Redding v. State

FINAL COPY

                S20A0177. REDDING v. THE STATE.


      BLACKWELL, Justice.

      Merrick Redding was tried by a Muscogee County jury and

convicted of murder and aggravated assault in connection with the

death of Joseph Davis.1 Redding appeals, asserting that the evidence

is legally insufficient to sustain his convictions, that he was denied

his constitutional right to a speedy trial, and that certain evidence

was admitted erroneously at trial. Although the evidence is

sufficient to sustain the convictions, we conclude that the trial court




      1 Davis died on September 6, 2016. On May 22, 2018, a Muscogee County

grand jury indicted Redding, charging him with murder with malice
aforethought, murder in the commission of a felony (aggravated assault), and
aggravated assault with a “closed fist.” Redding was tried in October and
November 2018. The jury acquitted him of malice murder, but it found him
guilty on the other two counts. In December 2018, the trial court sentenced
Redding to imprisonment for life without the possibility of parole for felony
murder and a concurrent term of imprisonment for 20 years for aggravated
assault. Redding timely filed a motion for new trial, and after a hearing, the
trial court denied the motion on June 4, 2019. Redding timely filed a notice of
appeal, and his appeal was docketed to the December 2019 term of this Court
and submitted for a decision on the briefs.
failed to apply the proper standard to the claim that Redding was

denied his right to a speedy trial. For that reason, we vacate the

judgment below and remand for the trial court to resolve that claim

under the proper standard. We decline at this point to address the

remaining claims of error.2

      1. Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the

evidence presented at trial shows the following. On September 5,

2016, Jason Bellamy hosted a barbeque at his house for his family.

During the barbeque, Davis came over to visit. Redding also came to

the house with his young grandchildren, though Redding had not

been invited. Around the time of the incident, Bellamy was

preparing to grill meat in an area adjacent to the house that



      2 In his other enumerations of error, Redding contends that the trial

court erred when it admitted certain other acts evidence under OCGA § 24-4-
404 (b) and when it allowed the State to impeach him with his prior convictions
without expressly finding that the probative value of this evidence outweighed
its prejudicial effect. We do not address these claims, as they “might be
rendered moot by the trial court’s speedy trial ruling on remand.” Goins v.
State, 

, 55 n.1 (

) (2019). We do address the sufficiency
of the evidence, however, because if Redding prevails on this issue, “his
conviction[s] would be reversed and he could not be retried,” irrespective of the
speedy trial issue. See 

witnesses characterized as an outdoor patio or carport. Davis was

leaning against a truck in the driveway, “talking to friends” and

“taking it easy.” Another resident of the house, Debbie Render, also

was sitting outside. Bellamy’s stepfather, Jerry Ferrell, was in the

washroom vacuuming up water, but he came out to the patio

periodically.

     While standing at the grill, Bellamy saw Redding approach

Davis and start talking to him. Bellamy could not hear what

Redding was saying, but he heard Davis repeatedly tell Redding,

“Leave me alone.” Both Bellamy and Render testified that they

heard Davis ask something like, “Why do you think I’m a p***y

motherf****r?” They also heard Redding call to Ferrell to “come get”

Davis. Bellamy further testified that Davis said to Redding, “Go get

a job . . . I work hard for my money, why won’t you get a job,” and

turning to Bellamy, Davis said, “What’s wrong with him, Jason?”

Bellamy did not think much of this confrontation and went inside

the house laughing, but he kept looking through the screen door to

see “what’s going on,” and he saw Redding move closer to Davis.
       As Bellamy went back outside through the kitchen door, he saw

Redding hit Davis once in the head. Bellamy testified that, just

before the hit, Redding

       looked back because I was in the house. You know, he
       looked back and he said something to [Ferrell], you know,
       while he was looking back, and when he turned around,
       he turned around and just swung like this. You know, and
       when he swung, it was like he was walking away at the
       same time.

Demonstrating the hit in front of the jury, Bellamy described it as a

“swing” with his right hand (rather than a “forward punch”), and he

testified that Redding hit Davis with a “closed” fist. Render, who also

observed the incident, similarly testified that Redding “just hit

[Davis] ‘side the head with his fist. . . . It was loud.” Both Bellamy

and Render testified that Redding hit Davis with his right hand and

that the blow landed somewhere on the left side of Davis’s head.

Both also testified that Davis did not provoke Redding before being

hit.

       As soon as Davis was hit, Bellamy testified, “it just looked like

all life left out of him. . . . He fell straight down. He never moved
from the position he had been in all day. He fell straight down and

he slumped up against my tire on my truck.” Bellamy explained that

Davis did not fall over and hit his head on something, but rather

“went straight down. And when I got there, he was sitting up on the

side of my truck just like I’m sitting in this chair, and it sounded like

he was snoring. . . . [H]e hadn’t hit his head.” Render also testified

that Davis did not hit his head while falling: “He just went around

like that and he just like slid down beside the truck.”

     Davis was taken to the hospital, but he never regained

consciousness and was taken off life support the next day. Dr. Steven

Atkinson, the medical examiner who conducted an autopsy on Davis,

testified that there was a “large abrasion in the back of the head on

the left side,” as well as a fracture on the back right side of the skull.

Dr. Atkinson explained that the fracture “was more centered on the

back right, but . . . it crossed the midline and went into the back left,

but it also wrapped around and went into the base of the skull.” Dr.

Atkinson concluded that the cause of death was blunt force head

trauma, and that the head injury could have resulted from any blunt
object, including a fist strike to the head or the head hitting the

ground.

     Redding testified in his own defense. He said that he came to

Bellamy’s house at the request of Ferrell, who had asked him to help

with a washing machine. After doing some work inside the

washroom, Redding sat on the patio and had a beer. Sometime later,

Redding testified, Davis came to the carport area from a shed nearby

where people were known to take drugs. According to Redding,

Davis then purchased some crack cocaine from Bellamy, and this

transaction occurred near the truck. Redding testified that he then

came up to Davis to trade beers, but after a verbal exchange, Davis

pushed him twice and “poked” him. This prompted Redding to hit

Davis with an “open hand slap.” Redding testified that Davis

stumbled back a little, slid down the side of the truck, and fell to the

ground, hitting his head on the concrete “lip.”3


     3  In addition to Redding’s testimony, the defense called a toxicology
expert who had tested Davis’s blood for the presence of cocaine and cocaine
metabolites. The expert testified that the test detected the presence of two
cocaine metabolites, but no recordable amount of actual cocaine. The expert
      2. Redding contends that the evidence is insufficient to sustain

his convictions. He argues that the evidence shows that he hit Davis

only once and that the hit was not particularly forceful.4 Redding

also suggests that his punch did not necessarily cause Davis’s death

because he punched Davis on the left side of the face, but the injury

was on the right side of his head. We disagree.

      Redding was convicted of felony murder in the commission of

an aggravated assault. A person commits aggravated assault when,

among other things, he assaults another “[w]ith a deadly weapon or

with any object, device, or instrument which, when used offensively

against a person, is likely to or actually does result in serious bodily

injury[.]” OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (2). We have stated that “fists and feet

are not deadly weapons per se,” but “they can become such

instruments when used to strike another.” Skaggs v. State, 278 Ga.



could not tell, based on these results, at what time Davis had taken cocaine or
how much he had consumed.

      4 Bellamy testified that, when Davis slumped over from the punch,
Bellamy “thought maybe [Davis] had a stroke or something because, you know,
I’ve seen people get hit harder. And, you know, [Redding] hit him kind of hard,
but I don’t think — it didn’t look like he hit him that hard to do that to him. . . .”
19, 20 (1) (

) (2004). Whether a fist was used as a deadly

weapon in a particular case is for the jury to decide. See Dasher v.

State, 

 (3) (

) (2009). See also Harwell

v. State, 

 (1) (

) (1999) (“Whether a

weapon is deadly or one likely to cause serious bodily injury is a

question for the jury, which may consider all the circumstances

surrounding the weapon and the manner in which it was used.”).

      Here, the testimony of two witnesses shows that Redding,

without provocation, swung his hand and hit Davis on the side of his

head with a closed fist. Those witnesses also testified that Davis did

not fall and hit his head after he was struck, which indicates that

the blow was hard enough to fracture Davis’s skull, as revealed by

the autopsy.5 And the medical examiner testified that Davis’s cause

of death was blunt force trauma to the head. We conclude that the



      5 We note that, even if the fatal injury was caused by Davis’s falling and

hitting his head on concrete, this might not have absolved Redding of felony
murder. See Skaggs, 

 (1) (defendant was guilty of felony murder
predicated on aggravated assault because, while “the immediate cause of
[victim’s] death was the injuries he suffered in the fall, the fall itself was the
direct and immediate result of the blows administered by [defendant]”).
evidence was sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find

beyond a reasonable doubt that Redding committed aggravated

assault upon Davis and that this felony proximately caused Davis’s

death. See Jackson v. Virginia, 

 (III) (B) (

, 61 LE2d 560) (1979); Miller v. State, 

 (1) (

) (2002) (evidence was sufficient to find aggravated assault

and felony murder where defendant struck the victim with his fist

in the back of the head, causing a fatal injury). See also Graham v.

State, 

 (1) (

) (2017) (“[I]t is the role of

the jury to resolve conflicts in the evidence and to determine the

credibility of witnesses, and the resolution of such conflicts

adversely to the defendant does not render the evidence

insufficient.” (citation and punctuation omitted)).

     3. Redding contends that the trial court erred when it failed to

dismiss the indictment on the ground that his constitutional right to

a speedy trial was violated. The record shows that Redding was

arrested on September 12, 2016, one week after the incident.

Redding was granted a bond on March 2, 2017, but he apparently
was unable to post the bond amount and so remained in jail. On

September 28, 2017, Redding filed a “Motion to Dismiss Charge

Based on Violation of Constitutional Right to Speedy Trial.” At that

point, Redding had not yet been indicted, and he noted in his motion

that he had repeatedly asked for his case to be presented to a grand

jury and that one of the few witnesses to the incident had died.6 The

trial court scheduled a hearing on the motion for November 30, 2017,

but, as the State concedes, there is no record that a hearing was held

that day. On April 17, 2018, Redding filed a request for a hearing on

his speedy trial motion. The trial court held a hearing—apparently

on May 9, 2018 — but did not make any ruling at the time of the

hearing.7 Redding was indicted on May 22, 2018, and his trial began

on October 29, 2018.




      6 Redding did not mention the name of        that deceased witness in the
motion. In his brief on appeal, he asserts that it was Ferrell who died while his
case sat unindicted, though Redding does not say when he died. The timing of
Ferrell’s death is not apparent from the record.

      7 The transcript of that hearing does not appear in the record.
     Redding’s motion came up again at a pre-trial hearing on

October 24, 2018, less than a week before trial. The trial court asked

about Redding’s arrest, and the prosecuting attorney said that

Redding had been arrested for a violation of probation and the

outstanding warrants on “the rest of these charges.” The prosecutor

also told the court, “Just got the toxicology and the Crime Lab

reports in this year. I took it to the grand jury right afterward.” The

trial court then stated:

          I overrule the motion on [the speedy trial] because of
     the violation of probation. The toxicology reports and
     other documents, police reports they had to accumulate in
     order to take the case to the grand jury for the charge of
     murder . . . .

The trial court did not enter a written order.

     A constitutional speedy trial claim is evaluated under a two-

part framework. Johnson v. State, 

 (3) (

) (2016) (citing Barker v. Wingo, 

 (

, 33

LE2d 101) (1972), and Doggett v. United States, 

 (

, 120 LE2d 520) (1992)). First, the trial court must consider

“whether the length of time between the defendant’s arrest and trial
is sufficiently long to be considered ‘presumptively prejudicial.’ If

not, the speedy trial claim fails at the threshold.” Goins v. State, 

 (2) (b) (

) (2019) (citation and punctuation

omitted). A delay of one year or more is “typically presumed to be

prejudicial.” 

     If the presumptive-prejudice threshold is crossed, as it was in

this case, the trial court “proceeds to the second part of the

framework, applying a context-focused, four-factor balancing test to

determine whether the defendant was denied the right to a speedy

trial.” Johnson, 

 (3). These four factors are “(1) the

length of the delay; (2) the reasons for it; (3) the defendant’s

assertion of his right to a speedy trial; and (4) prejudice to the

defendant.” 

 This second part of the speedy trial analysis

“requires courts to engage in a difficult and sensitive balancing

process and necessarily compels them to approach speedy trial cases

on an ad hoc basis.” Ruffin v. State, 

 (2) (b) (

) (2008) (citation and punctuation omitted).
     Because the analysis of a speedy trial claim is “fact-intensive,”

and because we review the trial court’s ruling on such a claim for

abuse of discretion, “it is imperative that the trial court enter

findings of fact and conclusions of law consistent with Barker.

Absent such findings, there is no exercise of discretion for this Court

to review.” Goins, 

 (2) (b) (citations and punctuation

omitted); Higgenbottom v. State, 

 (

)

(2011). See also Johnson, 

 (3) (“It is not the job of an

appellate court to apply the Barker-Doggett framework in the first

instance.”).

     Here, the trial court barely expressed any findings of fact or

conclusions of law when it verbally denied Redding’s speedy trial

motion. Nothing in the court’s brief statement suggests that it

conducted the four-factor balancing test mandated by the Barker–

Doggett framework. Furthermore, Redding’s speedy trial claim does

not strike us as so patently meritless that its denial is certain and

that a remand for consideration of this issue would be a waste of

judicial resources. For this reason, we vacate the trial court’s order
denying Redding’s constitutional speedy trial motion, we vacate

Redding’s convictions, and we remand this case “for the entry of an

order containing appropriate findings of fact and conclusions of law

on the speedy trial claim.” Goins, 

 (2) (c) (citation and

punctuation omitted).8

      Judgment vacated and case remanded with direction. All the
Justices concur.



                       DECIDED JUNE 16, 2020.
     Murder. Muscogee Superior Court. Before Judge Peters.
     Kennon Peebles, Jr., for appellant.
     Julia F. Slater, District Attorney, Ray W. Daniel, Assistant
District Attorney; Christopher M. Carr, Attorney General, Patricia B.
Attaway Burton, Deputy Attorney General, Paula K. Smith, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Michael A. Oldham, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee.



      8 If the trial court denies Redding’s speedy trial motion, it should reenter

the judgment of conviction on the jury verdict and resentence Redding
accordingly. In that regard, as the State concedes, Redding’s aggravated
assault count should merge with the felony murder count. See Norris v. State,

 (III) (

) (2018) (“[B]ecause the crime of
aggravated assault . . . was the underlying felony for the felony murder
conviction, it should have merged with the felony murder conviction for
sentencing purposes.”). If the trial court reenters judgment, Redding may file
a notice of appeal, and in his new appeal, he may raise again the issues raised
in his current appeal that we decline to address today, as well as any issue
arising from the proceedings on remand.