387
Submitted September 29, affirmed October 28, 2020
STATE OF OREGON,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
FELIPE CISNEROS CARRERA,
aka Cisneros Felipe Carrera,
aka Feliipe Carrera,
aka Felipe Carrera-Cisneros,
aka Felipe Carrera Cisneros,
aka Felipe Cisneros-Carrera,
Defendant-Appellant.
Umatilla County Circuit Court
CF150297; A169592
477 P3d 458
Defendant appeals from a judgment of conviction for attempted first-degree
assault, ORS 161.405(2)(b), ORS 163.185, to challenge a 56-month sentence of
imprisonment. First, he argues that the trial court erred in classifying his criminal history to place him on grid block 8-C, rather than 8-D, on the sentencing
grid by considering a juvenile adjudication as a prior offense. Second, he argues
that the trial court erred when it imposed a durational departure of 56 months’
imprisonment without explaining the compelling circumstances justifying the
departure. Held: Although the trial court erred in recognizing the juvenile adjudication as a prior offense in sentencing, the 56-month departure sentence was
permissible with either criminal history score as framed by the plea agreement.
Accordingly, the trial court did not err in imposing or explaining the sentence.
Affirmed.
Daniel J. Hill, Judge.
Ernest G. Lannet, Chief Defender, Criminal Appellate
Section, and Stephanie Hortsch, Deputy Public Defender,
Office of Public Defense Services, filed the brief for appellant.
Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman,
Solicitor General, and Timothy A. Sylwester, Assistant
Attorney General, filed the brief for respondent.
Before DeVore, Presiding Judge, and DeHoog, Judge, and
Mooney, Judge.
388 State v. Carrera
DeVORE, P. J.
Affirmed.
Cite as 307 Or App 387 (2020) 389
DeVORE, P. J.
Defendant appeals to challenge a 56-month sentence of imprisonment imposed as part of a judgment of
conviction upon his guilty plea to attempted first-degree
assault. He made the plea with an admission of a sentencing enhancement factor that he was on supervision at the
time of the offense. He assigns two errors. First, he argues
that the court erred by classifying his criminal history to
place him on grid block 8-C, rather than 8-D, on the sentencing guideline grid. In making that determination, the
trial court considered a juvenile adjudication as a prior
offense over defendant’s objection that defendant had not
admitted, and a jury had not found, the existence of that
adjudication. Next, he argues that the court erred by imposing a durational departure of 56 months’ imprisonment
purportedly without explaining why it found compelling circumstances to do so. For the reasons that follow, we agree
that the trial court erred in recognizing the juvenile adjudication as a prior offense in sentencing, but we conclude
that the 56-month departure sentence was permissible with
either criminal history score and that the court did not err
in imposing or explaining the sentence.
The dispositive facts are procedural and not disputed. Defendant and the state reached a plea agreement.
Defendant pleaded guilty to attempted first-degree assault,
ORS 161.405(2)(b) (attempt), ORS 163.185 (first-degree
assault).1 The state agreed to dismiss nine other charges.
For purposes of sentencing later, defendant and the state
had agreed to disagree whether defendant’s criminal history score should place him in grid block 8-C or 8-D. The
parties differed on whether his juvenile adjudication for
unlawful use of a motor vehicle should be considered as an
offense when determining his criminal history in sentencing for the attempted assault charge. In addition, defendant admitted, as a sentencing enhancement factor, that, at
the time of the offense, he was on supervision. The parties
1
In relevant part, ORS 163.185 provides, “(1) A person commits the crime of
assault in the first degree if the person: (a) [i]ntentionally causes serious physical
injury to another by means of a deadly or dangerous weapon.” The indictment
alleged those elements and, in addition, that JL, the victim did not substantially
contribute to the commission of the offense by precipitating the attack.
390 State v. Carrera
agreed that, at sentencing, defendant would urge application of grid block 8-D and seek a sentence of 27 months and
no durational departure, while the state would urge application of grid block 8-C and seek a durational departure of 56
months. Before accepting the plea, the court clarified with
defendant that the enhancement factor was a separate issue
and that a durational departure for the enhancement up to
56 months could be imposed with either grid block 8-C or
8-D. Defendant acknowledged that he understood that to be
true.
At the sentencing hearing, the state recounted
the facts underlying the charge of attempted first degree
assault. On May 31, 2015, the victim, JL, had been walking
his dog when he heard a car speed up. He began running.
Someone from the car began shooting a gun at him. Four
bullet casings were found on the street. Two bullet holes
were found in JL’s house, where four adults and one child
had been present at the time of the shooting. Police stopped
the car in which defendant was a passenger. A bodycam
video recording showed defendant’s resistance to following
an officer’s directions when taking him into custody.
The state offered a sentencing memorandum with a
criminal history worksheet reporting, among other things,
that defendant had a 2010 juvenile adjudication for unlawful use of a motor vehicle in 2009. In addition, the state
offered as an exhibit the register of actions for the juvenile
proceedings. The state argued that, after turning 18 years
of age, defendant had convictions or violations involving
providing false information to police, driving while suspended, interfering with a peace officer, third degree felony
assault, driving while under the influence of intoxicants,
and unlawful possession of a firearm. The state argued that
defendant has had repeated involvement with the court system, an unsuccessful diversion, and opportunities for probation. The state argued that defendant’s behavior during
the traffic stop here “displays defiance, disobedience, disregard for public safety, [and] disregard for the safety of others.” The state recommended an upward departure of 56
months’ imprisonment “because [defendant has] shown that
he is a danger to the public, whether he’s on supervision or
not.”
Cite as 307 Or App 387 (2020) 391
Defendant acknowledged that he had admitted the
enhancement factor of being on supervision at the time of
the offense, but he argued that something more should be
necessary before relying on that factor. Assuming no durational departure should be imposed, defendant argued that
the sentence should be 27 months where 27-28 months is
the presumptive sentence for grid block 8-D. Defendant
argued that grid block 8-D, not 8-C, was the appropriate
score because the state had not established the existence
of a past juvenile adjudication either by his admission or
by a determination of that judicial fact before a jury in this
case. To that point, he relied on Blakely v. Washington, 542
US 296,
124 S Ct 2531,
159 L Ed 2d 403 (2004), Apprendi
v. New Jersey,
530 US 466,
120 S Ct 2348,
147 L Ed 2d 435
(2000), and State v. Harris,
339 Or 157,
118 P3d 236 (2005)
(discussed below).
As for the initial issue, the trial court determined
that the juvenile adjudication should be considered in determining defendant’s criminal history in the grid block score
of 8-C. The court, however, was careful to explain that the
juvenile adjudication only related to criminal history aspect
of the grid block determination, not to the issue of a durational departure due to an enhancement factor. The court
went on to indicate that, regardless which grid block determination is correct, a durational departure of 56 months
would be permissible. That is, because a durational departure permits a doubling of the presumptive sentences, a
56-month sentence—the most the state would seek—would
be permitted with a grid block determination of either 8-C
or 8-D. The court found that defendant had admitted the
enhancement fact of being on supervision at the time of
the offense and that is a “malevolent factor” in sentencing.
Speaking to defendant, the court stated that “there was
clearly an unsafe situation going on. One of the most severe
unsafe ones I’ve seen in—around here.” The court found substantial and compelling reasons to rely on the enhancement
factor. The court explained, “I’m doing that, in part, well,
largely in part because the circumstances were pretty egregious.” The court added that, if it were not for the plea agreement, the sentencing would “highly likely [have] resulted in
a grid block depart[ure] up to the 64 months—68 months.”
392 State v. Carrera
Accordingly, the court imposed a sentence of 56 months with
three years’ post-prison supervision but with a waiver of
fines and waiver of court-appointed attorney fees.
On appeal, defendant first argues that the trial
court erred in considering a juvenile adjudication when
determining his criminal history score, resulting in a grid
block of 8-C, rather than 8-D. As to the determination of
criminal history, we agree with defendant.2
In Harris, the Oregon Supreme Court examined
the significance of the jury trial guarantee of the Sixth
Amendment to the United States Constitution, given the
absence of juries in juvenile adjudications, when considering
whether juvenile adjudications may be recognized as prior
offenses that may enhance a sentence for a later offense committed as an adult. 339 Or at 159-75. The court concluded
that the consideration of prior juvenile adjudications in sentencing does not violate the Sixth Amendment, but, if the
existence of a juvenile adjudication is offered as an enhancement factor to increase a criminal sentence, its existence
must be proved to a trier of fact or admitted by a defendant
for sentencing purposes following an informed and knowing
waiver.
Id. at 175 (relying on Apprendi and Blakely). In that
case, the judgment was reversed and remanded for resentencing.
Id.
Our subsequent decisions are in accord. In State v.
Murphy, 205 Or App 675, 676,
135 P3d 357 (2006), we recognized that Harris, following Apprendi and Blakely, extends
to the determination of the criminal history score. The trial
court had erred when considering a juvenile adjudication in
defendant’s criminal history.
Id. We remanded for resentencing.
Id. In State v. Lafferty,
240 Or App 564, 569,
247 P3d
1266 (2011), the trial court had refused consideration of a
juvenile adjudication when determining criminal history
scores in a pair of consolidated cases. In the first case, the
2
In relevant part, ORS 138.105(8)(c)(A) provides:
“… [T]he appellate court has authority to review whether the sentencing court erred:
“(A) In ranking the crime seriousness classification of the current crime
or in determining the appropriate classification of a prior conviction or juvenile adjudication for criminal history purposes.”
Cite as 307 Or App 387 (2020) 393
prior adjudication appeared in a criminal history worksheet
with a prosecutor’s letter to defendant, giving notice of intent
to rely on the juvenile adjudication.
Id. at 566-67. In the second case, the juvenile adjudication appeared in a presentence
report.
Id. at 568. The state appealed, challenging the trial
court’s refusal to take into account a juvenile adjudication.
Id. at 569. We rejected the state’s argument that either the
pretrial notice to defendant or the defendant’s waiver of a
jury as to the pending charge served to waive the establishment of the existence of the juvenile adjudication before a
fact finder.
Id. at 570. We affirmed the trial court’s refusal to
treat the juvenile adjudication as a prior offense.
Id. at 585.
In this case, defendant waived a jury as to the
charge of attempted assault, but he did not waive a jury as
to the determination that he had had a prior juvenile adjudication. He did not admit the adjudication for purposes of
sentencing in this case. For its part, the state did no more
than it did in Lafferty to establish the existence of the juvenile adjudication before a requisite fact finder. Accordingly,
the trial court erred in using the juvenile adjudication to
determine defendant’s criminal history score as 8-C. That
conclusion, however, does not ultimately affect the sentence
in this case.
Defendant acknowledged both at the plea hearing
and at the sentencing hearing the trial court’s understanding that, regardless of whether defendant’s criminal history
score is 8-C or 8-D, a 56-month durational departure would
be permissible in either case. Ordinarily, the presumptive
sentence for a grid block 8-C is 29-34 months and the presumptive sentence for grid block 8-D is 27-28 months. OAR
213-004-0001, App 1 (Oregon Sentencing Guidelines Grid).
Under OAR 213-008-0003(2), “A durational departure from
a presumptive prison term shall not total more than double the maximum duration of the presumptive prison term.”
Because the parties here had agreed that the maximum
durational departure sentence in this case would be 56
months, the issue of a durational departure did not depend
upon the determination of defendant’s correct criminal history score. Consequently, defendant’s sentence was determined by the durational departure, based on an aggravating factor, not based on his criminal history score.
394 State v. Carrera
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in making a durational departure because the court did not sufficiently explain its reasoning. In material part, OAR 213-
008-0001 provides:
“[T]he sentencing judge shall impose the presumptive sentence provided by the guidelines unless the judge finds
substantial and compelling reasons to impose a departure.
If the sentencing judge departs from the presumptive sentence, the judge shall state on the record at the time of
sentencing the substantial and compelling reasons for the
departure.”
Defendant contends his admission of an enhancement factor
is not enough in itself to explain why the judge concluded
that there were substantial and compelling circumstances.
He urges a remand for resentencing.
The scope of our review on this question is prescribed by ORS 138.105(8)(b), which provides:
“If the trial court imposed a sentence that departs from
the presumptive sentence prescribed by the rules of the
Oregon Criminal Justice Commission, the appellate court’s
authority to review is limited to whether the trial court’s
findings of fact and reasons justifying a departure from the
sentence prescribed by the rules of the Oregon Criminal
Justice Commission:
“(A) Are supported by the evidence in the record; and
“(B) Constitute substantial and compelling reasons for
departure.”
Defendant’s argument implicates both requirements, particularly the latter one. “In determining whether a factor constitutes a substantial and compelling reason for departure,
we look at whether exceptional circumstances [exist that]
overcome the presumption that the [presumptive] sentence
accomplishes the purposes of the guidelines.” State v. Davilla,
280 Or App 43, 58,
380 P3d 1003 (2016) (under former ORS
138.222 (2015) (internal quotation marks omitted)). We have
recognized that committing an offense while on supervision
as a result of a prior offense is a substantial and compelling
reason to impose a departure sentence. See State v. Gallegos,
217 Or App 248, 256-57,
174 P3d 1086 (2007), rev den,
344
Or 670 (2008) (being on supervision as an aggravating
Cite as
307 Or App 387 (2020) 395
factor supporting departure although not listed in the nonexclusive list of factors in OAR 213-008-0002(1)(b)).
In this case, the sentencing court declared that the
circumstances in which defendant attempted first degree
assault provided substantial and compelling circumstances
to warrant an upward departure. The record permitted the
court to conclude, as the state argued, that defendant had
“been intimately involved with the court system” and “was on
supervision” when “he attempted to unlawfully cause physical
injury to another by means of a deadly or dangerous weapon,
that being the 9 millimeter Glock that was found in the glove
box of the El Camino.” His actions had shown, in the state’s
view, “that he is a danger to the public, whether he’s on supervision or not.” When adopting the state’s recommendation,
the trial court adopted its rationale and rejected defendant’s
contrary view.3 In doing so, the trial court acted within the
bounds of the its authority to determine a sentence “designed
to fit both the offense and the offender.” See State v. Speedis,
350 Or 424, 432,
256 P3d 1061 (2011) (affirming enhanced
sentence on nonenumerated sentencing factors). Defendant
admitted the enhancement factor that he was on supervision
at the time he attempted first-degree assault using a deadly
weapon. That admission on this record provides “evidence
in the record” and “constitute[s] [a] substantial and compelling reason[ ] for departure.” See ORS 138.105(8)(b) (review
standards). Those things explain the trial court’s durational
departure in sentencing. See State v. Williams,
133 Or App
191, 195 n 2,
891 P2d 3, rev den,
321 Or 512 (1995) (affirming
judgment imposing departure sentence considering, among
other things, the defendants’ disregard for any laws and
inability to be deterred from committing new criminal activity). No further explanation was necessary.
We conclude that, although the trial court erred in
determining defendant’s criminal history, it did not err in
imposing a durational departure sentence.
Affirmed.
3
Defendant had argued that his admission had not encompassed “a separate
malevolent quality and an inclination to increase–to commit increasingly serious
crimes.” The court’s ruling on the record responded directly to that argument: “I
believe [defendant] also admitted to the enhancement fact of being on supervision, which includes that malevolent factor.” (Emphasis added.)
