540
Argued and submitted January 30, reversed November 18, 2020
STATE OF OREGON,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
STEVEN X. McQUEEN,
aka Steven Zavier McQueen,
Defendant-Appellant.
Multnomah County Circuit Court
17CR82739; A168469
478 P3d 581
Defendant, who surreptitiously recorded an otherwise consensual sexual
encounter, appeals a judgment of conviction for one count of second-degree invasion of personal privacy, ORS 163.700(1)(b). That count required that the state
prove that the person defendant recorded had “a reasonable expectation of privacy concerning” her “intimate area.” ORS 163.700(1)(b)(B). As defined in ORS
163.700(2)(f), a person has “a reasonable expectation of privacy concerning [an]
intimate area” when “the person intended to protect the intimate area from being
seen and has not exposed the intimate area to public view.” On appeal, defendant
assigns error to the trial court’s denial of his motion for a judgment of acquittal,
arguing that because the person he recorded consented to having sexual intercourse with him, she did not evince a desire to protect her intimate area from
being seen by him. Held: The trial court erred. No rational trier of fact could
have found that the person defendant recorded had a “reasonable expectation of
privacy concerning” her “intimate area,” as that phrase is used in ORS 163.700
(1)(b)(B), because no rational trier of fact could determine that she intended
to protect her “intimate area from being seen,” within the meaning of ORS
163.700(2)(f).
Reversed.
David F. Rees, Judge.
Kali Montague, Deputy Public Defender, argued the
cause for appellant. Also on the brief was Ernest G. Lannet,
Chief Defender, Criminal Appellate Section, Office of Public
Defense Services.
Rolf C. Moan, Assistant Attorney General, argued
the cause for respondent. Also on the brief were Ellen F.
Rosenblum, Attorney General, and Benjamin Gutman,
Solicitor General.
Before Armstrong, Presiding Judge, and Tookey, Judge,
and Aoyagi, Judge.
Cite as 307 Or App 540 (2020) 541
TOOKEY, J.
Reversed.
542 State v. McQueen
TOOKEY, J.
Defendant appeals a judgment of conviction for one
count of second-degree invasion of personal privacy, ORS
163.700. On appeal, defendant assigns error to the trial
court’s denial of his motion for a judgment of acquittal with
respect to that count. We agree with defendant that the trial
court erred. Consequently, we reverse.
The relevant facts are few and undisputed. Defendant and M had a sexual relationship. One day, M went to
defendant’s home and had sex with him. Defendant surreptitiously filmed M and himself having intercourse. M did not
know defendant was filming them, and she did not consent
to being recorded engaged in that sexual encounter.
Subsequently, M discovered the videotape that defendant had made and reported the incident to police.
Defendant was charged with one count of second-degree invasion of personal privacy, ORS 163.700. That statute provides, in relevant part:
“(1) … [A] person commits the crime of invasion of
personal privacy in the second degree if:
“…
“(b)(A) The person knowingly makes or records a photograph, motion picture, videotape or other visual recording of another person’s intimate area without the consent of
the other person; and
“(B) The person being recorded has a reasonable
expectation of privacy concerning the intimate area.”
“[I]ntimate area” means “nudity, or undergarments
that are being worn by a person and are covered by clothing.”
ORS 163.700(2)(a). “Reasonable expectation of privacy concerning the intimate area” means “that the person intended
to protect the intimate area from being seen and has not
exposed the intimate area to public view.” ORS 163.700
(2)(f).1
1
“Public view” is defined in ORS 163.700(2)(e) to mean “that an area can be
readily seen and that a person within the area can be distinguished by normal
unaided vision when viewed from a public place as defined in ORS 161.015.”
Cite as 307 Or App 540 (2020) 543
During defendant’s trial, at the end of the state’s
case-in-chief, defendant moved for a judgment of acquittal.
Defendant argued that the state failed to prove that M had
a “reasonable expectation of privacy concerning [her] intimate area.” In defendant’s view, the state failed to prove
that element of the offense, because evidence did not reflect
that M “intended to keep any part of her body from being
seen by [defendant]” and, therefore, “no rational finder of
fact could conclude that that … element of this offense[ ]
has been satisfied.”
The trial court denied defendant’s motion, concluding that the phrase “the person intended to protect the intimate area from being seen” means that the person intended
to protect the intimate area from “being seen by the
public.”
On appeal, defendant contends that the trial court
erred in denying his motion for a judgment of acquittal.
Defendant contends that, because M consented “to having sexual intercourse with defendant and did not evince
a desire to protect her intimate area from being seen by
defendant,” he did not “commit second-degree invasion of
personal privacy as charged in this case.” Defendant posits that the “legislative history and the context of the invasion of privacy statutes show that the legislature intended
[ORS 163.700(1)(b)] to cover so-called ‘up-skirting’ and
‘down-blousing’—acts of surreptitiously recording or taking
pictures up women’s skirts or down their blouses in public
areas.”
Defendant maintains that ORS 163.700(1)(b) “was
not intended to cover surreptitiously recording intimate
encounters in private spaces” and that “that conduct is captured by other statutory provisions.” Defendant acknowledges that his conduct was “likely criminal” under ORS
163.701, the statute setting forth the crime of first-degree
“Public place” is defined in ORS 161.015(10) to mean
“a place to which the general public has access and includes, but is not
limited to, hallways, lobbies and other parts of apartment houses and hotels
not constituting rooms or apartments designed for actual residence, and
highways, streets, schools, places of amusement, parks, playgrounds and
premises used in connection with public passenger transportation.”
544 State v. McQueen
invasion of personal privacy but notes that “the state did not
charge him under that statute.”2
The state, for its part, argues that “statutory text
and context, legislative history, and maxims of construction show that a person who intends to keep the general
public from seeing her intimate areas does intend to keep
those areas ‘from being seen’ ” within the meaning of ORS
163.700(2)(f), “even if she simultaneously intends for a
romantic partner to see them,” and, accordingly, the trial
court correctly denied the motion for acquittal.
Where, as here, “ ‘the dispute on review of a ruling on a motion for a judgment of acquittal centers on the
meaning of the statute defining the offense, the issue is
one of statutory construction’ ” that “we review for legal
error.” State v. Velasquez, 286 Or App 400, 404,
400 P3d
1018 (2017) (quoting State v. Hunt,
270 Or App 206, 209-
10,
346 P3d 1285 (2015)). After we “settle the legal issue,”
we “determine whether a rational trier of fact could have
found that the essential elements of the crime had been
proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Bowen,
280
Or App 514, 516,
380 P3d 1054 (2016) (internal quotation
marks omitted); see also Hunt,
270 Or App at 209 (“We generally review the denial of a motion for a judgment of acquittal by examining the evidence in the light most favorable
to the state to determine whether a rational trier of fact,
accepting reasonable inferences and reasonable credibility
choices, could have found the essential element of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Internal quotation marks
omitted.)).
Given the parties’ arguments and the trial court’s
ruling, the first issue before us is the proper construction
of the statutory phrase “intended to protect the intimate
2
As relevant here, ORS 163.701(1)(a) provides that, subject to certain exceptions, a person commits the crime of first-degree invasion of personal privacy if:
“(A) The person knowingly makes or records a photograph, motion picture, videotape or other visual recording of another person in a state of nudity
without the consent of the other person; and
“(B) At the time the visual recording is made or recorded the person
being recorded is in a place and circumstances where the person has a reasonable expectation of personal privacy[.]”
Cite as 307 Or App 540 (2020) 545
area from being seen” in ORS 163.700(2)(f).3 In interpreting
statutes, “we seek to determine the legislature’s intention,
by reviewing the statutory text and context, and, if the
court concludes that it appears useful to the analysis, the
legislative history.” TriMet v. Amalgamated Transit Union
Local 757,
362 Or 484, 493,
412 P3d 162 (2018). “In conducting that examination, we keep in mind what the legislature
has told us about how it wants us to read the words it has
written: ‘In the construction of a statute, the office of the
judge is simply to ascertain and declare what is, in terms
or in substance, contained therein, not to insert what has
been omitted, or to omit what has been inserted.’ ” Tarr v.
Multnomah County,
306 Or App 26, 33,
473 P3d 603 (2020)
(quoting ORS 174.010; brackets omitted).
Generally, “the text of the statutory provision itself
is the starting point for interpretation and is the best evidence of the legislature’s intent.” PGE v. Bureau of Labor
and Industries, 317 Or 606, 610,
859 P2d 1143 (1993). Unless
a word or phrase has a specialized meaning, we typically
give “words of common usage” their “plain, natural, and
ordinary meaning.”
Id. at 611. “The ordinary meaning of
a word is presumed to be what is reflected in a dictionary.”
State v. Shifflett,
285 Or App 654, 661,
398 P3d 383 (2017).
The word “seen” means “perceived or verified by
sight.” Webster’s Third New Int’l Dictionary 2056 (unabridged
ed 2002). It is also the past participle of the verb “to see,”
which means, as relevant here, “to perceive by the eye
: apprehend through sight.” Id. at 2054; see State v. Oliver,
221 Or App 233, 237,
189 P3d 1240, rev den,
345 Or 318
(2008) (relevant dictionary definition is the one that “seems
most relevant to the use of the word in the statute”). We
thus understand a person to have a “reasonable expectation
of privacy concerning the intimate area,” as that phrase is
used in ORS 163.700(1)(b)(B), only if the person “intend[ed]
to protect the intimate area” from being “perceive[d] by the
eye” or “apprehend[ed] through sight.” And, conversely, if a
person intentionally exposes an intimate area to another
3
We do not address the proper construction of the phrase “has not exposed
the intimate area to public view,” ORS 163.700(2)(f), because defendant does not
contend that the state failed to prove that M did “not expose[ ] the intimate area
to public view.”
546 State v. McQueen
person, allowing the “intimate area” to be “perceive[d] by
the eye” or “apprehend[ed] through sight,” the person exposing the intimate area does not have “a reasonable expectation of privacy concerning the intimate area,” as that
phrase is used in ORS 163.700(1)(b)(B), at least as to that
person.
As noted above, the state argues that a person “who
intends to keep the general public from seeing her intimate
areas does intend to keep those areas ‘from being seen’ ”
within the meaning of ORS 163.700(2)(f), “even if she simultaneously intends for a romantic partner to see them.” That
argument is untenable given the text of ORS 163.700(2)(f).
Accepting it would require us to, in effect, append the words
“by the general public” to the end of the phrase “intended to
protect the intimate area from being seen” in ORS 163.700
(2)(f), so that the text would, in effect, read “intended to protect the intimate area from being seen by the general public.” We are prohibited from doing so. State v. Patton, 237
Or App 46, 50-51,
238 P3d 439 (2010), rev den,
350 Or 131
(2011) (“We are prohibited, by statutory command and by
constitutional principle, from adding words to a statute that
the legislature has omitted.”).
We next turn to context—specifically, a prior version of ORS 163.700 and the state of the law in Oregon prior
to creation of the crime of second-degree invasion of personal privacy—as well as legislative history. Pete’s Mountain
Homeowners v. Ore. Water Resources, 236 Or App 507, 520,
238 P3d 395 (2010) (“Consideration of prior versions of a
statute certainly is appropriate as part of a statute’s context.”); Mastriano v. Board of Parole,
342 Or 684, 693,
159
P3d 1151 (2007) (“[W]e generally presume that the legislature enacts statutes in light of existing judicial decisions
that have a bearing on those statutes.”). Context and legislative history support our understanding that if a person
intentionally exposes an intimate area to another person,
allowing the intimate area to be “perceive[d] by the eye” or
“apprehend[ed] through sight,” the person exposing the intimate area does not have “a reasonable expectation of privacy concerning the intimate area,” as that phrase is used
in ORS 163.700(1)(b)(B), at least as to that person.
Cite as
307 Or App 540 (2020) 547
As described more fully below, context and legislative history reflect that the “manifest general legislative intent” behind the creation of the version of the crime
of second-degree invasion of personal privacy with which
defendant was charged was to criminalize conduct sometimes referred to as “up-skirting” and “down-blousing.” 4
DCBS v. Muliro, 359 Or 736, 753,
380 P3d 270 (2016) (noting that, in general, “an examination of legislative history is
most useful when it is able to uncover the manifest general
legislative intent behind an enactment” (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
Prior to 2015, ORS 163.700 described the crime
of “invasion of personal privacy.” A person committed
that crime if they created nonconsensual “photograph[s],
motion picture[s], videotape[s] or other visual recording[s]”
of another person, but only when the other person was
(1) “in a state of nudity” and (2) “in a place and circumstances where the person ha[d] a reasonable expectation of
personal privacy.” ORS 163.700 (2013), amended by Or Laws
2015, ch 321, §§ 1, 4; Or Laws 2016, ch 72, § 11.5
4
That is, the conduct of “surreptitiously tak[ing] photographs of women up
their skirts or down their blouses.” Danielle Keats Citron, Sexual Privacy, 128
Yale LJ 1870, 1914 (2019). Such “up-skirt” and “down-blouse” photographs “violate sexual privacy” and “undermine[ ] the victim’s decision to shield her genitalia and breasts from the public.” Id.
5
ORS 163.700(1) (2013) provided:
“Except as provided in ORS 163.702, a person commits the crime of invasion of personal privacy if:
“(a)(A) The person knowingly makes or records a photograph, motion
picture, videotape or other visual recording of another person in a state of
nudity without the consent of the person being recorded; and
“(B) At the time the visual recording is made or recorded the person
being recorded is in a place and circumstances where the person has a reasonable expectation of personal privacy; or
“(b)(A) For the purpose of arousing or gratifying the sexual desire of the
person, the person is in a location to observe another person in a state of
nudity without the consent of the other person; and
“(B) The other person is in a place and circumstances where the person
has a reasonable expectation of personal privacy.”
ORS 163.700(2)(c) (2013) provided that “ ‘[p]lace[ ] and circumstances where
the person has a reasonable expectation of personal privacy’ includes, but is not
limited to, a bathroom, dressing room, locker room that includes an enclosed area
for dressing or showering, tanning booth and any area where a person undresses
in an enclosed space that is not open to public view.”
548 State v. McQueen
In 2015, the legislature passed House Bill (HB) 2596
(2015), which amended ORS 163.700. HB 2596 was designed
to “expand[ ] the statute to prohibit the nonconsensual
recording of a person’s intimate areas, regardless of whether
that person is nude or in a private place.” Preliminary Staff
Measure Summary, Senate Committee on Judiciary, HB
2596 A, May 11, 2015.
The amendments to ORS 163.700 set forth in HB
2596 created a new crime of second-degree invasion of personal privacy, which a person commits when that person
“knowingly makes or records a photograph, motion picture,
videotape or other visual recording of another person’s intimate area without the consent of the other person,” and the
“person being recorded has a reasonable expectation of privacy concerning the intimate area.” Or Laws 2015, ch 321,
§§ 1, 4. “Reasonable expectation of privacy concerning the
intimate area” was defined to mean “the person intended
to protect the intimate area from being seen and has not
exposed the intimate area to public view,” and “intimate
area” was defined as “nudity, or undergarments that are
being worn by a person and are covered by clothing.” Id. § 1.6
In introducing HB 2596 to the House Committee
on Judiciary, the bill’s co-sponsor, Representative Peter
Buckley, told his colleagues, “Who would have thought that
we’d actually be having this as an issue come before the
Oregon legislature to have to resolve the idea of up-skirting.”
Audio Recording, House Committee on Judiciary, HB 2596,
Feb 18, 2015 at 2:21 (comments of Rep Peter Buckley),
https://olis.oregonlegislature.gov (accessed Oct 14, 2020).
Another co-sponsor, Representative Andy Olsen commented
6
A different bill, House Bill (HB) 2356 (2015), created the crime of first-degree invasion of personal privacy, which a person commits if they engage in
the conduct previously covered by ORS 163.700 (2013)—i.e., “[t]he person knowingly makes or records a photograph, motion picture, videotape or other visual
recording of another person in a state of nudity without the consent of the other
person” and “[a]t the time the visual recording is made or recorded the person
being recorded is in a place and circumstances where the person has a reasonable expectation of personal privacy.” Or Laws 2015, ch 645, § 2; see also ORS
163.701(1)(a) (defining one way to commit the crime of first-degree invasion of
personal privacy). The change made such conduct a more serious crime: Prior
to passage of HB 2356, the conduct now proscribed by ORS 163.701(1)(a) was a
Class A misdemeanor. ORS 163.700(3) (2013). HB 2356 made such conduct into a
Class C felony. Or Laws 2015, ch 645, § 2; ORS 163.700(2)(a).
Cite as 307 Or App 540 (2020) 549
on the “timeliness” of HB 2596, noting that “Wisconsin
is working really hard on doing a bill that addresses
down-blousing and up-skirting,” and that he thought that
HB 2596 could be a “great role-model bill” for the “rest of
the states in the country” on those topics. Audio Recording,
House Committee on Judiciary, HB 2596, Feb 18, 2015
at 3:30 (comments of Rep Andy Olsen), https://olis.
oregonlegislature.gov (accessed Oct 14, 2020).
HB 2596 was “requested” by the Oregon Education
Association (OEA) to “close” what they viewed as “a gap in
[Oregon] laws pertaining to invasions of personal privacy.”
Testimony, House Committee on Judiciary, HB 2596, Feb 18,
2015, Ex 4 (statement of Laurie Wimmer). A representative from OEA, Laurie Wimmer, provided testimony to
both the House Committee on Judiciary and the Senate
Committee on Judiciary regarding HB 2596, characterizing the bill as an “[u]pskirting prohibition.” Id.; Testimony,
Senate Committee on Judiciary, HB 2596, May 11, 2015,
Ex 4 (statement of Laurie Wimmer). Wimmer explained to
both committees that up-skirting is a “phenomenon” involving “the surreptitious recording of images of people’s intimate areas using flip phones, and then circulating and sharing the stolen images on social media,” but that such conduct
is “not illegal conduct in Oregon if the unsuspecting victim
is wearing underwear—because the images taken are not
specifically ‘nude’ photos.” Testimony, House Committee on
Judiciary, HB 2596, Feb 18, 2015, Ex 4 (statement of Laurie
Wimmer); Testimony, Senate Committee on Judiciary, HB
2596, May 11, 2015, Ex 4 (statement of Laurie Wimmer).
Wimmer provided a newspaper article to both committees
titled “Taking photos up girl’s skirt at Beaverton Target:
Appalling, but not a crime, judge rules,” which concerned a
Washington County criminal case, wherein the defendant
was acquitted of two counts of invasion of personal privacy,
notwithstanding that the defendant took photographs up a
13-year-old girl’s skirt in a Target store. Testimony, House
Committee on Judiciary, HB 2596, Feb 18, 2015, Ex 4 (statement of Laurie Wimmer); Exhibit 5, House Committee on
Judiciary, HB 2596, Feb 18, 2015 (newspaper article accompanying statement of Laurie Wimmer); Senate Committee
on Judiciary, HB 2596, May 11, 2015, Ex 4 (statement of
550 State v. McQueen
Laurie Wimmer). The article quoted the prosecutor following the acquittals acknowledging that what the defendant
in the case did was “not a crime” under “the current interpretation of Oregon law.” Exhibit 5, House Committee on
Judiciary, HB 2596, Feb 18, 2015 (newspaper article accompanying statement of Laurie Wimmer).
Additionally, both committees heard testimony from
a middle school teacher about a student at her middle school
who had taken pictures underneath the teacher’s anklelength dress, and that pictures had been found on students’
phones of “adolescent female classmates with exposed gaps
in their shirts,” many of which “showed the undergarments
of the girls,” but that such conduct was not criminal under
Oregon law. Testimony, House Committee on Judiciary,
HB 2596, Feb 18, 2015, Ex 6 (statement of Dana Lovejoy);
Audio Recording, Senate Committee on Judiciary, HB 2596,
May 11, 2015 at 28:37 (statement of Dana Lovejoy), https://
olis.oregonlegislature.gov (accessed Oct 14, 2020).
In sum, the context and legislative history of ORS
163.700 reflect that the “manifest general legislative intent”
in creating the crime of second-degree invasion of personal
privacy, as set forth in ORS 163.700(1)(b), was to criminalize
“up-skirting” and “down-blousing,” not to criminalize defendant’s conduct in this case, viz., surreptitiously recording an
otherwise consensual sexual encounter.
In light of the foregoing, considering the text, context, and legislative history of ORS 163.700, we conclude that
under the provisions of ORS 163.700 if a person intentionally exposes an “intimate area” to another person, allowing
the “intimate area” to be “perceive[d] by the eye” or “apprehend[ed] through sight,” the person exposing the intimate
area does not have “a reasonable expectation of privacy concerning the intimate area,” as that phrase is used in ORS
163.700(1)(b)(B), at least as to that person.7
7
This opinion does not address other situations that might arise, such as a
peeping tom standing outside watching two people engaged in a sexual encounter. The only issue we address in this case is whether M had a “reasonable expectation of privacy concerning the intimate area,” as that phrase is used in ORS
163.700(1)(b)(B).
Cite as 307 Or App 540 (2020) 551
As defendant acknowledges, defendant’s conduct
was perhaps criminal under a different statute, ORS 163.701,
but that is not the crime with which defendant was charged.
Having construed ORS 163.700, we now turn to the
second issue in this case, viz., whether “a rational trier of
fact could have found that the essential elements” of second-degree invasion of personal privacy, ORS 163.700(1)(b), “had
been proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” Bowen, 280 Or App
at 516 (internal quotation marks omitted). Given the facts
of this case, we conclude that no rational trier of fact could
find that M had a “reasonable expectation of privacy concerning the intimate area,” ORS 163.700(1)(b)(B), because
no rational trier of fact could determine that M “intend[ed]
to protect [her] intimate area from being seen” within the
meaning of ORS 163.700(2)(f). We therefore reverse.
Reversed.
