Lynn v. State

FINAL COPY

                    S20A1533. LYNN v. THE STATE.


      PETERSON, Justice.

      James Morris Lynn, Jr., appeals his conviction for malice

murder and aggravated assault in connection with the beating death

of his wife, Tonya Lynn.1 Lynn argues that we should vacate the trial




      1 The crimes occurred sometime between July 26 and July 27, 2011. In

October 2011, a Barrow County grand jury indicted Lynn for malice murder,
felony murder predicated on aggravated assault, and aggravated assault. Lynn
was convicted of malice murder following a jury trial in June 2012, but we
reversed his conviction based on the erroneous exclusion of evidence. See Lynn
v. State, 

 (

) (2014). Lynn was retried from August 26
to September 3, 2015, and the jury found him guilty on all counts. The trial
court sentenced Lynn to life in prison without the possibility of parole for
malice murder and to a 20-year concurrent term for aggravated assault; the
felony murder count was vacated by operation of law. Lynn timely filed a
skeletal motion for new trial, which the trial court denied on November 2, 2016.
Substitute appellate counsel filed a motion for out-of-time appeal in March
2019, alleging that Lynn’s prior attorney failed to file a notice of appeal due to
an oversight. The trial court granted the motion for out-of-time appeal, and
Lynn filed an amended motion for new trial, raising claims that trial counsel
was ineffective. See Maxwell v. State, 

 (3) (

)
(1992) (permitting a defendant to file a second motion for new trial following
the grant of an out-of-time appeal, and giving the trial court the discretion to
refuse to reopen issues decided in the first motion for new trial). On May 1,
2020, the trial court denied Lynn’s amended motion for new trial following a
hearing. Lynn timely filed a notice of appeal. His case was docketed to this
Court’s August 2020 term and submitted for a decision on the briefs.
court’s order denying his motion for new trial for lack of adequate

findings and remand for more detailed findings. He also argues that

the trial court erred in denying his motion for a mistrial, he received

ineffective assistance of trial counsel, and the combined errors

cumulatively prejudiced him. But the trial court was not required to

make detailed findings in denying Lynn’s motion for new trial. The

trial court did not err in denying Lynn’s motion for a mistrial

because the alleged basis for a mistrial posed little prejudice to Lynn

and the court gave a sufficient curative instruction. Lynn’s

ineffective assistance claims fail because he has not established that

trial counsel performed deficiently in any respect. And his

cumulative error argument fails because there are no errors to

cumulate. We vacate Lynn’s sentence for aggravated assault

because this count should have merged with the malice murder

conviction, but we affirm the murder conviction.

     The evidence at trial showed the following.2 After Tonya went


     2 Because we consider the cumulative prejudice of alleged trial counsel

deficiencies, we present the evidence as jurors reasonably would have viewed
it, rather than in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict.
                                     2
missing, police interviewed Lynn multiple times, and he eventually

admitted killing Tonya by hitting her in the head with a baseball

bat. He led police to a well where he had dumped her body. An

autopsy showed that Tonya died from blunt force trauma to the

head.

     The State presented evidence showing that the couple had a

rocky relationship. Lynn and Tonya, who had four children together,

separated and both filed for a divorce in early 2011. During their

separation, Lynn and Tonya each started dating other people. Tonya

began a relationship with David Bulloch, while Lynn began a

relationship with Jennifer Butler. Lynn told Tonya’s aunt that he

was not going to share custody of his children with anyone.

     The couple moved back in together in May 2011, but their

troubles continued. On May 13, 2011, Tonya was in her bedroom

watching a movie with one of her daughters and her niece. Tonya’s

niece testified that when Lynn arrived home from work, he began

an argument with Tonya about whether she was texting someone.

Lynn yelled at Tonya and flipped over the mattress Tonya was

                                 3
sitting on, causing her to fall to the floor and injure her knee.

     Tonya became increasingly scared of Lynn, telling people he

had said he would kill her before he let her go. One of Tonya’s

cousins explained that Tonya did not immediately leave Lynn

because Tonya was concerned about supporting herself and her

children on her salary, and Lynn controlled access to their bank

accounts. Tonya began taking steps to save money in order to leave

Lynn permanently.

     Meanwhile, Lynn continued to communicate with Butler,

stating that he did not want to be a part-time dad and frequently

expressing his frustration with the pending divorce and fear that

Tonya would leave with their children. On June 30, Lynn wrote an

e-mail to Butler, saying, “I have high hopes my problem will soon be

gone for good. I have to be patient and bide my time wisely and

always have a good alibi[.]” In subsequent e-mails, Lynn expressed

his anger about the possibility of Tonya leaving with the children

and said that she “doesn’t deserve to even be living” and that he

thought he would be happy if she were “gone for good.”

                                   4
     On July 24, Tonya talked to Bulloch and told him that Lynn

threw her into a doorframe and that, as a result, she planned to

leave Lynn and take the children with her. The next day, Lynn

called Tonya’s cousin, Julie Royster Hollifield, saying that Tonya

wanted to leave him and asking Hollifield to convince Tonya to stay

with him. Hollifield and Tonya talked on July 26, and Tonya said

she had “decided for sure she was leaving” and had packed her

belongings.

     The following day, July 27 Tonya failed to show up to work at

6:30 a.m. as scheduled. When Tonya was still absent at 7:30 a.m.,

her supervisor, Stacey Morris, began making phone calls in an

attempt to locate Tonya. Tonya’s co-workers called law enforcement,

and officers began searching for her. Tonya’s family members told

officers that Lynn claimed both that Tonya probably died due to a

heart condition and that one of Tonya’s cousins probably killed her.

Officers asked to interview Lynn and requested that he bring in his

cell phone because it might contain data that could help them in

their investigation. Lynn brought his cell phone, but it had been

                                 5
“completely wiped” of all data.

     Tonya’s SUV was found in a library parking lot on July 27, but

there were no signs of Tonya. Surveillance video from the library

showed that the vehicle was left there around 1:38 a.m. on July 27,

and that the male subject driving the SUV got into a truck that was

later determined to be owned by Butler. Police interviewed Butler,

who testified at trial that she went to the library to pick up Lynn

after he called her. After Butler’s interview, the police arrested Lynn

on obstruction charges because he had lied about not knowing how

Tonya’s vehicle came to be left at the library. During an interview

conducted after his arrest, Lynn admitted killing Tonya with a

baseball bat and told police where they could find her body.

     Lynn testified in his defense at trial, claiming that he killed

Tonya in the heat of passion and in self-defense. His story was as

follows. Lynn and Tonya separated in early 2011 because she was

having an affair with Bulloch, he believed she continued the affair

after he and Tonya reconciled, and he and Tonya argued repeatedly

about his suspicions. On July 26, 2011, he confronted Tonya with

                                  6
information that confirmed his suspicions about her continuing an

affair and told her that he was going to contact his divorce attorney.

Tonya became extremely upset and taunted Lynn, saying that,

because he could not satisfy her sexually, she was having sex with

multiple men. Tonya retrieved a baseball bat and took a swing at

him while he was in the bathroom. Lynn caught the bat with his

hands, snatched it away, and immediately swung back at her,

hitting her twice. Lynn left the room, returned after a few minutes,

and noticed that Tonya was not breathing and did not have a pulse.

Lynn then wiped up the blood on the floor, rolled Tonya up in a

blanket, slid her down the stairs, put her in the back of his vehicle,

and drove around town for a while before returning home to clean

the house and the bathroom. Several hours later, Lynn got ready

for work and, on his way there, he decided to dump Tonya’s body.

      1. Lynn does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to

support his convictions, but we have independently reviewed the

evidence presented at trial and conclude that the evidence was

legally sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find beyond a

                                   7
reasonable doubt that he was guilty of the crimes of which he was

convicted. See Jackson v. Virginia, 

 (

,

61 LE2d 560) (1979); see also Shaw v. State, 

 (1)

(

) (2013) (“[I]ssues of witness credibility and

justification are for the jury to decide, and the jury is free to reject a

defendant’s claim that he acted in self-defense.” (citation and

punctuation omitted)).3

     Lynn also does not challenge his sentence on appeal, but we do

recognize a merger error in his sentence. See Dixon v. State, 

 (4) (

) (2017) (“We have the discretion to

correct merger errors sua sponte . . . because a merger error results

in an illegal and void judgment of conviction and sentence.” (citation

omitted)). As set out in footnote 1 above, Lynn was sentenced on the

aggravated assault count that was based on hitting Tonya in the

head with a baseball bat. This is the very act that caused her death,


     3 We remind litigants that the Court will end our practice of considering

sufficiency sua sponte in non-death penalty cases with cases docketed to the
term of court that begins in December 2020. See Davenport v. State, 

 (4) (b) (

) (2020). The Court began assigning cases to the
December term on August 3, 2020.
                                     8
so the aggravated assault count should have merged with the malice

murder conviction. See Culpepper v. State, 

 (2) (a)

(

) (2011) (unless there is a “deliberate interval”

between infliction of a non-fatal injury and a fatal one, the

aggravated assault count merges with malice murder). We therefore

vacate Lynn’s sentence for aggravated assault.

     2. Lynn argues that we should vacate the trial court’s order

denying his motion for new trial for lack of adequate findings and

remand for more detailed findings. We disagree.

     Lynn argues that, in the absence of detailed findings, we

cannot conduct a meaningful review of the claims raised in his

motion, especially his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.

Lynn cites cases in which we have remanded for further findings,

but none of those cases involve motions for new trial. It is well

settled that a trial court is not required to issue written findings of

fact and conclusions of law when deciding a motion for new trial. See

Treadaway v. State, 

 (2) (

) (2020). And

this principle applies no differently when a motion raises claims of

                                  9
ineffective assistance of counsel. See 

 We decline to vacate and

remand for a more detailed order.

     3. Lynn argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion

for a mistrial when the State elicited testimony referencing a

polygraph test in violation of a pretrial agreement between the

parties. We disagree.

     At trial, the prosecutor asked Detective Rachel Love about

Lynn’s interview in 2011 after he was arrested. In response to a

question about who initiated the interview, Detective Love replied,

“I started it because he had asked to speak with me by myself. He

actually had a polygraph scheduled for that day, as well.” Lynn

objected and moved for a mistrial. The trial court denied the motion

and issued a curative instruction instead, telling the jury that a

polygraph test was offered to Lynn, he agreed to take it, the test was

never administered, and the jury was to disregard any mention of

the test and not consider it in its deliberations.

     “When prejudicial matter is improperly placed before the jury,

a mistrial is appropriate if it is essential to the preservation of the

                                  10
defendant’s right to a fair trial.” White v. State, 

 (4)

(

) (1997). But a trial court “can negate the potentially

harmful effect of improperly introduced evidence by prompt curative

instructions rather than by granting a mistrial.” Walker v. State, 

 (4) (

) (2019). “Whether to grant a mistrial is

within the trial court’s discretion, which an appellate court will not

disturb unless there is a showing that a mistrial is essential to the

preservation of the right to a fair trial.” Jones v. State, 

 (3) (

) (2019) (citation and punctuation omitted).

     Even assuming that the detective’s non-responsive and passing

reference to a polygraph was prejudicial, any prejudice was low

given that the trial court informed the jury that Lynn had agreed to

take a polygraph but there were no results, either positive or

negative, to report. And the trial court’s prompt curative instruction

negated any prejudice by telling the jury to disregard the reference,

an instruction that we presume the jury followed. See Walker, 

 (4). There was no abuse of discretion in denying Lynn’s

motion for a mistrial.

                                  11
     4. Lynn makes several arguments as to why his trial counsel

was ineffective. To prevail on any of his claims, Lynn must show

both that his counsel’s performance was constitutionally deficient

and that he was prejudiced by this deficient performance. See

Strickland v. Washington, 

 (

, 80 LE2d

674) (1984). To establish deficient performance, Lynn must

“overcome the strong presumption that counsel’s performance fell

within a wide range of reasonable professional conduct, and that

counsel’s decisions were made in the exercise of reasonable

professional judgment.” Mims v. State, 

 (2) (

) (2019) (citation and punctuation omitted). “[D]ecisions

regarding trial tactics and strategy may form the basis for an

ineffectiveness claim only if they were so patently unreasonable that

no competent attorney would have followed such a course.” Richards

v. State, 

 (2) (

) (2019) (citation and

punctuation omitted). Our inquiry focuses on the objective

reasonableness of counsel’s performance. See Bozzie v. State, 

 (5) (

) (2017). To demonstrate prejudice,

                                 12
Lynn must establish “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been

different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to

undermine confidence in the outcome.” Mims, 

 (2)

(citation and punctuation omitted).

     If Lynn fails to meet his burden in establishing one prong of

the Strickland test, we need not review the other, because a failure

to meet either of the prongs is fatal to an ineffectiveness claim. See

Smith v. State, 

 (2) (

) (2015). In

considering an ineffectiveness claim, we review a trial court’s factual

findings for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo. See

Lawrence v. State, 

 (2) (

) (2010).

     (a) Lynn argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing

to obtain a ruling on a second motion for a mistrial made by counsel

when the State played a portion of Lynn’s recorded custodial

interview in which the polygraph was mentioned a second time. We

disagree.



                                  13
     Lynn makes no showing that the trial court would have

granted the second motion for a mistrial had trial counsel made a

request for a definite ruling. When listening to the recording more

closely as part of the mistrial motion, the trial court said it did not

hear the polygraph reference, and asked if Lynn wanted a curative

instruction. Trial counsel declined, saying she did not want to draw

more attention to the issue.

     Regardless of whether the reference was discernible, there is

no dispute that the recording mentioned nothing more than a

scheduled polygraph. On appeal, Lynn argues that the repeated

reference to the polygraph was prejudicial because it tended to show

that, in 2011, Lynn was prepared to stand by his version of events,

which the State argued changed by the time of his trial in 2015. But

the record does not show that the State used the polygraph reference

against Lynn, and the State’s ability to point out inconsistencies in

Lynn’s versions of the events did not depend on the fact that a

polygraph was scheduled, but not taken.



                                  14
     Because these circumstances do not show that a mistrial was

necessary to preserve Lynn’s right to a fair trial, Lynn has not shown

that the court would have granted a mistrial had trial counsel

obtained a ruling on his mistrial motion. Thus, trial counsel’s failure

to obtain a ruling does not constitute deficient performance. See

Yancey v. State, 

 (4) (

) (2013) (no

deficient performance in failure to make meritless objection, and

thus no ineffectiveness in failing to make objection that the trial

court “would not have been required to sustain”); see also Billings v.

State, 

 (7) (

) (2013) (same, citing

Yancey).

     (b) Lynn argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to

move for a mistrial when a reference to a prior “jury” was made when

a witness for the prosecution read Lynn’s testimony from the first

trial. This claim fails.

     When the jury reference was made, trial counsel asked for a

bench conference and asked the court to direct the witness to avoid

saying the term “jury.” Trial counsel specifically declined a limiting

                                  15
instruction, saying that such an instruction would draw more

attention to the issue. After noting that there might be other

objectionable material in Lynn’s prior testimony, the trial court

instructed the prosecutor to instruct her witness to read certain

lines rather than read the entirety of Lynn’s testimony.

     At the motion for new trial hearing, one of Lynn’s trial counsel

testified that she and co-counsel did not move for a mistrial because

they had already made two motions (based on the polygraph

reference) and that another would be “distracting to the jury and

interrupting.” She repeated that she and co-counsel did not ask for

a limiting instruction because they did not want to draw more

attention to the issue and hoped the jurors did not notice the

reference. Considering that the “jury” reference was brief and co-

counsel’s explanations for not moving for a mistrial were reasonable,

Lynn has not shown that trial counsel’s decision not to move for a

mistrial was constitutionally deficient. See Sweet v. State, 

 (8) (

) (2004) (trial counsel’s decision not to

move for a mistrial was reasonable where counsel believed motion

                                 16
would have emphasized the prejudicial matter to the jury); Wright

v. State, 

 (5) (d) (

) (2003) (trial

counsel’s decision not to object to a passing reference to defendant’s

post-arrest silence “was a valid exercise of professional judgment”

where counsel testified that an objection would “focus the jury’s

attention” on the testimony).

     (c) Lynn argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to

object to three sets of out-of-court statements made by Tonya. Lynn

argues that his trial counsel should have objected to the three sets

of statements on hearsay grounds and to one of the sets of

statements on Confrontation Clause grounds. None of Lynn’s

arguments prevail because the statements either fell within a

hearsay exception or were cumulative of other statements that were

properly admitted.

     A Confrontation Clause violation occurs when an out-of-court

statement admitted into evidence is “testimonial” in nature and the

declarant is unavailable at trial and was not previously subject to

cross-examination. See Crawford v. Washington, 

, 68

                                 17
(

, 158 LE2d 177) (2004). “Hearsay” is an out-of-court

statement that a party offers into evidence “to prove the truth of the

matter asserted” in the statement. OCGA § 24-8-801 (c); see also

Carter v. State, 

 (2) (b) (

) (2017).

      (i) Lynn argues that trial counsel should have challenged the

admission of Tonya’s petition for a temporary protective order

(“TPO”) filed after Lynn threw her off a bed, as well as testimony as

to the petition’s contents. He argues that this evidence was

inadmissible on hearsay and Confrontation Clause grounds because

the sworn, out-of-court statements in the petition were testimonial

in nature and Lynn did not have the opportunity to cross-examine

Tonya.4 Lynn also argues that trial counsel should have objected on

hearsay grounds when three other witnesses ⸺ Travis Royster,

Bulloch, and Hamilton Hudson ⸺ testified about what Tonya told

them about the mattress incident. Lynn’s ineffectiveness claim on

this ground fails.



      4 The TPO was granted ex parte but was later dismissed after Tonya

failed to appear for a hearing.
                                   18
     Before introducing the challenged testimony, the State had

already presented eyewitness testimony about Lynn throwing

Tonya off a bed. Tonya’s niece testified early in the trial that she was

present when Lynn began an argument with Tonya about texts he

thought she sent. The niece also testified that she left the room

during the argument, she returned when she heard Tonya scream,

and she found Tonya on the floor crying and Lynn with his hands

underneath the mattress. Lynn does not challenge this testimony,

nor could he. See Favors v. State, 

 (3) (

) (2015) (“A witness who personally observed the event to which

she is testifying may state her impressions drawn from, and

opinions based upon, the facts and circumstances observed by her.”

(citation and punctuation omitted)).

     Even if trial counsel was deficient for failing to object to the

admission of additional evidence about the bed incident, Lynn was

not prejudiced as a result, because the additional evidence was

cumulative of the niece’s testimony that was already before the jury.

See Koonce v. State, 

 (2) (c) (

) (2019)

                                  19
(defendant failed to show prejudice resulting from failure to object

to certain testimony that was “largely cumulative of other,

unobjected-to evidence of the same facts”); Wilson v. State, 

 (2) (

) (2015) (trial counsel’s failure to raise

hearsay and Confrontation Clause objections to certain testimony

was not prejudicial where the challenged testimony was cumulative

of other evidence).

     (ii) Lynn argues that trial counsel should have raised hearsay

objections to the testimony of three witnesses ⸺ Morris, Hollifield,

and Marsha Saunders ⸺ about Tonya’s car hood flying up while she

was driving. Trial counsel was not deficient because the challenged

testimony did not include hearsay, fell within an exception to the

hearsay rule, or was cumulative of other admissible evidence.

     (A) Morris, Tonya’s supervisor, generally described measures

her department took to protect Tonya after the bed incident and

after Tonya reported that she was afraid that Lynn would hurt her.

Morris said that Tonya was generally on time for work, always

called or sent a text message if she was ever going to be late, and

                                 20
made Morris promise to start looking for her if she unexpectedly

failed to show up for work. When Morris testified about the morning

of Tonya’s disappearance, she said that, as she was trying to locate

Tonya, she received a call from Lynn that “rocked [her] to the core”

because she had spoken to him only one other time, when Lynn

called to ask if Tonya had arrived at work on a day that Tonya had

previously called Morris to say “that she wasn’t there yet because

the hood of her car flew up for the second time on her way to work,

and she was waiting for the police.”

     Lynn complains that Morris’s testimony about the car hood

included impermissible hearsay, because Tonya’s out-of-court

statement was offered to prove that he was responsible for the

malfunctioning of the car hood. But the State did not offer Tonya’s

statement to prove that the hood of Tonya’s car flew up, and Tonya’s

statement to Morris did not even blame Lynn. Rather than trying to

prove that the car hood malfunctioned, or that Lynn was to blame,

the State introduced the evidence in an attempt to give context to

Morris’s actions after Tonya failed to show up for work and explain

                                 21
why Morris became scared after receiving Lynn’s call on the

morning of Tonya’s disappearance. Morris’s testimony about

Tonya’s statement to Morris about the car hood was not hearsay.

See Carter v. State, 

 (2) (b) (

) (2017)

(out-of-court statements were not hearsay when offered to give

context to defendant’s statements). Trial counsel was therefore not

deficient for failing to object to Morris’s testimony. See Jackson v.

State, 

 (2) (d) (

) (2010) (“Trial counsel

was not deficient for failing to object to admissible evidence.”).

     (B) Hollifield testified that Tonya told her repeatedly that

Tonya was afraid that Lynn was trying to kill her, and that Tonya

was convinced Lynn had attempted to do so but could not prove it.

Hollifield then gave the now-challenged testimony in which she

described the day that Tonya’s car hood malfunctioned, saying:

          [Tonya] was convinced that [Lynn] had done
     something to the car so the hood would fly open, thinking
     that then she would wreck and that would be a way out,
     you know. So she was convinced that day. She called me
     when she got to work and told me [Lynn] had tried to kill
     her that morning and that’s how she felt.


                                  22
     Even if the statement was offered to prove that Lynn had

actually tried to kill Tonya by tampering with her car hood, the trial

court still could have admitted the statement under the excited

utterance exception to the hearsay rule. OCGA § 24-8-803 (2) (“Rule

803 (2)”) provides that “[a] statement relating to a startling event or

condition made while the declarant was under the stress of

excitement caused by the event or condition” shall not be excluded

by the hearsay rule. For this exception to apply, a statement need

not be made contemporaneously with the startling event, but it must

be made while the declarant was still under the stress of excitement

of that event. See Robbins v. State, 

 (2) (

) (2016).

     From the evidence, a trial court could reasonably conclude that

having a car hood fly up while driving would qualify as a startling

event. Tonya’s statement to Hollifield was made as soon as she got

to work after the event, so her statement that she believed Lynn had

tried to kill her would qualify as an excited utterance. See Blackmon

v. State, 

 (2) (

) (2019) (victim’s statement

                                  23
relating to defendant’s threat to shoot at the car she was in if she

did not return home fell under excited utterance exception because

the statement was made soon after defendant intercepted the victim

when she tried to escape and threatened to shoot the car). Because

Hollifield’s testimony about the car hood was admissible, trial

counsel was not deficient for failing to object to it. See Walker v.

State, 

 (2) (b) (

) (2019) (“[T]he failure

to make a meritless objection is not deficient performance.”).

     (C) Saunders’s testimony about the car hood was materially

identical to Morris’s testimony in that Tonya’s statement to

Saunders merely described the incident without blaming Lynn for

the occurrence. Even if there were a reason to object to Saunders’s

testimony, trial counsel’s failure to do so did not prejudice Lynn

given that the testimony was cumulative of Tonya’s statement to

Morris. See Wilson, 

 (2).

     (iii) The last alleged hearsay statement challenged by Lynn

concerns Bulloch’s testimony that Tonya told him a few days before

her death that Lynn threw Tonya against a doorframe. Bulloch gave

                                 24
this testimony as an example of why Tonya was becoming

increasingly scared of Lynn. Bulloch testified that Tonya was upset

and crying during the conversation, and that she told him she

needed to “get out,” leave Lynn, and take the children with her.

     Lynn argues that Tonya’s statement about being thrown

against a doorframe was elicited not just to show that she had a fear

of Lynn, but that her fear was rational because it was based on the

fact that he committed acts of violence against her. The State argues

that Tonya’s statement fell under the excited utterance and state-

of-mind exceptions to the rule against hearsay.

     Pretermitting whether Tonya’s statement would have been

admissible as an excited utterance under Rule 803 (2) or under the

state-of-mind exception listed in OCGA § 24-8-803 (3), any failure to

object to evidence of the incident did not prejudice Lynn given the

strength of the evidence against him.

     Lynn admitted that he killed Tonya. It is highly unlikely the

jury rejected his defenses that he killed her in self-defense and out

of provocation simply because it heard brief testimony that he

                                 25
pushed her into a doorframe a few days earlier. There was ample

evidence in the record showing that Lynn was upset by the

possibility that Tonya would leave with their children, and that

Tonya feared that Lynn would kill her before he let her go. Lynn

admitted that after killing Tonya, rather than calling the police, he

cleaned up the scene, put Tonya into his truck, rode around in his

truck with her body, and ultimately decided to dump her body in a

well several hours after her death. After Tonya’s death, Lynn lied to

police about how Tonya’s vehicle came to be in the library parking

lot, and he also erased all the data on his phone before giving his

phone to the police when they requested it. Given this strong

evidence of guilt, there is no reasonable probability that the result

of the proceeding would have been different had trial counsel

objected to the evidence regarding Lynn pushing Tonya into a

doorframe. See Henderson v. State, 

 (3) (d) (

) (2018) (no reasonable probability that the outcome of

defendant’s trial would have been more favorable had the jury been

prevented from hearing hearsay statements where evidence against

                                 26
defendant was strong); Bozzie, 

 (4) (a) (given the

strong evidence of guilt, the defendant failed to establish prejudice

from trial counsel’s decision to introduce defendant’s prior

convictions); see also Virger v. State, 

 (7) (a) (

) (2019) (the strong evidence of defendant’s guilt “easily

offset any prejudice” resulting from testimony regarding an act of

domestic violence).5

     Judgment affirmed in part and vacated in part. Melton, C. J.,
Nahmias, P. J., and Boggs, Bethel, Ellington, and McMillian, JJ.,
concur. Warren, J., not participating.



                    DECIDED DECEMBER 21, 2020.
     Murder. Barrow Superior Court. Before Judge Booth.
     Jacob D. Rhein, for appellant.
     James B. Smith, District Attorney, Patricia J. Brooks,
Assistant District Attorney; Christopher M. Carr, Attorney General,
Patricia B. Attaway Burton, Deputy Attorney General, Paula K.
Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Mark S. Lindemann,
Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.



      5 Our conclusion remains the same even when we aggregate the prejudice

resulting from the assumed trial counsel deficiencies in Division 4 (c) (i) and
(c) (ii) (C). See Jones v. State, 

 (4) (e) (

) (2019)
(the prejudice resulting from trial counsel’s deficient performance is viewed
cumulatively). There are no trial court errors to consider in a cumulative
prejudice analysis, so Lynn’s claim in this respect fails.
                                      27