310 Ga. 460
FINAL COPY
S20G0613. THORNTON v. THE STATE.
BLACKWELL, Justice.
In the parking lot of a gas station, a Department of Natural
Resources (DNR) game warden told Christopher Thornton to turn
down the volume of his car stereo. Thornton refused to comply, and
he eventually drove away, dragging the game warden for a short
distance. He later was arrested and charged with several crimes,
including two counts of obstructing a game warden in the lawful
discharge of his official duties.1 Thornton was tried for these crimes
by a Walker County jury and convicted. He appealed, arguing that
1 Thornton was charged with one count of misdemeanor obstruction for
refusing to comply with the instructions of the game warden and one count of
felony obstruction for offering violence to the game warden. Under OCGA § 16-
10-24 (a), “a person who knowingly and willfully obstructs or hinders any . . .
game warden in the lawful discharge of his or her official duties shall be guilty
of a misdemeanor.” And under OCGA § 16-10-24 (b), “[w]hoever knowingly and
willfully resists, obstructs, or opposes any . . . game warden in the lawful
discharge of his or her official duties by offering or doing violence to the person
of such officer . . . shall be guilty of a felony . . . .” Both counts required the
State to prove, among other things, that the game warden was in the lawful
discharge of his official duties.
the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to sustain his
convictions for obstruction because it failed to establish that the
game warden was in the lawful discharge of his official duties at the
time of the incident. In particular, Thornton argued that a game
warden has no authority to enforce the Uniform Rules of the Road2
— including OCGA § 40-6-14,3 which limits the volume of sound that
can be emitted from a stereo in a motor vehicle — in the parking lot
of a gas station. In Thornton v. State, 353 Ga. App. 252 (
836 SE2d
541) (2019), the Court of Appeals rejected these arguments and
affirmed the judgment of conviction. We granted a petition for a writ
of certiorari to review that decision, and although our analysis
2 The provisions of Chapter 6 of Title 40 of the Code are known as the
“Uniform Rules of the Road.” See Ga. L. 1974, p. 633, § 1 (“Uniform Rules of
the Road” enacted as Title 68A of the Code of 1933, the predecessor of Title 40,
Chapter 6 of the current Code). In this opinion, we refer to the Uniform Rules
of the Road simply as the “Rules of the Road.”
3 Section 40-6-14 (a) provides:
It is unlawful for any person operating or occupying a motor
vehicle on a street or highway to operate or amplify the sound
produced by a radio, tape player, or other mechanical soundmaking device or instrument from within the motor vehicle so that
the sound is plainly audible at a distance of 100 feet or more from
the motor vehicle.
A violation of OCGA § 40-6-14 (a) is a misdemeanor. See OCGA § 40-6-14 (e).
2
differs somewhat from that of the Court of Appeals, we likewise
conclude that the obstruction convictions can stand. Accordingly, we
affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
1. Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the
evidence presented at trial shows that Thornton was parked at a gas
pump outside a gas station in the City of LaFayette on January 10,
2013. A DNR game warden — on duty and in uniform — stopped at
the gas station to refuel his DNR vehicle.4 The game warden noticed
that the stereo in Thornton’s car was blaring music very loudly. The
game warden approached Thornton, identified himself as a DNR law
enforcement officer, and asked Thornton to turn down the volume of
the stereo. When Thornton refused, the game warden told him that
the loud music was in violation of state law, and Thornton became
increasingly belligerent. The game warden then went to retrieve his
radio from his DNR vehicle, instructing Thornton to remain outside
4 In January 2013, game wardens were known as “conservation rangers.”
They were retitled “game wardens” in 2019, see Ga. L. 2019, p. 808, § 7, Act
264, and for the sake of simplicity, we refer to the officer in this case as a game
warden.
3
his car. In defiance of this instruction, Thornton got into his car. The
game warden returned, and as he approached Thornton again, he
noticed that the music was blaring even more loudly. The game
warden told Thornton to exit the car, informing him that he was
under arrest for obstruction. Thornton refused to exit the car, and
the game warden reached through an open window of the car in an
attempt to grab Thornton’s identification card. As the game warden
did so, Thornton drove away, dragging the game warden a short
distance, while the game warden instructed Thornton to bring his
car to a stop.
Thornton was later arrested, charged with two counts of
obstruction — a misdemeanor count for defying the instructions of
the game warden, and a felony count for offering violence to the
game warden — and convicted of those crimes. He appealed, and the
Court of Appeals affirmed, rejecting Thornton’s argument that the
evidence failed to show that the game warden was in the lawful
discharge of his official duties at the time of the incident. The Court
of Appeals held that the game warden was authorized under OCGA
4
§ 40-13-30 to enforce the Rules of the Road, see Thornton, 353 Ga.
App. at 254-255 (1), and it cited OCGA § 40-6-3 (a) (2) for the
proposition that the Rules of the Road apply in parking lots, see 353
Ga. App. at 255 (1) n.6. We issued a writ of certiorari to review the
decision of the Court of Appeals, directing the parties to address
these two questions:
1. Does OCGA § 40-13-30 grant statewide arrest
powers to Department of Natural Resources game
wardens for violations of the Uniform Rules of the Road?
2. Do the provisions of OCGA § 40-6-1 et seq. apply
generally to privately owned shopping centers, parking
lots, or other similar areas that are not customarily used
by the public as through streets or connector streets, see
OCGA § 40-6-3 (a) (2)?
As we explain below, the answer to the first question is yes, game
wardens do have authority to enforce the Rules of the Road at any
location in Georgia where OCGA § 40-13-30 applies. And although
the answer to the second question is no, the State presented
evidence in this case that the parking lot of the gas station in
question was used customarily as a through or connector street, and
the evidence is not, therefore, insufficient to sustain the convictions.
5
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
2. We first consider the extent to which game wardens have
authority under OCGA § 40-13-30 to enforce the Rules of the Road,
and we conclude the game warden in this case had such authority.
We begin, however, by recalling some of the familiar and settled
principles that inform our consideration of the meaning of a statute.
“A statute draws its meaning from its text,” City of Marietta v.
Summerour, 302 Ga. 645, 649 (2) (
807 SE2d 324) (2017) (citation
and punctuation omitted), and as we read the text, “we must
presume that the General Assembly meant what it said and said
what it meant.” Deal v. Coleman,
294 Ga. 170, 172 (1) (a) (
751 SE2d
337) (2013) (citation and punctuation omitted). To this end, “we
must view the statutory text in the context in which it appears,”
id.,
and “[f]or context, we may look to other provisions of the same
statute, the structure and history of the whole statute, and the other
law — constitutional, statutory, and common law alike — that forms
the legal background of the statutory provision in question.”
Zaldivar v. Prickett,
297 Ga. 589, 591 (1) (
774 SE2d 688) (2015)
6
(citation and punctuation omitted). In the light of the relevant
context, “we must read the statutory text in its most natural and
reasonable way, as an ordinary speaker of the English language
would.” Deal, 294 Ga. at 172-173 (1) (a). And when we are confronted
with a statute having several parts, we must endeavor to harmonize
those parts so as to “give a sensible and intelligent effect to each
part.” Premier Health Care Investments v. UHS of Anchor, ___ Ga.
___, ___ (3) (c) (
849 SE2d 441) (2020) (citation and punctuation
omitted). With these principles in mind, we turn now to the text and
context of OCGA § 40-13-30.
Article 2 of Chapter 13 of Title 40, of which OCGA § 40-13-30
is a part, concerns the prosecution of misdemeanor traffic offenses
in probate and municipal courts. Pertinent to this case, which arose
from an incident at a gas station within the municipal limits of
LaFayette, OCGA § 40-13-29 provides that “the judge of the
municipal court in each municipal corporation shall have exclusive
jurisdiction of traffic misdemeanor cases originating inside the
corporate limits of municipalities.” And OCGA § 40-13-24 provides
7
that a prosecution of a misdemeanor traffic offense in a municipal
court does not require an indictment or accusation, and such a
prosecution instead may be commenced by a citation and complaint.
To that end, OCGA § 40-13-30 provides:
Officers of the Georgia State Patrol and any other
officer of this state or of any county or municipality
thereof having authority to arrest for a criminal offense of
the grade of misdemeanor shall have authority to prefer
charges and bring offenders to trial under this article,
provided that officers of an incorporated municipality
shall have no power to make arrests beyond the corporate
limits of such municipality unless such jurisdiction is
given by local or other law.
Examining the statutory text, we discern three distinct parts of the
statute.
The first part identifies the officers to whom the statute
applies, namely, officers of the State Patrol, as well as other state
officers, county officers, and municipal officers “having authority to
arrest for a criminal offense of the grade of misdemeanor[.]” The
second part confers upon these officers the “authority to prefer
charges and bring offenders to trial under [Article 2 of Chapter 13 of
Title 40],” a grant of authority that necessarily implies the power to
8
enforce the Rules of the Road by the issuance of a citation for a
misdemeanor violation of the rules, see OCGA § 40-13-24,5 as well
as the concomitant power to effectuate an arrest by citation.6 And
the third part of OCGA § 40-13-30 appears to be a limitation of the
5 We understand the phrase “prefer charges” to refer generally to the
initiation of proceedings before an adjudicatory body. See OCGA §§ 12-6-62 (d)
(State Board of Registration of Foresters empowered to “prefer charges” for
fraud, forgery, or license violations); 43-15-25 (a) (individual may “prefer
charges” for fraud and the like and present them to Board of Professional
Engineers and Land Surveyors); 38-2-1030 (b) (regarding presentation of
charges under Code of Military Justice). See also Armstrong Cork Co. v. Joiner,
221 Ga. 789, 790 (
147 SE2d 317) (1966) (referencing labor union’s threat to
“prefer charges” against employees who crossed picket lines) (punctuation
omitted); Hayes v. City of Dalton,
209 Ga. 286, 288 (
71 SE2d 618) (1952)
(referencing police commission’s notification of intent to “prefer charges”
against police chief and hold a hearing); State v. Byrd,
197 Ga. App. 661, 662-
663 (
399 SE2d 267) (1990) (noting various means by which a grand jury may
“prefer charges,” including “upon the endorsement of the prosecutor or the
charge of the judge of the court or on its own motion”), overruled on other
grounds, State v. Grace,
263 Ga. 220, 221 (
430 SE2d 583) (1993). As provided
in OCGA § 40-13-24, the issuance of a citation and complaint is the mechanism
for the initiation of a prosecution for a misdemeanor traffic violation under
Article 2 of Chapter 13 of Title 40.
6 In some contexts, the term “arrest” connotes a custodial arrest. But in
other contexts, “arrest” includes the temporary seizure of a person for purposes
of issuing a citation. See, e.g., OCGA §§ 17-4-23 (a) (1) (authorizing law
enforcement officers to “arrest a person accused of violating any law or
ordinance enacted by local law governing the operation, licensing, registration,
maintenance, or inspection of motor vehicles . . . by the issuance of a citation”);
40-13-53 (providing that “any officer who arrests any person for the violation
of a traffic law or traffic ordinance alleged to have been committed outside the
corporate limits of any municipality shall permit such person to be released
upon being served with a citation and complaint and agreeing to appear, as
provided in [Article 3 of Chapter 13 of Title 40]”).
9
second with respect to municipal officers, providing that they “shall
have no power to make arrests beyond the corporate limits of [their
respective] municipalit[ies] unless such jurisdiction is given by local
or other law.”
We readily conclude that a DNR game warden is among the
officers identified in the first part of OCGA § 40-13-30. Thornton
does not dispute that a game warden is an “officer of this state . . .
having authority to arrest for a criminal offense of the grade of
misdemeanor[,]” and he is right not to dispute it. DNR is a
department of the state government, and inasmuch as they are
classified as “a unit of peace officers” within DNR, see OCGA § 27-
1-16 (a), game wardens undoubtedly are “officer[s] of this state” for
purposes of OCGA § 40-13-30. Moreover, game wardens are
specifically and expressly authorized to make arrests for violations
“of the laws, rules, and regulations pertaining to wildlife or to
hunting, fishing, or boating[,]” OCGA § 27-1-20 (a) (4), violations
that most commonly are misdemeanors. See OCGA § 27-1-38
(generally classifying violations of Game and Fish Code as
10
misdemeanor offenses). In addition, game wardens are expressly
authorized “[t]o enforce all state laws on property owned or
controlled by [DNR,]” OCGA § 27-1-18 (a) (1); “[t]o enforce any state
law when the violation of that law is committed in conjunction with
a violation of a state law pertaining to functions assigned to [DNR,]”
OCGA § 27-1-18 (a) (3); “[t]o enforce any state law when ordered to
do so by the Governor or to protect any life or property when the
circumstances demand action[,]” OCGA § 27-1-18 (a) (4); upon the
direction of the Commissioner of Natural Resources, and at the
request of the Governor or certain judicial or law enforcement
officers, “to cooperate with and render assistance to any law
enforcement agency . . . in any criminal case, in the prevention or
detection of violations of any law, or in the apprehension or arrest of
persons who violate the criminal laws of this state,” OCGA § 27-1-
18 (b); and “[t]o exercise the full authority of peace officers while in
the performance of their duties[,]” OCGA § 27-1-20 (a) (10). We do
not hesitate to conclude that DNR game wardens are among the
officers identified in the first part of OCGA § 40-13-30.
11
As such, the game warden in this case was authorized under
the second part of OCGA § 40-13-30 to enforce the Rules of the Road,
including the provision of OCGA § 40-6-14 (a) limiting the sound
emitted by a car stereo, with respect to a misdemeanor violation of
the rules subject to the procedures of Article 2 of Chapter 13 of Title
40. This power to enforce the Rules of the Road not only includes the
power to issue a citation for a misdemeanor violation, but it
necessarily must also include the power to effectuate an arrest for
the purpose of issuing and serving the citation, as well as the
authority to direct the offender to cease the conduct that constitutes
the violation (by telling a driver, for instance, to turn down the
volume of his car stereo) and to reasonably control the person of the
offender during the arrest (by telling a driver, for instance, to remain
outside his car or to stop his vehicle). Moreover, to the extent that a
game warden is authorized to enforce the Rules of the Road — as
was the game warden in this case — we readily conclude that he also
is authorized to arrest any person who attempts to obstruct his
enforcement of those rules. See OCGA § 27-1-20 (a) (10) (game
12
warden has power “[t]o exercise the full authority of peace officers
while in the performance of [his] duties”).
And the territorial limitation expressed in the third part of
OCGA § 40-13-30 — which by its own terms is limited to municipal
officers — does not apply to a DNR game warden. Aside from this
express limitation, however, Thornton argues that OCGA § 40-13-
30 should not otherwise be understood to supersede the legal limits
of the authority of law enforcement agencies with limited
jurisdiction, whether those limits are territorial or defined in terms
of subject matter. This argument is plausible, see Zilke v. State, 299
Ga. 232 (
787 SE2d 745) (2016),7 but to resolve this case, we need not
decide whether it is meritorious. Although some of the powers
conferred by statute upon DNR game wardens are territorially
limited, see, e.g., OCGA § 27-1-18 (power “[t]o enforce all state laws
7 In Zilke, this Court held that another statute generally authorizing law
enforcement officers to make arrests for traffic offenses committed in their
presence, OCGA § 17-4-23 (a), did not authorize a law enforcement officer “to
make a custodial arrest outside the jurisdiction of the law enforcement agency
by which he is employed.” 299 Ga. at 235. We do not decide today whether the
reasoning of Zilke would apply to OCGA § 40-13-30.
13
on all property owned or controlled by [DNR]”), and some of those
powers are limited in terms of subject matter, see, e.g., OCGA § 27-
1-20 (a) (1) (power “[t]o enforce all laws, rules, and regulations
pertaining to wildlife and to boating safety”), game wardens also are
authorized by statute to exercise general law enforcement powers
without respect to territory or subject matter in a wide variety of
circumstances. See, e.g., OCGA §§ 27-1-18 (a) (4) (authority “[t]o
enforce any state law when ordered to do so by the Governor or to
protect any life or property when the circumstances demand
action”); 27-1-18 (b) (authority in some circumstances “to cooperate
with and render assistance to any law enforcement agency . . . in any
criminal case, in the prevention or detection of violations of any law,
or in the apprehension or arrest of persons who violate the criminal
laws of this state”); 27-1-20 (a) (10) (power “[t]o exercise the full
authority of peace officers while in the performance of their duties”).
In light of the breadth of the general law enforcement authority
conferred by statute upon DNR game wardens, understanding
OCGA § 40-13-30 to authorize game wardens to enforce the Rules of
14
the Road under Article 2 of Chapter 13 of Title 40 would neither
drastically expand the jurisdiction of DNR nor be inconsistent with
any express statutory limitation on the authority of game wardens.
Cf. Zilke, 299 Ga. at 233 (noting that arrest authority of campus
police officers is limited by statute to campus and locations within
500 yards of campus, and holding that general authorization of law
enforcement officers to arrest for traffic citations under OCGA § 17-
4-23 did not supersede that specific limitation on the power of
campus police officers).
3. We next consider the extent to which the Rules of the Road
apply to the operation of vehicles in parking lots. Even though the
game warden in this case was authorized to enforce the Rules of the
Road pursuant to Article 2 of Chapter 13 of Title 40, if the Rules of
the Road did not apply in the parking lot in which the game warden
encountered Thornton, his attempts to enforce OCGA § 40-6-14
against Thornton would not have been in the lawful discharge of his
official duties for purposes of an obstruction conviction. In general,
15
OCGA § 40-6-3 (a) provides that “[t]he provisions of this chapter[8]
relating to the operation of vehicles refer to the operation of vehicles
upon highways[,]” and for the purposes of Title 40, a “highway” is
defined as “the entire width between the boundary lines of every way
publicly maintained when any part thereof is open to the use of the
public for purposes of vehicular travel.” OCGA § 40-1-1 (19). In
addition, OCGA § 40-6-3 (a) (2) provides that the Rules of the Road
also apply to “a vehicle operated at shopping centers or parking lots
or similar areas which although privately owned are customarily
used by the public as through streets or connector streets[.]”
According to the State, OCGA § 40-6-3 (a) (2) means that the Rules
of the Road apply in all “shopping centers [and] parking lots” —
including, for instance, the parking lot of the gas station in this case
— as well as in privately-owned “similar areas which . . . are
customarily used by the public as through streets or connector
streets.” Thornton, on the other hand, contends that OCGA § 40-6-3
8 “[T]his chapter” refers to Chapter 6 of Title 40, the Rules of the Road.
See note 2 supra.
16
(a) (2) applies the Rules of the Road to the locations identified in the
statute — “shopping centers or parking lots or similar areas” — only
to the extent that those locations are customarily used by the public
as through or connector streets.
The basic dispute thus centers on whether the qualifying
phrase (“which although privately owned are customarily used by
the public as through streets or connector streets”) is intended to
modify only the term that immediately precedes it (“similar areas”)
or the entire series of terms that precede it (“shopping centers or
parking lots or similar areas”).
Under the canon of statutory construction known as the
“rule of the last antecedent,” a qualifying phrase should
ordinarily be read as modifying only the noun or phrase
that it immediately follows. However, this rule is not
absolute, and the inference it raises may be rebutted
where the structure and internal logic of the statutory
scheme so militate. Under the alternative “seriesqualifier principle,” a qualifying phrase appearing at the
end of a series should be read to apply to all items in the
series when such an application would represent a
natural construction.
Scott v. State, 299 Ga. 568, 572-573 (1) (
788 SE2d 468) (2016)
(citations and punctuation omitted). In choosing among the different
17
understandings of the statute proposed by the parties, we must
assess the qualifying phrase by reference to “its situation within and
relationship to the entire statutory text.” Id. at 573 (2).
Examining the text, structure, and context of OCGA § 40-6-3
(a) (2), we conclude that Thornton is right, and the qualifying phrase
is most naturally and reasonably understood to modify all of the
terms in the series that precedes it. By its use of the adjective
“similar” to modify the “areas,” OCGA § 40-6-3 (a) (2) suggests that
“shopping centers [and] parking lots” are linked to other “similar
areas” to form a singular, cohesive set of locations, and this cohesive
set is then qualified by reference to the customary usage of these
locations by the public. Understanding OCGA § 40-6-3 (a) (2) in this
way also fits naturally with the provision of OCGA § 40-6-3 (a) that
the Rules of the Road apply generally to highways. Indeed, the
general provision of OCGA § 40-6-3 (a) with respect to highways
effectively extends the Rules of the Road to “every way publicly
maintained when any part thereof is open to the use of the public for
purposes of vehicular travel[,]” and construed most reasonably,
18
OCGA § 40-6-3 (a) (2) is understood to extend the same Rules of the
Road to privately owned property — whether a “shopping center,” a
“parking lot,” or another “similar area” — that likewise is
customarily used by the public as a “through street” or a “connector
street,” that is, used as if it were a public way.9
This understanding also finds support in other paragraphs of
subsection 40-6-3 (a). Paragraph (a) (3), for instance, extends the
Rules of the Road regarding reckless driving, driving under the
influence of alcohol or drugs, and homicide by vehicle “to vehicles
operated upon highways and elsewhere throughout the state[.]”
(Emphasis supplied.) Paragraph (a) (4) provides that certain
provisions of the Rules of the Road regarding a driver’s duties after
an accident “shall apply upon the highways of this state, in all
parking areas, and in all areas which are customarily open to the
9 The alternative understanding of OCGA § 40-6-3 (a) (2) proposed by the
State would mean that, for instance, the Rules of the Road would apply in a
private, gated parking lot that is inaccessible to the public, but the Rules of the
Road typically would not apply to a private, ungated driveway (a “similar
area”) leading to that parking lot, which (because it leads to an inaccessible,
gated parking lot) likely would not be customarily used by the public as a
through street or connector street.
19
public and within 200 feet [thereof].” (Emphasis supplied.) Similarly
broad language was not used in OCGA § 40-6-3 (a) (2) to make clear
that all shopping centers and all parking lots are covered by the
Rules of the Road, and this omission suggests that paragraph (a) (2)
has a narrower scope. In addition, the phrase “all parking lots” in
paragraph (a) (4) would be entirely superfluous if paragraph (a) (2)
separately makes all of the Rules of the Road applicable in all
parking lots. See Kennedy v. Carlton, 294 Ga. 576, 578 (2) (
757 SE2d
46) (2014) (courts should “avoid[ ] a statutory construction that will
render some of the statutory language mere surplusage”). In sum,
reading OCGA § 40-6-3 (a) (2) in the context of the other paragraphs
of subsection 40-6-3 (a) reinforces the conclusion that paragraph (a)
(2) is most reasonably understood to extend the Rules of the Road
only to those privately owned shopping centers, parking lots, and
similar areas that are customarily used by the public as through or
connector streets. To the extent the Court of Appeals has previously
held the Rules of the Road applicable in a parking lot without regard
to its customary use as a through or connector street, those cases are
20
disapproved. See, e.g., Canino v. State, 314 Ga. App. 633, 636 (1)
n.10 (
725 SE2d 782) (2012); Jackson v. State,
297 Ga. App. 615, 617
(
677 SE2d 782) (2009); Patton v. State,
287 Ga. App. 18, 20-21 (
650
SE2d 733) (2007); Miller v. State,
221 Ga. App. 494, 495 (
471 SE2d
565) (1996).
Although Thornton is correct that the Rules of the Road apply
to the operation of vehicles in a privately owned parking lot only to
the extent that the parking lot is customarily used by the public as
a through street or connector street, we conclude that the evidence
in this case nevertheless is sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that the game warden was in the lawful discharge of his
official duties when he attempted to enforce the statutory limitation
of sound emitted from a motor vehicle against Thornton in the gas
station parking lot. At trial, the evidence established that the gas
station was situated at the intersection of two public roads, and the
game warden was asked whether the parking lot was “[c]ommonly
used as a cut through or a way to get from one road to the other?”
The game warden answered: “Yes, sir, I have seen people do that
21
before.” This testimony was sufficient to authorize the jury to find
that the parking lot outside the gas station was a parking lot that,
although privately owned, was customarily used by the public as a
through street or connector street. As such, the jury properly could
have found that the game warden was in the lawful discharge of his
official duties when he attempted to enforce OCGA § 40-6-14 against
Thornton in the parking lot.
4. For these reasons, the evidence presented at trial was
sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find beyond a
reasonable doubt that Thornton was guilty of obstruction, and the
judgment of the Court of Appeals is, therefore, affirmed.
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur, except Warren, J.,
not participating.
22
Decided November 16, 2020.
Certiorari to the Court of Appeals of Georgia — 353 Ga. App.
252.
Jad B. Johnson, David J. Dunn, Jr., Victor P. Aloisio III, for
appellant.
Christopher A. Arnt, District Attorney, Megan S. Dietz.
Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.
Christopher M. Carr, Attorney General, Ross W. Bergethon,
Deputy Solicitor-General, amici curiae.
23
