310 Ga. 567
FINAL COPY
S20A1383. SCHELL v. THE STATE.
BOGGS, Justice.
Appellant Eugenia Schell challenges her 2016 convictions for
malice murder and other crimes in connection with the death of her
mother, Willie Jo Vaughn.1 In her sole enumeration of error,
1 Vaughn was killed on March 26, 2015. On July 8, 2015, a Wayne County
grand jury indicted Appellant for aggravated stalking on November 6, 2014
and March 26, 2015 (Counts 1 & 2), making a false statement to law
enforcement (Count 3), malice murder (Count 4), felony murder based on
aggravated stalking (Count 5), false imprisonment (Count 6), kidnapping
(Count 7), and making terroristic threats (Count 8). At a trial from September
26 to 28, 2016, the jury found Appellant guilty of all charges. The trial court
sentenced Appellant to two consecutive life sentences for malice murder (Count
4) and kidnapping (Count 7), ten years consecutive for aggravated stalking
(Count 1), five years consecutive for making a false statement (Count 3), and
five years consecutive for terroristic threats (Count 8). The counts for felony
murder (Count 5), aggravated stalking (Count 2), and false imprisonment
(Count 6) were merged for sentencing purposes. The felony murder count,
however, was actually vacated by operation of law. See Malcolm v. State, 263
Ga. 369, 373 (
434 SE2d 479) (1993).The State has not challenged Appellant’s
sentences. See Dixon v. State,
302 Ga. 691, 697-698 (
808 SE2d 696) (2017). On
October 25, 2016, Appellant filed a motion for new trial, which she amended
through new counsel on August 15, 2018. After a hearing on June 20, 2019, the
trial court denied the amended motion for new trial in an order filed on April
21, 2020. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal to the Court of Appeals. The
case was transferred to this Court, was docketed to the August 2020 term, and
was submitted for a decision on the briefs.
Appellant contends that the evidence was legally insufficient to
support her convictions. We affirm.
Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdicts, the evidence
at trial showed the following. Appellant had a demonstrated history
of abuse and violence toward her mother. This pattern of behavior
led to a permanent protective order being issued against Appellant
on February 9, 2011. Pursuant to the order, Appellant was not
permitted to have contact with Vaughn absent her express
permission.
Sometime later, Vaughn invited Appellant to live with her at
her home. In October 2014, however, Vaughn initiated eviction
proceedings against Appellant. Vaughn went to stay with her
youngest daughter, and Appellant was given a timeframe to vacate
Vaughn’s home. In response, Appellant left a voicemail for Vaughn
stating that if Vaughn returned to the house, Appellant “would shoot
first and ask questions later.” Vaughn had the locks changed and a
spare key for the new locks hidden somewhere outside the house by
her grandson.
2
Vaughn was afraid of Appellant. She told her pastor that
Appellant threatened to kill her multiple times. Appellant had
threatened to burn Vaughn’s house down with her inside of it.
Vaughn regularly told her friends that if something ever happened
to her, they should tell the police that Appellant did it. Shortly
before evicting Appellant, Vaughn even went to her neighbor to get
her gun that he kept for her because she feared for her life.
On November 6, 2014, Appellant sat in a car in Vaughn’s
driveway and continuously honked the horn while Vaughn was
inside the house. Virginia Little, one of the two neighbors to witness
this event, went inside the house to find Vaughn. Little found
Vaughn looking out the window trying to see the vehicle’s tag
number, and Vaughn did not know why Appellant was there.
Appellant eventually stopped honking the horn and drove away.
Vaughn filed a police report, and a warrant was issued for
Appellant’s arrest.
On March 25, 2015, Appellant was seen by the same two
neighbors walking out the back door of Vaughn’s home toward a car;
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Vaughn was in the driver’s seat. Around 9:00 a.m. the next morning,
March 26, a different neighbor saw Appellant in Vaughn’s front yard
with Vaughn, who seemed unusually depressed. Just before 1:00
p.m. that same day, Vaughn was seen alone at the drive-through of
her local bank. She then went to a friend’s house and stayed until a
little after 2:00 p.m. At about 4:00 p.m., Appellant was seen driving
Vaughn’s car with Vaughn in the back seat. Around 7:00 p.m. that
night, Appellant was again seen driving Vaughn’s car, heading
toward the boat ramp at Upper County Landing, the same boat
ramp where Vaughn’s body was later found. Witnesses testified that
Vaughn had an aversion to water and would not have gone to the
boat ramp on her own.2
Over the next few days, people accustomed to seeing or hearing
from Vaughn did not. Vaughn did not report to work or to services
at the church that weekend. Neighbors, who had a good view of her
2 There is some evidence to suggest that Vaughn was alive and in
possession of her car at 9:00 that night, at which time she spoke to a fellow
church member about finalizing a purchase and indicated that she had to go to
her car to get her purse.
4
home and regularly interacted with her, did not see Vaughn’s car in
her driveway after March 26. When they went to check on her at her
home, they got no response, and all of her doors and windows were
locked. On March 29, another longtime friend and neighbor went to
the house with the police, who had to use a screwdriver to break into
the house because the spare key was not where Vaughn’s grandson
had left it.
Inside the house, they found televisions on, fans blowing, and
Vaughn’s dog, which had obviously been locked in a crate without
food or water for days. The police found no broken doors or windows
or any sign of a struggle. They also found a newspaper dated March
25, 2015, and an unopened vial of albuterol, which is used to treat
asthma; Appellant is asthmatic, but Vaughn was not. The police also
found champagne flutes, photo albums with every picture of Vaughn
removed, and Appellant’s child’s baby book strewn across
Appellant’s old room. Vaughn had a reputation as a teetotaler, and
her other daughters found the state of the room unusual.
Having heard the news of Vaughn’s disappearance, Veronica
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Thomas, a friend of Appellant’s, called her. When Thomas
remarked, “I didn’t know your mama was still driving,” Appellant
responded with emphasis, “Was driving.” Thomas was troubled by
this response. While Vaughn’s neighbors and other family had been
looking for her continuously since her disappearance, Appellant only
started making contact with her family approximately five days
after Vaughn disappeared. When Appellant did eventually make
contact, it was only to complain about her own portrayal in the
media.
On March 30, Appellant voluntarily went to the police to speak
to them about Vaughn. During the interview, she repeatedly stated
that she had not been to Vaughn’s house since her eviction in
October 2014. Despite being confronted with several witnesses
placing her at Vaughn’s house in November 2014 and March 2015,
Appellant continued to deny ever being there. She maintained this
defense during trial.
On April 3, Vaughn’s vehicle was found submerged at the
bottom of a boat ramp at Upper County Landing in Wayne County.
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Vaughn’s body was found lying face down across the back seat with
the same clothes on that she was seen wearing on March 26, with
the addition of a sweater. A white, vinyl-type material was found
draped over her body. A plastic bag was found near her head. Her
purse, a coin purse with her identification cards, her walking cane,
dentures, and an open can of Coke were also found in the car with
her. Although investigators had found no Coke at Vaughn’s, at
Appellant’s home they found Cokes and a receipt for a pack of Coke
dated March 26, 2015.
When investigators powered on the car, the lights and
windshield wipers, set to high, came on automatically. It had been
raining on March 26 and 27, 2015. When police found the car, the
transmission was in “park,” but the ignition was in the “on” position.
The child safety locks were also engaged. The driver’s side window
was down and the seat was in an extremely far forward position.
Appellant was much smaller than Vaughn and admitted that there
was no way she could carry her mother given their difference in size.
Also, the crime scene investigator testified that due to her size
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relative to the interior of the vehicle, Vaughn would not have been
able to move between the front and back of the vehicle. Large rocks
taken from the banks of the boat ramp had been placed on the trunk
of the vehicle to keep it from floating.
The medical examiner found that Vaughn died under
“objectively suspicious circumstances.” The evidence suggested to
him that she died of asphyxiation. Because he could not determine
whether the asphyxiation occurred due to suffocation, drowning, or
strangulation, however, he ruled that her cause of death was
“unspecified violence.” He concluded that the manner of death was
homicide.
The toxicologist only found substances in her body consistent
with the medications she was taking and — given the extent of
decomposition — did not find her blood alcohol content to be
significant. However, Appellant’s ex-husband, a doctor, testified
that Appellant had told him on multiple occasions that she knew a
chemist who had agreed to provide her with an untraceable chemical
to kill someone if she ever needed it. Appellant’s ex-husband
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believed she was telling the truth, and the medical examiner
testified that such traceless lethal drugs exist.
In her sole enumeration of error, Appellant challenges the
sufficiency of the evidence to support her convictions.3 Specifically,
Appellant argues that evidence of her mere presence with Vaughn
on March 26, 2015, does not prove her involvement in the murder.
Appellant also argues that there is no evidence that Vaughn was
prevented from leaving or was taken from one location to another
without her permission to support the kidnapping conviction. We
disagree.
When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence as a matter of
constitutional due process, we view the evidence in the light most
favorable to the verdicts, see Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307, 319
(
99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979), and do not resolve conflicts in
3 Although Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to
support all of her convictions, the felony murder count was vacated by
operation of law, and the guilty verdicts for aggravated stalking on March 26,
2015, and false imprisonment were merged for sentencing. As such,
Appellant’s challenge to these counts is moot, and we limit our sufficiency
review to the counts of which she was convicted. See Lupoe v. State, 284 Ga.
576, 577 n.2 (
669 SE2d 133) (2008).
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the evidence, leaving those within the province of the jury, see
Lowery v. State, ___ Ga. ___ (___ SE2d ___) (2020). In addition, as a
matter of Georgia statutory law, where a conviction is based on
circumstantial evidence, as here, the evidence must “not only be
consistent with the hypothesis of guilt, but shall exclude every other
reasonable hypothesis save that of the guilt of the accused.” OCGA
§ 24-14-6. Whether an alternative hypothesis is reasonable or
whether the circumstantial evidence excludes every reasonable
hypothesis save that of guilt is left to the jury, and this Court “will
not disturb that finding unless it is insupportable as a matter of
law.” Johnson v. State, 307 Ga. 44, 48 (
834 SE2d 83) (2019).
Viewed in this manner, the evidence shows that Appellant had
a history of threats and abuse toward Vaughn and was evicted from
Vaughn’s home in October 2014. After being evicted, Appellant
threatened to shoot Vaughn if Vaughn came back to the home. In
November 2014, Appellant drove to the home in violation of the
February 2011 protective order and continuously honked the horn
of her car, harassing Vaughn.
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The evidence also authorized the jury to find that in the late
hours of March 26, 2015, with Vaughn in the back of her car and the
child safety locks activated, Appellant drove the car to Upper County
Landing — where Vaughn would not have gone on her own —
submerged the vehicle in the water with Vaughn trapped inside, and
placed rocks on the trunk of the car to keep it there. The evidence
also suggests that before submerging the vehicle in the river,
Appellant could have killed Vaughn with an untraceable substance,
suffocated her with the plastic bag found next to Vaughn’s head in
the back seat of the car, or rendered Vaughn unconscious so that she
then drowned. Given the above and the lack of evidence of a struggle
at the house, the fact that Appellant could not have moved Vaughn
on her own, and Appellant’s awareness of Vaughn’s vigilant
neighbors, the jury could have reasonably concluded that Vaughn
was alive when she entered the back seat of her vehicle, was driven
away by Appellant, and at some point was kept in the vehicle
against her will.
Appellant never aided in the search for her mother and made
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a suspicious comment to a friend after Vaughn’s disappearance.
When interviewed by police about her mother’s death, Appellant
repeatedly denied ever being present at Vaughn’s home after
October 2014, despite multiple witnesses placing her there on
multiple occasions. Thus, the evidence presented at trial was both
sufficient to allow a rational jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt
that Appellant was guilty of all of the crimes for which she was
convicted as required by due process and to reject any hypothesis
save that of Appellant’s guilt for said crimes as required by OCGA §
24-14-6.
Judgment affirmed. Melton, C. J., Nahmias, P. J., and
Peterson, Bethel, Ellington, and McMillian, JJ., concur. Warren, J.,
not participating.
DECIDED DECEMBER 7, 2020.
Murder. Wayne Superior Court. Before Judge Kelley.
Joseph C. Timothy Lewis, for appellant.
Jacquelyn L. Johnson, District Attorney, Thomas E.
Buscemi, Assistant District Attorney; Christopher M. Carr, Attorney
General, Patricia B. Attaway Burton, Deputy Attorney General,
Paula K. Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General, William C.
Enfinger, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
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