Casey v. State

FINAL COPY

                S20A1105. CASEY v. THE STATE.


     BETHEL, Justice.

     A Lowndes County jury found Clarence Casey guilty of felony

murder predicated on an aggravated assault and possession of a

firearm during the commission of a felony in connection with the

shooting death of Alfred Pierre Bradley. Following the denial of his

motion for new trial, Casey appeals, alleging that the State

presented insufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict, the trial

court did not apply the proper standard in evaluating Casey’s claim

for relief on the “general grounds” set forth in OCGA §§ 5-5-20 and

5-5-21, and the trial court erred by admitting certain evidence.

While there was sufficient evidence to support the verdict as a

matter of due process, we conclude that the trial court failed to

exercise its discretion as the “thirteenth juror” under OCGA §§ 5-5-
20 and 5-5-21 in ruling upon Casey’s motion for new trial.1 We

therefore vacate the trial court’s order in part and remand the case

to the trial court. We do not reach Casey’s final enumeration of error

in this appeal.

   1. Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence

presented at trial showed the following. In the early morning of

January 13, 2013, Bradley drove his car to a store in Lowndes

County. He exited his car and walked into the store. Casey, Radcliffe

Eady, and Michael Green were standing outside the store. When

Bradley exited the store, Eady ran toward Bradley with a .45-caliber




      1 The crimes occurred on January 13, 2013. Casey was indicted by a

Lowndes County grand jury on April 26, 2013, for malice murder (Count 1);
felony murder (Count 2); aggravated assault (Count 3); possession of a firearm
during the commission of a felony (Count 4); and possession of a firearm by a
convicted felon (Count 5). A jury trial was held on January 27, 28, and 30, 2014,
and the jury found Casey not guilty on Count 1 but guilty on Counts 2, 3, and
4. The trial court entered an order of nolle prosequi as to Count 5. Casey was
sentenced to serve life in prison without parole for felony murder, and the
aggravated assault count was merged into the felony murder count. Casey was
also sentenced to five years consecutive for possession of a firearm during the
commission of a felony. Casey filed a timely motion for new trial on March 11,
2014, which he amended on May 2, 2019. The trial court entered an order
denying the motion on August 20, 2019. Casey filed a timely notice of appeal.
This case was docketed in this Court to the August 2020 term and submitted
for a decision on the briefs.
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pistol. The two struggled over the firearm, and Bradley eventually

obtained control of it. During this struggle, the pistol fired, and

Bradley then ran around the side of the building.

      Bradley was highly agitated and returned to the front of the

building waving the gun, “screaming, and yelling.” Casey, a

convicted felon armed with a firearm, approached Bradley from

behind and shot him at close range in the back of the head. Casey,

still in possession of the gun he used to shoot Bradley, walked away.

At some point following the incident, Casey apologized to the owner

of the establishment for shooting Bradley at her store.

      On January 15, 2013, during a custodial police interrogation

and after receiving Miranda warnings,2 Casey agreed to answer

questions. Casey initially said that he was not at the store at all on

the day the crime occurred. He later admitted that he was at the

store but said that he was not there when the shooting occurred, and

he denied shooting Bradley.



      2 See Miranda v. Arizona, 

 (

, 16 LE2d 694)

(1966).
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     Following an autopsy, the forensic pathologist determined that

a gunshot wound to the head caused Bradley’s death and ruled the

death a homicide. The entrance wound, located on the left side of the

back of Bradley’s head, had a partial muzzle imprint, meaning that

the gun’s muzzle was in contact with the skin at the time it was

fired.

     Casey argues that the evidence was insufficient to support the

jury’s verdict because, even when viewed in the light most favorable

to the verdict, no rational trier of fact could have found Casey guilty

beyond a reasonable doubt of felony murder and possession of a

firearm during the commission of a felony. We disagree.

     When evaluating the sufficiency of evidence as a matter of

federal due process under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United

States Constitution, the proper standard of review is whether a

rational trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a

reasonable doubt. See Jackson v. Virginia, 

 (III)

(B) (

, 61 LE2d 560) (1979). This Court views the evidence

in the “light most favorable to the verdict, with deference to the

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jury’s assessment of the weight and credibility of the evidence.”

(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Hayes v. State, 

(

) (2013).

     Casey was convicted of felony murder predicated on

aggravated assault and possession of a firearm during the

commission of a felony. Although the trial court properly merged the

aggravated assault count for sentencing, we must consider whether

the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support a finding

that Casey committed the alleged aggravated assault because it was

the predicate felony for the felony murder.

     OCGA § 16-5-1 (c) provides that “[a] person commits the offense

of murder when, in the commission of a felony, he or she causes the

death of another human being irrespective of malice.” OCGA § 16-5-

21 (a) provides, in relevant part, that “[a] person commits the offense

of aggravated assault when he or she assaults . . . [w]ith a deadly

weapon or with any object, device, or instrument which, when used

offensively against a person, is likely to or actually does result in

serious bodily injury[.]” OCGA § 16-11-106 (b) (1) provides, in

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relevant part, that “[a]ny person who shall have on or within arm’s

reach of his or her person a firearm . . . during the commission of, or

the attempt to commit[,] . . . [a]ny crime against or involving the

person of another . . . and which crime is a felony, commits a

felony[.]”

     Eyewitness testimony established that Casey shot Bradley in

the head at close range. Forensic evidence supported this testimony

by showing that Bradley was fatally shot in the back of the head by

a gun in contact with his scalp. Moreover, Casey later apologized to

the shop owner for shooting Bradley, and he gave inconsistent

accounts to the police. This evidence was sufficient as a matter of

due process to authorize a rational trier of fact to find Casey guilty

of felony murder predicated on aggravated assault and possession of

a firearm during the commission of a felony. See Jackson, 

 (III) (B). See also Dunbar v. State, 

 (1) (

) (1994). 3


     3 Because we remand this case on the thirteenth juror issue, we note that

the evidence featured contradictory testimony, testimony that conflicted with

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      2. Casey also argues that the trial court failed to properly

exercise its discretion as the “thirteenth juror” in ruling upon his

motion for new trial. The trial court’s order denying Casey’s motion

for new trial includes the following:

           [OCGA §§ 5-5-20 and 5-5-21] afford the trial court
      broad discretion to sit as a “thirteenth juror” and weigh
      the evidence on a motion for new trial alleging these
      general grounds. Walker v. State, 

 [(

)] (2013).
           However, “[t]he . . . verdict must be upheld if any
      rational trier of fact could have found the essential
      elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Barber
      v. State, 

 [(

)] (1998). “When
      an appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence,
      ‘the relevant question is whether, after viewing the
      evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution,
      any rational trier of fact could have found the essential
      elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’”
      Jackson v. State, 

[ (

)] (2011)


prior statements, and other reasons to either credit or doubt much of the
testimony the jury heard. For instance, after the shooting, Dorothy Brinson,
the store owner at the time of the shooting, told police officers that Casey
apologized for shooting Bradley in the store and that he shot Bradley to protect
others behind the store counter. But, at trial, she testified that Casey had not
admitted shooting Bradley and had only stated that he was “sorry for what
happened.” Another witness, Martavius Smith, told police officers after the
shooting that he saw Casey walk up to Bradley with the gun, put the gun to
the back of Bradley’s head, and shoot Bradley. Smith told police officers that
Casey calmly walked away with the gun. But, at trial, Smith testified that
Bradley shot himself. Consistent with our sufficiency review, we have
presented and reviewed the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict
of the jury. See Jackson, 

 (III) (B).
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     [(quoting Jackson, 

 (III) (B))].

     Casey contends that while the trial court’s order mentions the

discretion given to the trial court by OCGA §§ 5-5-20 and 5-5-21, it

shows that the trial court failed to actually exercise this discretion.

Casey contends that the order must be vacated and this case

remanded to the trial court so that it can apply the correct legal

standard under OCGA §§ 5-5-20 and 5-5-21. We agree.

     When the evidence is legally sufficient to sustain a conviction

as a matter of due process, as the evidence was in this case, a trial

judge may, nevertheless, grant a new trial if the verdict of the jury

is “contrary to . . . the principles of justice and equity,” OCGA § 5-5-

20, or if the verdict is “decidedly and strongly against the weight of

the evidence[.]” OCGA § 5-5-21. See also White v. State, 

 (2) (

) (2013). These grounds for a new trial,

commonly known as the “general grounds,” require the trial judge

“to sit as a ‘thirteenth juror’” and conduct a review more expansive

than that required for legal sufficiency of the evidence by

considering any testimonial conflicts, the witnesses’ credibility, and

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the weight of the evidence. Walker, 

 (2). See also

Choisnet v. State, 

 (

) (2013).

     Here, Casey properly raised the general grounds in a timely

motion for new trial and argued that there was insufficient evidence

to support his conviction under Jackson. These are two distinct legal

arguments that require the trial court to apply distinct legal

standards. The trial court’s order, however, indicates that the court

failed to exercise its discretion in its consideration of the general

grounds and only applied the Jackson standard, by which a court

assesses the legal sufficiency of the evidence as a matter of due

process. Further, the trial court’s use of the word “[h]owever”

following the outline of its role as the thirteenth juror and its

immediate reference to the sufficiency standard “denote[ ] that the

trial court failed to apply its discretion, as the determination if there

is sufficient evidence to support the verdict is a matter of law, not

discretion.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Manuel v. State,

 (2) (

) (2011); Walker, 

(2). “[W]hen the record reflects that the trial court reviewed the

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motion for new trial only for legal sufficiency of the evidence, the

trial court has failed to exercise” its discretion under the general

grounds. (Emphasis supplied.) Holmes v. State, 

 (2)

(

) (2019).

     We conclude that the trial court failed to conduct the proper

general grounds analysis as requested by Casey in his motion for

new trial. See Manuel, 

 (2). Accordingly, we vacate the

denial of Casey’s motion for new trial, and we remand this case so

that the trial court can apply the proper standard in exercising its

discretion pursuant to OCGA §§ 5-5-20 and 5-5-21.

     3. Lastly, Casey argues that he is entitled to a new trial

because the trial court improperly overruled his objection to the

admission of a witness’ pre-trial statement. Because this case must

be remanded in any event, “it is unnecessary for us to address the

remaining enumeration of error at this time.” Manuel, 

 (2). If the trial court concludes on remand that a new trial is

unnecessary and Casey decides to appeal, Casey may present this

enumeration of error along with any other potential errors that may

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occur on remand.

     Judgment affirmed in part and vacated in part, and case
remanded with direction. All the Justices concur, except Warren, J.,
not participating.




                   Decided November 16, 2020.

     Murder. Lowndes Superior Court. Before Judge Cowart.
     Conger & Smith, Gregory D. Smith, for appellant.
     Bradfield M. Shealy, District Attorney, Michelle T. Harrison,
Assistant District Attorney; Christopher M. Carr, Attorney General,
Patricia B. Attaway Burton, Deputy Attorney General, Paula K.
Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Leslie A. Coots, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee.




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