301
Argued and submitted December 30, 2019, reversed and remanded
October 21, 2020
Sarah E. Rios LOPEZ,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
Danielle KILBOURNE,
Defendant-Appellant,
and
Antonio KILBOURNE,
Defendant.
Washington County Circuit Court
18LT13687; A169439
477 P3d 14
In this forcible entry and detainer proceeding, tenant appeals from a judgment of restitution restoring the premises to landlord’s possession. The trial
court found that tenant had misrepresented her rental history and income in her
rental application, in violation of the duty of good faith imposed by the Oregon
Residential Landlord Tenant Act (ORLTA). As a result, the court disregarded
tenant’s defenses and rights under the ORLTA, ruled in favor of landlord, and
granted landlord possession of the residence. Tenant assigns error to that ruling. Held: The trial court erred. Under the circumstances of this case, tenant’s
representation about her rental history and income history in the rental application was neither a duty nor a condition precedent to the exercise of her rights or
defenses under the ORLTA.
Reversed and remanded.
Ricardo J. Menchaca, Judge.
Frank Wall argued the cause and filed the brief for
appellant.
Geoffrey B. Silverman argued the cause for respondent.
Also on the brief was The Law Office of Geoffrey B. Silverman,
LLC.
Before Ortega, Presiding Judge, and Shorr, Judge, and
James, Judge.
SHORR, J.
Reversed and remanded.
302 Lopez v. Kilbourne
SHORR, J.
In this forcible entry and detainer (FED) proceeding, tenant appeals from a judgment of restitution restoring the premises to landlord’s possession. The trial court
found that tenant had been untruthful in her rental application, in violation of the duty of good faith imposed by the
Oregon Residential Landlord Tenant Act (ORLTA). Because
the court found that tenant had misrepresented her rental
history in her application, the court disregarded tenant’s
defenses and rights under the ORLTA, ruled in favor of
landlord, and granted landlord possession of the residence.
Tenant assigns error to that ruling. Because we conclude
that, under these circumstances, the court erred in ruling
that tenant’s misrepresentation in the application process
was grounds for disregarding her defenses and rights under
the ORLTA, we reverse and remand.
Tenant and landlord entered into a lease agreement for a residential property in Aloha, Oregon.1 Before
the parties entered into the lease agreement, tenant had
sent landlord a text message that stated:
“So about me and my income, last year 2016 I made
76,000. I have not done my taxes this year yet. I have never
been evicted, I always pay my rent, I actually paid Jan and
feb [sic] rent at the beginning of January.”
Landlord had a “very limited time” to screen applicants,
though she did contact tenant’s previous landlord. The parties entered into a one-year written lease agreement beginning in April 2018.
Tenant directly paid a portion of her rent, and the
rest was paid through a subsidized housing program. Tenant
did not pay her portion of the rent in August and September,
and landlord served tenant with a 72-hour notice of termination of tenancy for nonpayment of rent. The notice, dated
and served by mail on September 11, 2018, indicated that
the lease would terminate if outstanding rent of $470 was
1
Tenant’s adult son, Antonio Kilbourne, was a party to the lease and lived at
the house for some time, though he moved out during tenant’s tenancy. Although
he was named as a defendant in landlord’s complaint, he did not participate in
the trial and he does not appear as a party to this appeal. The facts regarding the
circumstances of his departure from the premises are not relevant to this appeal.
Cite as 307 Or App 301 (2020) 303
not paid by 11:59 p.m. on September 18, 2018. As discussed
further below, tenant maintains that, through both her
father and friend, she then made two attempts to pay rent at
landlord’s home prior to the termination of the lease. There
is some dispute in the record about the reasons for the landlord’s rejection of those payments, but landlord ultimately
rejected those offers. Landlord ultimately filed the underlying FED action for nonpayment of rent.
Tenant filed an answer alleging a counterclaim
that landlord had unlawfully accessed the premises on
three occasions without the required notice. Tenant also
raised an “affirmative defense” of tender, asserting that
she had attempted to pay her rent before September 18 and
that landlord had wrongfully refused to accept it.2 Pursuant
to an order of the court, tenant paid her outstanding rent
into court in an attempt to preserve her right to possession
under the ORLTA. Tenant paid $846 into the court while
the case was pending.3
Landlord filed a reply, in which landlord argued
that tenant had violated the duty of good faith under the
ORLTA, ORS 90.130, for having misrepresented her rental
history and her income in the text message that tenant sent
to landlord during the application process. Landlord argued
that tenant misled landlord into believing that she had
never been evicted when “she has been the defendant in at
least 4 previous eviction lawsuits in Oregon.” Landlord also
argued that tenant misrepresented her income when she
stated that she earned $76,000 in 2016.
The case proceeded to a bench trial. As to the
alleged defense of tender of payment, tenant presented evidence that tenant had attempted to pay landlord through
her father and girlfriend at landlord’s residence, and that
landlord had wrongfully refused to accept that payment.
Landlord presented additional evidence that those tendered
2
Although labelled an affirmative defense, the prior payment of rent to a
landlord in response to a termination notice for nonpayment of rent appears to be
an ordinary defense and not an affirmative defense.
3
There is some confusion in the record as to how much rent tenant owed, but
the parties appear to agree that the $846 paid into court exceeded the amount of
rent that tenant owed.
304 Lopez v. Kilbourne
payments had been only partial payments of the rent that
was owed, and landlord argued that she was not required to
accept either partial payments or payments from third parties. The parties also presented competing evidence regarding whether landlord improperly entered the leased premises without sufficient notice.
The following evidence was presented regarding
landlord’s argument that tenant had acted in bad faith.
Landlord questioned tenant regarding her rental history
and confronted tenant with an “OJIN printout” that purported to show tenant’s involvement in four previous eviction actions. Tenant admitted that she had been the defendant in one of the previous eviction actions, which she stated
had been dismissed in 2015. Landlord questioned whether
that case had been filed for tenant’s nonpayment of rent,
and tenant stated that she did not remember the landlord’s
reason for seeking an eviction. In regard to the three other
eviction cases, which the OJIN printout reflected were filed
in 2012, 2011, and 1999, tenant testified that she was not
a party to the 2011 and 1999 cases. As to the 2012 case,
tenant acknowledged that she rented from the landlord in
that case, but she did not remember that landlord having
filed an eviction against her. In regard to her income, tenant
testified that her income had changed significantly after
2016 because she underwent back surgery. The OJIN printout was not received into evidence, and landlord presented
no other evidence of tenant’s rental history or income.
During closing argument, landlord argued that
tenant had lied during the application process and, accordingly, the duty of good faith in ORS 90.130 should bar her
from raising any defenses or counterclaims. Landlord conceded that tenant had never actually been evicted but argued
that tenant had lied by saying so because it was not the legal
definition of “eviction” that applied but the “common definition of an eviction[, which] is when a landlord has to use a
court process to remove a tenant from their property. …
[T]hat’s what [tenant] was saying that did not happen to
her.” Landlord argued that tenant had also been dishonest
in the application process about “how much she could afford
to pay, about whether or not she was a person that paid her
rent all the time.” (Emphasis added.) Landlord argued that,
Cite as 307 Or App 301 (2020) 305
had tenant “been honest with the landlord in the beginning,
then … she might not have rented to” tenant. Landlord
argued that tenant’s misrepresentations amounted to a violation of the duty of good faith, and that, accordingly, tenant
“should not get to come in here and ask for the protections
of the landlord-tenant act, namely the affirmative defenses
that they’ve listed and the counter-claim.”
In response, tenant argued that she had not
breached the duty of good faith and that, because she had
paid in more rent than was owed, tenant should retain possession. As to the duty of good faith, tenant argued that the
ORLTA provides for only one instance in which a landlord
can evict a tenant for untruthfulness on the application:
when the tenant intentionally provides false information
on the application about a criminal conviction.4 Tenant
argued that, moreover, she had not acted in bad faith and
there was no evidence that tenant had been untruthful in
the application process, because she had never been evicted
and landlord had produced no evidence about her income.
Tenant argued that, under the ORLTA, a tenant who raises
counterclaims in an eviction for nonpayment of rent may
pay their rent into court.5 Tenant argued that, under that
statutory scheme, if no rent is owed to the landlord after
4
ORS 90.396 provides, in part:
“Except as provided in subsection (2) of this section, after at least 24
hours’ written notice specifying the acts and omissions constituting the cause
and specifying the date and time of the termination, the landlord may terminate the rental agreement and take possession as provided in ORS 105.105
to 105.168, if:
“…
“(e)(A) The tenant intentionally provided substantial false information
on the application for the tenancy within the past year;
“(B) The false information was with regard to a criminal conviction of
the tenant that would have been material to the landlord’s acceptance of the
application; and
“(C) The landlord terminates the rental agreement within 30 days after
discovering the falsity of the information[.]”
5
ORS 90.370(1)(b) provides, in part:
“In the event the tenant counterclaims, the court at the landlord’s or
tenant’s request may order the tenant to pay into court all or part of the
rent accrued and thereafter accruing, and shall determine the amount due
to each party. … If no rent remains due after application of this section and
unless otherwise agreed between the parties, a judgment shall be entered for
the tenant in the action for possession.”
306 Lopez v. Kilbourne
the disposition of the claims and counterclaims, then the
tenant retains possession of the premises. Therefore, tenant
asserted that, because she had paid into court more rent
than was owed, she should retain possession.
The trial court ruled in favor of landlord, entering a
general judgment of restitution awarding possession to landlord. The court found that tenant “failed to act in good faith
as defined in the Oregon Residential Landlord Tenant Act.”
The court found that tenant’s testimony about her rental
history was not credible and concluded that tenant acted in
bad faith when she led landlord “to believe that she always
paid her rent.” In a letter opinion citing Stonebrook Hillsboro,
L.L.C. v. Flavel, 187 Or App 641,
69 P3d 807, rev den,
335 Or
656 (2003), the court reasoned that “a prerequisite to asserting the rights and remedies under the ORLTA [is that] a
party must act in good faith.” Because the court found that
tenant had acted in bad faith, the court ignored (1) tenant’s
defense that landlord had improperly rejected tenant’s offer
of rent prior to terminating the lease and (2) tenant’s right
to possession because she paid adequate rent into the court
even if she did not prevail on her counterclaims.6 The court
also specifically concluded that tenant had not proven her
counterclaims, which the court dismissed with prejudice.
Rather than ruling that tenant had a right to maintain
possession for having paid outstanding rent into court, the
court returned to tenant the $846 rent payment that she
had paid.
Tenant now appeals. Tenant raises two related
assignments of error, both of which relate to the trial court’s
6
The court’s letter opinion and general judgment do not explicitly address
tenant’s defenses and right to possession, but the letter opinion and judgment
conclude that tenant failed to act in good faith under the ORLTA. The opinion
and judgment then disregard tenant’s defenses and right to possession before
specifically concluding that tenant did not prove her counterclaims. As noted, the
court ordered the return of tenant’s rent payment, which exceeded the amount of
rent due, and ordered tenant’s eviction.
Both tenant and landlord contend that the court disregarded tenant’s
defenses and right to possession because it concluded that tenant had violated
the duty of good faith. In the context of the trial court’s opinion, the record, and
the parties’ arguments to the trial court, we also conclude that the court rejected
tenant’s defenses and right to possession based on its finding that tenant acted
in bad faith in her representations in the rental application process.
Cite as 307 Or App 301 (2020) 307
ruling granting the FED to landlord. Beginning with her
first assignment of error, tenant argues that the court erroneously concluded that the duty of good faith bars a tenant
who supplies inaccurate information on a rental application
from asserting defenses or seeking rights under the ORLTA.
Tenant maintains that the court improperly ignored both
(1) her defense that she had offered landlord payment of rent
prior to termination and (2) her right to possession under
the ORLTA because, in connection with filing her counter-claim, she had paid money into court that covered her outstanding rent.7
Landlord argues first that tenant’s argument is
unpreserved. That argument is unsupported, and we reject
it without further discussion. As to the merits, landlord
argues that the trial court properly applied the duty of good
faith as a prerequisite to tenant’s exercise of any defenses or
rights under the ORLTA. Therefore, landlord contends, the
court properly disregarded tenant’s tender-of-rent defense
and her right to possession under the ORLTA because the
court found that tenant had acted in bad faith.
“In an appeal from a residential FED action tried
to the court, we review the trial court’s legal conclusions
for errors of law, and we are bound by the trial court’s findings of fact if there is any evidence to support them.” Home
Forward v. Graham, 287 Or App 191, 193,
401 P3d 797,
adh’d to as modified on recons,
288 Or App 227,
404 P3d 1151
(2017), rev den,
362 Or 482 (2018). We first address tenant’s
legal argument that the trial court misapplied the duty of
good faith.
We begin with a brief overview of the relevant
statutes. The ORLTA provides that, in an eviction action
7
Although tenant makes passing reference to the landlord having not proved
that she made a misrepresentation in her rental application, her brief does not
assign error to or otherwise challenge the trial court’s finding that she made a
misrepresentation in her rental application. Instead, tenant raises a legal argument that the court erred when it granted landlord’s FED claim after it improperly ignored her defenses once it found that she had made a misrepresentation
in her application. We, therefore, address the purely legal argument that tenant
raises in her brief.
We further note that tenant did not assign error to the trial court’s ruling
that she had not proved her counterclaims.
308 Lopez v. Kilbourne
for the nonpayment of rent, “the tenant may counterclaim
for any amount … that the tenant may recover under the
rental agreement or this chapter,” provided that the landlord received appropriate notice of the facts underlying the
counterclaim. ORS 90.370(1)(a).
“In the event the tenant counterclaims, the court at the
landlord’s or tenant’s request may order the tenant to pay
into court all or part of the rent accrued and thereafter
accruing, and shall determine the amount due to each
party. The party to whom a net amount is owed shall be
paid first from the money paid into court, and shall be paid
the balance by the other party. The court may at any time
release money paid into court to either party if the parties
agree or if the court finds such party to be entitled to the
sum so released. If no rent remains due after application
of this section and unless otherwise agreed between the
parties, a judgment shall be entered for the tenant in the
action for possession.”
ORS 90.370(1)(b). As the Supreme Court has observed, the
“net effect” of those statutory provisions “is an implicit withholding remedy.” Napolski v. Champney, 295 Or 408, 418,
667 P2d 1013 (1983).
“[I]f the landlord is in noncompliance with his obligations
under the ORLTA to the monetary damage of the tenant,
the tenant can withhold rent, and if the landlord commences an FED action the tenant can counterclaim and
pay the rent arrearage into court to protect her right to
possession.”
Id.8 In other words, ORS 90.370 provides tenants a withholding remedy in the event the tenant files counterclaims. If the
tenant’s damages on her counterclaims plus the rent that
tenant paid into court equals or exceeds the rent owed to the
landlord such that “no rent remains due,” the tenant “shall”
retain possession. ORS 90.370(1)(b); see also Napolski, 295
Or at 418 (“[A] tenant is not in default of rent and a landlord is not entitled to terminate the lease for nonpayment
of rent if the tenant has refused to pay the rent because of
some default of the landlord’s which entitles her to damages
8
Although the court in Napolski applied an older version of the statute, former ORS 91.810 (1983), renumbered as ORS 90.370 (1993), the text of the statute
remains largely unchanged, as is relevant to this appeal.
Cite as 307 Or App 301 (2020) 309
and she tenders sufficient funds into court to cover any rent
that ultimately may be determined to be due.”). A tenant
need not prevail on her counterclaims; in the event that the
tenant fails to prove her counterclaims, if the tenant has
paid in enough to cover the rent that is owed, the tenant
retains possession. Amatisto v. Paz,
82 Or App 341, 346,
728 P2d 42 (1986). However, as a “prerequisite” to invoking the withholding remedy of ORS 90.370, the tenant must
bring their counterclaims in good faith. Napolski,
295 Or at
419.
The duty of good faith is codified in the ORLTA. It
applies to every duty arising under the ORLTA and every
act that is a condition precedent to exercising a right or a
remedy under the ORLTA.
“Every duty under this chapter and every act which
must be performed as a condition precedent to the exercise
of a right or remedy under this chapter imposes an obligation of good faith in its performance or enforcement.”
ORS 90.130. For instance, because a tenant must bring
counterclaims as a condition precedent to the tenant’s withholding of rent under ORS 90.370, those counterclaims
must be brought in good faith. See Napolski, 295 Or at 419
(“Spurious, frivolous, or improperly motivated counterclaims
may not be used to justify a tenant’s rent withholding.”).
The ORLTA defines “good faith” as “honesty in fact
in the conduct of the transaction concerned.” ORS 90.100(19).
The Supreme Court recently explained that, because the
duty of good faith in the ORLTA was imported from the
Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), sections 1 to 203, the
appropriate standard for good faith in the ORLTA context
is subjective. Eddy v. Anderson, 366 Or 176, 186-87,
458 P3d
678 (2020). The standard “is a ‘subjective one, looking to the
intent or state of mind of the party concerned.’ ”
Id. at 187.
Contrasted with the common-law standard of good faith,
which is an objective standard that looks to the parties’ reasonable expectations, the UCC’s subjective good faith standard does not “provide a remedy for an unpleasantly motivated act that is expressly permitted by contract or statute.”
Id. (citing U.S. National Bank v. Boge,
311 Or 550, 567, 814
310 Lopez v. Kilbourne
P2d 1082 (1991)). In applying good faith in the context of the
ORLTA,
“the obligation of good faith cannot vary the substantive
terms of the ORLTA. Thus, a person who acts in a manner expressly permitted by the ORLTA does not breach the
duty of good faith unless the person has acted dishonestly
as to the matter. Whether (or not) his or her actions meet
an objective standard of reasonableness … is irrelevant.”
Id. at 188 (internal quotation marks omitted).
With that background in mind, we turn to the facts
of this case. Here, the trial court found that tenant’s statements to landlord concerning her rental history and that
she always paid her rent were not true and that those statements amounted to bad faith. The court ruled that tenant’s
bad faith in the application process was grounds for disregarding tenant’s defenses and assertion of her rights under
the ORLTA, including tenant’s defense that she offered to
pay rent through third parties prior to termination and her
right to retain possession under the ORLTA for paying rent
into court under ORS 90.370. Therefore, the question before
us is whether tenant’s misrepresentation in the application
process is a violation of the duty of good faith that justifies
disregarding her defense that she offered to pay rent prior to
termination and her right to remain in possession because
she paid rent into court under ORS 90.370(1)(b). We conclude, for the following reasons, that it does not.
The duty of good faith applies to either the performance or enforcement of “[e]very duty” and “every act which
must be performed as a condition precedent to the exercise
of a right or remedy” under the ORLTA. ORS 90.130. For
example, we have held that a tenant’s bad faith in avoiding
a landlord’s notice of an eviction prevented that tenant from
attempting to enforce the notice requirement during the
FED proceeding. Stonebrook Hillsboro, L.L.C., 187 Or App
at 647. In that case, the tenants had resided in a hotel long
enough to become tenants, and then promptly stopped paying their rent.
Id. at 643. The hotel manager and employees
attempted twice to hand deliver an eviction notice to the
tenants, and they refused to accept it.
Id. at 644-45. After
the tenants refused to accept hand delivery of the notices, a
Cite as
307 Or App 301 (2020) 311
hotel employee slipped termination notices under the door
of the tenants’ rooms. Id. at 645. The tenants admitted
that they received the notices, but they argued that such
notice was inadequate under the ORLTA because the statute required personal delivery. Id. We held that the tenants
were barred from enforcing the landlord’s statutory obligation to achieve personal service of the notice, because the
tenants acted in bad faith when they avoided the landlord’s
attempts to personally deliver the notices. Id. at 646-47.
Here, the trial court relied on Stonebrook Hillsboro,
L.L.C. to bar tenant from raising a defense to this eviction
because of a lie—the statement that tenant always paid
her rent—that tenant told during the application process.
The court quoted from our opinion in Stonebrook Hillsboro,
L.L.C. that, “as a prerequisite to asserting the rights and
remedies under the ORLTA, a party must act in good faith.”
Id. at 647. The trial court’s application of that quotation,
taken out of context, to the circumstances of this case suggests that parties are required to act in good faith at all
times, without qualification, or risk losing all of their rights
as tenants or landlords under the ORLTA. The duty of good
faith under the ORLTA, however, is not so broad.
The clear text of ORS 90.130 extends the duty of
good faith to “[e]very duty” and “every act which must be
performed as a condition precedent to the exercise of a right
or remedy” under the ORLTA. (Emphases added.) Here, neither the trial court nor landlord identified the precise duty
or condition precedent that tenant was either performing or
enforcing when she sent landlord a text message as part of
her application for the apartment in which she claimed that
she always paid her rent or when she made other representations about her rental history. Without the identification
of a duty or an act that is a condition precedent, the statutory duty of good faith does not apply. The ORLTA does not
condition the tenant’s right to contend that she had paid
rent—in an eviction action that claimed she had not—on
any prior statements in her rental application. The ORLTA
also does not condition the right to pay rent into court to
maintain possession under ORS 90.370(1)(b) on the tenant’s
prior good faith in the application process. Nowhere in the
ORLTA are those rights and duties tied together. Nor is this
312 Lopez v. Kilbourne
case similar to Stonebrook Hillsboro, L.L.C., a case in which
we concluded that the tenant could not complain about lack
of personal service of notice of termination of the tenancy
when the tenant had not acted in good faith in avoiding personal service. That was a case in which the right and duty
were both tied to the same act, personal service of the eviction notice. Under the circumstances of this case, tenant’s
representation about her rental and income history in the
rental application process was neither a duty nor a condition
precedent to the exercise of her right to pay rent prior to
termination of her lease or her right to pay rent into court
under the ORLTA and, as such, the duty of good faith in
ORS 90.130 did not apply.9
We turn briefly to tenant’s second assignment of
error. Tenant contends that the trial court erred in entering
judgment in favor of landlord on the FED claim because,
according to tenant, to the extent that the court considered tenant’s defense that she timely offered to pay rent to
the landlord through third parties, the court improperly
rejected that defense on the merits. We do not resolve that
assignment of error. As discussed above, we conclude that
the court erred in ignoring tenant’s defense of tender of rent
and never reached the merits of that defense. There are
disputed issues of fact about tenant’s attempt to pay rent
through third parties that the court never reached. However,
because it may be helpful for resolving issues on remand
should tenant wish to pursue her defense that she timely
offered to pay rent to her landlord, we address a legal issue
that may arise on remand. We observe that the lease does
not prohibit tenant from delivering her rent to landlord at
her home through third parties. It specifically provides that
rent may be provided “by mail” or “in person” at landlord’s
9
We do not intend to suggest that tenants are free to misrepresent facts to
landlords without consequence during the application process. Landlords may
still have claims for breach of contract or material misrepresentation. Landlords
may have claims under other statutory provisions in the ORLTA for the landlord
to take possession, such as when a tenant lies about a criminal conviction under
ORS 90.396(1)(e). We merely conclude that the statutory duty of good faith in
the ORLTA does not apply in this instance to bar tenant from defending against
an FED action for nonpayment of rent by paying her rent, nor does it preclude
tenant from maintaining possession under ORS 90.370(1)(b) by paying her rent
into court.
Cite as 307 Or App 301 (2020) 313
address. It does not otherwise limit who may deliver the rent
payments on behalf of tenant.
In sum, the trial court erred in both rejecting
tenant’s defense of a timely tender of rent to landlord and
her right under the ORLTA to retain possession by paying
rent into court under ORS 90.370(1)(b) as barred due to a
breach of the duty of good faith. With respect to tenant’s
payment of rent into court under ORS 90.370(1)(b), the court
found that tenant had not proved her counterclaim, but the
court did not make explicit or implicit findings that tenant
had raised those counterclaims in bad faith. Therefore, the
court was required to consider that tenant had exercised the
withholding remedy of ORS 90.370 and paid her rent into
the court. See Amatisto, 82 Or App at 346-47 (holding that
a tenant who brought counterclaims in good faith that were
ultimately rejected retained possession because she had
paid her rent into court). Because tenant had paid into court
more rent than was owed, the court erred in granting possession of the premises to landlord and returning tenant’s
rent money.
The trial court erred in failing to consider tenant’s
tender-of-rent defense and in awarding possession to landlord.
Reversed and remanded.