Davis v. State

FINAL COPY

                  S19A1187. DAVIS v. THE STATE.


      WARREN, Justice.

     Carlton Davis was convicted of felony murder in connection

with the death of Lakeitha Sims.1 On appeal, Davis argues that the

trial court erred by admitting a statement he made to a detective

that Davis contends he did not freely and voluntarily make; that the

trial court erred by improperly admitting into evidence a letter that

Davis contends violated his reasonable expectation of privacy under

the Fourth Amendment; and that his due process rights were

violated because of the 14-year delay between Davis’s jury verdict

and the trial court’s denial of his motion for new trial. For the


     1   On February 6, 2004, a Liberty County grand jury indicted Davis for
malice murder and felony murder predicated on the aggravated assault of
Sims. After a trial held from September 29 to 30, 2004, a jury found Davis
guilty of felony murder, and the trial court sentenced Davis to life
imprisonment on the same day. Davis filed a motion for new trial on October
5, 2004, and amended it twice through new counsel. After a February 26, 2018,
hearing on the motion, the trial court denied Davis’s amended motion for new
trial on September 18, 2018. Davis timely filed a notice of appeal on October
3, 2018, and the case was docketed in this Court for the August 2019 term and
submitted for a decision on the briefs.
reasons that follow, we disagree and affirm the trial court’s denial

of Davis’s motion for new trial.

     1. Viewed in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict, the

evidence presented at Davis’s trial showed that on the evening of

August 16, 2003, Davis was at Sims’s mobile home with Sims and

Emanuel Tillman. Davis and Tillman were living with Sims, and

Davis and Sims were involved in a romantic relationship.

     On the evening of August 16, Davis and Sims “got into an

argument over how the furniture was moved around” in the living

room. At some point after the argument, Davis and Tillman went to

a gas station to buy “a few beers.” After returning from the gas

station, both men began drinking and smoking marijuana in a car

outside of Sims’s home. When “it was starting to get dark out,”

Davis went inside. Tillman stayed in the car “listening to music”

and “drinking” and eventually fell asleep.

     At some point later that night, Davis came back outside, woke

Tillman up, and said that “someone was coming looking for” them.

Davis was “in a rush,” and he and Tillman went inside, packed their

                                   2
bags, and drove to the nearby mobile home of Lisette Rodriquez

around 2:00 or 3:00 a.m.2          When Davis and Tillman entered

Rodriquez’s home, Rodriquez was not there but two other people

were. Tillman “looked like he [had seen] a ghost,” and Davis “was

acting . . . edgy” and “pacing the floor back and forth.” Davis said

that he and Tillman had gotten into an argument at a nightclub in

Savannah a few weeks prior with a man called “TKO” and that TKO

was now coming after Davis and Tillman.3 Davis said that he and

Tillman were fleeing to Chicago, where Davis was originally from,

and that he needed to get in touch with Rodriquez in order to

retrieve some money she owed him for a television he gave to her.

After talking to Rodriquez by phone, Davis left to pick up Rodriquez

from a Holiday Inn, where she was with a friend after work, and

Rodriquez gave Davis the money he requested and filled his car with



     2 While Davis was still living with and in a relationship with Sims, Davis

was also in a romantic relationship with Rodriquez starting in March or April
2003.

     3 Tillman testified at trial that during this incident in Savannah, TKO

threatened to kill Davis and Tillman, claimed to know where Davis and
Tillman lived, and “brandished a weapon” at Davis and Tillman.
                                      3
gas. Tillman stayed behind at Rodriquez’s house. At this point, it

was “[c]lose to 4:00 or 5:00 in the morning, still dark.” Davis told

Rodriquez that there were men “chasing” him and Tillman before he

left to pick up Tillman from Rodriquez’s home. Davis and Tillman

then drove to Chicago, arriving around 9:00 or 10:00 that evening.

     Later that morning, Sims’s mother, Delores, called Sims after

not receiving a call from her daughter. Sims and her mother were

close and talked on the phone every day, and Sims had made plans

to bring her three-month-old daughter to visit Delores that weekend.

Delores grew concerned when her repeated calls to Sims went

unanswered. Finally, after a day and a half of unanswered phone

calls, Delores decided to drive to Sims’s home to check on her

daughter, bringing her nephew along with her. When they arrived

at Sims’s home, they saw Sims’s car in the yard and Sims’s

pocketbook in the front seat of her car. After unsuccessfully calling

for Sims and knocking on her door, Delores called the police. A police

officer came by the house but eventually left. Finally, Delores’s

nephew was able to enter the house through a back window and let

                                  4
Delores in the home. Inside, Delores found Sims’s daughter on the

bedroom floor crying, and Delores’s nephew found Sims’s body in the

bathroom “laying over the tub.” They called the police, and the

paramedics and police arrived on the scene shortly thereafter.

     Davis was arrested on September 13, 2003, and eventually

indicted for malice murder and felony murder.               At trial, the

paramedic who responded to the scene testified that he found Sims’s

body in the bathroom. Sims was “knelt down, bent over into the

bathtub” and had “obvious rigor mortis,” meaning that “she had

been dead for a while in order for her body to be stiff.”

     The detective, who was the primary investigator on the case,

testified that Sims was “laying across the bathtub with her head into

the bathtub laying down.” He also testified that he noticed “some

blood” “down by her face” when he “looked into the bathtub.”

Although there were no signs of struggle elsewhere in the house, the

detective sealed the crime scene.

     The medical examiner testified that Sims had abrasions on the

back of her left shoulder, her knees, and the top of the foot at her

                                    5
ankle. Although the medical examiner testified that there were no

“significant areas of abrasion” or “remarkable external injuries” to

Sims’s neck area, Sims did suffer internal neck injuries, multiple

abrasions to her face and lips, a “large area of hemorrhage” in both

eyes, and a “bloody-mucussy discharge coming from the nose.” The

medical examiner ultimately concluded that Sims “died as a result

of manual strangulation with multiple perimortem blunt force

[injuries]” and that her manner of death was homicide.

     At trial, Davis testified in his own defense. He testified that

on the evening of August 16, he and Sims were arguing because he

was planning to leave because TKO was after him and “the

relationship wasn’t working really to a point.”    He remembered

arguing but could not remember how the argument “escalated” or

what “exactly . . . happened.” He denied ever meaning to harm or

kill Sims that night and said he “never meant for anything —

nothing like this to happen.”

     Davis does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence.

Nevertheless, consistent with this Court’s practice in murder cases,

                                 6
we have reviewed the record and conclude that, when viewed in the

light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence presented at trial

was sufficient to authorize a rational jury to find beyond a

reasonable doubt that Davis was guilty of the crime for which he was

convicted. See Jackson v. Virginia, 

 (

, 61 LE2d 560) (1979).

      2. Davis contends that the trial court erred by admitting into

evidence the second statement Davis made to a detective because

that statement was not freely and voluntarily made. We disagree.4

      During the course of the investigation into Sims’s death,



      4 In his brief on appeal, Davis also appears to make an argument that

his second statement to law enforcement was inadmissible under Miranda v.
Arizona, 

 (

, 16 LE2d 694) (1966). To the extent that
Davis argues that his statement was inadmissible because Davis was in
custody and his Miranda warnings were not administered again before Davis’s
second interview, we conclude that the trial court did not err when it ruled that
Davis “was not in custody” when he gave his statements to the detective. See
Teasley v. State, 

 (

) (2013) (“Unless a
reasonable person in the suspect’s situation would perceive that he was in
custody, Miranda warnings are not necessary [and in] reviewing a ruling on
the admissibility of a defendant’s statements . . . we accept the trial court’s
factual findings and credibility determinations unless they are clearly
erroneous.” (citation and punctuation omitted.)). See also, e.g., Rhynes v. State,

 (

) (2019); DeVaughn v. State, 

 (

) (2015); Leslie v. State, 

 (

)
(2013).
                                        7
Hinesville Police Department Detective Tracy Howard and another

detective traveled to Chicago to locate and interview Davis and

Tillman. On September 13, 2003, with the assistance of local police,

Detective Howard located the men in Matteson, Illinois, a Chicago

suburb. Detective Howard asked Davis if “he would agree to go”

with him to talk about “this particular investigation” at the Country

Club Hills police department.          Davis agreed and followed the

detectives in his own vehicle. The detectives asked that “Tillman, if

he would agree to it, ride with [the detectives] in [their] vehicle just

to prevent any conversation between . . . Tillman and . . . Davis

regarding any type of questioning that . . . may occur.” Davis was

not under arrest at this time and charges were not pending against

him.

       Detective Howard then interviewed Davis in an interview room

at the Country Club Hills police department. The room was “boxed

in shape” with a table “against the wall and pretty much . . . in the

middle of [the] room.” Davis and Detective Howard were sitting at

the table, with Detective Howard seated on the side closest to the

                                   8
door. Prior to interviewing Davis, Detective Howard advised Davis

that he was not in custody and also advised Davis of the Miranda5

warnings. Davis indicated that he understood his rights, initialed

and signed the waiver form, and agreed to speak with Detective

Howard.     After Davis and Detective Howard talked for a “little

while,” Detective Howard started recording audio of Davis’s

statement, which was approximately 13 minutes long and ended at

3:03 a.m.

     Davis then “indicated he wanted to make an additional

statement,” which began at 4:02 a.m., 59 minutes after the

conclusion of his first statement.      In that 59-minute interval

between recorded interviews, Davis and Detective Howard took at

least one smoke break and the two continued to talk; they discussed

baseball, talked about the Chicago area, and Detective Howard told

Davis that he did not believe Davis was telling the truth. Before

Davis gave his second recorded statement, Detective Howard

“reassured on the tape that [Davis] understood [that] . . . his rights


     5 Miranda, 

.

                                   9
were still in place” and “[t]hat [Davis] didn’t have to talk to [Howard]

if he didn’t choose to and to [e]nsure that the tape was being freely

and voluntarily given.”

      “To determine whether a confession was voluntarily made, a

trial court must consider the totality of the circumstances, and

unless clearly erroneous, a trial court’s credibility determinations

and factual findings relating to the admissibility of a confession

must be upheld on appeal.” Turner v. State, 

 (

) (2010) (citation and punctuation omitted). “However,” on

appeal we “independently apply the law to the facts.” 

 (citation

and punctuation omitted).

     During a pretrial Jackson-Denno6 hearing on the admissibility

of the second recorded statement, the trial court found “by a

preponderance of the evidence that [Davis] was advised of each of

his Miranda rights”; “[t]hat he understood them”; and that he

“voluntarily waived them and he then thereafter gave his statement

freely and voluntarily . . . not only as to the initial statement but as


     6 Jackson v. Denno, 

 (

, 12 LE2d 908) (1964).

                                    10
to the second statement also.”

     Here, the evidence presented at the Jackson-Denno hearing

showed that Davis voluntarily agreed to go to the police station for

questioning; drove to the station in his own car; was told he was not

in custody and did not have to talk to law enforcement; and initiated

his second statement to the detective. The evidence also showed

that Davis was able to read and write, was educated, had additional

education through the military, and appeared to understand his

Miranda rights. Moreover, no evidence was presented that Davis

was ever restrained, was told he was not free to leave, or was under

the influence of any alcohol or drugs. See, e.g., Hopwood v. State,

 (

) (2019) (affirming that the trial court did

not err by admitting the defendant’s statements to an investigator

where the defendant “did not appear to be intoxicated or otherwise

unable to voluntarily waive her rights,” the record did not show the

defendant suffered from “any mental incapacity at the time she

made her statement,” and the defendant “appeared to understand

and voluntarily waive her rights”); Turner, 

-795

                                 11
(affirming that the trial court did not err by admitting the

defendant’s statements where the defendant could read and write,

was not under the influence of drugs or alcohol, was never

handcuffed, was free to leave at any time, and voluntarily

accompanied the interrogating officers to the sheriff’s office).

Accordingly, the trial court did not err in ruling that, under the

totality of the circumstances, Davis gave his statements “freely and

voluntarily” and by admitting those statements at trial.         See

Hopwood, 307 Ga. at __; Turner, 

.

     3. Davis argues that the trial court improperly admitted as

evidence at trial a letter that Liberty County jail personnel opened,

violating his reasonable expectation of privacy under the Fourth

Amendment. However, because the record shows that opening the

letter was for security and maintenance purposes, rather than for

prosecutorial purposes, the search did not violate the Fourth

Amendment, and Davis’s contention fails.

     On March 15, 2004, Sergeant Delores Wilson, the office

manager at Liberty County jail who handles all of the incoming

                                 12
mail, received an envelope addressed to “PFC Robert R. Thompson”

at a Fort Stewart address from “Jerome Smith” with a return

address from Liberty County jail. When Sergeant Wilson saw the

letter, it was marked “return to sender” because it could not be

delivered to the designated Fort Stewart recipient. Sergeant Wilson

realized that the letter had originally been sent from the jail, as

evidenced by the Liberty County jail return address and the Liberty

County jail stamp on the back of the envelope — a stamp that marks

every piece of outgoing mail pursuant to the jail’s policy.

     Sergeant Wilson then checked the jail’s computer database and

discovered that the jail had never housed a “Jerome Smith” as an

inmate. Because she was unsure to whom she should return the

letter, she opened the letter to determine its author.             She then

brought it to Doug Franks, the jail administrator in charge of daily

jail operations. Based on the content of the letter, Franks instructed

that the letter be turned over to Detective Howard.7


     7 In essence, the letter asked its intended recipient to force Tillman to

confess to the murder of Sims and then to kill Tillman and make his death look

                                     13
      At a hearing on the admissibility of the letter, Sergeant Wilson

testified that she opened the letter to “verify who actually [wrote it]

since we knew it came out of the Liberty County Jail [and] we knew

that it had to have been one of our inmates that had written the

letter” and “to know whose file — to put [the letter] in because we

don’t just leave the mail — you know, there’s nowhere to put this

and so it has to be filed away in the proper place.” She confirmed

that she was “basically investigating to try and find out who to give

the letter back to.”

      Franks testified that “[i]n all cases, . . . all mail that comes into

the jail is [opened and] monitored for contraband . . . unless it’s

marked from an attorney.” He also confirmed that, in this case,

what they “essentially . . . were concerned with . . . [was]

investigating inside the letter to find out who the letter actually


like a suicide. The letter instructed the recipient to capture this “confession”
on videotape. The letter also cautioned the recipient to “[m]ake sure you got
your alibis covered” and contained statements like: “Plan this out perfectly and
look at all angles. They could get me for conspiracy but not unless they got
hard evidence.” To facilitate the plan, the letter included Tillman’s cell phone
number, home phone number, home address, and a map to his house. It also
provided the work schedule of Tillman’s mother and her husband and
explained that “[n]either one of them possesses a firearm.”
                                      14
belonged to” and “who [they] could return it to.”

      As an initial matter, the trial court ruled that “under [this] set

of circumstances [Davis] was a [pretrial] detainee” because “[h]e had

not been convicted of a crime” when the letter was opened by Liberty

County jail personnel. It further concluded that “any expectation of

privacy by this defendant, if he in fact did mail this letter, was

waived when he put somebody else’s name on the address,” and that,

“as a security and administrative process of the jail,” jail personnel

“had a right to open the letter to determine who it should be

returned to.” As a result, it ruled that “the letter [was] admissible

providing there’s some testimony that would tie it to this defendant.”

At trial, Rodriquez testified that she recognized the letter’s

handwriting as belonging to Davis, and the letter was admitted over

objection.

     “A pre-trial detainee’s Fourth Amendment expectation of

privacy in his cell and personal effects ‘is necessarily diminished.’”

Leslie v. State, 

 (

) (2017) (quoting

Thomas v. State, 

 (

) (1993)); see

                                  15
Armstead v. State, 

 (

) (2013) (“Pretrial

detainees have a substantially diminished expectation of privacy for

purposes of the Fourth Amendment.”). “Consequently, items found

during searches conducted for security and maintenance purposes

are not within the scope of protection of the Fourth Amendment.”

Leslie, 

; see also State v. Henderson, 

(

) (1999) (“[Our prior case law] thus stands for the

proposition that the Fourth Amendment does not apply to a search

by jail officials of a pre-trial detainee’s cell for security and

maintenance purposes.”). “However, where a search is not initiated

for legitimate prison objectives, but instead is instigated by the State

for the purposes of bolstering the prosecution’s case against a pre-

trial detainee, then the pre-trial detainee ‘retains a limited but

legitimate expectation of privacy’ and is protected from an

unreasonable search.” Leslie, 

 (quoting Henderson,

).

     Here, the record supports the trial court’s ruling that the letter

was recovered during a search conducted for security and

                                  16
maintenance purposes. At the hearing on the admissibility of the

letter, the State presented evidence that Sergeant Wilson opened

the letter for the administrative purpose of processing the mail

because she did not know to whom the letter should be routed.

Indeed, even Davis admits in his appellate brief that the “jailers

opened the letter . . . to determine how to file it.” Moreover, Franks

testified that “all mail” is opened and monitored “for contraband.”

There is no record evidence showing that the opening of the letter

was instigated for prosecutorial purposes or “for the purposes of

bolstering the prosecution’s case against [Davis].”8 See Leslie, 

. Compare Henderson, 

 (holding a

warrant was required to search a pre-trial detainee’s cell where “the

evidence adduced in the case at bar establishe[d] uncontrovertedly

that the sole purpose of the search of [the detainee’s] cell was to

further the prosecution’s effort to obtain a conviction against [the




     8  Davis’s argument that the jailers did not testify they had a
particularized concern about this letter containing contraband does not
amount to evidence that the jailers opened the letter for prosecutorial
purposes.
                                  17
pre-trial detainee]”).   To the contrary, the Liberty County jail

personnel did not even know the identity of the letter’s author or

sender when they opened the letter.           And because Rodriquez

testified at trial that she recognized the letter’s handwriting as

belonging to Davis, a sufficient connection between Davis and the

letter was made for the trial court to admit the letter into evidence.

Accordingly, the trial court did not err when it ruled that Davis’s

Fourth Amendment rights were not violated and by admitting the

letter into evidence at trial.

     4. Davis contends that the 14-year delay between his jury

verdict and the trial court’s denial of his motion for new trial violates

his due process rights.      We have admonished that long post-

conviction delays ‘put at risk the rights of defendants and crime

victims and the validity of convictions obtained after a full trial,’ and

have “‘reiterate[d] that it is the duty of all those involved in the

criminal justice system . . . to ensure that the appropriate post-

conviction motions are filed, litigated, and decided without

unnecessary delay.’” Owens v. State, 

 (

) (2018) (quoting Shank v. State, 

 (

)

(2012)). Even so, Davis’s due process claim fails here because, as

explained below, he has failed to demonstrate any prejudice caused

by the delay. See Norman v. State, 

 (

) (2018); Owens, 

; Shank, 

.

      “Substantial delays in the appellate process implicate due

process rights, and we review appellate due process claims under

the four-factor analysis used for speedy trial claims set forth in

Barker v. Wingo, 

 (

, 33 LE2d 101) (1972).”

Veal v. State, 

 (

) (2017). The four

Barker factors include the length of the delay, the reason for the

delay, the defendant’s assertion of his right, and prejudice to the

defendant. Barker, 

. “However, in determining

whether an appellate delay violates due process, prejudice, unlike in

the speedy trial context, is not presumed but must be shown.”

Glover v. State, 

 (

) (2012) (citation and

punctuation omitted). “‘[A]ppellate delay is prejudicial when there

is a reasonable probability that, but for the delay, the result of the

                                 19
appeal would have been different.’”       Norman, 

(citation omitted).

     Davis argues that the first three Barker factors weigh in his

favor and that he has also proven prejudice through his presentation

of meritorious claims on appeal. However, even assuming that the

first three Barker factors weigh in Davis’s favor, his due process

claim nevertheless fails because Davis has failed to show that he

was prejudiced by the delay. See Norman, 

. (“But

where prejudice is clearly lacking, we will not reverse a conviction,

even if the other factors favor the defendant.”); Veal, 

-

169 (noting that this Court has “repeatedly found that the failure to

make [a showing of prejudice] in an appellate delay claim to be fatal

to the claim, even when the other three factors weigh in the

appellant’s favor”). Here, Davis only points to his enumerations of

error on appeal as evidence that he has suffered prejudice. But

considering that his enumerations are without merit — as we have

concluded above — our decision would have been the same

regardless of when Davis brought his appeal and thus Davis has

                                  20
failed to demonstrate prejudice.      See Norman, 

;

Loadholt v. State, 

 (

) (2010) (“[W]here

‘the enumerations . . . raised on appeal are without merit[,] there

can therefore be no prejudice in delaying a meritless appeal.’”

(citation omitted)).   Accordingly, Davis cannot establish a due

process violation, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in

denying relief on this ground. See Norman, 

.

     Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.




                   DECIDED JANUARY 13, 2020.
     Murder. Liberty Superior Court. Before Judge Stewart.
     Rouse & Copeland, Amy L. Copeland, for appellant.
     Tom Durden, District Attorney, Alexis M. Antonucci, Sandra
Dutton, Assistant District Attorneys; Christopher M. Carr, Attorney

                                 21
General, Patricia B. Attaway Burton, Deputy Attorney General,
Paula K. Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Matthew M.
Youn, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.




                             22