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309 Or. App. 474

State v. Shelnutt

Court of Appeals of Oregon

Decided March 3, 2021

Court of Appeals of Oregon · decided 2021-03-03

Applies 18 U.S.C. § 925

Applies OR 135 § 135.630 · OR 163 § 163.005 · OR 166 § 166.270 · OR 166 § 166.274

Affirmed · Decided 2021-03-03

                                       474

      Submitted January 26, affirmed March 3, petition for review denied
                        June 10, 2021 (
368 Or 206
)


                       STATE OF OREGON,
                        Plaintiff-Respondent,
                                  v.
                  NICOLE GLYNNE SHELNUTT,
                       Defendant-Appellant.
                  Multnomah County Circuit Court
                       18CR58492; A171524
                                   
483 P3d 53

    Defendant appeals a judgment of conviction for felon in possession of a firearm, ORS 166.270(1). She argues that the trial court should have granted her
demurrer because that statute, which applies regardless of the nature of the predicate felony—in her case, alleged in the indictment to be the unlawful possession
of methamphetamine—violates her right to bear arms under Article I, section
27, of the Oregon Constitution and the Second Amendment to the United States
Constitution. Held: Defendant’s as-applied argument under the state constitution was not consistent with how Article I, section 27, had been interpreted by the
Oregon Supreme Court. Given the procedural posture of the case, her as-applied
argument under the federal constitution likewise failed under even the most
favorable standard applied by federal courts to date; defendant’s challenge relied
only on the alleged predicate felony in the indictment, and it did not sufficiently
demonstrate that the facts of the underlying crime or her personal circumstances
were outside those historically excluded from the right to bear arms.
    Affirmed.



    David F. Rees, Judge.
   Ernest G. Lannet, Chief Defender, Criminal Appellate
Section, and Marc D. Brown, Deputy Public Defender, Office
of Public Defense Services, filed the brief for appellant.
   Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman,
Solicitor General, and Carson L. Whitehead, Assistant
Attorney General, filed the brief for respondent.
  Before Lagesen, Presiding Judge, and James, Judge, and
Kamins, Judge.
    LAGESEN, P. J.
    Affirmed.
Cite as 
309 Or App 474
 (2021)                                                    475

          LAGESEN, P. J.
          Defendant appeals a judgment of conviction for felon
in possession of a firearm, ORS 166.270(1).1 She argues that
the trial court should have granted her demurrer because
that statute, which applies regardless of the nature of the
predicate felony—in her case, alleged in the indictment to be
the unlawful possession of methamphetamine—violates her
right to bear arms under Article I, section 27, of the Oregon
Constitution and the Second Amendment to the United
States Constitution. We affirm.
          We review the disallowance of a demurrer for errors
of law, considering only the information appearing on the
face of the indictment and the applicable law. See State v.
Woodall, 
259 Or App 67, 69
, 
313 P3d 298
 (2013), rev den, 
354 Or 735
 (2014) (“We review the denial of a demurrer for errors
of law.”); State v. Cervantes, 
232 Or App 567, 573
, 
223 P3d 425
 (2009) (“A demurrer in a criminal case is governed by
ORS 135.630. That statute provides that a trial court, when
considering whether to sustain a demurrer, may consider
only the information alleged in the indictment.”).
          Defendant’s arguments are premised on the view
that ORS 166.270 is an “absolute ban” on firearms that must
survive strict scrutiny under the state and federal constitutions, and that any restriction on defendant’s right to bear
arms based on her previous conviction must be narrowly tailored to further a compelling state interest.2
    1
      ORS 166.270(1) provides:
         “Any person who has been convicted of a felony under the law of this state
    or any other state, or who has been convicted of a felony under the laws of the
    Government of the United States, who owns or has in the person’s possession
    or under the person’s custody or control any firearm commits the crime of
    felon in possession of a firearm.”
    2
      Defendant acknowledges that the ban may not apply after 15 years in some
cases. ORS 166.270(4) provides:
         “Subsection (1) of this section does not apply to any person who has been:
         “(a) Convicted of only one felony under the law of this state or any other
    state, or who has been convicted of only one felony under the laws of the
    United States, which felony did not involve criminal homicide, as defined in
    ORS 163.005, or the possession or use of a firearm or a weapon having a blade
    that projects or swings into position by force of a spring or by centrifugal
    force, and who has been discharged from imprisonment, parole or probation
    for said offense for a period of 15 years prior to the date of alleged violation of
    subsection (1) of this section; or
476                                                        State v. Shelnutt

         Starting with our state constitution, that premise
is inconsistent with the way that Article I, section 27, has
been interpreted and applied by our Supreme Court. As that
court has explained, “Because the right to bear arms is not
an absolute right, our Article I, section 27, holdings reflect a
judicial recognition that the legislature has wide latitude to
enact specific regulations restricting the possession and use
of weapons to promote public safety.” State v. Christian, 
354 Or 22, 33
, 
307 P3d 429
 (2013); see State v. Hirsch/Friend,
338 Or 622, 678-79
, 
114 P3d 1104
 (2005) (rejecting an overbreadth challenge to ORS 166.270(1) under Article I, section 27; holding that the framers of the Oregon Constitution
understood it to be within the legislature’s purview “to designate certain groups as posing identifiable threats to the
public safety by virtue of the earlier commission of serious
criminal conduct”; and observing that “conviction of a ‘felony’ signifies a breach of society’s most essential rules for
obligatory conduct—rules that are central to the legislative
task of protecting the public from violence and various forms
of abuse”). For that reason, we reject defendant’s state constitutional argument that ORS 166.270 is unconstitutional
as applied to the limited facts alleged in the indictment.
         We reach the same conclusion with regard to her
as-applied arguments under the Second Amendment in
light of decisions by federal courts in the wake of District
of Columbia v. Heller, 
554 US 570, 626
, 
128 S Ct 2783
, 
171 L Ed 2d 637
 (2008). In State v. Beeman, 
290 Or App 429
, 
417 P3d 541
, rev den, 
363 Or 119
 (2018), we discussed some of
those decisions in the context of a facial challenge to ORS
166.270. We disagreed that strict scrutiny was appropriate
and upheld the statute under intermediate scrutiny. We
explained that “[t]he restriction on the possession of firearms by a felon has a well-established, historical, and obvious relationship to public safety. Even under intermediate

        “(b) Granted relief from the disability under 18 USC 925(c) or ORS
    166.274 or has had the person’s record expunged under the laws of this state
    or equivalent laws of another jurisdiction.”
We further note that, although it is not discussed by the parties, one of the crossreferenced provisions in subparagraph (4)(b), ORS 166.274, allows a petitioner to
seek relief from the ban if the petitioner “demonstrates, by clear and convincing
evidence, that the petitioner does not pose a threat to the safety of the public or
the petitioner.” ORS 166.274(7).
Cite as 
309 Or App 474
 (2021)                                  477

scrutiny, ORS 166.270 is substantially related to an important governmental objective.” 
Id.
 at 434 & n 2 (footnote omitted). We observed further that, after Heller, “numerous
facial challenges to felon in possession statutes were raised
nationwide” but “[n]o state law banning felons from possessing guns has ever been struck down” and “no federal ban
on felons possessing guns has been struck down.” 
290 Or App at 434
. Accord Folajtar v. Attorney Gen. of the United
States, 
980 F3d 897, 901
 (3d Cir 2020) (“Since Heller, we,
along with every court to consider the issue, have rejected
challenges that § 922(g)(1) on its face violates the Second
Amendment.”).
          In Beeman, however, we did not address whether the
application of ORS 166.270 in the case of a “nonviolent” predicate felony would violate the Second Amendment. 
290 Or App at 435
 n 3 (noting that the defendant had “not advanced
an argument that the application of ORS 166.270 to him is
unconstitutional because of his personal characteristics, or
the specific facts of his felony conviction, i.e., that the facts of
his crime lack an indication of violence”). That issue is currently spurring divergent thinking in the federal appellate
courts. Some have categorically rejected as-applied challenges. E.g., Hamilton v. Pallozzi, 
848 F3d 614, 626-29
 (4th
Cir), cert den, ___ US ___, 
138 S Ct 500
 (2017) (“conviction of
a felony necessarily removes one” from Second Amendment
protection, unless the felony conviction is pardoned or the
law defining the crime of conviction is found unconstitutional or otherwise unlawful); United States v. Vongxay, 
594 F3d 1111, 1115
 (9th Cir), cert den, 
562 US 921
 (2010) (holding
that “felons are categorically different from the individuals
who have a fundamental right to bear arms”). Others have
treated restrictions on firearms possession by convicted felons as presumptively lawful but have allowed challengers
to rebut that presumption by proving that they were not
convicted of “serious” felonies, thereby shifting the burden
to the government to prove that the regulation at issue survives a “heightened” level of scrutiny. See, e.g., Binderup v.
Attorney Gen. United States of Am., 
836 F3d 336, 347, 356
(3d Cir 2016), cert den, ___ US ___, 
137 S Ct 2323
 (2017)
(once the challengers have carried their burden to show that
their offenses were not serious and have distinguished their
478                                                        State v. Shelnutt

circumstances from persons historically excluded from the
right to bear arms, the government must “meet some form of
heightened scrutiny”—in Binderup, intermediate scrutiny);
accord Kanter v. Barr, 
919 F3d 437, 442
 (7th Cir 2019) (“We
have consistently described step two as ‘akin to intermediate scrutiny’ and have required the government to show
that the challenged statute is substantially related to an
important governmental objective.”).3
         Regardless of the approach, “[a]s-applied challenges
have fared only marginally better [than facial challenges to
the federal dispossession statute], and no circuit has held
the law unconstitutional as applied to a convicted felon.”
Medina v. Whitaker, 
913 F3d 152, 155
 (DC Cir 2019), cert den
sub nom Medina v. Barr, ___ US ___, 
140 S Ct 645
 (2019).
And, given the procedural posture of this case, defendant’s
as-applied challenge would fail under the most favorable
standard applied by the federal courts to date. Defendant’s
challenge to ORS 166.270 is “as-applied” in the sense that it
relies on the alleged predicate felony in the indictment, but
it does not turn on any facts surrounding that underlying
drug crime or facts regarding her personal circumstances
or potential dangerousness. Without such an evidentiary
showing, and given the legislature’s judgment to classify her
conduct as a felony, defendant has not sufficiently demonstrated that the underlying crime or her circumstances are
outside those historically excluded from the right to bear
arms such that the application of ORS 166.270 to her violates her Second Amendment rights. See Folajtar, 
980 F3d 3
      In Medina v. Whitaker, 
913 F3d 152, 155
 (DC Cir 2019), cert den sub nom
Medina v. Barr, ___ US ___, 
140 S Ct 645
 (2019), the court provided the following
overview of the split:
    “The Ninth Circuit takes the view that ‘felons are categorically different
    from the individuals who have a fundamental right to bear arms.’ Vongxay,
    
594 F3d at 1115
. Four other circuits have, in a similar vein, also rejected
    as-applied challenges by convicted felons. See Hamilton v. Pallozzi, 
848 F3d 614, 626-27
 (4th Cir), cert den, ___ US ___, 
138 S Ct 500
 (2017); United States
    v. Rozier, 
598 F3d 768, 770-71
 (11th Cir 2010); United States v. Scroggins, 
599 F3d 433, 451
 (5th Cir 2010); In re United States, 
578 F3d 1195, 1200
 (10th Cir
    2009). The Seventh and Eighth Circuits, while leaving open the possibility
    of a successful felon as-applied challenge, have yet to uphold one. See United
    States v. Woolsey, 
759 F3d 905, 909
 (8th Cir 2014); United States v. Williams,
    
616 F3d 685, 693-94
 (7th Cir 2010).”
For additional discussion of the different approaches, see Folajtar, 
980 F3d at 900-04
, which has a petition for writ of certiorari pending.
Cite as 
309 Or App 474
 (2021)                             479

at 911 (holding out the possibility of an “exceptional federal
or state felony unmoored from the bar’s historical underpinnings” but concluding that a person could be dispossessed
of the right to bear arms for felony tax evasion); Kanter, 
919 F3d at 448
 (rejecting facial and as-applied challenges to federal felon dispossession statute in the context of nonviolent
but “serious” fraud and theft convictions, and holding that
“[t]he government identifies its interest as preventing gun
violence by keeping firearms away from persons, such as
those convicted of serious crimes, who might be expected
to misuse them”); Medina, 
913 F3d at 159
 (“On balance, the
historical evidence and the Supreme Court’s discussion of
felon disarmament laws leads us to reject the argument
that non-dangerous felons have a right to bear arms.”);
cf. Binderup, 
836 F3d at 351
 (sustaining an as-applied challenge in the context of predicate offenses that were categorized by the relevant states as misdemeanors and stating
that “a state legislature’s classification of an offense as a
misdemeanor is a powerful expression of its belief that the
offense is not serious enough to be disqualifying”). For those
reasons, defendant’s as-applied challenge under the Second
Amendment does not supply grounds for a demurrer.
        Affirmed.

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