Henderson v. State

FINAL COPY

             S20A0986. HENDERSON v. THE STATE.


     BETHEL, Justice.

     A Gwinnett County jury found Arion Henderson guilty of

malice murder, felony murder, and aggravated assault in connection

with the death of his grandfather, William Stridiron. Henderson

contends that the State violated his constitutional right to a speedy

trial and that his trial counsel provided constitutionally ineffective

assistance in several regards. For the reasons set forth below, we

affirm.1



     1 The crimes occurred sometime between January 9 and 13, 2012. On

April 11, 2012, a Gwinnett County grand jury indicted Henderson for malice
murder, felony murder predicated on aggravated assault, and aggravated
assault. In a jury trial held from June 15 to 17, 2015, Henderson was found
guilty on all counts. The trial court sentenced Henderson to life in prison
without the possibility of parole on the malice murder count. The felony
murder count was vacated by operation of law, and the aggravated assault
count merged with the malice murder count.
      On June 18, 2015, Henderson filed a motion for new trial through trial
counsel. He later amended the motion twice through new counsel. After a
hearing, the trial court denied the motion for new trial, as amended, on
December 17, 2019. Henderson filed a notice of appeal on January 13, 2020.
His case was docketed to this Court’s April 2020 term and submitted for a
decision on the briefs.
    1. The Jury Had Sufficient Evidence to Find Henderson Guilty.

     Viewed in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict, the

evidence presented at trial showed the following. After an accident,

Stridiron suffered nerve damage and a spinal injury that disabled

him. In December 2011, after Henderson moved in with Stridiron,

Stridiron expressed concerns to his caretaker that Henderson “had

a lot of rage” and was disrespectful to him. Stridiron said that his

physical condition would leave him unable to defend himself in an

altercation with Henderson.

     Later that month, an investigator responded to a domestic

violence call at Stridiron’s apartment. Henderson was present when

the investigator arrived and said that he and Stridiron had argued.

Visibly upset, Stridiron told the investigator that Henderson

disrespected him by stealing his marijuana and that he wanted

Henderson to leave the apartment. After the incident, Henderson

gathered his belongings and agreed to move out of the apartment.

After Henderson moved out, Stridiron suspected that Henderson

was sneaking into his apartment to steal food, clothes, and other

                                 2
items. In response, Stridiron installed new locks to prevent

Henderson from accessing his apartment.

     Stridiron’s caretaker last saw him on Monday, January 9,

2012, and talked to him on the phone that evening after she left

work. On Friday, January 13, after several unanswered calls to

Stridiron, the caretaker called his apartment complex to request a

welfare check. That same day, an apartment complex employee and

a law enforcement officer conducted a welfare check at Stridiron’s

apartment. Because Stridiron had recently replaced the front door

lock, the key did not work, so the employee crawled into the

apartment through an unlocked window. In the apartment’s back

bedroom, the employee found Stridiron’s body lying face down and

covered with a blanket. Stridiron was dead. The officer testified that

it appeared as though someone had poured bleach on Stridiron’s

clothing.

     In the apartment’s entryway, a large carpet piece was missing.

The employee and officer noticed blood spatter on water bottles near

the missing carpet area and red drag marks going from the entryway

                                  3
toward the back bedroom where Stridiron’s body was found.

     The medical examiner testified that Stridiron had four stab

wounds to his neck and shoulder that caused his death. A weapon

with one sharp edge and one blunt edge inflicted the stab wounds.

The state of Stridiron’s body at his autopsy indicated that at least

one day had passed between his death and his body’s discovery.

     Officers noted an oval-shaped dust print in the shape of a

television on the surface of the bedroom dresser, but there was no

television in the room. Officers also found a broken six-inch steak

knife blade with a missing handle in the bedroom.

     Henderson spoke with officers at Stridiron’s apartment. He

told them that he had clothes at his friend’s apartment, which was

located in the building across the parking lot from Stridiron’s

apartment building. Henderson took the officers to the friend’s

apartment, pulled a suitcase from the patio closet filled with clean

clothes that still had their original tags, and told the officers they

could go through the suitcase. Henderson told the officers that the

clothes belonged to Stridiron.

                                  4
     Henderson told an officer that he had an alibi for January 9

and 10 because he was staying with Anthony Miller. Henderson

then gave the officer an incorrect phone number for Miller. When

the officer went to Miller’s apartment to speak with him, the officer

saw Henderson leaving the same apartment. Miller agreed to speak

with the officer and got into the officer’s car. While Miller and the

officer were speaking, Henderson appeared antsy, walking back and

forth, moving in and out of Miller’s apartment.

     At trial, Miller testified that, at the time he spoke to law

enforcement in January 2012, he had just met Henderson in the

neighborhood through his cousin. Miller met Henderson the week

before Stridiron’s death on January 4, hung out with him on

January 5, and did not see him at all on January 6. Contrary to

Henderson’s claims, Henderson did not stay with Miller on January

9 or 10, which were the Monday and Tuesday during the week of

Stridiron’s death. On January 11, Henderson told Miller that he had

an argument with Stridiron and pushed him and that Stridiron had

hit his head and stopped moving. On January 12, Henderson left

                                 5
Miller’s apartment in the early morning and went back to Stridiron’s

apartment. Miller also bought a $150 television from Henderson,

which Henderson claimed belonged to him.

     On January 12, after Henderson visited Stridiron’s apartment,

Miller and Henderson rode around in Stridiron’s van. Miller drove

the van and picked up some friends who stayed at his apartment.

Miller and Henderson parked the van in front of Stridiron’s

apartment. On the morning of Friday, January 13, Miller and

Henderson noticed crime scene tape around Stridiron’s apartment

building. Henderson went to check on Stridiron, and Miller returned

to his apartment. When Henderson came back to Miller’s apartment,

he told Miller not to say anything about the television to law

enforcement and to hide the television in the closet. Officers arrived

at Miller’s apartment about ten minutes later.

     In Miller’s apartment, officers found a television covered with

a blanket. The television’s size matched the size of the dust print on

Stridiron’s bedroom dresser. Henderson told officers that he last saw

Stridiron in December, when the police responded to their argument

                                  6
about Stridiron’s marijuana.

     Officers searched the dumpster outside Stridiron’s apartment

complex and found the following items: the same type of trash bags

and latex gloves as those in Stridiron’s apartment; knives similar to

the knife blade found in the apartment; a bloody knife handle

wrapped in a paper towel and white tape; and one double-bound

trash bag that contained a bloodstained carpet piece that matched

the carpet from Stridiron’s apartment.

     Despite Henderson’s claim that he had not been in Stridiron’s

van or apartment since he moved out a month earlier, officers found

Henderson’s “fresh” fingerprints on the GPS screen and exterior

mirror of Stridiron’s van, and a “fresh” palm print on a Chinese

takeout menu in Stridiron’s trash. They also found Henderson’s

fingerprints on the television in Miller’s apartment. However,

officers were unable to locate Stridiron’s cell phone, wallet, and car

keys during the investigation. The State also presented evidence

suggesting that Henderson had withdrawn money from Stridiron’s



                                  7
bank account during the week of his death.2

      DNA testing revealed that Stridiron and Henderson’s DNA

profiles were on the knife’s handle and that Stridiron’s DNA was on

the knife’s blade. The volume of epithelial skin cells found on the

knife’s handle matching Henderson was sufficient for the crime lab

to secure a full DNA profile. An expert in forensic serology testified

that this indicated that Henderson must have had more than casual

or brief contact with the knife handle. The expert testified that, to

have Henderson’s full DNA profile on the handle, he must have held

the handle for “quite a bit.”




      2 After reviewing Stridiron’s bank account activity, officers noted three

suspicious transactions on January 9 and January 10, during the week of
Stridiron’s death. In each of those transactions, approximately $300 was
withdrawn from Stridiron’s checking account. Bank records also showed that
an additional $500 in withdrawals were attempted from Stridiron’s account.
Those attempted withdrawals were declined due to insufficient funds. These
were the last transactions listed from Stridiron’s accounts. All six transactions
occurred at an ATM located near Stridiron’s apartment. The State introduced
surveillance video recordings from that location for January 9, 10, and 11. In
the videos, a man resembling Henderson, not Stridiron, is seen using the ATM
three times, once each day. He successfully withdrew cash at least once and
was denied at least once for insufficient funds. The person in the video wore
the same jacket or vest on January 9, 10, and 11. Investigators found the same
jacket type in Stridiron’s hall closet.

                                       8
     Henderson does not challenge the legal sufficiency of the

evidence supporting his conviction for malice murder, the only crime

of which he was convicted. Nevertheless, it is our customary practice

in murder cases to review the record independently to determine

whether the evidence was legally sufficient with regard to the

offenses of which the appellant was convicted.3 Having done so, we

conclude that the evidence presented at trial and summarized above

was sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find Henderson

guilty of malice murder. See Jackson v. Virginia, 

(III) (B) (

, 61 LE2d 560) (1979).

  2. The State Did Not Violate Henderson’s Right to a Speedy Trial.

     Henderson contends that his constitutional right to a speedy

trial was denied. We disagree.

     The United States Constitution guarantees that, “[i]n all

criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy


     3 We remind litigants that the Court will end its practice of considering

sufficiency sua sponte in non-death penalty cases with cases docketed to the
term of court that begins in December 2020. See Davenport v. State, 

 (4) (

) (2020). The Court began assigning cases to the
December term on August 3, 2020.
                                     9
and public trial,” U.S. Const. Amend. VI. Likewise, the Georgia

Constitution protects this same right “[i]n criminal cases, the

defendant shall have a public and speedy trial[.]” Ga. Const. of 1983,

Art. I, Sec. I, Par. XI (a).

     In ruling on a defendant’s constitutional speedy trial claim, the

analysis proceeds in two stages. A trial court’s threshold inquiry is

“whether the interval from the accused’s arrest, indictment, or other

formal accusation to the trial is sufficiently long to be considered

presumptively prejudicial.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.)

Ruffin v. State, 

 (

) (2008). If not, the

speedy trial claim fails at this threshold. See 

     However, if the delay is deemed presumptively prejudicial, the

trial court must consider the United States Supreme Court’s four

Barker-Doggett factors, which guide Georgia courts in considering

whether a delay violated an accused’s right to a speedy trial. See

Barker v. Wingo, 

 (

, 33 LE2d 101)

(1972); Doggett v. United States, 

 (

,

120 LE2d 520) (1992); see also Redd v. State, 

, 301 n.1

                                  10
(

) (1991) (applying the Barker-Doggett factors to

speedy trial claims under the Georgia Constitution).

     As we have explained,

     [i]f the delay is long enough to invoke the presumption of
     prejudice, the trial court must balance four factors: (1) whether
     the delay before trial was uncommonly long, (2) whether the
     government or the criminal defendant is more to blame for the
     delay, (3) whether, in due course, the defendant asserted his
     right to a speedy trial, and (4) whether he suffered prejudice as
     the delay’s result.

(Citations omitted.) Cash v. State, 

 (2) (a) (

) (2019).

     Speedytrial claims require trial courts “to engage in a difficult

and sensitive balancing process.” Ruffin, 

 (2) (quoting

Barker, 

). This task is committed principally to the

discretion of the trial court, and this Court has a “limited” role in

reviewing the trial court’s decision. State v. Buckner, 

 (

) (2013).

     [W]e must accept the factual findings of the trial court unless
     they are clearly erroneous, and we must accept the ultimate
     conclusion of the trial court unless it amounts to an abuse of
     discretion, even though we might have reached a different
     conclusion were the issue committed to our discretion.

                                 11
Buckner, 

.

      (a) Length of Delay. The right to a speedy trial attaches at the

time of arrest or formal accusation or indictment, whichever occurs

first, and courts measure the delay from the time the right attaches.

See Scandrett v. State, 

 (1) (a) (

)

(2005). That time then runs until the date on which the defendant’s

trial begins. See Christian v. State, 

 (2) (

) (2007). The delay in this case, calculated from Henderson’s

arrest on January 13, 2012, until the first day of his trial on June

15, 2015, was just over three-and-a-half years. As the trial court

found and the State concedes, this delay was “presumptively

prejudicial,” and the trial court was correct to weigh the length of

the delay against the State. See Goins v. State, 

 (2) (b)

(

) (2019) (“A one-year delay is typically presumed to be

prejudicial.”).

     (b) Reasons for the Delay. The trial court attributed the delays

in this case to both the State and Henderson. It did not abuse its


                                  12
discretion in doing so.

     Whether the defendant or the State bears the primary
     responsibility for delay in reaching trial is pivotal in
     evaluating the strength of a constitutional speedy trial
     claim, as it can color the consideration of all other factors.
     Deliberate delay is weighed heavily against the State.
     Delay resulting from neutral causes, such as negligence,
     has lighter weight. Of course, delay caused by the defense
     weighs against the defendant.

(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Burney v. State, 

 (4) (b) (

) (2020).

     In this case, the trial court attributed the delay in bringing

Henderson to trial both to the State’s backlog of cases and to the

actions of Henderson’s trial counsel. The court found that the State’s

role in the delay was benign, noting that an overcrowded docket

contributed to the delay. The court also noted that Henderson never

alleged that the State intentionally delayed bringing him to trial to

gain an advantage. The court also weighed the factor against

Henderson benignly, noting that his trial counsel filed 11 leaves of

absence, covering nearly 35% of the available trial dates from the

date of the indictment to the time of Henderson’s trial. Henderson’s


                                  13
trial counsel also requested two continuances, resulting in an

additional four-to-five-month delay. See Williams v. State, 

 (2) (

) (2011) (“[W]hen any portion of a delay in

trial is caused by or at the behest of defense counsel, it should not

be weighed against the State.”). These findings were not clearly

erroneous and support the trial court’s determination that

Henderson and the State both contributed to the delays.

     Henderson also contends that the trial court should not have

blamed him for any of the delay following his indictment,

complaining that the court improperly cited his counsel’s consent to

a State-requested continuance for four to five months and attributed

the delay’s cause to Henderson. Henderson is correct that the State

caused this specific delay by requesting the continuance. However,

because Henderson consented to this continuance and its resulting

delay, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by weighing the

continuance lightly against the State.

     (c) Defendant’s Assertion of the Right. The trial court

determined that Henderson invoked his statutory right to a speedy

                                 14
trial roughly ten months after his indictment. The trial court noted

that Henderson later filed an out-of-time demand for speedy trial.

The record supports these findings.

     In determining the weight to assign this assertion-of-the-right

factor, courts should consider the “timing, form, and vigor of the

accused’s demands to be tried immediately.” Ruffin, 

(2). Henderson argues that the trial court improperly assessed his

assertion’s vigor and timing and should have weighed this factor

more in his favor. Henderson asserts that the trial court improperly

determined when he asserted this right by failing to consider

Henderson’s own pro se motions with the court and Henderson’s

private conversations with his counsel.

     First, regarding Henderson’s pro se motions, this argument

has no merit. “A demand for speedy trial has no legal effect

whatsoever if filed by a defendant acting pro se at a time he is

represented by counsel.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.)

Redford v. State, 

 (

) (2016); see

also Johnson v. State, 

 (

) (2016). A

                                15
defendant “does not have the right to represent himself and also be

represented by an attorney.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.)

White v. State, 

 (

) (2017). Any pro se

filings by represented parties are “unauthorized” nullities that are

“without effect.” 

 Thus, because the trial court could not consider

Henderson’s pro se motions, we also do not consider them in

assessing the trial court’s determination of when and in what

manner Henderson asserted his right to a speedy trial.

     Second, Henderson also argues that the trial court failed to

consider private conversations between him and his trial counsel

where he asserted his right to a speedy trial to his counsel even

before the indictment. This argument also lacks merit. To invoke

this right to a speedy trial, the accused must assert it to the court.

Privileged, off-the-record conversations cannot serve as a sufficient

assertion of this right, as neither the trial court nor the State are

put on notice of such privately made assertions until they are

relayed through counsel. “[T]he accused bears some responsibility to

invoke the speedy trial right and put the government on notice that

                                 16
he or she, unlike so many other criminal defendants, would prefer

to be tried as soon as possible.” (Emphasis supplied.) Ruffin, 

 (2); see also Dillard v. State, 

 (4) (

) (2015) (“While appellant was not required to seek a speedy trial

at the first available opportunity, it was incumbent upon him to put

the State on notice that he preferred to be tried as soon as possible.”).

     Lastly, we consider whether Henderson’s demand for a speedy

trial required greater weight than the trial court gave it. On October

31, 2012, Henderson, through counsel, filed an untimely statutory

demand for speedy trial pursuant to OCGA § 17-7-171, which

included an assertion of his constitutional right to a speedy trial.

This statute requires that a statutory demand for a speedy trial be

filed: either (1) within the term of court in which the indictment was

returned, or (2) during the next succeeding regular term of court.

See OCGA § 17-7-171. In this case, OCGA § 15-6-3 (20) provides that

terms of court for Gwinnett County Superior Court begin on the first

Monday in March, June, and December and the second Monday in

September. The statute thus allowed Henderson to file his statutory

                                   17
demand during the March 2012 term, which is the term in which he

was indicted, or the June 2012 term, which was the next succeeding

term. However, Henderson did not file his demand until the

September 2012 term. Accordingly, Henderson’s statutory demand

for speedy trial failed to comply with these statutory requirements

and was properly deemed “untimely” by the trial court. However,

even though the statutory demand was untimely, the constitutional

assertion that accompanied it was not, as a defendant may file an

assertion based on his constitutional right to a speedy trial at any

time after arrest. See Dillard, 

 (4).

     On November 8, 2012, after realizing the statutory demand

was untimely, Henderson, through counsel, filed an out-of-time

speedy trial demand “without leave of court” asserting both his

statutory and constitutional right to a speedy trial. Although the

trial court found that the statutory speedy trial demand was

untimely, the court concluded that for purposes of the Barker-

Doggett balancing test, it would consider that Henderson did invoke

his right to a speedy trial.

                                  18
     We agree that the filing of a speedy trial demand would

typically weigh in a defendant’s favor in determining when he

asserted his constitutional right to a speedy trial. However, when

assessing the weight to give the statutory demand, it was within the

trial court’s discretion to consider the assertions’ “timing, form, and

vigor[.]” Ruffin, 

 (2). Moreover, even though the

constitutional assertion was timely, Henderson has relied in his

arguments in the trial court and on appeal almost exclusively on the

statutory demand. Given that Henderson’s statutory speedy trial

demand did not comply with the requirements of OCGA § 17-7-171

and his inattention to the constitutional assertion, as well as his

delays in asserting his rights to a speedy trial, we hold that it was

not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to weigh this factor

neither for nor against Henderson.

     (d) Prejudice to the Defendant. The trial court did not abuse its

discretion when it determined that Henderson failed to establish

prejudice arising out of the alleged violation of his right to a speedy

trial. The prejudice associated with unreasonable delay before trial

                                  19
includes “oppressive pretrial incarceration, anxiety and concern of

the accused, and the possibility that the (accused’s) defense will be

impaired by dimming memories and loss of exculpatory evidence.”

(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Doggett, 

 (III)

(A). “Of these forms of prejudice, the most serious is the last, because

the inability of a defendant adequately to prepare his case skews the

fairness of the entire system.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.)

      Henderson argues that he suffered prejudice in two ways: by

suffering from anxiety due to his pre-trial confinement, and by

losing the ability to present an alibi defense. The trial court did not

abuse its discretion by rejecting both contentions.

      Henderson asserts that he experienced extreme anxiety and

concern when his trial delay caused him to develop an overall

distrust in the judicial system and a loss of his support system.

However, as we have noted, “[a]nxiety and concern of the accused

are always present to some extent, and thus absent some unusual

showing are not likely to be determinative in defendant’s favor.”

                                  20
(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Mullinax v. State, 

 (2) (

) (2001). Because the trial court did not clearly

err in finding that Henderson’s anxiety was not unusual or

extraordinary for a criminal defendant awaiting trial, we see no

abuse of discretion in its determination that Henderson was not

prejudiced in this regard.

     Henderson also contends that the delays in bringing him to

trial impaired his alibi defense because his ex-girlfriend, Shawnice

Gibbs, broke up with him and did not testify at trial. Henderson

claims her testimony would have established an alibi defense for

him. Henderson does not explain how the termination of their

relationship impaired Gibbs’s ability to testify truthfully. Moreover,

the trial court correctly noted that other than Henderson’s own

claims regarding Gibbs’s potential testimony, Henderson did not

provide any evidence that Gibbs’s testimony at trial would have

corroborated Henderson’s story or that Henderson sought to contact

her as a trial witness or secure her attendance at trial. See Johnson

v. State, 

 (2) (

) (1997) (no showing of

                                 21
prejudice    where   the   defendant   speculated    about   possible

exculpatory witnesses but presented no evidence that those

witnesses would have testified or what their testimony might have

shown). Contrary to Henderson’s assertions, the trial court noted

that, had Gibbs testified, her testimony likely would have hurt

Henderson’s alibi defense. For instance, despite Henderson claiming

that Gibbs could provide his alibi, Gibbs told investigators that she

had not been with Henderson at all during the week of the murder.

Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s

determination that the delay in bringing Henderson to trial did not

prejudice his ability to present an alibi defense involving Gibbs’s

testimony.

     In sum, although the delays in this case were presumptively

prejudicial, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion

in applying the Barker-Doggett factors to determine that the other

factors weighed neutrally against a determination that Henderson’s

constitutional right to a speedy trial was violated. Nor was there any

clear error in the factual findings supporting those determinations.

                                 22
This enumeration of error therefore fails.

     3. Henderson Did Not Receive Ineffective Assistance of Counsel.

     Henderson also contends that his trial counsel provided

constitutionally ineffective assistance. We disagree.

     To succeed on his claims, Henderson must show that his

counsel’s performance was professionally deficient and that he

suffered prejudice as a result. See Strickland v. Washington, 

 (III) (

, 80 LE2d 674) (1984). To establish

deficient performance, Henderson must prove that his lawyer

“performed his duties in an objectively unreasonable way,

considering all the circumstances and in the light of prevailing

professional norms.” Thornton v. State, 

 (3) (

) (2019). “To establish prejudice, [Henderson] must prove

that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s

deficiency, the result of the trial would have been different.” 

 “It

is not enough ‘to show that the errors had some conceivable effect on

the outcome of the proceeding.’” Harrington v. Richter, 

 (

, 178 LE2d 624) (2011) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.

                                  23
S. at 693). Rather, Henderson must establish a “reasonable

probability” of a different result, which means “a probability

sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Strickland, 

. Finally, “[i]f [Henderson] fails to meet either prong of

the Strickland test, it is not incumbent upon this Court to examine

the other prong.” Green v. State, 

 (2) (

)

(2012).

     (a) Failing to File a Timely Statutory Demand for Speedy Trial.

Henderson     first   asserts   that   his   trial   counsel   provided

constitutionally ineffective assistance by failing to calculate court

terms correctly for filing a timely statutory demand for a speedy trial

under OCGA § 17-7-171. This claim lacks merit.

     We have considered this issue before. With facts somewhat

analogous to this case, in Crawford v. Thompson, 

 (

) (2004), this Court held that trial counsel performed

deficiently by failing to comply with the strict requirements of




                                  24
OCGA § 17-7-171 by citing the wrong statute.4 We also held that

trial counsel’s error prejudiced the defendant in that the defendant

could not exercise his right to a speedy trial. See Crawford, 

 n.3. However, that analysis was erroneous under Strickland,

and for the reasons set forth below, we overrule Crawford’s prejudice

analysis.

      Under the doctrine of stare decisis, courts generally stand by

their prior decisions, because doing so “promotes the evenhanded,

predictable, and consistent development of legal principles, fosters

reliance on judicial decisions, and contributes to the actual and

perceived integrity of the judicial process.” Duke v. State, 

 (

) (2019) (punctuation omitted) (citing

State v. Hudson, 

 (

) (2013)). “Stare

decisis, however, is not an ‘inexorable command.’” 

 at 184 (quoting



      4 We note that Crawford involved a claim of ineffective assistance of

appellate counsel in which the defendant claimed that his appellate counsel
was deficient in failing to enumerate as error a claim of ineffective assistance
of trial counsel based on trial counsel’s failure to file a proper demand for
speedy trial under OCGA § 17-7-171. See Crawford, 

. Our
consideration goes to the soundness of our ruling as to the underlying claim of
ineffective assistance of trial counsel.
                                      25
Hudson, 

). “‘Courts, like individuals, but with more

caution and deliberation, must sometimes reconsider what has been

already carefully considered, and rectify their own mistakes.’” 

(quoting City of Atlanta v. First Presbyterian Church, 

 (

) (1891)). “In reconsidering our prior decisions, ‘we

must balance the importance of having the questions decided

against the importance of having it decided right.’” (Emphasis in

original.) 

 (quoting State v. Jackson, 

 (5) (

) (2010)). “To that end, we have developed a test that

considers ‘the age of the precedent, the reliance interests at stake,

the workability of the decisions, and most importantly, the

soundness of its reasoning.’” (Emphasis omitted.)        

 (quoting

Jackson, 

 (5)).

     In Crawford, this Court held that trial counsel’s failure to file

a timely statutory speedy trial demand prejudiced the defendant

under Strickland. We see several reasons to revisit Crawford’s

prejudice analysis.

     First, Crawford relied upon a speculative analysis to determine

                                 26
that the defendant suffered prejudice. Crawford held that due to

trial counsel’s deficient performance, the defendant had failed to

comply with the statutory speedy trial requirements. See Crawford,

. The Crawford court noted that it would not

“speculate” as to whether “the State would have tried [the

defendant] had [his trial counsel] acted in strict statutory

compliance” with the filing requirements. Id at 520 n.2. But our

review of Crawford shows that the court did just that.

     Strickland places a heavy burden on the defendant to

“affirmatively prove” prejudice through evidence of a “reasonable

probability” of a different result. Pierce v. State, 

(

) (2009). Our conclusion that the defendant in

Crawford satisfied this burden was wrong as Crawford presumed

prejudice based on deficiency. In Crawford, it is clear that the

defendant did not demonstrate actual prejudice, which he could only

do by showing that, had his counsel actually filed a proper statutory

speedy trial demand, the State would not have been able to try him

on time. See Hughley v. State, 

, 195 (

)

                                 27
(2020) (defendant unable to show Strickland prejudice because he

could not “prove whether he would have been tried earlier if his trial

counsel had properly filed a speedy trial demand”); see also Bigham

v. State, 

 (

) (2014) (“[B]ecause a

defendant can be re-indicted after the grant of a special demurrer, a

failure to file such a demurrer generally will not support a finding

of ineffective assistance of counsel.” (citation and punctuation

omitted)). Absent this affirmative showing of prejudice, the only

argument the Crawford defendant provided was his speculative

assertion that prejudice would have occurred. But as we have noted,

“mere speculation on the defendant’s part is insufficient to establish

Strickland prejudice.” Pierce, 

.

     Second, we also held in Crawford that the defendant suffered

prejudice, not because he was not discharged, but because he could

not exercise his statutory right to a speedy trial. See Crawford, 

 n.3. That conclusion is also erroneous. If Crawford was

correct, it would follow that any time a trial lawyer improperly filed

a statutory speedy trial demand, the defendant would automatically

                                 28
suffer Strickland prejudice and have a winning claim of ineffective

assistance of counsel after being found guilty at trial. This is

inconsistent with the Strickland prejudice analysis, which gauges

the effect of a lawyer’s error on the outcome of the proceedings. See

Strickland, 

. We cannot categorize a delay in a

proceeding as per se determinative of that proceeding’s outcome.

     We    conclude    that   Crawford’s   prejudice   analysis   was

speculative, incorrect, and resulted in an incorrect holding. This

significant unsoundness cuts “heavily in favor of overruling

[Crawford].” Olevik v. State, 

 (2) (c) (iv) (

) (2017). We turn to the other stare decisis factors to evaluate

whether any of them alone or in combination weigh in favor of saving

this incorrect decision.

     As for the age of the decision, Crawford was decided 16 years

ago, “and we have overruled decisions older than that.” Olevik, 

 (2) (c) (iv). See also Duke, 

 (overruling a case

that had been decided 19 years previously). Crawford is “neither

ancient nor entrenched” within our judicial system. (Citation and

                                  29
punctuation omitted.) Southall v. State, 

 (1) (

) (2017). Moreover, neither this Court nor the Court of

Appeals has ever relied upon Crawford’s prejudice analysis

regarding the untimely filing of a statutory demand for a speedy

trial. With respect to reliance and workability, we see no reason to

save the rule in Crawford. As discussed above, Crawford employs a

test that presumed prejudice based on deficiency. A Strickland claim

requires a showing of actual prejudice to the defendant flowing from

counsel’s defective performance. See Keller v. State, 

(

) (2020). Crawford deviates from this standard and

lowers the burden that an appellant must satisfy in bringing a claim

of constitutionally ineffective assistance.

     Accordingly, we overrule Crawford to the extent it held that

the untimely filing of a statutory speedy trial demand under OCGA

§ 17-7-171 always results in Strickland prejudice. This is not to say

that failing to file a timely statutory speedy trial demand can never

result in Strickland prejudice, but that is a case-by-case

determination.

                                  30
     Having overruled Crawford, we must now determine whether

the trial court erred by determining that Henderson did not suffer

prejudice as the result of counsel’s failure to file a timely statutory

demand for speedy trial. Henderson claims that this failure to timely

file a speedy trial demand and subsequent delay in his trial

prejudiced him by contributing to his distrust in the judicial system

and by losing contact with his ex-girlfriend, Gibbs. We disagree that

Henderson has established prejudice under Strickland because he

has not demonstrated a reasonable probability that had his counsel

filed a proper speedy trial demand, his trial’s outcome would have

been different. See Strickland, 

.

     As the trial court properly noted, filing a statutory speedy trial

demand would not have automatically resulted in Henderson’s

acquittal as Henderson suggests, but would likely have sent

Henderson to trial earlier and given his counsel less time to prepare

a defense. In light of the overwhelming evidence against him,

Henderson has not shown that holding his trial earlier would have

resulted in a different outcome. He therefore has not satisfied his

                                  31
burden of demonstrating that counsel’s conduct caused him

prejudice. Accordingly, this claim of ineffective assistance fails.

     (b)   Failing   to   Reasonably   Investigate    Alibi    Witnesses.

Henderson     also   contends   that   his   trial   counsel    provided

constitutionally ineffective assistance by failing to make a

reasonable investigation of alibi witnesses that might have aided his

case. We disagree.

     Henderson claims that his trial counsel did not investigate his

case or interview possible witnesses that could have provided an

alibi, including Gibbs, Shaquille Clarke, and Thomas Tribble.

Concerning the adequacy of investigations, “counsel has a duty to

make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision

that makes particular investigations unnecessary,” and heavy

deference is given to counsel’s judgments. (Citation and punctuation

omitted.) Wiggins v. Smith, 

 (II) (A) (

, 156 LE2d 471) (2003). Here, the trial court properly found that

Henderson’s trial counsel moved for additional investigative funds,

filed motions seeking discovery, and hired an investigator who

                                  32
interviewed defense witnesses, photographed the crime scene, and

subpoenaed phone records. Specifically, trial counsel testified at the

motion for new trial hearing that she had advised the investigator

to reach out to Gibbs, Clarke, and Tribble, but they could not be

found or could not testify to a credible alibi defense on Henderson’s

behalf.

     Henderson was required to offer more than “mere speculation”

that Gibbs, Clarke, and Tribble would have bolstered his defense.

See Mangrum v. State, 

 (

) (2012).

Henderson has failed to point this Court to any additional efforts

that could have been made to gain information about the case from

Gibbs, Clark, or Tribble or to any additional defense witnesses who

might have been found through reasonable investigative efforts.

Henderson has thus failed to demonstrate how his trial counsel

performed deficiently with regard to her investigation of the case

and possible defenses, and this claim of ineffective assistance fails.

     (c) Failing to Impeach Witness with Phone Records. Henderson

also claims that his counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing

                                  33
to use phone records to impeach Anthony Miller, one of the State’s

witnesses. Miller testified that Henderson told him that he had an

argument with Stridiron and pushed him and that Stridiron had hit

his head and stopped moving. Miller also testified that Henderson

left Miller’s apartment early Thursday morning and went back to

Stridiron’s apartment and that Miller bought a television from

Henderson.

     On cross-examination, trial counsel asked Miller questions

about a possible plea deal that he had entered into with the State in

exchange for his testimony and about his prior felony conviction for

possession of marijuana with the intent to distribute. Henderson

now asserts that his counsel should have also utilized certain phone

records during the cross-examination to contradict the information

Miller testified to at trial concerning Henderson’s whereabouts and

activities during the week of Stridiron’s death. At the hearing on his

motion for new trial, Henderson’s trial counsel testified that the

phone records included calls from Miller to Henderson prior to the

date that Miller testified they met as well as calls from Henderson

                                 34
to Gibbs that contradicted Miller’s timeline.5

      However, when asked about her decision not to use the phone

records to impeach Miller, trial counsel characterized her general

impeachment strategy as “less is more.” Trial counsel stated that

she generally chooses not to “throw every little thing” at witnesses

because it “dilutes the power” of the strongest impeachment

evidence available to her. Trial counsel testified that, in this case,

she chose to prioritize Miller’s prior felony conviction over the phone

records because she believed evidence of Miller’s criminal history

would be most helpful to Henderson’s defense.

      Given what little we know about the phone records, we cannot

say that trial counsel’s decision not to impeach Miller with the phone

records was a patently unreasonable trial strategy. “Counsel’s trial

decisions are presumed to be strategic, and, absent some evidence to

the contrary, an appellant fails to overcome the strong presumption

that trial counsel’s performance fell within the range of reasonable


      5 Neither party produced these phone records during Henderson’s trial,

or during the motion for new trial hearing, and they do not appear in the record
before this Court.
                                      35
professional conduct and was not deficient.” Smith v. State, 

 (3) (b) (

) (2017); see also Romer v. State, 

 (3) (a) (

) (2013) (holding that, in light

of other methods of impeaching State’s witness used by trial counsel,

failure to impeach on other specific grounds was a matter of trial

strategy that did not constitute deficient performance). This claim

of ineffective assistance fails.

     Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur, except Warren, J.,
not participating.




                         Decided October 19, 2020.

     Murder. Gwinnett Superior Court. Before Judge Beyers.
     Lynn M. Kleinrock, for appellant.
     Daniel J. Porter, District Attorney, Daniel Sanmiguel,
Assistant District Attorney; Christopher M. Carr, Attorney General,
Patricia B. Attaway Burton, Deputy Attorney General, Paula K.
Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Leslie A. Coots, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee.




                                   36