Carson v. State

FINAL COPY

                 S20A0288. CARSON v. THE STATE.


      ELLINGTON, Justice.

      Anderson Carson was tried before a Fulton County jury and

convicted of the malice murder of Lee Sokol and the robbery by force

of Fred Hickson.1 Carson contends on appeal that the trial court

erred in (1) denying his motion to sever, (2) appearing to assist the

State in its prosecution by recommending that the State procure

material witness warrants, (3) permitting the introduction into



      1 The   crimes occurred on June 8 and 9, 2009. On February 9, 2010,
Carson was indicted for the malice murder, felony murder predicated on
aggravated assault, and aggravated assault of Sokol. In the same indictment,
Carson was charged with the robbery by force and battery of Fred Hickson.
Carson was tried before a jury in January 2011. The jury found Carson guilty
of malice murder, felony murder, aggravated assault, and robbery by force, and
not guilty of battery. The trial court sentenced Carson to life imprisonment for
malice murder and to a consecutive sentence of ten years for robbery by force.
The count of aggravated assault merged with the count of malice murder. The
trial court indicated that the count of felony murder merged with the count of
malice murder, although the felony murder was actually vacated by operation
of law. See Lucky v. State, 

 (2) (

) (2010). Carson
filed a timely motion for new trial, which he amended on September 6, 2013.
The trial court denied the motion on February 8, 2019. Carson filed a timely
notice of appeal, and his appeal was docketed to the term beginning in
December 2019 and submitted for decision on the briefs.
evidence of Carson’s prior conviction for aggravated assault, (4)

allowing the State to introduce into evidence a booking photograph

without providing the photograph to the defense in accordance with

the State’s discovery obligations, (5) denying his motion to exclude

his statements to a police detective, (6) denying his motion to

suppress, and (7) failing to strike a prospective juror for cause.

Carson also contends that the evidence was insufficient to support

the jury’s verdicts. We affirm for the reasons set forth below.

     Viewed in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdicts, the

evidence presented at trial shows the following. On the morning of

June 9, 2009, a teacher at E. Rivers Elementary School in Atlanta

looked out of his classroom window and saw a man’s body lying in

the courtyard. City of Atlanta police officers responded to the scene

around 7:30 a.m. The decedent, later identified as Sokol, had

suffered severe head wounds. A bloody rock was lying two to three

feet away from the body.

     Detective William Murdock noticed that cameras had been

placed around the school and asked Atlanta Public Schools for a copy
of the video. After speaking with the teacher who discovered the

body, Murdock and other officers canvassed the school and nearby

areas but were unable to locate any additional witnesses.

     Later in the day, Detective Murdock attended the autopsy of

the victim. The medical examiner determined that Sokol had died

from blunt force injuries to the head. While Detective Murdock was

at the medical examiner’s office, he received a report that Carson

had been arrested at approximately 12:15 a.m. the night before near

Piedmont Hospital on a charge of robbery of a pedestrian. That

location was less than a mile from the elementary school. The

sequence of violent crimes stood out to Detective Murdock because

those types of crime were rare in that area of the city.

     Detective Murdock arranged for the Fulton County sheriff to

have Carson remanded to his custody for purposes of an interview,

which occurred on June 9. Before the interview, Detective Murdock

received two video images recorded by the school’s cameras. One

frame, taken at 10:43 p.m. on June 8, showed a man wearing all

black clothing, white shoes, and carrying a light colored bag. The
other image, time stamped 10:48 p.m., showed another man wearing

long dark or blue shorts and a hooded sweatshirt.

     During the interview, Detective Murdock read Carson his

Miranda2 rights. Carson then denied having been anywhere near

the elementary school. Carson also said that he had been wearing

jean shorts and a “hoodie sweatshirt” on the night of his arrest.

Detective Murdock applied for and obtained a search warrant for the

clothes Carson had been wearing when he was arrested. A GBI

forensic analyst testified that DNA obtained from blood on Carson’s

clothes, as well as from the rock found at the scene, originated from

Sokol.

     Three days after interviewing Carson, Detective Murdock

received 12 hours of video recordings from the elementary school’s

security cameras. Portions of the video recordings were played for

the jury at trial. None of the cameras had been pointed at the

courtyard area where Sokol’s body was found. However, a man

wearing long shorts and a light-colored hooded sweatshirt was


     2 Miranda v. Arizona, 

 (

, 16 LE2d 694) (1966).
shown entering the school property after 10:39 p.m. A second man,

dressed in black clothes and wearing white tennis shoes, was seen

at 10:43 p.m. walking into the courtyard and off camera. The second

man’s clothing matched that worn by Sokol. The man wearing a

hood walked in and out of the view of the cameras several times,

including walking into and out of the courtyard area. The man with

the hood was last seen on the school’s video at 11:31 p.m.

     The State also presented evidence of the robbery that occurred

the night before Sokol’s body was discovered. In the early morning

of June 9, 2009, Fred Hickson and his cousin left Piedmont Hospital

and waited for their cab to arrive. Carson came from behind Hickson

and punched him in the face. After Hickson turned around in shock,

Carson took Hickson’s jacket and ran. Hickson and his cousin ran

after Carson, who picked up a brick and confronted the two men.

     A City of Atlanta police officer was driving by Piedmont

Hospital shortly after midnight on June 9 when he saw Hickson and

his cousin chasing Carson through the parking lot. The officer

stopped the two cousins, and then Carson. Carson was arrested and
taken to jail. Hickson’s jacket was recovered at the scene.

     The State also introduced evidence of a similar transaction.

Jory Hardin testified that on December 1, 2003, he was working as

a uniformed police officer with the Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid

Transit Authority. When Officer Hardin opened the Civic Center

station at 4:00 that morning, Carson hit Officer Hardin in the head

with a brick.

     1. Carson claims that the evidence was insufficient for a

rational trier of fact to find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of

the malice murder, felony murder, and aggravated assault of Sokol

because the State relied on circumstantial evidence which did not

exclude all reasonable hypotheses other than his guilt.

     Under both former OCGA § 24-4-6, in effect at the time of
     [Carson’s] trial, and present OCGA § 24-14-6, in order to
     convict [Carson] of the crimes based solely upon
     circumstantial evidence, the proven facts had to be
     consistent with the hypothesis of his guilt and exclude
     every reasonable hypothesis save that of his guilt. Not
     every hypothesis is reasonable, and the evidence does not
     have to exclude every conceivable inference or hypothesis;
     it need rule out only those that are reasonable. The
     reasonableness of an alternative hypothesis raised by a
     defendant is a question principally for the jury, and when
     the jury is authorized to find that the evidence, though
     circumstantial, is sufficient to exclude every reasonable
     hypothesis save that of the accused’s guilt, this Court will
     not disturb that finding unless it is insupportable as a
     matter of law.

Cochran v. State, 

 (1) (

) (2019)

(citation and punctuation omitted).

     Carson argues that the evidence failed to exclude the

reasonable possibility that other persons killed Sokol or that

Carson’s involvement in Sokol’s death, if any, did not rise to the level

of malice murder, felony murder, or aggravated assault. However, a

jury could have reasonably inferred from the evidence that Sokol

was bludgeoned to death with the bloody rock found at the scene.

DNA evidence showed that Sokol’s blood was on Carson’s clothes. It

could also be inferred that the two persons seen before midnight on

the school’s video were Carson and Sokol. Although Carson points

to Detective Murdock’s testimony that the school’s video showed

several persons on school property around 6:00 a.m., which was

before Sokol’s body was discovered, Carson does not point to

evidence showing that those persons came into contact with Sokol.
On the other hand, the evidence showed that Carson had been in

contact with Sokol hours earlier given that he was wearing clothing

containing Sokol’s blood when he was arrested on the robbery charge

shortly after midnight. The evidence, though circumstantial, was

sufficient to exclude every reasonable hypothesis other than

Carson’s guilt, see former OCGA § 24-4-6, and for a rational trier of

fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Carson was guilty of the

malice murder, felony murder, and aggravated assault of Sokol. See

Jackson v. Virginia, 

 (III) (B) (

, 61

LE2d 560) (1979).

     2. Carson contends that the trial court erred in denying his

motion to sever the charges alleging the robbery and battery of

Hickson from the charges alleging the murder, felony murder, and

aggravated assault of Sokol. In a related claim of error, Carson

contends that the trial court erred by characterizing the charged

offenses as a “crime spree” while hearing argument on the motion to

sever.

     (a) We first consider whether the trial court erred in denying
the motion to sever. Where offenses are joined in a single indictment,

     a defendant has a right to severance where the offenses
     are joined solely on the ground that they are of the same
     or similar character because of the great risk of prejudice
     from a joint disposition of unrelated charges. However,
     where the joinder is based upon the same conduct or on a
     series of acts connected together or constituting parts of a
     single scheme or plan, severance lies within the sound
     discretion of the trial judge since the facts in each case are
     likely to be unique.

Simmons v. State, 

 (4) (

) (2007) (citation

and punctuation omitted). If severance is not mandatory, it is

nevertheless “incumbent upon the trial court to determine whether

severance was necessary to achieve a fair determination of

appellant’s guilt or innocence as to each offense.” Hickman v. State,

 (2) (

) (2016) (citation omitted). To

make that determination, “[t]he court should consider whether in

view of the number of offenses charged and the complexity of the

evidence to be offered, the trier of fact will be able to distinguish the

evidence and apply the law intelligently as to each offense.” 

 (2) (citation and punctuation omitted).

     In this case, the crimes against Sokol and Hickson occurred
only a few blocks apart and within a short period of time. During

these incidents, Carson hit Sokol on the head with a rock and picked

up a brick and threatened Hickson. “Severance is generally not

warranted where the crimes charged occurred over the same period

of time and stem from a course of continuing conduct.” Hubbard v.

State, 

 (2) (

) (2002). See Strozier v.

State, 

 (5) (a) (

) (2003) (finding no abuse

of discretion in court’s failure to sever charges that were part of a

single “crime spree”).   Carson’s arrest for the robbery was also

integral to Carson’s identification as a suspect in the murder and

was part of the series of events that led to the DNA testing of

Carson’s clothes. See Stewart v. State, 

 (3) (

) (1977) (It was not an abuse of discretion to refuse to sever

charges that “were part of a continuous transaction conducted over

a relatively short time, and from the nature of the entire transaction,

it would be almost impossible to present to a jury evidence of one of

the crimes without also permitting evidence of the other[.]” (citation

and punctuation omitted)).
     As the robbery and murder charges were not joined solely

because they were of the same or similar character, severance was

not mandatory. See Green v. State, 

 (2) (

) (2012) (“[O]ffenses have not been joined solely because they are

of the same or similar character when evidence of one offense can be

admitted upon the trial of another[.]” (citation, punctuation and

emphasis omitted)). “There is no evidence in this case that the

combined trial of the charges confused or misled the jury, and the

verdict itself, including [Carson’s] acquittal for [battery], shows that

the jury fully understood the law and evidence.” Heard v. State, 

 (4) (

) (2010) (citation and punctuation

omitted). The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the

motion to sever.

     (b) Carson also contends that the trial court “erred by

characterizing the unrelated events as a crime spree where the State

had not characterized the events as such.” During the motion

hearing, the State argued that the trial court should not grant the

motion to sever because, among other things, the events underlying
the robbery and battery charges occurred “within moments of the

murder . . . [eight-tenths] of a mile away . . . [constituting] a second

violent crime in . . . [Carson’s] plan for the night.” The trial court

then asked, “[y]ou’re saying it’s a crime spree?” The prosecutor

responded, “it is two violent crimes right there together . . . almost

within 20 minutes of each other and within three blocks[.]”

     Carson does not cite any authority for the proposition that a

trial court cannot ask counsel to clarify an argument, and we are not

aware of any. Nor does Carson show that the trial court

misunderstood the State’s position. This claim of error has no merit.

     3. Carson contends that the trial court erred in appearing to

assist the State in the prosecution of its case by recommending that

the State secure material witness warrants for its witnesses. The

record shows that, during the course of the trial, the court asked the

State to call its next witness. Rather than call a witness, the

prosecutor asked to approach and a bench conference followed. The

trial court sent the jury out and then said that “[i]f the State needs

a material witness warrant, they need to get it to me right now. . . .
Get people out looking. Otherwise call the rest of your witnesses in

early.” The trial court then ordered a recess for an “early lunch.”

Carson contends that this series of events, to which he interposed

no objection, violated the trial court’s duty under OCGA § 17-8-57

not to intimate its opinion of the evidence during the trial of the case

and constituted at least the appearance of impropriety in advising

the prosecution how to proceed with its case.

     In context, the trial court’s comments to the State were taken

with a view to avoid further delay in the proceedings and were not a

comment on the evidence or an attempt to help the State with the

prosecution. Nor did OCGA § 17-8-573 apply to the trial court’s

comments as those comments were made outside the presence of the

jury. See Bamberg v. State, — Ga. —, — (5) n.12 (

)

(2020) (“[T]he prohibitions found in OCGA § 17-8-57 do not apply

when the complained of comments are made outside the presence of




     3 OCGA § 17-8-57, “as amended in 2015, applies to appeals decided after

2015.” Bamberg v. State, — Ga. —, — (5) (

) (2020).
the jury.” (citation and punctuation omitted)). Carson shows no

error.

     4. Carson contends that the trial court erred in allowing the

State to introduce Carson’s prior conviction for aggravated assault.

At the time of Carson’s 2011 trial, before introducing evidence of a

“similar transaction” the State was required to show that (1) the

evidence was being admitted for a proper purpose, (2) there was

sufficient evidence to establish that the accused committed the

independent offense or act, and (3) there was a sufficient connection

or similarity between the independent offense or act and the crime

charged so that proof of the former tends to prove the latter.

Williams v. State, 

 (2) (b) (

) (1991). We

review the admission of similar transaction evidence for abuse of

discretion. Pareja v. State, 

 (

) (2009).

     Carson does not contest that the similar transaction was

admitted for a proper purpose, which in this case was to show bent

of mind and course of conduct. See Scruggs v. State, 

 (2) (

) (2014).4 Carson argues that the State

nevertheless failed to carry its burden of showing that Carson

committed the similar offense because Officer Hardin was not

certain of the name or identity of his assailant. During his testimony

at trial, Officer Hardin initially said that it was “possibly” Carson

who hit him with a brick over seven years earlier. However, after

the State refreshed Officer’s Hardin’s memory with the police report,

he recalled that Anderson Carson was the name of the person he

identified as his attacker shortly after the incident. Thus, the State

sufficiently showed that Carson assaulted Officer Hardin. See

Rucker v. State, 

 (5) (

) (1982) (a

witness may use a document to refresh his memory and then speak

from his recollection as refreshed); former OCGA § 24-9-69 (effective

until January 1, 2013) (“A witness may refresh and assist his

memory by the use of any written instrument or memorandum,




      4 As we have explained, “bent of mind” and “course of conduct” are not

proper purposes for the admission of other acts evidence under OCGA § 24-4-
404 (b) of the current Evidence Code. See Brooks v. State, 

 (2)
(

) (2016).
provided he shall finally speak from his recollection thus refreshed

or shall be willing to swear positively from the paper.”).

     Carson also claims that the trial court erred in allowing the

State to introduce the similar transaction because there was no

evidence that the previous assault and the later assault of Sokol

occurred in a “like manner.” The proper focus in the assessment of

similar transaction evidence at the time of Carson’s trial was “on the

similarities, not the differences, between the separate act and the

crimes in question.” Johnson v. State, 

 (2) (

) (2011) (citation omitted). In both incidents the victims were

struck on the head at night with blunt objects not commonly wielded

as a weapon, specifically a brick and a rock. See Sport v. State, 

 (1) (

) (1985) (prior acts evidence showing

that defendant shot another person the day before the murder with

a similar weapon was admissible to show “bent of mind and

propensity for use of a pistol”); Saylors v. State, 

 (7)

(

) (1983) (trial court properly admitted “prior conduct

involving knives”). The trial court did not abuse its discretion in
allowing the evidence.

     5. Carson claims that the trial court erred in allowing the State

to introduce a booking photograph of Carson over his objection that

the State had not provided the photograph to the defense in response

to his request for discovery. The photograph shows Carson’s face and

shoulders and that he was wearing, as described by Detective

Murdock, “a hooded top of some sort.”

     OCGA § 17-16-4 (a) (3) (A)5 generally requires that the

prosecuting attorney allow the defendant to inspect and copy, no

later than ten days before trial, the photographs, among other

objects, that the State has within its possession, custody, or control

and intends to use as evidence at trial in its case-in-chief or in


     5 OCGA § 17-16-4 (a) (3) (A) provides in pertinent part:

            [T]he prosecuting attorney shall, no later than ten days prior
     to trial, or as otherwise ordered by the court, permit the defendant
     at a time agreed to by the parties or ordered by the court to inspect
     and copy or photograph books, papers, documents, photographs,
     tangible objects, audio and visual tapes, films and recordings, or
     copies or portions thereof . . . which are within the possession,
     custody, or control of the state or prosecution and are intended for
     use by the prosecuting attorney as evidence in the prosecution’s
     case-in-chief or rebuttal at the trial or were obtained from or
     belong to the defendant.
rebuttal. “[T]he State may be prohibited from introducing evidence

that was not timely disclosed only upon a showing of both prejudice

to the defendant and bad faith by the State. See OCGA § 17-16-6[.]”6

Thompson v. State, 

 (3) (a) (

) (2014)

(citation omitted).

     Carson argues that he was prejudiced in that he was unable to

prepare for the “damaging evidence” of a picture showing him

wearing clothes that were later shown to have the deceased’s blood

on them. But the booking photograph was cumulative of other

evidence. An individual who worked at the jail testified as to the

clothing Carson was recorded as wearing when he was booked.

Detective Murdock testified that Carson told him that he had been

wearing a grey hoodie and jean shorts at the time of his arrest.



     6 OCGA § 17-16-6 provides in pertinent part:

           If at any time during the course of the proceedings it is
     brought to the attention of the court that the state has failed to
     comply with the requirements of this article, the court may order
     the state to permit the discovery or inspection, interview of the
     witness, grant a continuance, or, upon a showing of prejudice and
     bad faith, prohibit the state from introducing the evidence not
     disclosed or presenting the witness not disclosed, or may enter
     such other order as it deems just under the circumstances.
Furthermore, the State introduced the actual clothing that Carson

wore when he was booked. As Carson does not show he was

prejudiced, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its

discretion in the admission of the booking photograph. See Swanson

v. State, 

 (3) (

) (2007) (appellant was not

prejudiced by the State’s alleged discovery violation in failing to

provide him with cell phone call logs as the evidence was cumulative

of direct testimony). See also Hawkins v. State, 

, 305-

306 (4) (b) (

) (2018) (admission of screenshot evidence

that was not provided by the State to the defense more than ten days

before trial was cumulative of witness testimony and not prejudicial

to the defense).

     6. Carson claims that the trial court erred in denying his

motion to exclude the statements he made to police officers in his

June 9, 2009 interview.

     In ruling on the admissibility of an in-custody statement,
     the trial court must look to the totality of the
     circumstances to decide whether the statement was made
     freely and voluntarily. The trial court’s factual findings
     and     credibility  determinations       regarding    the
     admissibility of in-custody statements will be upheld on
     appeal unless clearly erroneous. Generally, if there is
     evidence supporting the trial court’s decision to admit
     statements, it will be upheld on appeal.

Milinavicius v. State, 

 (2) (

) (2012)

(citations omitted).

     At the pre-trial Jackson-Denno7 hearing, the trial court

considered Carson’s motion to exclude the in-custody statements he

made to Detective Murdock on June 9, 2009 and December 2, 2009.

The trial court allowed Carson’s statements from the June interview

to be admitted at trial. The trial court suppressed Carson’s

statements in the December interview other than for purposes of

rebuttal.

     With respect to the June interview, Detective Murdock

testified at the hearing that after Carson was released into his

custody by the Fulton County sheriff, he interviewed Carson at a

police station, where he read Carson his Miranda rights. According

to Detective Murdock, he asked Carson if he understood those rights



     7 Jackson v. Denno, 

 (

, 12 LE2d 908) (1964).
and if he wished to speak without a lawyer. Carson then agreed to

speak.

     Carson argues that Detective Murdock’s hearing testimony

“was in conflict” and so could not support a finding that his custodial

statements were voluntary. We disagree. The inconsistencies in

Detective Murdock’s testimony alleged by Carson pertain to the

December interview, not the June interview. Nor did the trial court

suppress Carson’s statements in the December interview because it

found that Detective Murdock’s testimony at the motion hearing

lacked credibility.8

     Carson also contends that the June interview was not

sufficiently documented. Testimony showed that due to technical

problems the June interview was not recorded. Nor did Detective

Murdock obtain a written waiver of Carson’s Miranda rights. It is

the better practice to record the reading of the Miranda warning and

the defendant’s waiver. See Humphreys v. State, 

 (6)


     8 The trial court suppressed the statements from the December interview

because Detective Murdock told Carson he was there to talk about the robbery
and failed to inform Carson that he was being charged with murder.
(

) (2010), disapproved on other grounds in Willis v.

State, 

 (

) (2018). The trial court was

nevertheless entitled to base its ruling on the testimony and

credibility of Detective Murdock. See Butler v. State, 

 (2) (

) (2013) (“[T]he law does not require that the

voluntariness of a statement be proved by a recording of the

interview.” (citations omitted)); Spain v. State, 

 (1)

(

) (1979) (In the absence of a written waiver of

constitutional rights, a court may still find from the totality of the

evidence that the State carried its burden of showing waiver.). The

trial court did not err in denying Carson’s motion to exclude his

statements in the June interview.

     7. Carson contends that the trial court erred in denying his

motion to suppress the search warrant for his clothes because the

probable cause for the search was derived from information

fabricated by Detective Murdock and included in the affidavit

supporting the issuance of the search warrant.

     In reviewing the trial court’s grant or denial of a motion
     to suppress, we apply the well-established principles that
     the trial court’s findings as to disputed facts will be
     upheld unless clearly erroneous and the trial court’s
     application of the law to undisputed facts is subject to de
     novo review, keeping in mind that a magistrate’s decision
     to issue a search warrant based on a finding of probable
     cause is entitled to substantial deference by a reviewing
     court.

Mizell v. State, 

 (2) (

) (2018) (citation

and punctuation omitted).

     The relevant portion of the affidavit states that Carson “was

arrested at 12[:]20 a.m. approximately 3 blocks from the scene of the

murder. Mr. Carson was wearing the same clothing as that a person

of interest was seen wearing on video captured from the school’s

video system.” Carson argues that Detective Murdock’s assertion

that Carson was wearing the same clothes as the person of interest

was knowingly false because the detective had not then seen

Carson’s clothes. “[I]f a court determines that an affidavit contains

material false representations or omissions, the false statements

must be deleted, the omitted truthful material must be included,

and the affidavit must be reexamined to determine whether
probable cause exists to issue a warrant.” Moss v. State, 

 (3) (

) (2002) (punctuation and footnote

omitted).

     The evidence showed that Carson told Detective Murdock

during the June 9 interview that he had been wearing a hoodie and

jean shorts the previous evening. Before submitting the affidavit in

support of the warrant for Carson’s clothes, Detective Murdock

viewed a photograph captured from the school’s video cameras

depicting a person wearing shorts and a hooded sweatshirt on school

property the night before. Thus, the trial court could conclude from

the evidence that the detective’s statement that Carson had been

“wearing the same clothing” as a person of interest had a factual

basis.   Although Carson contends that the trial court erred in

accepting the testimony of the detective as to what Carson said

about his clothes during the June interview, it was for the trial court

to assess the detective’s credibility. See Mizell, 

 (2)

(“[T]he trial court’s findings on disputed facts and credibility must

be accepted unless clearly erroneous.” (citation and punctuation
omitted)). Carson shows no error.

      8. Lastly, we consider Carson’s claim that the trial court erred

in denying his motion to strike a prospective juror for cause.

Pretermitting whether the trial court erred as alleged, Carson

cannot show harm. In assessing harm arising from a trial court’s

erroneous refusal to excuse a prospective juror, at issue is “whether

any unqualified juror was seated as the ultimate result of errors

with respect to jurors challenged for cause.” Willis, 

(11) (a) (citation and punctuation omitted). Here, the prospective

juror whom the trial court refused to excuse was not seated on the

jury.9 Nor does Carson show that any unqualified juror was seated.

Accordingly, Carson does not show reversible error. See Willis, 

 (11) (a). See also Johnson v. State, 

, 679



      9 It is not clear from the record why the prospective juror was not seated

as a juror. But even assuming that Carson used a preemptive strike to remove
the prospective juror, he cannot show harm. See Welbon v. State, 

 (2) (

) (2018) (if trial counsel had moved to strike the
prospective juror, any error by the trial court in denying the motion to strike
would have been harmless because the appellant “used one of his peremptory
strikes to remove that same prospective juror from the panel from which the
twelve-person jury was chosen, and he [did not show] that any challenged juror
who served on his jury was unqualified”).
(2) (

) (2019) (As appellant did not argue “that any of

the jurors who ultimately served on the jury at her trial were

unqualified[,] . . . even if [appellant] could establish that [the

prospective juror was] impermissibly biased and unqualified to

serve on the jury, she cannot show that she was harmed by the trial

court’s failure to strike [the prospective juror] for cause.”).

     Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.



                      DECIDED MAY 18, 2020.
     Murder. Fulton Superior Court. Before Judge Newkirk.
     Viveca B. Famber, for appellant.
     Paul L. Howard, Jr., District Attorney, Lyndsey H. Rudder,
Aslean Z. Eaglin, Assistant District Attorneys; Christopher M. Carr,
Attorney General, Patricia B. Attaway Burton, Deputy Attorney
General, Paula K. Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Alex M.
Bernick, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.