Public-domain · open source
OpenJurist

309 Ga. 1

Hamilton v. State

Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided June 1, 2020

Supreme Court of Georgia · decided 2020-06-01

Cited by 5 later decisions — most recently August 2024

5 state decisions

Relies on Jackson v. Virginia · Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. · Harper v. State

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 2020-06-01

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

309 Ga. 1
FINAL COPY

               S20A0483. HAMILTON v. THE STATE.



      BOGGS, Justice.

      At a 2018 jury trial, Rodney Hamilton was convicted of felony

murder based upon aggravated battery, arising out of the death of

his three-year-old adopted daughter, Tamia. He appeals, asserting

insufficiency of the evidence and error in the admission of expert

testimony from Dr. Mary Case regarding Tamia’s brain injury. For

the reasons stated below, we affirm.1

      1. Construed in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdicts,2



      1 The crimes occurred on January 30, 2015. On July 22, 2015, a Gwinnett

County grand jury indicted Hamilton for felony murder and aggravated
battery. At a trial from January 29 to February 2, 2018, a jury found Hamilton
guilty of both charges. The trial court sentenced Hamilton to life imprisonment
without the possibility of parole for felony murder and merged the aggravated
battery count. On March 5, 2018, Hamilton’s trial counsel filed a motion for
new trial, which subsequent counsel amended on December 17, 2018. A
hearing on the amended motion for new trial was held on December 18, 2018,
and the motion was denied on January 15, 2019. Hamilton filed a timely notice
of appeal on February 13, 2019, and the case was docketed in this Court to the
term beginning in December 2019 and orally argued on April 21, 2020.
      2 See Jackson v. Virginia, 
443 U. S. 307, 319
 (III) (B) (
99 SCt 2781
, 61

LE2d 560) (1979).
the evidence presented at trial showed that Hamilton was a stay-at-

home husband and father with two sons and two adopted daughters,

who were his biological nieces. At approximately 4:25 p.m. on

Friday, January 30, 2015, a 911 operator received a call from

Hamilton, who reported that Tamia was unconscious. Hamilton did

not call 911 immediately upon discovering Tamia. He called his wife

at 4:08 and 4:10 p.m., but she did not answer, and although she did

not call him back until 4:21 p.m., he did not call 911 in the

intervening time. Hamilton was on the phone with his wife for two

minutes and forty-three seconds and only then called 911.

     Emergency medical personnel were dispatched at 4:26 p.m.

and arrived approximately three minutes later. Hamilton met the

EMT at the door and told him that Tamia “wouldn’t wake up.” The

EMT went upstairs and made an “extremely quick assessment” of

Tamia. She was lying on her back, her jaw was clenched, she was

biting her tongue, and her pupils were unreactive to light, which

indicated to the EMT that there was “not a whole lot of brain

activity.” Her body was limp except for her clenched jaw, and her
skin was pale blue. Upon questioning, Hamilton indicated that

Tamia had fallen and hit her head four days earlier but had been

acting normally. Based on Tamia’s condition, the EMT carried

Tamia to the ambulance to administer an IV and oxygen and

transported her to the Gwinnett Medical Center. On the way to the

hospital, Tamia’s color improved with the administration of oxygen,

but as the ambulance arrived at the hospital, she began “posturing,”

a condition in which the limbs stiffen involuntarily, indicating an

absence of brain activity or lack of oxygen to the brain. At the

hospital, doctors inserted a breathing tube, administered anti-

seizure medication, and performed a CT scan of Tamia’s head.

     Tamia was airlifted to Children’s Healthcare of Atlanta,

Scottish Rite Hospital. Dr. Greg Melnikoff, the treating emergency

room physician at Scottish Rite, determined that the earlier CT scan

showed catastrophic damage to Tamia’s brain. Tamia had a large

subdural hematoma from a torn vein that caused her brain to shift

inside her skull; the hematoma caused an “infarction,” or brain

death, in part of the brain due to interrupted blood flow. The CT
scan also showed a missing ventricle from damage and blood

accumulation, as well as an uncal herniation, which occurs when

swelling forces the brain stem out of the skull through the small

opening at the spinal column. Dr. Melnikoff concluded that Tamia’s

injuries were so severe that there was very little that could be done

to help her. A craniectomy did not improve Tamia’s condition, and

she was kept on life support for six days so that her organs could be

donated before her death on February 5.

     Dr. Melnikoff testified that Tamia’s injury was a “major force

injury . . . something massive” and that Tamia could not have been

behaving normally after it occurred. The lack of external injuries

was not unusual, in Dr. Melnikoff’s opinion, as Tamia’s injury was

consistent with a “very rapid acceleration and deceleration or kind

of rotational force” injury — for example, a fall from a second-story

railing to the floor below, or a car crash in which a person was

wearing a seatbelt but suffered rapid deceleration. Dr. Melnikoff

testified that nothing that Hamilton told him about Tamia’s history,

including his report that “about a week earlier she had fallen down
. . . a flight of stairs,” explained her severe injury and that it would

be abnormal for Tamia to have suffered this type of injury, be fine

for a week, and then have a sudden onset of symptoms. He

acknowledged that rebleeding of an old bleed could occur but

explained that rebleeding was generally asymptomatic and non-life-

threatening and would not produce severe symptoms without “a

new, separate event.”

     Dr. Melnikoff was the first physician to speak with Hamilton

at Scottish Rite, and he testified that their conversation seemed so

unusual to him that he made a record of it. Instead of asking how

Tamia was doing, as most parents did in such circumstances,

Hamilton immediately launched, unsolicited, into a detailed account

of everything that had happened since Tamia allegedly fell down the

stairs. Dr. Melnikoff had to interrupt Hamilton to talk to him about

Tamia’s condition, and Hamilton did not interact with, question, or

comment on the doctor’s explanation about how critical her

condition was. The doctor testified that he had never seen anyone

react to bad news in this “flat” and emotionless way, and he felt that
Hamilton’s reaction was “kind of off.” As a result of Hamilton’s odd

behavior and lack of a reasonable explanation for Tamia’s severe

injury, Dr. Melnikoff referred Tamia’s case to the hospital’s child

abuse team.

     Dr. Tamika Bryant, a Scottish Rite physician specializing in

child abuse pediatrics, examined Tamia and reviewed her medical

records in response to the request from Dr. Melnikoff. She concluded

that Tamia’s injury was caused by “a violent, very significant force”

to her head. Hamilton’s account that Tamia was behaving normally

when he laid her down for her nap at 1:45 p.m. and was suddenly in

critical condition two hours later did not make sense to Dr. Bryant,

“without any sort of intervening event happening.” In her opinion, a

fall down the stairs a week earlier could not have produced the

traumatic effects noted if the child were acting normally two hours

earlier. Dr. Bryant also did not believe that Tamia’s brain injury was

due to “rebleeding” of an older injury, which is typically not life-

threatening.

     Dr. Carol Terry, the chief medical examiner for Gwinnett
County, performed the autopsy on Tamia’s body and prepared

specimens of brain, eye, and spinal cord tissue for microscopic

examination. Dr. Terry noted no external injuries or injuries to the

spine or neck. She observed swelling of the brain and consequent

brain death due to deprivation of blood flow and oxygen,

hemorrhaging in the retinas, and a torn area of the retina,

consistent with trauma. Dr. Terry saw no evidence of a chronic bleed

with an acute component. She concluded that Tamia suffered a

traumatic head injury and closed head trauma, either through

impact or inertia, and that her death was a homicide. Like Dr.

Melnikoff and Dr. Bryant, Dr. Terry concluded that Tamia’s injuries

were inconsistent with either a fall down a staircase, as Hamilton

claimed, or any other sort of incident, including a fall, occurring a

week prior to symptoms developing. Dr. Terry also concluded that

Hamilton’s story that Tamia was fine when put down for a nap and

later woke up in a tremendously deteriorated state was not a

reasonable explanation for Tamia’s brain injuries.

     Dr. Mary Case, a forensic pathologist and neuropathologist
who testified for the State at Hamilton’s trial, stated that she

reviewed Tamia’s file, including all her medical records from birth

forward and all other records associated with the case. She testified

to the presence of hemorrhages in Tamia’s brain and eyes, which Dr.

Case said were typical of injuries inflicted by “very severe” forces on

the head. Dr. Case also tested the brain sections preserved by the

medical examiner with a “beta amyloid precursor protein stain”

(“BAPP stain”) to look for damaged “axons” or nerve fibers in the

brain. Dr. Case testified that with this test, she discovered two types

of axonal damage: traumatic and hypoxic (lack of oxygen). The right

side of Tamia’s brain showed traumatic damage, while the left side

showed only hypoxic damage. Based upon all this information, Dr.

Case concluded that Tamia suffered a closed-head injury or inertial

brain injury, and that the manner of death was homicide. She

further testified that the BAPP stain procedure was not necessary

to make the diagnosis, but illustrated the process of injury. Dr. Case

discounted the possibility of “rebleeding” of an older injury. She also

testified that the retinal hemorrhages she observed were due to
trauma, that Tamia could not have had a “lucid interval” after the

fatal injury, and that the injury could not have been caused by a fall

down the stairs.

     Hamilton testified in his own defense and recounted that

Tamia fell down a staircase on January 23 but did not cry and did

not appear to be injured. He further testified that on the day of

Tamia’s fatal injury, nothing seemed to be wrong with her. He stated

that when he put her down for her nap she was “weepy and

moaning” and did not want to go to sleep, but he convinced her to

take a nap. Hamilton said that when he went to wake her after the

two older children returned from school, he saw that she had one

arm in the air, was biting her tongue, and would not wake up.

Hamilton stated that he told the doctors on multiple occasions that

he knew of nothing that had happened to Tamia other than her fall

down the stairs.

     Hamilton’s wife testified for the defense that when she was

home for a short time two days before Tamia’s fatal injury,

“everything was fine at the house.” She also testified that Hamilton
had told her about Tamia’s fall down the stairs at the time it

occurred.3

     Hamilton also presented the testimony of Dr. Jonathan Arden,

an expert in forensic pathology. Dr. Arden testified that his

examination of the medical records, including CT scans and

microscopic slides, showed not only an acute subdural hemorrhage

that was very recent, within hours or a day of Tamia’s

hospitalization, but also an older hemorrhage that Dr. Arden

concluded could have occurred up to a week earlier, as well as “old

membrane” that was at least several weeks or months old. He

testified that a fall down a staircase might “on occasion” cause

injuries like Tamia’s, and that the cause of Tamia’s death was “the

totality of blunt head trauma.” Dr. Arden disagreed that Tamia’s

retinal hemorrhages were caused by trauma, concluding that they

were caused by increased cranial pressure.

     Dr. Arden admitted on cross-examination that his “first


     3 In addition, during the State’s case, a daycare worker testified that

Tamia was behaving normally in the days after Hamilton told the worker that
Tamia had fallen down the stairs.
consideration” was homicide and that he did not “have enough

evidence to say definitively one way or the other.” Dr. Arden

acknowledged that he had not interviewed Hamilton but relied upon

the medical records and police reports, including Hamilton’s

statement to police, and he agreed that his opinion could change if

Hamilton’s account of the circumstances of Tamia’s injury was

inaccurate. Dr. Arden also agreed that Tamia’s brain injuries were

the result of trauma and that he would not expect someone with

such injuries to be up and walking around for any period of time

subsequent to sustaining them. Dr. Arden acknowledged that he had

“no explanation in terms of history for [any subsequent] injury” and

that the fall down a staircase probably “would not be the only thing”

to cause Tamia’s injuries, although he also testified that it was

“possible but much less likely” that the earlier fall down the stairs

was the only trauma that Tamia had suffered.

     2. Hamilton challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to

support his conviction, noting that because the evidence against him

was circumstantial, the State was required to exclude every
reasonable hypothesis other than his guilt. He contends that the

State failed to exclude his hypothesis that Tamia suffered an injury

in her fall down the stairs a week earlier and that, as shown by Dr.

Arden’s testimony, her death could have resulted from rebleeding of

a “subacute” injury approximately a week old or an even earlier

membrane injury.

     OCGA § 24-14-6 provides: “To warrant a conviction on

circumstantial evidence, the proved facts shall not only be consistent

with the hypothesis of guilt, but shall exclude every other reasonable

hypothesis save that of the guilt of the accused.” But

     [n]ot every hypothesis is reasonable, and the evidence
     does not have to exclude every conceivable inference or
     hypothesis; it need rule out only those that are
     reasonable. The reasonableness of an alternative
     hypothesis raised by a defendant is a question principally
     for the jury, and when the jury is authorized to find that
     the evidence, though circumstantial, is sufficient to
     exclude every reasonable hypothesis save that of the
     accused’s guilt, this Court will not disturb that finding
     unless it is insupportable as a matter of law.

(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Cochran v. State, 
305 Ga. 827, 829
 (1) (
828 SE2d 338
) (2019).
     [I]t was for the jury to determine the credibility of the
     witnesses and to resolve any conflicts or inconsistencies
     in the evidence. Likewise, it was for the jury to decide
     whether the defense theory . . . was reasonable and not
     excluded by the other evidence.

(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Bamberg v. State, 
308 Ga. 340, 343
 (1) (a) (
839 SE2d 640
) (2020).

     Here, evidence was presented that Hamilton was the only

adult in the home in the time leading up to Tamia’s injuries; that

the child’s injury was profound and would have immediately

incapacitated her; and that Hamilton’s account of events did not

explain the severity of the injury, which could only have resulted

from massive trauma inconsistent with a typical fall down a

staircase, and certainly not from a fall approximately one week

earlier. Several expert witnesses testified that “rebleeding” could

not account for the severe injury to Tamia without another

intervening event, as to which no reasonable alternative hypothesis

was offered by Hamilton. “Accordingly, the jury was not required to

conclude that the hypothesis [proposed by Hamilton] was

reasonable.” Cochran, 
305 Ga. at 829
 (1).
     As Hamilton notes, this Court reversed a conviction for felony

murder predicated upon cruelty to children in Johnson v. State, 
269 Ga. 840
 (
506 SE2d 374
) (1998), based largely upon the State’s failure

to eliminate a reasonable hypothesis consistent with Johnson’s

innocence. While Hamilton cites this case as “highly instructive,” it

is distinguished by its facts. Johnson was jointly tried with the five-

month-old victim’s mother and the mother’s boyfriend and convicted

of felony murder based upon cruelty to children. Similar to the facts

of this case, Johnson’s actions and statements after the victim’s

death were somewhat unusual, and the evidence suggested that he

failed to call 911 in a timely fashion. See 
id. at 842
. Other evidence,

however, showed that Johnson was downstairs, where he usually

slept, while the mother and boyfriend were upstairs with the baby

at 3:00 a.m. when a neighbor heard the baby crying through the

upstairs wall and then the sound of a heavy blow, after which the

crying ceased. See 
id. at 841
. We held that the State failed to exclude

the reasonable hypothesis that Johnson was downstairs at the time

of the murder and had no knowledge of the attack on the baby by
one or both of his co-defendants until after it was complete. See 
id. at 842-843
.

     Here, by contrast, no other adults were present in the home

before Hamilton called 911, evidence was presented that Tamia

suffered a catastrophic injury that would have immediately

incapacitated her, and the only alternative explanation offered for

her condition was the sudden onset of severe symptoms as a result

of an injury the week before or even earlier, with that explanation

being discounted by expert witnesses for the State and conceded as

“less likely” by Hamilton’s own expert witness. The jury, as the trier

of fact, therefore was authorized to find that the evidence, though

circumstantial,   was   sufficient   to   exclude   every   reasonable

hypothesis other than that of Hamilton’s guilt. See Johnson, 
269 Ga. at 842-843
. See also Walker v. State, 
308 Ga. 33, 35
 (1) (
838 SE2d 792
) (2020); Spence v. State, 
307 Ga. 520, 524
 (1) (
837 SE2d 334
)

(2019). The evidence also was sufficient as a matter of constitutional

due process to authorize a rational finder of fact to find beyond a

reasonable doubt that Hamilton was guilty of the crime for which he
was convicted. See Jackson v. Virginia, 
443 U. S. 307, 319
 (III) (B)

(
99 SCt 2781
, 61 LE2d 560) (1979).

      3. In his second enumeration of error, Hamilton contends that

the trial court erred in admitting Dr. Case’s testimony regarding the

BAPP stain testing, asserting that the State failed to show that it

was scientifically reliable or that it had been developed using proper

standards and protocols. We disagree.4

      The determination of whether a scientific principle or

technique is competent evidence in a criminal case is guided by

Harper v. State, 
249 Ga. 519
 (
292 SE2d 389
) (1982):

      [I]t is proper for the trial judge to decide whether the
      procedure or technique in question has reached a
      scientific stage of verifiable certainty, or in the words of
      Professor Irving Younger, whether the procedure “rests
      upon the laws of nature.” The trial court may make this
      determination from evidence presented to it at trial by the
      parties; in this regard expert testimony may be of value.
      Or the trial court may base its determination on exhibits,
      treatises or the rationale of cases in other jurisdictions.
      The significant point is that the trial court makes this

      4 The District Attorney contends that Hamilton waived this enumeration

of error by failing to challenge directly the scientific validity of the BAPP test
at the hearing on Hamilton’s motion to exclude Dr. Case’s testimony. But even
assuming, without deciding, that Hamilton preserved this issue for appeal, his
enumeration of error nevertheless lacks merit.
     determination based on the evidence available to him
     rather than by simply calculating the consensus in the
     scientific community.

(Citations omitted.) 
Id. at 525-526
 (1). And

     [t]he foundation for evidence based on a scientific
     principle or technique requires two findings regarding the
     evidence’s reliability: such evidence is admissible upon a
     showing by the party offering the evidence that (1) the
     general scientific principles and techniques involved are
     valid and capable of producing reliable results, and (2) the
     person performing the test substantially performed the
     scientific procedures in an acceptable manner.

(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Walsh v. State, 
303 Ga. 276, 279
 (
811 SE2d 353
) (2018).5 We review the trial court’s decision for

an abuse of discretion. See Winters v. State, 
305 Ga. 226, 228
 (2) (
824 SE2d 306
) (2019).

     On June 30, 2017, Hamilton filed a pleading styled as a

Daubert motion seeking to exclude the testimony of Dr. Case.6 In the



     5  As we have previously noted, Harper remains good law under the
current Evidence Code. See OCGA § 24-7-707; Winters v. State, 
305 Ga. 226, 227
 (2) n.2 (
824 SE2d 306
) (2019).
      6 See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 
509 U. S. 579
 (
113 SCt 2786
, 125 LE2d 469) (1993). When the State noted in its response to Hamilton’s
motion that under Georgia law Harper, rather than Daubert, applies to
criminal cases, Hamilton filed a reply brief asserting that Harper is
motion, Hamilton contended that the mechanism of “shaken baby

syndrome” had been called into question by the literature; that the

use by Dr. Case of evidence of axonal damage in distinguishing

impact from inertial injury or for assessing the timing of an injury

had been called into question; and that Dr. Case had failed to explore

the possibility of other causes for Tamia’s head injury. Hamilton also

challenged    generally    the   use    “of   axonal   damage,     retinal

hemorrhage, and subdural hematoma to draw inferences concerning

the manner of infliction, the timing, and the cause of the injuries

suffered by the alleged victim in this case.”

     The trial court held a hearing on Hamilton’s motion on

September 15, 2017. Dr. Case was the only witness, and the only

exhibit was her curriculum vitae, introduced by the State.

Hamilton’s defense counsel cross-examined Dr. Case but presented

no evidence at the hearing. Dr. Case testified at length regarding

her education and her experience as a pathologist, chief medical


unconstitutional. In its order denying Hamilton’s motion, the trial court
declined to find the Harper standard unconstitutional, and Hamilton has not
enumerated that ruling as error.
examiner, and professor at St. Louis University, as well as her

studies of child abuse head injuries as a neuropathologist beginning

in the 1970s, her research into BAPP stain testing since the early

1990s, and her service as a consultant to forensic pathologists in

head injury cases. She was admitted as an expert in anatomic

forensics and neuropathology without objection.

     Dr. Case then testified to her procedures in consulting on a

head injury case and her method of producing a report, as well as

her procedure specifically in investigating Tamia’s case. She

testified to her work in the examination of brains for axonal injury

by the use of BAPP stain testing. She described the methods used in

BAPP stain testing and the basis for its findings, and testified that

results of BAPP stain testing are accepted in the medical

community, reliable and reproducible, and based upon valid

scientific principles. Dr. Case noted that other experts perform

BAPP stain testing to find axonal injury and use a scoring method

similar to her own. She testified to her findings in her investigation

of Tamia’s case, including not only the BAPP stain testing but the
multiple specific injuries to Tamia’s brain. Finally, Dr. Case testified

that her conclusions would have remained the same even if she had

not considered the BAPP stain test results.

     On November 8, 2017, the trial court entered an order,

finding that

     the State’s proposed expert, Dr. Mary Case[,] is qualified
     and has shown the requisite skill, knowledge, training
     and expertise to give her opinion in this case.
     Furthermore, it appears that the testimony she is
     prepared to offer is beyond the ken of the average
     layperson. Lastly, the Court finds that Dr. Case’s opinion
     is based upon proven science and has reached a scientific
     stage of verifiable certainty and is thus admissible.

While Hamilton asserts that Dr. Case “acknowledged . . . that ‘most’

medical examiners do not use” the BAPP stain testing, Dr. Case

testified that this is because most laboratories do not have the

equipment to perform it. She also testified that as a consultant she

performs such tests for pathologists throughout the country.

Moreover,      Hamilton   did   not   present   expert   testimony   or

documentary evidence to challenge Dr. Case’s testimony about the

scientific validity of BAPP stain testing. See Sharp v. State, 
286 Ga. 799, 804-805
 (7) (
692 SE2d 325
) (2010) (concluding no abuse of

discretion in admitting testimony under Harper when appellant

“presented no expert testimony or other evidence to undermine [the

expert’s] testimony, the theory it discussed, or the application of that

theory in this case”)7

      In any event, given the other evidence presented at trial, any

error in admitting Dr. Case’s testimony with regard to the BAPP

stain testing was cumulative and thus harmless.

      The test for determining nonconstitutional harmless
      error is whether it is highly probable that the error did
      not contribute to the verdict. When applying harmless
      error analysis, we review the evidence de novo and weigh
      it as a reasonable juror would, rather than reviewing it in
      a light most favorable to upholding the jury’s verdicts of
      guilty.

(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Taylor v. State, 
306 Ga. 277, 283

(2) (
830 SE2d 90
) (2019).

      As noted above, Dr. Terry testified that while performing the


      7 Hamilton’s reliance upon Jefferson v. State, 
312 Ga. App. 842
 (
720 SE2d 184
) (2011), is inapposite because in that case the witness failed to testify that
the technique at issue had reached a verifiable level of scientific certainty. See
id. at 845
 (2) (a).
autopsy, she observed a closed-head traumatic injury with

hemorrhaging, swelling of the brain, and brain death due to

deprivation of blood and oxygen. Similarly, Dr. Melnikoff and Dr.

Bryant testified that Tamia’s brain injuries were catastrophic and

consistent with a closed-head injury and described the severe

injuries depicted on the CT scan as being consistent with abusive

head trauma. Finally, at trial, Hamilton’s expert acknowledged that

he had previously relied upon BAPP staining analysis and was

familiar with the research on the process. Hamilton’s expert

challenged Dr. Case’s opinion not based on the reliability or

scientific verifiability of the BAPP analysis itself, but on the ground

that the results in this case may have been altered by Tamia having

been on life support before her death. Under these circumstances, it

is highly probable that the admission of Dr. Case’s testimony

regarding BAPP stain testing did not contribute to the jury’s verdict.

See Bulloch v. State, 
293 Ga. 179, 186
 (3) (a) (
744 SE2d 763
) (2013)

(challenged testimony merely cumulative of other evidence

sufficient to show appellant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt).
     Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.



                       DECIDED JUNE 1, 2020.
     Murder. Gwinnett Superior Court. Before Judge Conner.
     Benjamin D. Goldberg, for appellant.
     Daniel J. Porter, District Attorney, Lee F. Tittsworth, Robby A.
King, Daniel Sanmiguel, Assistant District Attorneys; Christopher
M. Carr, Attorney General, Patricia B. Attaway Burton, Deputy
Attorney General, Paula K. Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney
General, Ashleigh D. Headrick, Assistant Attorney General, for
appellee.

/309/ga/1 · .json · Public domain