Goins v. State

FINAL COPY

                S20A0847. GOINS v. THE STATE.


     NAHMIAS, Presiding Justice.

     After a jury trial, Appellant Charmane Goins was convicted of

malice murder in connection with the strangling death of Lauren

Taylor, and the trial court summarily denied his motion for new

trial. In a prior appeal, this Court held that the evidence presented

at Appellant’s trial was legally sufficient to support his murder

conviction, but we otherwise vacated the trial court’s order and

remanded the case for the court to make factual findings and legal

conclusions regarding Appellant’s claim that his constitutional right

to a speedy trial was violated; we did not address his other claims.

See Goins v. State, 

, 55 & n.1 (

) (2019)

(Goins I).

     On remand, the trial court issued a detailed order rejecting the

speedy trial claim and again denying Appellant’s motion for new

trial. He then filed this second appeal, raising his constitutional
speedy trial claim again along with claims that the State failed to

preserve allegedly exculpatory evidence and that the trial court

erred by admitting evidence from his cell phone, by denying his

motion for a mistrial, and by excluding evidence about the victim.

We see no reversible error, so we affirm.1

      1. As we explained in upholding the sufficiency of the evidence

supporting Appellant’s murder conviction in Goins I:

           Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the
      evidence at trial showed the following. Appellant, who
      was married and lived in Tunnel Hill in north[west]
      Georgia, began an affair with Taylor in 2013. In August
      2014, Appellant told his friend Karl Wyatt that he wanted
      to end the affair but could not because Taylor was
      threatening to expose it to his wife and children. Taylor
      was last seen leaving her friend[ Dallas Regal’s] house
      with Appellant around 1:30 p.m. on October 7, 2014; the
      next morning, her partially burnt body was found in
      Deshong Park in Gwinnett County. The cause of death
      was manual strangulation, after which her body had been
      doused in gasoline and set on fire.
           Appellant told investigators that he dropped off
      Taylor at a mall in Chattanooga, Tennessee on the
      afternoon of October 7 and then returned to Chattanooga

      1 The procedural history of this case is summarized in Goins I. See 

 n.1. After the trial court denied Appellant’s motion for new trial again
on remand in August 2019, he filed a timely notice of appeal, and the case was
docketed to the April 2020 term of this Court and submitted for a decision on
the briefs.
                                        2
     around 11:00 that night to help Wyatt with car trouble.
     Wyatt initially confirmed that alibi, but he later recanted
     and testified that he was not with Appellant that night
     and that Appellant had asked him to provide the false
     alibi. Appellant’s cell phone records showed that, instead
     of going to Chattanooga that night as he had claimed,
     Appellant actually traveled south along I-75 around
     midnight, and then traveled east along I-285 toward
     Gwinnett County around 1:00 a.m. In addition, later on
     the day [Taylor’s dead body was found], Appellant
     pawned a guitar that Taylor had stolen from an ex-boyfriend. Finally, Appellant’s former cellmate testified
     that Appellant had confessed that he killed Taylor by
     strangling her with the seatbelt while she was sleeping
     and left her body at a “gang park” that Wyatt had told
     him about. Appellant testified at trial, giving a new
     version of his alibi story and claiming that Taylor gave
     him the stolen guitar as payment for gas.

Goins I, 

.

     2. Appellant contends that his constitutional right to a speedy

trial was violated. That claim, which Appellant raised in a pretrial

motion to dismiss his indictment and again in his amended motion

for new trial, requires the trial court to make findings of fact and

conclusions of law under the two-part framework set forth in Barker

v. Wingo, 

 (

, 33 LE2d 101) (1972), and

refined in Doggett v. United States, 

 (

, 120

LE2d 520) (1992). See Heard v. State, 

 (

                            3
314) (2014). The first part of the framework requires the court to

determine whether the length of time between Appellant’s arrest

and his trial was presumptively prejudicial. See 

 If it was, the trial

court is required under the second part of the framework to apply a

four-factor balancing test that examines the length of the delay, the

reasons for it, Appellant’s assertion of his right to a speedy trial, and

whether he suffered prejudice as a result of the delay. See 

     In its brief oral ruling denying Appellant’s pretrial motion to

dismiss and in its July 2018 order summarily denying his motion for

new trial, the trial court failed to make the necessary findings of fact

and conclusions of law under the Barker-Doggett framework.

Accordingly, in the first appeal of this case, we vacated the trial

court’s judgment in part and remanded the case for the entry of an

order containing appropriate findings and conclusions regarding the

speedy trial claim. See Goins I, 

.

     In its ten-page order on remand, the trial court correctly

determined that the thirty-two-month delay between Appellant’s

arrest and trial was presumptively prejudicial. The court then made

                                   4
detailed factual findings and legal conclusions regarding each of the

Barker-Doggett factors, and after balancing the factors, the court

ultimately rejected Appellant’s speedy trial claim. We have carefully

reviewed the trial court’s order, the record, and the parties’ briefs,

and we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its broad

discretion by determining that Appellant’s constitutional right to a

speedy trial was not violated. See, e.g., Heard, 

(explaining that when this Court reviews a speedy trial claim, “[w]e

must accept the [trial] court’s findings of fact if the record contains

any evidence to support them, and we will defer to the court’s

‘ultimate conclusion . . . unless it amounts to an abuse of discretion’”

(citation omitted)); State v. Buckner, 

 (

)

(2013) (explaining that the weighing of the Barker-Doggett factors

“is committed to the substantial discretion of the trial court, and ‘its

ultimate judgment is reviewed on appeal only for an abuse of that

discretion’” (citation omitted)).2


      2 As Appellant points out in his brief, the record does not support the

trial court’s factual findings that the parties consented to a continuance in July

                                        5
      3. During the trial, the lead detective on Appellant’s case

testified that near the beginning of his investigation, he focused on

Taylor’s friend Regal as a suspect, because the detective “noticed

quite a few indicators of deception” when he first questioned Regal

about the days before Taylor’s death. The detective explained that

after he told Regal about Taylor’s murder, however, Regal appeared

less nervous and more honest, and the detective believed that Regal

had initially been deceptive because he had assumed he was being

interviewed about some stolen property that Taylor had given him.

Regal showed the detective some gasoline-soaked clothing in Regal’s

house, and the detective observed some scratches on Regal’s hands

and arms. The detective testified that Regal explained that the

clothing and injuries were related to his work as a stone mason. The

detective did not collect the clothing or further investigate the



2015 and that Appellant’s trial counsel requested a continuance in October
2015. Given the other continuances requested by Appellant and the court’s
other findings regarding the reasons for delays in the case and regarding the
other Barker-Doggett factors, which the record supports, it is clear that those
two erroneous findings were not material to the court’s ultimate conclusion.
See, e.g., Dillard v. State, 

 (

) (2015).

                                      6
injuries.3

      Relying on California v. Trombetta, 

 (

, 81 LE2d 413) (1984), and Arizona v. Youngblood, 

(

, 102 LE2d 281) (1988), Appellant contends that the

State deprived him of due process by failing to preserve Regal’s

clothing or better document his injuries. He argues that because

Taylor was manually strangled and her body was burned with

gasoline, the detective ignored the obvious exculpatory value of the

gas-soaked clothing and scratches, and that if the clothing had been

collected, Appellant could have conducted DNA or other testing on

it, the results of which might have exonerated him.

      In evaluating whether a defendant’s constitutional right to due

process was violated when the State failed to preserve evidence that

could be exculpatory,

      a court must determine both whether the evidence was
      material and whether the police acted in bad faith in
      failing to preserve the evidence. . . . Youngblood, 

 Regal testified that Taylor had brought to his house some property,

including a guitar, that she had taken from her ex-boyfriend and planned to
pawn. He also testified that he often got scratches on his hands and arms from
his work as a stone mason.
                                      7
     51 . . . . To meet the standard of constitutional materiality,
     the evidence must possess an exculpatory value that was
     apparent before it was destroyed, and be of such a nature
     that the defendant would be unable to obtain comparable
     evidence by other reasonably available means. . . .
     Trombetta, 

. . . .



Krause v. State, 

 (

) (2010) (citation

and punctuation omitted). See also State v. Mussman, 

 (

) (2011) (applying this test where the State failed

to preserve evidence that “could have been exculpatory, but where

it is not known that the evidence would have been exculpatory”)

(emphasis in original).

     This test is ordinarily applied when State officials dispose of

potential evidence that was previously in the State’s actual or

constructive possession. See, e.g., Youngblood, 

(sexual assault kit not fully tested and victim’s clothing not

refrigerated); Trombetta, 

 (suspected drunk drivers’

breath samples not preserved by arresting officers); Hill v. State, 

 (

) (2020) (correctional officer’s video

of post-crime search lost); Clay v. State, 

, 841-
                                   8
843 (

) (2012) (blood samples taken from defendant

destroyed); Mussman, 

 (defendant’s impounded

car released). Cf. Krause, 

 (applying the test to a bat

seen in a crime scene photograph but not taken into evidence). That

is different from the situation presented here, where a detective did

not try to collect or further document certain potential evidence in

the first place — evidence that might have required Regal’s consent

or a search warrant to obtain — and no State actor then had

anything to do with the disposition of that potential evidence. Cf.

Youngblood, 

 (disagreeing “strongly” with the claim

that “the Due Process Clause is violated when the police fail to use

a particular investigatory tool” and explaining that “the police do

not have a constitutional duty to perform any particular tests”).

     But we need not decide whether Appellant’s claim invokes the

test to determine a due process violation based on the State’s failure

to preserve evidence. Even if we assume it does, and even if we also

assume that he could establish under the first part of the test that

the evidence was constitutionally material (and even if we assume

                                  9
further that this claim was timely and properly raised in the trial

court), the claim fails, because he has not shown that the detective

acted in bad faith. Indeed, the record provides no support for such a

finding, and Appellant made no allegation in the trial court that the

detective acted in bad faith.4 Although the detective initially

considered Regal a suspect, he believed that Regal was truthful after

learning the actual reason for the investigation, and he credited

Regal’s explanation for the clothing and injuries. Moreover, the

detective testified that at that point in the investigation, he had not

yet contacted Appellant for an interview and did not “really think

[Appellant] was a suspect.” Thus, Appellant cannot establish that

the State violated his right to due process. See Krause, 

 (“[The appellant] did not even argue bad faith failure to preserve

the bat evidence at trial, much less produce any evidence of bad faith

on the part of the State. Accordingly, [his] due process rights were

not violated.”). See also Hill, 

 (explaining that “‘even


      4 Appellant also made no claim of bad faith in this Court until his reply

brief, where he simply and circularly asserts that because the detective failed
to collect the potential evidence, the detective acted in bad faith.
                                      10
if we were to assume that the State’s handling of the [potential

evidence]   indicated   careless,        shoddy[,]   and   unprofessional

investigatory procedures, it did not indicate that the police in bad

faith attempted to deny [the appellant] access to evidence that they

knew would be exculpatory’” (citation omitted)).

     4. Appellant contends next that the trial court erred by failing

to suppress evidence obtained from his cell phone. Appellant’s

pretrial counsel filed a motion to suppress the evidence, arguing that

the lead detective seized Appellant’s phone from him during an

interview about two weeks after Taylor’s murder, without a warrant

and under no applicable exception to the warrant requirement,

thereby violating the Fourth Amendment to the United States

Constitution. The trial court held a hearing on the motion but did

not issue a ruling at the hearing or in an order, and Appellant’s trial

counsel did not request a ruling or object when the cell phone

evidence was admitted during the trial. We therefore review

Appellant’s claim only for plain error. See OCGA § 24-1-103 (a), (d);

Lofton v. State, 

, 358-359 (

) (2020). To

                                    11
prevail on this claim, Appellant must demonstrate that the trial

court committed an error that was not affirmatively waived, was

obvious beyond reasonable dispute, likely affected the outcome of his

trial, and seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public

reputation of judicial proceedings. See Lofton, supra.

     Pretermitting whether the trial court committed an obvious

error by failing to suppress the cell phone evidence, Appellant

cannot show that any such error likely affected the outcome of his

trial, and indeed he makes no effort to do so in his briefs here.

During the trial, the lead detective testified that the downloaded

content of Appellant’s cell phone showed that Taylor’s phone

number, which was saved in Appellant’s phone under the name “Mr.

Davis,” had been deleted at some unknown time. The investigator

who downloaded the content of the cell phone testified that some

text messages and time-and-date entries for phone calls between

Appellant’s phone and Taylor’s phone had also been deleted at an

unknown time. The investigator’s report, which was admitted into

evidence, showed that Appellant’s phone and Taylor’s phone

                                 12
exchanged 24 text messages mostly in June and September 2014, all

of which had been deleted, and 33 calls in September and October

2014; the entries for three calls on October 6 and two on October 7,

the day Taylor was last seen alive, had been deleted.

     The evidence that Appellant saved Taylor’s phone number

under a false name and that he deleted her number, their text

messages, and some of their call entries at some unknown time was

not especially incriminating, given that Appellant admitted to the

police and at trial that he had an extramarital affair with Taylor.

And although the report showed and the investigator briefly

testified that two of the deleted call entries were from the day Taylor

was last seen alive, indicating that the calls had been deleted that

day or sometime after Taylor’s death, that evidence was not

mentioned again during the trial.

     On the other hand, the State presented strong evidence of

Appellant’s guilt that is unchallenged here, including evidence that

he told Wyatt that he wanted to end the affair with Taylor but could

not because of her threats to expose it; that he was the last person

                                  13
to see her alive; and that he then lied repeatedly to investigators

about being in Chattanooga with Wyatt around the time of the

murder and asked Wyatt to corroborate that alibi, which Wyatt

initially did before admitting and testifying that the alibi was false.

When Appellant’s cell phone location information showed that his

phone was not in Chattanooga as he had claimed but instead

traveled toward the area where Taylor’s dead body was discovered,5

Appellant claimed that the location data was incorrect, and then at

trial he changed his story to claim that he had driven Wyatt to

Atlanta to pick up some money from a friend, a claim that Wyatt

also denied. In addition, on the day Taylor’s dead body was found,

Appellant pawned a guitar that she had stolen from an ex-boyfriend,

and while awaiting trial, Appellant confessed to his cellmate that he

strangled Taylor and left her body at a park.


     5 Notably,  the cell phone location evidence was not derived from the
downloaded content of Appellant’s phone but rather from the AT&T billing
records for his wife’s account, which were admitted into evidence without
objection. Those billing records also showed the dates and times of calls
between Appellant’s phone and Taylor’s phone. The State also introduced,
again without objection, a voicemail from Appellant and dozens of text
messages between Appellant’s cell phone and Taylor’s cell phone, which were
obtained from Taylor’s phone records.
                                    14
      Given the other, compelling evidence of Appellant’s guilt in

comparison to the weakly incriminating evidence derived from his

cell phone, he has not shown that any error in the admission of the

cell phone evidence likely affected the outcome of his trial. He has

therefore failed to show plain error. See, e.g., Thompson v. State, 

 (

) (2018) (concluding that the appellant

had not shown that the challenged testimony probably affected the

outcome of his trial under the third part of the plain error test,

because the testimony was not particularly prejudicial and the other

evidence of his guilt was compelling). See also Wallace v. State, 

 (

) (2020) (holding that the appellant

failed to show that he was prejudiced when the challenged evidence

was “not . . . especially incriminating” and the other evidence of his

guilt was “strong”).6



      6  To the extent Appellant argues that his trial counsel provided
ineffective assistance by failing to obtain a ruling on the motion to suppress
the cell phone evidence, Appellant did not raise that claim in his motion for
new trial, in the amended motion, or at the hearing on the motion, and the trial
court did not rule on it, so he has not preserved the claim for review on appeal.
See Robinson v. State, 

 (

) (2019). And even if the

                                       15
      5. During direct examination of the lead detective, the State

introduced into evidence a video recording of one of Appellant’s

interviews with the police. Outside the presence of the jury, the

prosecutor explained that he had redacted from the recording any

discussion of Appellant’s prior conviction. The prosecutor then

played the video recording for the jury. Near the end of the

approximately hour-long recording, one of the interviewing

investigators told Appellant that they were obtaining a search

warrant for his DNA. Appellant said, “When I left prison, they

already took my DNA. So you should have records of my DNA. That

might help you.” About four minutes later, during a phone call to his

wife while he was left alone in the interview room, Appellant said,

“Like I told them, you already got my DNA. They took my DNA

before I left prison.”

      After playing the recording, the prosecutor continued his direct



claim had been preserved, Appellant cannot show that the alleged deficiency
of trial counsel caused him prejudice. See Roberts v. State, 

(

) (2019) (explaining that “the test for prejudice in the ineffective
assistance analysis is equivalent to the test for harm in plain error review”
(citation and punctuation omitted)).
                                       16
examination of the detective. The trial court then released the jury

for a lunch break, and Appellant’s counsel moved for a mistrial on

the ground that the recording mentioned Appellant’s prior

incarceration. The court denied the motion but offered to give the

jury a curative instruction. The discussion then moved on to another

topic, and Appellant’s counsel never requested the instruction.

     Appellant now claims that the trial court abused its discretion

by denying the mistrial motion because the references to his

incarceration constituted improper character evidence. This claim,

however, is not preserved for review because Appellant failed to

“make a contemporaneous motion for a mistrial at the time [he]

became aware of the matter giving rise to the motion.” Coley v. State,

 (

) (2019) (citation and punctuation

omitted). See also Kilpatrick v. State, 

 (

) (2020).

     But even if Appellant had properly preserved this issue, the

trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the mistrial

motion. “Whether to grant a mistrial is within the discretion of the

                                 17
trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal unless there is a

showing that a mistrial is essential to the preservation of the right

to a fair trial.” Swims v. State, 

 (

)

(2020) (citation and punctuation omitted). The two comments about

Appellant having been in prison were brief and nonspecific, and such

“‘passing reference[s] to [his] incarceration [did] not place his

character in evidence.’” 

 (citation omitted). Moreover, after

Appellant’s counsel moved for a mistrial, the trial court proposed the

remedy of a curative instruction, but counsel did not accept the

court’s offer. See 

 (“‘Failure to give an unrequested curative

instruction does not create reversible error.’” (citation omitted)).

Accordingly, the trial court acted within its discretion in denying the

mistrial motion. See, e.g., 

 (concluding that the trial court did not

abuse its discretion by denying the defendant’s mistrial motion after

a witness briefly referenced the defendant’s “incarceration in West

Virginia for an unstated crime”); Lewis v. State, 

, 212-

213 (

) (2010) (holding that even if the prosecutor’s

questions at trial referenced the defendant’s incarceration, the trial

                                  18
court did not abuse its discretion by denying his motion for a

mistrial).7

     6. Finally, Appellant contends that the trial court abused its

discretion by excluding evidence about Taylor that he asserts would

have supported his defense theory that other people had a motive to

kill her. We disagree.

     Appellant’s pretrial counsel filed a motion to introduce

“character evidence” about Taylor, including her prostitution- and

drug-related convictions and posts from her Facebook page. At the

hearing on the motion, counsel argued that Taylor’s convictions and

Facebook posts showed that she solicited customers for sex and

drugs and that the posts also showed that she had conflicts with

people other than Appellant. Counsel asserted that this evidence

showed “the various suspects in this case, all the people [Taylor]

came in contact with,” and was relevant to prove that other people

could have had a motive to kill her. The trial court denied the


     7 Although Appellant baldly asserts in his principal brief here that the

references to his incarceration caused him to decide that it was necessary to
testify, nothing in the record supports that assertion.
                                     19
motion.

     Evidence is relevant if it has “any tendency to make the

existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of

the action more probable or less probable than it would be without

the evidence.” OCGA § 24-4-401. According to OCGA § 24-4-402,

“[a]ll relevant evidence shall be admissible, except as limited by

constitutional requirements or as otherwise provided by law or by

other rules. . . . Evidence which is not relevant shall not be

admissible.” OCGA § 24-4-403 allows for the exclusion of relevant

evidence “if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the

danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the

jury or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless

presentation of cumulative evidence.”

     Appellant has not shown how the evidence of Taylor’s

convictions and Facebook posts met these basic requirements of

admissibility.

     This Court has followed the general rule that, before
     [evidence] can be introduced that another person
     committed the charged crime, the proffered evidence

                                 20
     must raise a reasonable inference of the defendant’s
     innocence and, in the absence of a showing that the other
     person recently committed a crime of the same or similar
     nature, must directly connect the other person with the
     corpus delicti.

Roberts v. State, 

 (

) (2019) (citation

and punctuation omitted). The proffered evidence showing that

Taylor had been convicted of prostitution and drug crimes and that

unknown individuals contacted her to obtain sex or drugs or had

some sort of conflict with her during the weeks and months before

her death would have done nothing to establish that someone other

than Appellant killed her, because none of the proffered evidence

linked any other individual to the murder.8 Thus, the convictions

and Facebook posts would not have raised a reasonable inference

that Appellant was innocent or directly connected anyone else to

Taylor’s murder, and “the trial court was not required to allow


     8  Appellant argues in particular that one of Taylor’s Facebook posts
saying, “DAT WHITE MAN THOUGHT he won . . . nope . . . I always come out
on top,” showed that Taylor had conflict with her ex-boyfriend or Regal, who
are both white. But Appellant has not shown that this post referred to either
of those men or that it somehow connected them to Taylor’s murder. Moreover,
the ex-boyfriend and Regal testified at trial, and Appellant’s counsel
thoroughly cross-examined them about conflicts in their relationships with
Taylor.
                                     21
Appellant to introduce evidence ‘based purely on rumor, speculation,

and conjecture.’” Moss v. State, 

 (

)

(2016) (citation omitted) (concluding that the trial court did not

abuse its discretion by excluding evidence of a prior shooting of the

murder victim that the defendant offered to show there were other

potential suspects in the murder). See also Roberts, 

-

262 (holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by

excluding evidence that the murder victim pulled a gun on another

individual about a week before the murder, because the evidence

“offered nothing more than speculation and conjecture that a third

person could have been involved in [the victim’s] murder”).

      Moreover, Appellant has not shown that the form of the

proffered evidence was proper under OCGA § 24-4-405 (a).9 Because

that rule generally limits “[c]haracter evidence about a victim . . . to

reputation or opinion, not specific bad acts,” the convictions and


      9 OCGA § 24-4-405 (a) says, “In all proceedings in which evidence of

character or a trait of character of a person is admissible [other than as an
essential element of a charge, claim, or defense or when an accused testifies to
his own character], proof shall be made by testimony as to reputation or by
testimony in the form of an opinion.”
                                      22
Facebooks posts showing Taylor’s acts of prostitution, drug-dealing,

and quarreling with individuals on social media were not

admissible. Wofford v. State, 

 (

) (2019)

(citation and punctuation omitted). Thus, the trial court did not

abuse its discretion by excluding the proffered evidence.

     Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur, except Warren, J.,
not participating and Bethel, J., disqualified.



                     Decided October 19, 2020.

     Murder. Gwinnett Superior Court. Before Judge Turner,
Senior Judge.
     Richard C. Armond, for appellant.
     Daniel J. Porter, District Attorney, Lee F. Tittsworth, Daryl E.
Manns, Daniel Sanmiguel, Assistant District Attorneys;
Christopher M. Carr, Attorney General, Patricia B. Attaway
Burton, Deputy Attorney General, Paula K. Smith, Senior Assistant
Attorney General, Matthew B. Crowder, Assistant Attorney General,
for appellee.




                                 23