofa, implying that the child was secure.
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But the jury also heard Scott’s dubious accounts of previously
leaving the child unattended on a bed,2 as well as his attempts to
explain the victim’s death as being caused by a fall from a swing and
the severe and ongoing trauma as merely being the result of falling
from a bed or “rough” playing. Juries are always authorized to
disbelieve witnesses, and that authority is certainly not less in cases
like this one where the credibility of the witness’s testimony has
been seriously challenged as to related matters. The jury was
authorized to believe Scott’s testimony that he left the child
unattended on a couch for 15 minutes, but disbelieve his testimony
that he secured the child into the corner of the couch before leaving
him. See Hines v. State, 254 Ga. 386, 387 (2) (
329 SE2d 479) (1985)
(“The jury is entitled to believe a part of the testimony of a witness
and disbelieve other parts.” (citation and punctuation omitted)). The
jury was also authorized to conclude that Scott’s failure to secure a
2 Scott initially claimed that he left the child, then two months old, in the
center of a queen-sized bed and the child moved toward the edge and fell off.
When the investigator expressed doubts that the young child could move that
far, Scott said his child was “very advanced” and conceded that the child was
not placed in the “very middle.”
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very young infant before leaving the child on a couch for 15 minutes
while he used the restroom exposed the infant to an obvious risk of
injury by being smothered by couch cushions. And the jury was
authorized to conclude that leaving an infant unattended for 15
minutes in the face of such a risk showed Scott’s reckless disregard
for the child’s safety.
2. Scott does not dispute that he was advised fully of his
Miranda rights prior to the first custodial interview, but argues that
the trial court erred in admitting statements from his second
custodial interview conducted the next day, because Scott was not
reminded of his rights. Scott’s claim fails.
There is no dispute that the second interview occurred the day
after and was a continuation of the first interview. The investigator
testified that he reminded Scott of his Miranda rights prior to the
second interview. Under these circumstances, the investigator was
not required to repeat the Miranda warnings. See, e.g., Ellis v. State,
299 Ga. 645, 648 (2) (
791 SE2d 16) (2016) (“Neither federal nor
Georgia law mandates that an accused be continually reminded of
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his rights once he has intelligently waived them.” (citations and
punctuation omitted)); Walker v. State, 296 Ga. 161, 170-171 (3) (a)
(
766 SE2d 28) (2014) (“[T]here is no duty to repeat Miranda
warnings for a follow-up interview that is part of a continuing
interrogation.”). The trial court made no explicit factual findings or
credibility determinations on the record, but by ruling that the
statement was voluntary, the court implicitly credited the
investigator’s testimony, as it was authorized to do, to conclude that
Scott was reminded of his rights. See Butler v. State,
292 Ga. 400,
403 (2) (
738 SE2d 74) (2013) (“Unless clearly erroneous, a trial
court’s findings as to factual determinations and credibility relating
to the admissibility of the defendant’s statement . . . will be upheld
on appeal.” (citation and punctuation omitted)).
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.
DECIDED OCTOBER 7, 2019.
Murder. Richmond Superior Court. Before Judge Jolly.
Brownstone, P.A., Robert L. Sirianni, Jr., for appellant.
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Henry W. Syms, Jr., Kelly J. Weathers, Joshua B. Smith,
Assistant District Attorneys; Christopher M. Carr, Attorney General,
Patricia B. Attaway Burton, Deputy Attorney General, Paula K.
Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
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