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308 Ga. 624

842 S.E.2d 869

Styles v. State

Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided May 4, 2020

Supreme Court of Georgia · decided 2020-05-04

Cited by 5 later decisions — most recently December 2023

5 state decisions

Relies on Strickland v. Washington · Jackson v. Virginia · Pruitt v. State

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 2020-05-04

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308 Ga. 624
FINAL COPY

                  S20A0236. STYLES v. THE STATE.


      ELLINGTON, Justice.

      A Brooks County jury found Derrick Styles guilty of felony

murder and other crimes in connection with the shooting death of

Alberto Lumens and the armed robbery of Juan Lumens Garcia.1


      1   Styles and his brother, Michael Styles, were indicted by a Brooks
County grand jury on April 7, 2010, for burglary (Count 1); the felony murder
of Alberto Lumens, predicated on armed robbery (Count 2); the armed robbery
of Alberto Lumens (Count 4); the armed robbery of Juan Lumens Garcia
(Count 6); and three counts of possession of a firearm during the commission
of a felony (Counts 3, 5, and 7). (The indictment shows Garcia’s surname as
“Zelaya,” which appears to be a misnomer.) Following a joint trial on May 16
through 18, 2011, the jury found Styles and his brother guilty on all counts.
On July 12, 2011, the court sentenced Styles to 20 years’ imprisonment for
burglary (Count 1); life imprisonment, consecutive to Count 1, for the felony
murder of Lumens (Count 2); five years’ imprisonment, consecutive to Count
2, for possession of a firearm during commission of the felony murder (Count
3); life imprisonment, consecutive to Count 3, for the armed robbery of Garcia
(Count 6); and five years’ imprisonment, consecutive to Count 6, for possession
of a firearm during commission of the armed robbery (Count 7). The trial court
merged Count 4 with Count 2, and Count 5 with Count 3. Styles filed a notice
of appeal on July 12, 2011, but the record was not transmitted to this Court for
years. Through new counsel, Styles also filed a motion for a new trial on April
7, 2017, and an amended motion for a new trial on October 6, 2017. Following
a hearing, the trial court dismissed Styles’ motion for a new trial on October
26, 2017, finding that it lacked jurisdiction to consider it. Styles filed an
amended notice of appeal on October 19, 2017. The appeal was docketed in this
Court to the term beginning in December 2019 and submitted for decision on
Styles contends that the trial court erred in admitting into evidence

a recording of an inculpatory telephone conversation between

himself and a witness. He also contends that his trial counsel was

ineffective for failing to object to an allegedly improper comment by

the prosecutor during closing argument. Because these claims of

error are without merit, we affirm.

     Viewed in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdicts, the

record shows the following. Lumens and his son, Cesar Lumens,

lived with Garcia in Garcia’s Brooks County home. On the evening

of July 25, 2009, the men had retired to their bedrooms after an

afternoon of drinking beer. Garcia testified that he heard the front

door open followed by the sounds of people talking. He left his

bedroom to investigate and saw three people, two men and one

woman, standing by the front door. Garcia recognized one of the men

as “Nino,” whom he later identified as Cornell Stephens from a

photographic lineup. When Garcia walked toward the front door, the



the briefs. Michael Styles filed a separate appeal, which was docketed to the
April 2020 term.
man with Stephens (later identified as Styles) pointed a gun at

Garcia and demanded money. Garcia refused, and Styles struck him

on the head with the gun. Styles forced Garcia to return to his

bedroom.    Once   there,   Styles   rummaged      through    Garcia’s

belongings; he took a photo album, a ring, a necklace, and Garcia’s

wallet, which contained $400. When Styles turned his back to

Garcia, Garcia pushed him through the doorway and closed the door.

Styles fired twice at the door. Because Garcia had moved away from

the door, the bullets did not strike him. When Garcia felt sure that

the robbers had left, he looked for Lumens. He found Lumens lying

on the bathroom floor, dead from a gunshot wound. Also, the $5,000

in cash that Lumens had kept in his bedroom was gone.

      On July 27, Essie Hollis, the woman who entered the house

with Styles and Stephens, called the police and agreed to be

interviewed by GBI Agent Michael Callahan. Hollis told Agent

Callahan, and also testified at trial, that she ran into Styles and his

brothers, Michael and Jonathan, at a gas station on the night of the

murder. Styles asked her if she wanted to “go make some money
tricking.” Hollis agreed and got into the car with Styles, his brothers,

and a fourth man, Lamar Jones. They stopped to pick up Stephens,

and they dropped Jonathan off. Thereafter, Styles discussed with

Hollis, Stephens, Jones, and his brother, Michael, a plan to rob the

people at Garcia’s house. They agreed that Stephens would take

Hollis to Garcia’s house, Hollis would have sex with the occupants

of the house, find out where the money was kept, and then report

back. According to Hollis, when they arrived at Garcia’s home, she

and Stephens executed the plan as instructed. After having sex with

Lumens, Hollis went back outside, allegedly to get another condom,

and told Styles where he could find money inside the house.

Stephens, Jones, Styles, and Michael walked toward the house while

Hollis got into the car. Hollis said she heard gunshots. She said that

Michael got in the driver’s side of the car. Moments later, she saw

Styles and Jones run from the house toward Stephens and the car.

Once everyone was in the car, Michael sped off.

     Hollis testified that Styles, who had been using cocaine all

evening, was acting “hyped up and crazy.” Styles told her that she
had “better not run [her] mouth” and that he ought to shoot her so

that she could not talk. Hollis testified that Styles was concerned

that he had dropped his gun somewhere near the house and that he

needed to go back and get it. Styles offered Hollis a stolen cell phone,

which she declined. Hollis also testified that a surveillance video

recording that the police had recovered from the gas station showed

her interacting with Styles, his brothers, and Jones. Hollis was

arrested on July 30, for her role in the crimes, and she later pleaded

guilty to robbery.2

      Stephens also pleaded guilty to robbery and testified at trial.

Stephens testified that Styles, Michael, and Jones had asked him to

pimp Hollis to Lumens and Garcia. Stephens testified that, after

Styles picked him up, they all went to Garcia’s home. On the way

there, they talked about committing a robbery. Stephens went inside

the house with Hollis. After Hollis had sex with Lumens, she went


      2 At the time of trial, Hollis, Stephens, and Jones had each pleaded guilty

to robbery for their part in these crimes, but they had yet to be sentenced. The
record indicates that the State had made no promises to them other than to
inform the trial court at sentencing whether they had been cooperating
witnesses.
back outside. Shortly thereafter, Stephens saw Styles and Jones

enter the home; Styles had a gun. Stephens heard gunfire coming

from inside the house and fled to the car. When he returned to the

car, Michael was already in the driver’s seat, and Hollis was in the

back seat. Stephens testified that he heard two or three more shots

from the house, and then Jones and Styles returned to the car. The

five drove off. When they arrived at Styles’ home, Jones took out a

wallet and gave Hollis some money. Thereafter, Stephens drove

Styles back to Garcia’s house to retrieve the gun; after they found it,

they drove to Valdosta. After the crimes, Styles and Michael asked

Stephens where Hollis could be found. Stephens decided to go to the

police because Styles had previously made threats about killing

Hollis. On July 28, Stephens spoke to Agent Callahan about the

crimes.

     Lamar Jones also pleaded guilty to robbery and later testified

at trial. Jones gave testimony corroborating Hollis’ and Stephens’

account of the crimes. He also testified that Hollis told them that

Lumens kept his money in a dresser drawer. When he went inside
the house with Styles, he saw Styles approach Lumens, who was

standing in his bathroom, wrapped in a towel. Styles began yelling

at Lumens, demanding his money. Jones said he did not see Styles

shoot Lumens, but he did see him shooting at Garcia’s bedroom door.

Jones ran outside to the car, followed by Styles, and the group sped

away. Jones also testified that he had participated in another armed

robbery earlier the same day with Styles and one of his other

brothers, Dominique Styles.

     During their investigation of the crimes, the police found a

photograph taken from Lumens’ home in Styles’ car. The police also

found two .380 bullets and five .380 shell casings in Lumens’ home.

One of the shell casings was found on the bathroom floor. Two bullet

holes were found in Garcia’s door. A bullet was recovered from the

door frame and another was recovered from Garcia’s bedroom. A

third bullet was recovered from Lumens’ body. The ballistics expert

who examined the bullets and shell casings testified that the five

shell casings had markings indicating that they had been ejected

from the same gun. The bullets had matching lands and grooves that
also indicated that they had been fired from the same gun. However,

without a gun to test the bullets and casings against, he was unable

to determine if the bullets had been fired from the same gun that

had ejected the shell casings. The medical examiner testified that

Lumens’ cause of death was a gunshot wound to the chest.

     Michael turned himself in on August 25, and Styles was

arrested in Texas on September 22, 2009. Styles elected not to testify

in his defense, but he presented three alibi witnesses.

     1. Styles does not contest the legal sufficiency of the evidence

supporting his convictions. Nevertheless, in accordance with this

Court’s general practice in murder cases, we have reviewed the

record and conclude that, when viewed in the light most favorable

to the verdicts, the evidence presented at trial and summarized

above was sufficient to authorize a rational jury to find Styles guilty

beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes for which he was convicted.

See Jackson v. Virginia, 
443 U. S. 307, 319
 (
99 SCt 2781
, 61 LE2d

560) (1979).

     2. Styles contends that the trial court erred in admitting, over
his objection, a recorded telephone conversation between Hollis and

a man whom she identified at trial as Styles based on her familiarity

with his voice. Styles objected to the admission of the recorded

conversation because, based on a pre-trial statement that Hollis had

given an investigator, Hollis claimed that she had never spoken to

Styles on the phone, did not know his phone number, could not

identify his voice, and believed the caller was Styles because he had

identified himself as Styles. The trial court overruled the objection.

Styles argues the court’s ruling was erroneous because the State had

failed to demonstrate a sufficient basis for identifying Styles’ voice.

     Under the old Evidence Code, which applies in this case, we

held that “[a]lthough voice identification testimony is generally

considered to be direct evidence, Georgia courts have construed such

testimony to be opinion evidence, which, of course, is inadmissible

unless the witness discloses the basis for his opinion.” (Citation and

punctuation omitted.) Brown v. State, 
278 Ga. 369, 371
 (2) (
602 SE2d 834
) (2004). In addition,

     proof of telephone conversations may be admissible in
     evidence when the identity of the person against whom
     the conversation is sought to be admitted is established
     by circumstantial as well as direct evidence. The
     probative value to be accorded such evidence is a matter
     for the jury’s determination.

(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Id.3

     At trial, Hollis admitted that she had not been entirely truthful

when she first spoke with Agent Callahan. She testified that she

had, in fact, spoken with Styles on the phone before. She explained

that she was familiar with his voice because she knew him and she

had spoken with him in person on the night of the crimes.

Additionally,    Styles    made      statements     during     the    phone

conversation from which the jury could infer that he was well-

acquainted with Hollis and that his name was “Derrick” because he

responded to that name. Because the State presented a sufficient

basis for identifying Styles’ voice, the trial court did not err in

admitting into evidence the recorded conversation. See Brown,




     3  Styles was tried before January 1, 2013, so the old Evidence Code
applies in this case. See Graves v. State, 
298 Ga. 551, 553
 (2) n.2 (
783 SE2d 891
) (2016). Authentication of telephone conversations is now governed by
OCGA § 24-9-901.
supra at 371 (2) (trial court correctly allowed victim to testify that

the voice of an assailant she heard but did not see belonged to the

defendant, where testimony concerning voice identification was

based on victim’s previous interactions with defendant and

knowledge of her voice).

      3. Styles contends, for the first time on appeal, that his trial

counsel was constitutionally ineffective when he failed to object

during closing argument when the prosecutor referred to Styles and

his brothers as the “Styles family army.” He contends that the

statement was prejudicial and required reversal because it implied

that Styles was involved in gang activity.

            Generally, when a preserved[4] ineffective assistance

      4 The State contends that this claim of error has been waived because it

was not raised in a valid motion for a new trial. The record shows, however,
that this appeal was the first opportunity that appellate counsel had to raise
the claim. Styles’ trial counsel filed a notice of appeal on July 12, 2011. After
trial counsel was permitted to withdraw from the case on May 5, 2016, new
appellate counsel entered an appearance on June 29, 2016. On April 7, 2017,
new counsel filed a motion for a new trial raising claims of ineffective
assistance. The trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider the motion for a new
trial, however, because the “filing of a notice of appeal divests the trial court of
jurisdiction to alter a judgment while appeal of that judgment is pending.”
(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Pruitt v. State, 
282 Ga. 30, 35
 (5) (
644 SE2d 837
) (2007). The trial court dismissed the motion for a new trial, and this
      of counsel claim is raised for the first time on appeal, we
      must remand for an evidentiary hearing on the issue. But
      remand is not mandated if we can determine from the
      record that the defendant cannot establish ineffective
      assistance of counsel under the two-prong test set forth in
      Strickland [v. Washington, 
466 U. S. 668
 (
104 SCt 2052
,
      80 LE2d 674) (1984)].

(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Anthony v. State, 
302 Ga. 546, 554
 (V) (
807 SE2d 891
) (2017). An evidentiary hearing is not

necessary in this case because we can determine from the record

that this claim of error is without merit.

      The trial transcript shows that the prosecutor, while

recounting the testimony of the State’s witnesses during closing

argument, said: “Lamar Jones is a lieutenant in the Styles’ family

army here.” That colorful characterization of Jones’ relationship

with the Styles brothers was based on Jones’ testimony that he had

participated in the charged armed robbery with Styles and his

brother Michael and a prior armed robbery with Styles and his

brother Dominique. There was no allegation by the State of gang


appeal is therefore new counsel’s first opportunity to raise a claim of ineffective
assistance of trial counsel. Accordingly, the claim of error is not waived. See
Ruiz v. State, 
286 Ga. 146, 148-149
 (2) (b) (
686 SE2d 253
) (2009).
activity or affiliation during the course of the trial.

     “A closing argument is to be judged in the context in which it

is made,” and a prosecutor has wide latitude “to argue reasonable

inferences from the evidence.”. Scott v. State, 
290 Ga. 883, 885
 (2)

(
725 SE2d 305
) (2012). That three of the Styles brothers had

participated in armed robberies with Jones was admitted in

evidence. Thus, the prosecutor was afforded wide latitude in arguing

inferences from that evidence, including characterizing Styles and

his brothers as an “army” of robbers. See Patterson v. State, 
124 Ga. 408, 409
 (1) (
52 SE 534
) (1905) (“It is quite natural, and by no means

unusual, for an advocate, in discussing the facts of a case before a

jury, to indulge to some extent in imagery and illustration.

Sometimes a simile may be inapt, or the metaphor mixed, or the

expression may be hyperbolical. What the law forbids is the

introduction into a case, by way of argument, of facts not in the

record and calculated to prejudice the accused.” (citation and

punctuation omitted)). Because the argument was permissible,

defense counsel was not constitutionally deficient for failing to object
to it. See Faust v. State, 
302 Ga. 211, 220
 (4) (c) (
805 SE2d 826
)

(2017) (Where the prosecutor’s argument was based on permissible

inferences and supported by the facts in evidence, trial counsel’s

failure to make a meritless objection to the State’s closing argument

was not evidence of ineffective assistance.).

     Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.



                      DECIDED MAY 4, 2020.
     Murder. Brooks Superior Court. Before Judge Hardy.
     Conger & Smith, Gregory D. Smith, for appellant.
     Bradfield M. Shealy, District Attorney, J. David Miller,
Michelle T. Harrison, Assistant District Attorneys; Christopher M.
Carr, Attorney General, Patricia B. Attaway Burton, Deputy Attorney
General, Paula K. Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General,
Matthew M. Youn, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

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