610
Argued and submitted October 20, affirmed November 18, 2020, petition for
review denied April 8, 2021 (367 Or 827)
STATE OF OREGON,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
BRIAN CURTIS RUDD,
Defendant-Appellant.
Washington County Circuit Court
18CR30074; A170133
478 P3d 603
Andrew Erwin, Judge.
David Sherbo-Huggins, Deputy Public Defender, argued
the cause for appellant. Also on the brief was Ernest G.
Lannet, Chief Defender, Criminal Appellate Section, Office
of Public Defense Services.
Dashiell L. Farewell, Assistant Attorney General, argued
the cause for respondent. Also on the brief were Ellen F.
Rosenblum, Attorney General, and Benjamin Gutman,
Solicitor General.
Before Lagesen, Presiding Judge, and James, Judge, and
Kamins, Judge.
PER CURIAM
Affirmed.
Cite as
307 Or App 610 (2020) 611
PER CURIAM
Defendant appeals a judgment of conviction pursuant to a bench trial for three sex offenses, including one count
of luring a minor in violation of ORS 167.057. He assigns
error to the trial court’s denial of his motion for judgment
of acquittal on that count, contending that the evidence was
insufficient to support his conviction under our interpretation of ORS 167.057 in State v. King, 278 Or App 65,
373 P3d
1205 (2016). We affirm.
Pertinent to this case, ORS 167.057(1) provides that
“[a] person commits the crime of luring a minor if the person furnishes to, or uses with, … a police officer posing
as a minor … [an] explicit verbal description … of sexual conduct for the purpose of inducing the … purported
minor to engage in sexual conduct.” In King, we construed
the phrase “explicit verbal description … of sexual conduct.” 278 Or App at 68. We held that, “in using the term
‘explicit verbal description … of sexual conduct,’ the legislature intended to target the explicit identification of sexual conduct when that identification is intended to bring a
graphic sexual image to the mind of the recipient.”
Id. at 71.
Applying that standard, we concluded that the defendant’s
text message to the victim in that case—“ ‘I really wanna
bang [you]’ ”—when considered in the context of defendant’s
other communications with her, was sufficient to permit a
reasonable factfinder to “infer that defendant intended to
bring a graphic sexual image to the mind of the victim.”
Id. at 72-73.
Although defendant argues otherwise, this case is
much the same. Here, defendant texted the phrase “You
looking for some dick?” to a police officer, who he believed to
be a 15-year-old girl named “Emma Ray.” That phrase, when
considered in the context of defendant’s entire exchange
with the police officer, would allow a reasonable factfinder
to infer that defendant intended to bring a graphic sexual
image (involving the recipient of defendant’s text and defendant’s penis) to the mind of the recipient:
“[Defendant:] Damn baby girl, I do. How old are you?
“[‘Emma Ray’:] 15
612 State v. Rudd
“[Defendant:] You like guys in their 20’s?
“[‘Emma Ray’:] Yeah that’s cool
“[Defendant:] How long are your parents gone for?
“[‘Emma Ray’:] Mom gone for a few more hours at least
“[Defendant:] You looking for some dick?
“[‘Emma Ray’:]
“[Defendant:] Send me the address, I’ll grab a shower and
head on over.
“[‘Emma Ray’:] Can you bring covers? I can’t get pregnant
“[Defendant:] Yeah, of course
“[‘Emma Ray’:] Ok yeah jump in the shower and come
over[.]”
Although that would not be the only reasonable inference
a factfinder could reach, it is a permissible one. The trial
court properly denied defendant’s motion for judgment of
acquittal.
Affirmed.
