Gray v. State

FINAL COPY

                 S20G0192. GRAY v. THE STATE.


     MCMILLIAN, Justice.

     We granted a petition for writ of certiorari to determine

whether a trial court has jurisdiction to modify a sentence outside

the one-year period after a sentence is imposed, as authorized under

OCGA § 17-10-1 (f), when the motion to modify is filed within the

one-year period. The Court of Appeals held in Gray v. State, 

 (

) (2019) that trial courts lack jurisdiction

after one year, irrespective of when the motion to modify sentence is

filed. As explained below, we reverse and remand the case to the

Court of Appeals for further proceedings consistent with this

opinion.1

     1. The Court of Appeals summarized the relevant facts as




     1 In addition to the parties’ briefs and presentations at oral argument,

the Court was assisted in its task by a joint amicus curiae brief from the
Georgia Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers and the Georgia Public
Defender Council.
follows:

           The record shows that Gray was indicted on five
     counts of sexual exploitation of children, and that in
     January 2017, he entered a non-negotiated plea of guilty
     and was sentenced to ten years to serve in prison followed
     by ten years on probation, with sexual offender
     requirements. Ten months later, Gray moved to modify
     his sentence. Eleven months after that, Gray and the
     State [jointly presented a consent order to the court to
     modify Gray’s sentence to a term of five years in prison
     followed by fifteen years on probation. On October 3,
     2018, they] appeared before a different trial court judge,
     sitting by designation, who granted the motion. Thus,
     twenty-one months after the original sentencing, the
     substitute judge entered a consent order reducing Gray’s
     sentence to a term of five years to serve in prison followed
     by fifteen years on probation, with sexual offender
     requirements (the “Modification Order”).
           Three weeks later, [on October 23, 2018,] the
     originally assigned judge, acting sua sponte and without
     notice or a hearing, filed an order vacating the
     Modification Order and reinstating Gray’s original
     sentence (the “Reinstatement Order”). The court found
     the Modification Order “to be inappropriate and not in the
     interests of justice,” and the court cited as authority its
     “inherent power during the same term of court in which
     the judgment was rendered to revise, correct, revoke,
     modify or vacate the judgment, even upon his own
     motion.”

Gray, 351 Ga. App. at 703.

     Gray timely appealed to the Court of Appeals. Both Gray and


                                  2
the State argued that the Reinstatement Order was void under

OCGA § 17-10-1 (f), with Gray asserting that the trial court violated

his constitutional rights by imposing a higher sentence after he had

already begun serving his lawful sentence as modified, and the State

arguing that the Reinstatement Order was void because the trial

court neither provided notice nor held a hearing as required by

OCGA § 17-10-1 (f).

     Without addressing either of those arguments, the Court of

Appeals affirmed the Reinstatement Order “based on the plain

language of OCGA § 17-10-1 (f).” Gray, 351 Ga. App. at 704. In

reaching that conclusion, the Court of Appeals recounted a 70-year

history of statutory and common-law authority, which permitted the

trial court to modify a sentence within certain time limits so long as

the proceeding initiating the sentence modification was begun

within that time limit. See id. at 706 & nn.3-5. The Court of Appeals

reasoned that “the legislature expressly limited the trial court’s

jurisdiction to modify sentences to a specific time when it enacted

OCGA § 17-10-1 (f)” because it “could have included the common law

                                  3
exception in the statute, thereby allowing a court to rule on any

motion filed within one year of sentencing, but it chose not to.” Id.

at 706 (emphasis in original). Relying on the addition of the word

“jurisdiction” to OCGA § 17-10-1 (f) in 2001, the Court of Appeals

held that the text explicitly limited trial courts’ jurisdiction to

modify sentences to within one year of the initial sentence

regardless of when a motion to modify sentence is filed. See id. at

707 (“[T]he legislature later rewrote the statute to make the time

constraints jurisdictional by adding language to provide that the

sentencing court only ‘has the jurisdiction, power, and authority’ to

correct or reduce a sentence within the specified times.”). Thus, the

Court of Appeals held that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter

the Modification Order, and the original sentencing judge was

authorized to correct the void modified sentence and thereby

reinstate the original sentence. See id.

     We granted Gray’s petition for a writ of certiorari and asked

the following question:

          Where the petitioner sought modification of his

                                  4
     sentence within one year of his original sentencing, did
     the Court of Appeals err in ruling that the trial court
     lacked jurisdiction to enter its order modifying
     petitioner’s sentence, because the order was entered
     outside the one-year period authorized under OCGA § 17-
     10-1 (f)? Compare Tyson v. State, 

     (

) (2009).2

     2. The central issue in this case is whether a trial court retains

jurisdiction under OCGA § 17-10-1 (f) to modify a sentence when the

motion to modify was filed within the one-year time limit. “[W]e first

look to the text because a statute draws its meaning from its text.”

Stubbs v. Hall, 

 (4) (

) (2020) (citation

and punctuation omitted). “The primary determinant of a text’s

meaning is its context.” City of Guyton v. Barrow, 

(3) (

) (2019). “For context, we may look to other

provisions of the same statute, the structure and history of the whole


     2   In Tyson v. State, 

 (

) (2009), the
defendant argued that the trial court lacked authority to modify his sentence
because the order was not entered during the same term of court in which the
original sentence had been rendered, even though the State filed its motion to
modify sentence during the term his sentence was rendered. However, the
Court of Appeals rejected his argument by applying the principle that “while a
trial judge loses the inherent right to modify a judgment after the term [of
court or statutory period] expires, a motion made during [that period] serves
to extend the power to modify.” 

 (1) (citations and punctuation
omitted).
                                      5
statute, and the other law — constitutional, statutory, and common

law alike — that forms the legal background of the statutory

provision in question.” Johnson v. State, 

 (

) (2020) (citation and punctuation omitted). “[A]ll statutes

are presumed to be enacted by the legislature with full knowledge of

the existing condition of the law and with reference to it. They are

therefore to be construed in connection and in harmony with the

existing law.” Grange Mut. Cas. Co. v. Woodard, 

(2) (a) (

) (2017) (citations and punctuation omitted).

     As a result, we presume that “common-law rules are still of

force and effect . . . except where they have been changed by express

statutory enactment or by necessary implication.” Grange Mut. Cas.

Co., 

 (2) (b) (citation and punctuation omitted); see

also Undisclosed LLC v. State, 

 (2) (a) (

) (2017) (“[A]lthough the common law may be amended, such

changes must be clear.”). “To the extent that statutory text can be

as reasonably understood to conform to the common law as to depart

from it, the courts usually presume that the legislature meant to

                                 6
adhere to the common law.” Coen v. Aptean, Inc., 

, 838-

39 (3) (c) (

) (2020) (punctuation omitted) (quoting May

v. State, 

 (

) (2014)). “When we construe

. . . statutory authority on appeal, our review is de novo.” State v.

Coleman, 

 (

) (2019).

      3. Georgia courts have long applied the common-law rule that

the trial court has the inherent authority to modify a judgment

within the term of court and that “a motion made during the term

serves to extend the power to modify.” Porterfield v. State, 

 (

) (1976) (physical precedent only).3 As


      3 Georgia courts have followed this common-law principle in both civil

and criminal cases for over a century. See, e.g., Doby v. Evans, 

 (

) (1988) (quoting Porterfield in criminal appeal); Ammons
v. Bolick, 

 (1) (

) (1974) (In civil cases, “if the
proceedings are begun during the term, they may be continued over and the
judgment set aside or modified after the expiration thereof.”); Maxwell v. Cofer,

 (

) (1946) (“[F]or the reason that proceedings so
to do were begun during the same interim between courts as that in which the
judgment sought to be vacated was granted[, t]his creates an exception to the
general rule as pointed out in Miraglia v. Bryson, [

 (

)
(1922)].”); Blakely Hardwood Lumber Co. v. Reynolds Bros. Lumber Co., 

 (

) (1931) (“When the judge hears the motion in vacation
on the day set, and holds up the motion for further consideration, the term of
the court, as to such motion, is extended until the judge finally passes upon the
motion . . . .”); Alley v. Halcombe, 

 (

) (1895) (plaintiff
should have moved before the expiration of the term of court); State v.

                                        7
explained in United States v. Mayer, 

 (

, 59 LE

129) (1914), the common-law rule provides that “[i]n the absence of

[a] statute providing otherwise, the general principle obtains that a

court cannot set aside or alter its final judgment after the expiration

of the term at which it was entered, unless the proceeding for that

purpose was begun during that term.” 

 (1) (emphasis

supplied); see also Miraglia v. Bryson, 

 (

)

(1922) (following Mayer).

      The current version of OCGA § 17-10-1 (f) was enacted in 2001,

and the relevant portion provides:

           Within one year of the date upon which the sentence
      is imposed, or within 120 days after receipt by the
      sentencing court of the remittitur upon affirmance of the
      judgment after direct appeal, whichever is later, the court
      imposing the sentence has the jurisdiction, power, and
      authority to correct or reduce the sentence and to suspend
      or probate all or any part of the sentence imposed. . . .



Bradbury, 

 (4) (

) (1983) (quoting Porterfield
and Yarborough); Yarborough v. State, 

 (

)
(1939) (“An order passed in term time, setting the hearing of a motion for new
trial on a designated day in vacation, in effect keeps the term, relatively to the
particular case, open until the designated day.” (citation and punctuation
omitted)).
                                        8
Ga. L. 2001, p. 94, § 5. This and previous versions of the statute have

granted trial court judges “power and authority” for a specific period

of time to suspend or probate sentences, and some versions,

including the current version, have extended that time period

beyond the term of court in which the sentence was imposed. The

term “jurisdiction” was added for the first time in 2001.4 No version


      4  See Ga. L. 1950, p. 352, §§ 3, 3A (“[T]he judge imposing the said
sentence is hereby granted power and authority to suspend or probate said
sentence, under such rules and regulations as he thinks proper. . . . After the
said prisoners have entered upon their services in the penal institutions of
Georgia the superior court judges shall have no authority to suspend and
probate the sentences of said prisoners by modifying sentences.”); Ga. L. 1964,
p. 483, § 4 (“[T]he judge imposing said sentence is hereby granted power and
authority to suspend or probate said sentence. . . . [A]fter the term of court at
which sentence is imposed the superior court judges shall have no authority to
suspend, probate, modify or change the sentences of said prisoners except as
otherwise provided.”); Ga. L. 1974, p. 352, § 4 (“The judge imposing said
sentence is hereby granted power and authority to suspend or probate said
sentence . . . . After the term of court at which the sentence is imposed by the
judge, he shall have no authority to suspend, probate, modify or change the
sentence of said prisoner, except as otherwise provided.”); Ga. L. 1981, p. 1024,
§ 1 (no change to relevant language); Ga. L. 1986, p. 842, § 1 (“After the term
of court, or 60 days from the date on which the sentence was imposed by the
judge, whichever time is greater, he shall have no authority to suspend,
probate, modify, or change the sentence of the defendant . . . .”); Ga. L. 1991, p.
310, § 1 (no change to relevant language); Ga. L. 1992, p. 3221, § 1 (“The judge
imposing the sentence is granted power and authority to suspend or probate
all or any part of the entire sentence under such rules and regulations as the
judge deems proper, subject to the conditions set out in this subsection”;
removing portion specifying a time when judges “shall have no authority” but
adding time limits in other places within the statute to which judges’ power

                                        9
of this statute has explicitly addressed whether the trial court was

authorized to modify a sentence so long as the motion to modify

sentence was filed within the term of court or statutory time limit.

     After the enactment of OCGA § 17-10-1 (f) in 2001, despite the

change in language from previous statutes, the Court of Appeals has

continued to follow the common-law rule as to motions filed within

the term of court or before the statutory deadline. See Jones v. State,

 (1) (

) (2019); Patterson v. State,

, 107 (1) (

) (2018); Pendleton v. State,

 (

) (2016); Richardson v.

State, 

 (

) (2015); Hudson v. State,

 (1) (

) (2015); Myrick v. State, 

, 607 n.1 (

) (2014); Valldeparas v. State,

 (1) (

) (2012); Bradberry v. State,

 (

) (2012); Grady v. State, 

 (

) (2011); State v. Fredericks, 256


and authority to modify sentences was subject); Ga. L. 1993, p. 1654, § 1 (no
change to relevant language); Ga. L. 1994, p. 1959, § 9 (no change to relevant
language).
                                     

 (

) (2002).

      The key question, then, is whether the addition of the word

“jurisdiction” to the statute’s grant of “power and authority” to the

trial court clearly overrides the common-law rule, and we conclude

that it does not. Under similar circumstances, we have used the

terms “jurisdiction,” “power,” and “authority” interchangeably,

explaining that “[j]urisdiction means nothing more or less than the

power and authority of the judge to act in the particular matter

before him.” Mar-Pak Michigan, Inc. v. Pointer, 

(

) (1970) (citing Black’s Law Dictionary (4th ed.

1951)).5 Even when the predecessor statutes to OCGA § 17-10-1 (f)



      5 Though we seek to “avoid a construction that makes some language

mere surplusage,” Campaign for Accountability v. Consumer Credit Research
Foundation, 

 (2) (

) (2018) (citation and
punctuation omitted), the surplusage canon can be overcome by context, such
as here, where context tells us that “power” and “authority” were already
equivalent. See Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The
Interpretation of Legal Texts 176-77 (2012) (“[L]ike all other canons, [the
surplusage canon] must be applied with judgment and discretion, and with
careful regard to context. It cannot always be dispositive because (as with most
canons) the underlying proposition is not invariably true. Sometimes drafters
do repeat themselves and do include words that add nothing of substance,
either out of a flawed sense of style or to engage in the ill-conceived but
lamentably common belt-and-suspenders approach. Doublets and triplets
abound in legalese . . . .” (emphasis in original)).
                                      11
provided that the trial court had no “authority” to modify sentences

after some period of time, the Court of Appeals often referred to the

trial court’s “jurisdiction.” See, e.g., Phillips v. State, 

 (

) (1957) (trial court was “without jurisdiction”

to modify sentence after term of court); Mauldin v. State, 

 (

) (1976) (trial court “lost jurisdiction” to

modify sentence); see also Shaw v. State, 

 (

) (1998) (even after 1992 amendment when OCGA § 17-10-

1 (f) did not expressly limit judges’ power to modify, trial court was

“without jurisdiction” to modify sentence after term of court).

     Moreover, we disagree with the Court of Appeals that the

legislature rejected the common-law rule because the legislature did

not expressly write the common-law rule into the current version of

the statute. See Gray, 351 Ga. App. at 706. Although the legislature

was aware of and could have codified the common-law rule, we

cannot assume that omitting the common-law rule from the statute

was proof of the legislature’s intended rejection of it. Instead, we

presume the opposite — that the legislature knew about the

                                  12
common-law rule, wanted to keep the rule, and understood that it

would be unnecessary to write the rule into the statute when courts

have incorporated the common-law rule into the statute for decades.

See Coen, 

 (3) (c).6

      We, thus, conclude that the text of OCGA § 17-10-1 (f) does not

expressly or by necessary implication contravene the common-law

rule, and the Court of Appeals erred in determining otherwise. See

Grange Mut. Cas. Co., 

 (2) (b). For the foregoing

reasons, we reverse and remand the case to the Court of Appeals for

further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

     Judgment reversed and case remanded. All the Justices concur,
except Warren, J., not participating.




      6 Additionally, both parties argued at oral argument that the passage of

House Bill 984 supports their construction. House Bill 984 was signed into law
on July 29, 2020, effective January 1, 2021, and added language incorporating
the common-law rule into OCGA § 17-10-1 (f) (“The time periods prescribed in
this subsection require the defendant to file a motion within such time periods;
however, the court shall not be constrained to issue its order or hear the matter
within such time periods.”). However, we interpret a statute according to its
meaning at the time of its enactment, so we place no weight on this subsequent
amendment in construing the prior version of the statute. See Undisclosed
LLC, 

 (3) (b) (when considering statutory text and relevant
context, statutes are to be construed as understood at the time of enactment).
                                       13
                      Decided October 19, 2020.

       Certiorari to the Court of Appeals of Georgia — 

.
     Brian Steel, John H. Petrey, for appellant.
     Sherry Boston, District Attorney, Otobong U. Ekpo, Destiny H.
Bryant, Elizabeth H. Brock, Assistant District Attorneys, for
appellee.
     James C. Bonner, Jr.; Brandon A. Bullard; Ross & Oines,
Andrew S. Fleischman; Greg A. Willis; Lawrence J. Zimmerman,
amici curiae.




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