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308 Ga. 321

840 S.E.2d 391

Corley v. State

Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided March 13, 2020

Supreme Court of Georgia · decided 2020-03-13

Cited by 11 later decisions — most recently January 2025

11 state decisions

Relies on Allen v. United States · Davis v. State · Hood v. State

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 2020-03-13

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308 Ga. 321
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               S20A0214. CORLEY v. THE STATE.


     BLACKWELL, Justice.

     Vivian Waldon Corley was tried by a Chatham County jury and

convicted of murder, aggravated assault, and the unlawful

possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony in

connection with the fatal shooting of Lorraine Manuel. Corley

appeals, claiming that the evidence is insufficient to support her

convictions, that she previously had been acquitted of murder with

malice aforethought and could not be retried for that crime, that the

trial court erred when it excluded certain evidence, and that the

prosecuting attorney made improper comments to the jury. Upon

our review of the record and briefs, we see no reversible error related

to these claims. We do note, however, that the trial court erred when

it failed to merge the aggravated assault into the murder. We

therefore vacate the conviction and sentence for aggravated assault,
and we otherwise affirm.1

      1. Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the record

shows that Manuel and her fiancé, Marshall Franklin, completed an

application in June 2015 to rent Corley’s house in Chatham County.

A few days later, the couple decided not to rent the house, and

Franklin told Corley that they wanted her to return their rental

application (which included            personal information,         including

Manuel’s social security number). Corley was not receptive to this

request, and she told Franklin that she would call the police if he

came to the house.




      1  Manuel was killed in June 2015. A Chatham County grand jury
indicted Corley in November 2015, charging her with murder with malice
aforethought, murder in the commission of a felony, aggravated assault, and
the unlawful possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. After
her first trial ended in a hung jury, Corley was retried in March 2018, and the
jury found her guilty on all counts. The trial court sentenced Corley to
imprisonment for life for malice murder, a concurrent term of imprisonment
for twenty years for aggravated assault, and a consecutive term of
imprisonment for five years for the unlawful possession of a firearm during the
commission of a felony. The felony murder was vacated by operation of law.
Corley timely filed a motion for new trial, which she twice amended in
September 2018, and the trial court denied that motion in June 2019. Corley
then timely filed a notice of appeal. The case was docketed in this Court for the
term beginning in December 2019 and submitted for decision on the briefs.
      Manuel was determined to retrieve the rental application,

however, and she set off for Corley’s house. Corley was apparently

aware that either Manuel or Franklin was coming, and she (twice)

called 911 to report that Franklin had threatened her; although

when the dispatcher asked how he had threatened her, Corley

acknowledged that she couldn’t understand what he had said but

thought he said something about having a “piece,” and Corley

repeatedly declined the dispatcher’s offer to send a patrol officer to

the house.2 When Corley saw Manuel approaching her house, she

told some potential renters who were looking at the house that they

needed to leave. Meanwhile, Manuel called Franklin, asking him “to

stay on the phone with her to make sure everything goes

smooth[ly].”

      Through Manuel’s phone, Franklin heard Manuel knock on

Corley’s door, and he heard them argue about the application (with




      2 Corley also told the 911 dispatcher that Franklin was threatening “to

sue [her] but he didn’t complete his application,” that he was trying to “make
[her] let him move in [her] house,” and that he had asked “a whole lot of
questions that didn’t make sense.”
Manuel ultimately demanding that Corley return the application

“right now”). Corley then fatally shot Manuel in the head with a .38-

caliber revolver. Corley called 911 and admitted that she had shot

Manuel, but when the dispatcher asked what had happened, Corley

evaded the question. And even though Manuel was lying on her back

with a single gunshot wound to the head that was bleeding

profusely, Corley told the dispatcher that she thought the shot was

to Manuel’s chest, and she claimed that she “tried to shoot [Manuel]

in the leg.”3 When police officers arrived, Corley reported that

Manuel — who was unarmed — had tried to attack her, but Corley

had not sustained any injuries.

     (a) Corley asserts that the State failed to prove beyond a

reasonable doubt that she was not justified in shooting Manuel. But

questions about the existence of justification are for a jury to decide,

see Crayton v. State, 
298 Ga. 792, 793
 (1) (
784 SE2d 343
) (2016), and




     3 Corley also initially told the dispatcher that she did not know if she

knew the victim, and — despite being a registered nurse — Corley resisted
efforts suggested by the dispatcher to provide first aid to Manuel (who can be
heard moaning on the 911 recording).
the verdict in this case is supported by the evidence. The jury was

able to consider Corley’s credibility through the recording of her 911

calls and her statements to the police immediately after the

shooting, and the jury was authorized to conclude that she did not

reasonably believe that it was necessary to shoot Manuel in order to

defend herself or her home. See Anthony v. State, 
298 Ga. 827, 829

(1) (
785 SE2d 277
) (2016) (“The jury is free to reject any evidence in

support of a justification defense and to accept the evidence that the

shooting was not done in self-defense.”).

     (b) Although the jury was authorized by the evidence to find

Corley guilty of both murder and aggravated assault, the trial court

could enter a judgment of conviction and impose sentence for only

one of those offenses. As charged in the indictment, the murder and

aggravated assault both were based on the single gunshot that

struck Manuel in the head. The trial court should have merged those

crimes, and because it did not, we vacate the conviction and sentence

for aggravated assault. See Reddings v. State, 
292 Ga. 364, 367
 (2)

(
738 SE2d 49
) (2013).
     2. Corley’s first trial ended with a mistrial after the jury was

unable to reach a verdict. Corley, however, maintains that the first

jury did, in fact, reach a verdict of not guilty as to the count charging

her with malice murder and that she could not, therefore, be tried

again for that offense. But Corley’s contention that the first jury

returned a not guilty verdict is belied by the record.

     The transcript of Corley’s first trial shows that the jury began

its deliberations on a Friday afternoon. Deliberations continued on

the following Monday, but one of the jurors was then replaced with

the alternate, and deliberations began anew around 11:15 on

Monday morning. Around 4:30 that afternoon, the trial court

received a note from the foreperson stating that the jury was “having

an impossible time coming to a unanimous decision” and asking if

the court would “consider the jury hung.” Neither the trial court,

Corley, nor the prosecuting attorney thought that it would be

appropriate to conclude deliberations at that point. Instead, the

prosecuting attorney asked if the court would give an Allen charge.4


     4 See Allen v. United States, 
164 U. S. 492
 (
17 SCt 154
, 41 LE 528) (1896).
The judge said that such a charge would be premature, that he

would inform the jury that it should continue to deliberate, and that

the court would consider giving an Allen charge the next day. No

objection to that approach was raised. The court brought in the

jurors, reminded them that they had only been deliberating for a few

hours (because their deliberation on Friday “really isn’t counted”),

and informed them that it would not “consider the jury hung” until

they had continued deliberating for some additional amount of time.

     At Corley’s request, the court asked the foreperson to write

down the jury’s current split as to each count (but to just include the

numbers and not to denote how “many for guilty or . . . not guilty”).

The foreperson reported that he already had such a list, and he

provided the list to the court. That list (which is now

mischaracterized by Corley as a “verdict form”) showed a count of 12

“NG” votes as to malice murder and split votes on the other counts.

The trial court noted that the list provided more information than it

wanted to know, but that “[a]gain, you haven’t really been

deliberating nearly long enough for this to be considered a hung
jury.” The jury never gave any indication that the list it provided to

the judge was intended to be a verdict, nor did the jury maintain

that it had concluded its deliberations as to any count. Instead, the

jury continued deliberating, and when the jury reported — three

days later — that it was hopelessly deadlocked (resulting in the trial

court declaring a mistrial), it was split as to all of the charges,

including malice murder. Contrary to Corley’s assertions, the first

jury never reached a verdict on any count, the trial court properly

declared a mistrial, and Corley’s claim that she could not be retried

for malice murder is without merit. See State v. Lane, 
218 Ga. App. 126, 127
 (
460 SE2d 550
) (1995) (“the trial court was incorrect in

ruling that the jury ‘(arrived) at a not guilty verdict for murder’”

where the jury merely had “handed notes to the trial court”

(emphasis in original)). Cf. Byrd v. State, 
277 Ga. 554, 557-558
 (3)

(
592 SE2d 421
) (2004) (trial court did not err when it accepted a

partial verdict of guilty on several counts where jury announced

“that it had reached a verdict” on those counts (but “was not

unanimous” on the remaining count) and trial court allowed the jury
to continue to deliberate on all counts before accepting the partial

verdict and declaring a mistrial as to the remaining count).

     3. Corley contends that the trial court erred when it excluded

extrinsic evidence to impeach Franklin’s testimony about a rent

dispute that he and Manuel had with a prior landlord. During her

cross-examination of Franklin, Corley asked if he and Manuel had

ever been served with an eviction notice. Franklin responded that

they had not, and Corley was permitted to cross-examine Franklin

about a rent dispute with a prior landlord that allegedly resulted in

an eviction. Corley was also permitted to present Franklin with

court papers to refresh his recollection about the dispute. And after

Franklin testified that he did not remember going to court over the

dispute and that he and Manuel moved out of the property at issue

before any eviction, Corley sought to present extrinsic evidence to

impeach Franklin’s testimony.5 But the trial court excluded the


     5 The proposed evidence consisted of magistrate court documents related

to the prior dispute as well as the testimony of the property manager who
represented the landlord in the dispute.
evidence after concluding that the issue of the prior dispute was not

“germane or material” to the relevant issues at trial (primarily,

whether Corley was justified in shooting Manuel).6 Corley now

alleges that the trial court abused its discretion when it excluded

this impeachment evidence. See Flannigan v. State, 
305 Ga. 57, 62

(3) (
823 SE2d 743
) (2019) (“The admission of evidence lies within the

sound discretion of the trial court, whose decision will not be

disturbed on appeal absent a clear abuse of discretion.” (Citation and

punctuation omitted)).

     OCGA § 24-6-621 provides that “[a] witness may be impeached

by disproving the facts testified to by the witness,” but the use of

extrinsic evidence to impeach a witness by contradiction is not

unlimited. The language in OCGA § 24-6-621 is substantively

identical to former OCGA § 24-9-82 (which provided that “[a]

witness may be impeached by disproving the facts testified to by




     6 We note that Corley did not propose to introduce the evidence of the

prior rent dispute as character evidence or to impeach Franklin on general
credibility grounds. Instead, she sought to introduce it solely to contradict
Franklin’s testimony about the prior rent dispute.
him”). And although former OCGA § 24-9-82 (like OCGA § 24-6-621)

did not include any express limitations on the ability to impeach a

witness, it was well settled under our old Evidence Code that

impeachment by contradiction was limited in regard to matters that

are collateral to the material issues at trial. See Brown v. State, 
260 Ga. 153, 156
 (4) (
391 SE2d 108
) (1990).

     As we have repeatedly noted, “we are all living in a new

evidence world” that requires analysis of the new law, not blind

reliance on the cases decided under the old law. See Davis v. State,

299 Ga. 180, 192
 (3) (
787 SE2d 221
) (2016). Nevertheless, there are

limited situations where it may be appropriate to rely upon cases

decided under the old Evidence Code. Such cases may be relevant

where, as here, our new rule was “carried over from our old Evidence

Code” and has no counterpart in the Federal Rules of Evidence.

State v. Frost, 
297 Ga. 296, 299
 (
773 SE2d 700
) (2015). Even so, the

applicability of the old cases is also limited by other newly adopted

provisions of the current Evidence Code. Primarily, OCGA §§ 24-4-

401, 24-4-402, and 24-4-403 “overlay the entire Evidence Code, and
are generally applicable to all evidence that a party seeks to

present.” Chrysler Group v. Walden, 
303 Ga. 358, 362
 (II) (A) (
812 SE2d 244
) (2018). In addition, we have previously noted that OCGA

§ 24-6-621 also may “be read in conjunction with OCGA §§ 24-6-607

and/or 24-6-613 (b), as well as their federal counterparts.” Taylor v.

State, 
302 Ga. 176, 180
 (3) n.5 (
805 SE2d 851
) (2017) (citing Ronald

L. Carlson, Carlson on Evidence, 351-352 (5th ed. 2016)). And we

have already held that impeachment with a prior inconsistent

statement under OCGA § 24-6-613 (b) does not allow the

introduction of extrinsic evidence related to issues that “are

collateral to the subject matter of the case.” Hood v. State, 
299 Ga. 95, 99
 (2) (
786 SE2d 648
) (2016) (citation and punctuation omitted).

Similarly, it is within a trial court’s discretion to determine if a party

is improperly attempting to use extrinsic evidence to impeach a

witness by contradiction under OCGA § 24-6-621 on a matter

collateral to the relevant issues at trial. And the trial court in this

case did not abuse its discretion when it excluded the extrinsic
evidence at issue.7

      4. At trial, Corley sought to introduce the testimony of two of

her neighbors about conversations that she had with them prior to

the shooting. The trial court allowed the first neighbor to testify

that, about an hour before the shooting, Corley came to his house

and told him to “watch out because somebody or that guy was going

to come [to her house]” and to call 911 if he “heard screaming.”

Corley sought to introduce testimony from a second neighbor that

Corley had made similar comments to him, but the trial court

excluded that evidence. Corley claims that this was error, but the

record shows that there was an abundance of evidence that Corley

was interested in contacting law enforcement prior to the shooting.

In fact, the best evidence of this was the recording of the 911 calls

that Corley actually made — just prior to the shooting — to report



      7  Corley argues that the evidence about the prior rent dispute was
sufficiently related to her case because Manuel and Franklin had represented
in their rental application with Corley that they had never been evicted. But
Manuel’s killing had nothing to do with a rent dispute with Corley (or anyone
else), nor does it seem plausible that Corley’s justification defense could have
any relation to an alleged misrepresentation that may have appeared on the
rental application.
that she was being “threatened” and “harassed” by Franklin and

thought he said something about having a “piece.” Because the jury

heard these recordings, it was well aware that Corley was interested

in contacting law enforcement just prior to the shooting, and the

testimony of a second neighbor about this interest would have had

little probative value and would have been needlessly cumulative.

See OCGA § 24-4-403. As a result, the trial court did not abuse its

discretion when it excluded the testimony of the second neighbor

about Corley’s interest in contacting law enforcement.

      5. Finally, Corley contends that the prosecuting attorney made

improper comments to the jury that deprived her of a fair trial.8 But

Corley did not object to these comments at trial, so this enumeration


      8 Both in her brief and in her motion for new trial (as amended), the only

“comment[ ]” that Corley mentions is a question posed to a police officer about
having the “unfortunate task[ ] of . . . having to tell these nice folks that their
daughter died.” Corley identifies the other comments only by their page
number in the transcript. As best we can tell, her complaints on appeal seem
to be about statements during the State’s closing argument that prosecuting
attorneys called “the best” police officers to testify, that “[w]e’re not making
this up” in reference to evidence that Corley had offered to lower the amount
of rent she would charge Manuel and Franklin (based on some improvements
that they had made and that they offered to make to Corley’s house), and a
statement that “[e]ither you believe [Franklin], and I think you should, or you
don’t.”
of error is not properly before our Court for review. See Grier v.

State, 
305 Ga. 882, 887
 (3) (
828 SE2d 304
) (2019) (“The

contemporaneous objection rule cannot be avoided by characterizing

trial occurrences as examples of prosecutorial misconduct.”)

(Citation and punctuation omitted.).

      Judgment affirmed in part and vacated in part. Melton, C. J.,
Nahmias, P. J., and Boggs, Peterson, Warren, Bethel, and Ellington,
JJ., concur.



DECIDED MARCH 13, 2020 — Reconsideration denied June 29, 2020.
     Murder. Chatham Superior Court. Before Judge Morse.
     Teri L. Thompson, for appellant.
     Meg E. Heap, District Attorney, Emily C. Puhala, Assistant
District Attorney; Christopher M. Carr, Attorney General, Patricia B.
Attaway Burton, Deputy Attorney General, Paula K. Smith, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Matthew B. Crowder, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee.

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