Doyle v. State

FINAL COPY

                  S19A1005. DOYLE v. THE STATE.


      MELTON, Chief Justice.

      Following a jury trial, Matthew Doyle appeals his convictions

for the murder of Lyndon “Pookie” Tucker and possession of a

firearm during the commission of a felony.1 Doyle contends that the

evidence was insufficient to support his conviction and that the trial

court erred by failing to charge the jury on the requirement for



      1 On July 22, 2011, Doyle was indicted, along with Lewis Parks a/k/a

Lewis Harris, for malice murder, felony murder predicated on aggravated
assault, felony murder predicated on possession of a firearm by a convicted
felon, aggravated assault, possession of a firearm during the commission of a
felony, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Following a jury trial
that took place from June 10 to 14, 2013, Doyle was found guilty on all counts.
The trial court sentenced Doyle to life in prison without parole for malice
murder and, due to his second conviction for possession of a firearm during the
commission of a felony, ten additional years to be served consecutively. The
State has not challenged that sentence. See Dixon v. State, 

 (4)
(

) (2017). Doyle initially filed an untimely pro se motion for a
new trial. On October 9, 2013, he filed an “Out of Time Motion for a New Trial,”
which the trial court treated as a request for an out-of-time appeal. The trial
court granted Doyle’s request, and the motion for a new trial was amended
through new counsel on August 25, 2016. Following a hearing, the trial court
denied the motion for a new trial as amended on March 9, 2018. Doyle timely
filed a notice of appeal, and his case was docketed to the August 2019 term of
this Court. Doyle’s case was orally argued on August 6, 2019.
corroboration of accomplice testimony. Because we conclude that

the trial court plainly erred, we reverse.

     1. Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the

evidence shows that, around 8:00 p.m. on December 17, 2010,

Tucker’s girlfriend dropped him off at his job as a security guard at

Midtown Towing.      After dropping Tucker off at work, Tucker’s

girlfriend attended a party at “The Yard,” a club located a short

distance from Midtown Towing. At the party, two groups of men

began fighting. One of the participants in the fight was her cousin,

a young man nicknamed “Poochie.”

     Keith Richardson, a drug addict who often drove Doyle’s co-

defendant Lewis Parks to various places in exchange for money or

drugs, received a call from Parks, who wanted Richardson to take

him to pick his son up from The Yard. Richardson drove his blue

Ford Explorer to Parks’s house, where three men got in his car.

Parks sat in the front passenger seat, while Doyle climbed in behind




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Richardson.2 When they arrived at The Yard, the men sat in the car

and discussed “hurting somebody or jumping on somebody” and

“getting payback” for something. After about 20 minutes, Parks

directed Richardson to drive to Midtown Towing. Apparently, the

men mistakenly believed that “Pookie” was somehow related to

“Poochie.”

     Just before 4:00 a.m., the men arrived at Midtown Towing.

Doyle jumped out and ran behind the car. Although Richardson

testified at trial that he did not see any weapons the night of the

shooting, the lead detective on the case testified that Richardson told

him that he had seen Parks “rack” a gun while in the passenger seat

and Doyle holding a gun when he got out of the car at Midtown

Towing. After Doyle exited the vehicle, Richardson heard gunshots.

He started to drive away, but Parks told him to “hold up” so Doyle

could get back in the car. Richardson then drove the men back to

Parks’s house, where he dropped them off.


     2  While Richardson testified that both Parks and Doyle were in his
vehicle the night of the shooting, the identity of the third man was never
established at trial.
                                    3
     Tucker, who had been sitting in Midtown Towing’s guard

shack, died from eight gunshot wounds, all of which were consistent

with the type of injury that results from bullets fired from a high-

velocity weapon. The shell casings recovered at the scene and the

bullet removed from Tucker’s body were consistent with those fired

from either an SKS or AK-47 rifle.

     The subsequent police investigation found a witness who lived

across the street from Midtown Towing. The witness had heard the

gunshots and had seen a blue Ford “truck,” with one man hanging

out the passenger window and another man standing outside the

vehicle. Several months after the shooting, an individual named

Kerry Henderson contacted the lead detective. Henderson told the

detective that, on the night of the shooting, her cousins had

borrowed her car to go to the party at The Yard. In the early

morning hours, her cousins called her and told her that her car had

sustained damage during a fight. When she arrived at a nearby

apartment complex to inspect her vehicle, she saw a blue SUV pull

up with Parks in the passenger seat.

                                 4
      At trial, Henderson admitted to meeting with the lead

detective about the shooting, but insisted she could not recall the

details of her conversation with him.           The lead detective then

testified that Henderson told him that she saw Parks, whom she

referred to as “Fat Lewis,” and a man named “Matthew” or “Matt”

the day after the shooting, and that they admitted to shooting

Tucker.3 The detective obtained Parks’s cell phone records, which

placed him near Midtown Towing at the time of the shooting. The

records also indicated that Parks’s cell phone had pinged towers

along the route that Richardson described driving when he returned

the men to Parks’s house.

      This evidence was sufficient as a matter of constitutional due

process to enable the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that

Doyle was guilty of the crimes for which he was convicted. Jackson

v. Virginia, 

 (III) (B) (

, 61 LE2d 560)

(1979).     Nonetheless, contending that Richardson was an



      3 Henderson positively identified Parks when testifying, but asserted

that she did not see “Matt” in the courtroom.
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accomplice, Doyle claims that there was insufficient corroboration of

Richardson’s testimony. Even if we assume without deciding that

Richardson was an accomplice, we disagree. Georgia law requires

corroboration in felony cases where the only witness testifying to the

defendant’s participation in the crime is an accomplice.       OCGA

§ 24-14-8 (“The testimony of a single witness is generally sufficient

to establish a fact. However, in certain cases, including . . . felony

cases where the only witness is an accomplice, the testimony of a

single witness shall not be sufficient.”).      “[T]he corroborating

evidence may be circumstantial and slight, and need not be

sufficient in and of itself to warrant a conviction, so long as it is

independent of the accomplice’s testimony and directly connects the

defendant to the crime or leads to the inference of guilt.” Lewis v.

State, 

 (1) (

) (2017).

     Here, the detective’s testimony regarding Henderson’s report

of the confession by “Fat Lewis” and “Matthew” or “Matt” was barely

sufficient corroborating evidence from which the jury could infer

Doyle’s guilt.   From this testimony, the jury could infer that

                                  6
“Matthew” or “Matt” was Matthew Doyle, thereby satisfying the

statutory requirement for corroborating evidence.

     2. Doyle contends that the trial court committed plain error by

failing to instruct the jury as to the corroboration requirement for

accomplice testimony. Under the circumstances of this case, we

agree.

     The trial court did not instruct the jury to determine if

Richardson was an accomplice, nor did it include the accomplice-

corroboration charge in its instruction to the jury. Rather, the trial

court gave the jury the following charge: “The testimony of a single

witness, if believed, is sufficient to establish a fact. Generally, there

is no legal requirement of corroboration of a witness — provided you

find the evidence to be sufficient.” Doyle neither requested that the

accomplice-corroboration charge be added, nor objected to its

omission.

     “[W]here no request for [the accomplice] charge is made at trial

or the defendant otherwise fails to properly preserve this ground for

appeal,” we review the trial court’s failure to give the instruction for

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plain error. Hamm v. State, 

 (2) n.8 (

)

(2014). We have adopted the federal plain-error test, as articulated

by the United States Supreme Court in Puckett v. United States, 

 (II) (

, 173 LE2d 266) (2009), which

requires:

     First, there must be an error or defect — some sort of
     deviation from a legal rule — that has not been
     intentionally    relinquished    or    abandoned,     i.e.,
     affirmatively waived, by the appellant. Second, the legal
     error must be clear or obvious, rather than subject to
     reasonable dispute. Third, the error must have affected
     the appellant’s substantial rights, which in the ordinary
     case means he must demonstrate that it affected the
     outcome of the trial court proceedings. Fourth and
     finally, if the above three prongs are satisfied, the
     appellate court has the discretion to remedy the error —
     discretion which ought to be exercised only if the error
     seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public
     reputation of judicial proceedings.

(Citations and punctuation omitted; emphasis in original.) State v.

Kelly, 

 (2) (a) (

) (2011). The record does

not indicate an affirmative waiver of this issue.

     (a) Evidence Supporting a Finding of Accomplice Liability. The

State argues that Richardson was not an accomplice, and therefore,


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the trial court did not err by failing to give the accomplice-

corroboration charge. However, where the evidence presented at

trial could support a finding that a witness acted as an accomplice,

it is for the jury to determine whether the witness acted in such a

capacity. Walter v. State, 

 (3) (b) (

)

(2018) (“It is error to fail to give a jury instruction on accomplice

liability where there is slight evidence supporting a finding that a

witness was an accomplice.”); 

 (2)

(“Where, as here, there is slight evidence supporting a finding that

a witness was an accomplice, the jury should be given proper

guidance not only on how to decide whether the witness was in fact

an accomplice but also on the extent to which it can rely on that

witness’ [sic] testimony by itself to support a conviction.”); Jones v.

State, 

 (1) (

) (1997) (“[I]t is for the jury

to determine whether the witness is an accomplice.”) (citation and

punctuation omitted).

     A person may be charged as an accomplice if he “[d]irectly

commits the crime,” “[i]ntentionally causes some other person to

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commit the crime,” “[i]ntentionally aids or abets in the commission

of the crime,” or “[i]ntentionally advises, encourages, hires, counsels,

or procures another to commit the crime.” OCGA § 16-2-20 (b).

“[C]riminal intent may be inferred from presence, companionship,

and conduct before, during and after the offense.” Belsar v. State,

 (1) (

) (2003).

     The evidence presented at Doyle’s trial could have supported a

finding that Richardson intentionally aided in the commission of a

crime. According to Richardson’s own testimony, he drove Doyle and

Parks to Midtown Towing after hearing them discuss hurting

somebody and getting payback. He told the detective that he saw

Parks rack a gun and Doyle holding a gun while in the car. He drove

them away from the scene after hearing gunshots and stopping to

wait for Doyle to get back in the car. He also did not report the

shooting to authorities and initially told the detective that he knew

nothing of the crime. Such evidence was enough to support a finding

of accomplice liability. See, e.g., Vasquez v. State, 

(2) (c) (

) (2019) (witness’s failure to seek medical care

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for the injured victim child and her subsequent flight could support

a finding that she acted as an accomplice); 

 (2) (witness’s presence at shooting, her subsequent flight, and

her failure to inform authorities could support a finding that she was

an accomplice); Jones v. State, 

 (1) (

)

(1979) (evidence of defendant’s presence in vehicle before, during,

and after the crime, her knowledge that one of her co-passengers

was armed, and her failure to notify authorities after the crime

supported a finding of accomplice liability). Thus, the question of

whether Richardson was an accomplice should have been for the

jury to decide.

     (b) Failure to Give the Accomplice-Corroboration Charge in

Conjunction with the Single-Witness Charge.

     On multiple previous occasions, we have held that giving the

single-witness instruction, while failing to give the accomplice-

corroboration instruction, in a case where the defendant was directly

linked to the crime through the testimony of an accomplice, deviates

from the plain language of OCGA § 24-14-8 and constitutes a clear

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and obvious error. See, e.g., State v. Johnson, 

(

) (2019) (same instruction given); Lyman v. State, 

 (2) (

) (2017) (same instruction given);

Stanbury v. State, 

 (2) (

) (2016)

(single witness instruction given without language of “no legal

requirement of corroboration”).             Such is the case here.          The

instruction given to the jury at Doyle’s trial contradicts the

requirement clearly set out in OCGA § 24-14-8, as well as multiple

holdings of this Court.4 Thus, we conclude that the trial court’s

omission of the accomplice-corroboration charge was a clear and

obvious error.

      Under the circumstances of this case, there is a strong

likelihood that the trial court’s error affected the outcome of Doyle’s

trial. Richardson’s testimony was the bedrock on which Doyle’s

convictions rest.      He was the only eyewitness to affirmatively




      4 We recognize that these decisions came after the 2013 trial in this case,

but “when conducting review of asserted plain error . . . , whether an error is
‘clear or obvious’ is judged at the time of the appellate court’s review.” 

 (2).
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identify Doyle as a participant in the shooting.       No cell phone

records, forensic evidence, or other eyewitness testimony placed

Doyle in Richardson’s car or in the vicinity of the shooting.

     The State points to Henderson’s and the lead detective’s

testimony as independent evidence of Doyle’s involvement.

However, their testimony — while sufficient to meet the “slight or

circumstantial” requirement for corroboration — is not strong

enough corroborating evidence to overcome the instructional error.

See 

 (2); 

. Compare Lyman, supra, 301 Ga. at 319-320 (2); 

 (2). The detective testified that Henderson

reported to him that “Fat Lewis” and “Matt” were with her the

morning after the shooting, and that they confessed to the crime.

Nowhere in his testimony did he confirm that Henderson identified

“Matt” to be Matthew Doyle either by last name or by photograph.

Furthermore, when asked to identify Doyle at trial, Henderson

testified as follows:

     Q. Do you see the person in the courtroom?

                                  13
     A. No.
     Q. You don’t see the person in the courtroom that was
     there that morning telling you what happened?
     A. No.
     Q. Do you see Fat Lewis in the courtroom?
     A. Yes, to the right.
     Q. And he was there that morning?
     A. Yes.

Thus, while Henderson’s testimony explicitly linked Doyle’s co-

defendant to the confession, it did not do so for Doyle.

     While Henderson’s and the detective’s testimony may serve as

legally sufficient corroboration of Richardson’s testimony, the jury

was never instructed how to properly evaluate this evidence, and it

is likely that the jury convicted Doyle on Richardson’s testimony

alone, which the jury was affirmatively told that it could do.

Because the jury did not receive proper instructions on how to

evaluate the evidence, we conclude that the outcome of the

proceedings was likely affected by the trial court’s failure to give the

accomplice-corroboration charge.

     Finally,

     [a] trial court’s failure to give an accomplice corroboration
     instruction when a defendant is affirmatively identified

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      as the second participant and gunman in a murder based
      solely on accomplice testimony undermines the fairness of
      the proceedings, at least when coupled with the express
      authorization by the court for the jury to establish critical
      facts based solely on this testimony.

(Emphasis in original.) 

 (2).

Affirming Doyle’s conviction on this record with a jury that was

authorized to find him guilty solely on Richardson’s testimony would

render the accomplice-corroboration requirement meaningless.

Consequently, we hold that the trial court plainly erred by failing to

give the accomplice-corroboration charge.5

      3. In light of our holding above, we do not reach Doyle’s

remaining enumerations of error.

      Judgment reversed. All the Justices concur.


      5 Due to our conclusion that there was sufficient evidence presented at

trial to support his convictions, the State may choose to re-try Doyle. We note
that our decision today impacts only Doyle. His co-defendant Parks did not
challenge the jury instruction in his direct appeal, only the sufficiency of the
evidence corroborating Richardson (and there was considerably more
corroboration as to Parks). See Parks v. State, 

 (

)
(2017) (in addition to Henderson’s report of Parks’s confession, other evidence
connected Parks to the crime, including cell phone records placing Parks at
Midtown Towing around the time of the shooting and Henderson’s
identification of Parks as the passenger in a blue SUV the night of the
shooting). As Parks did not raise the jury-instruction issue, this Court did not
consider the question in his case.
                                      15
                   DECIDED JANUARY 13, 2020.
     Murder. Fulton Superior Court. Before Judge LaGrua.
     Jacob D. Rhein, for appellant.
     Paul L. Howard, Jr., District Attorney, Lyndsey H. Rudder,
Marc A. Mallon, Assistant District Attorneys; Christopher M. Carr,
Attorney General, Patricia B. Attaway Burton, Deputy Attorney
General, Paula K. Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General,
Matthew M. Youn, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.




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