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310 Or. App. 190

Laux v. Akebono Brake Corp.

Court of Appeals of Oregon

Decided March 24, 2021

Court of Appeals of Oregon · decided 2021-03-24

Affirmed · Decided 2021-03-24

                                       190

   Argued and submitted May 7, 2019, affirmed March 24, petition for review
                     denied July 29, 2021 (
368 Or 510
)


                       Marilee M. LAUX,
         individually and as Personal Representative of
                 the Estate of Ronald K. Laux,
                       Plaintiff-Appellant,
                                 v.
           AKEBONO BRAKE CORPORATION et al,
                          Defendants,
                               and
              YAMAHA MOTOR COMPANY LTD
            and Yamaha Motor Corporation, U.S.A.,
                    Defendants-Respondents.
                Multnomah County Circuit Court
                      140405683; A164168
                                   
484 P3d 329

     Plaintiff appeals from a limited judgment for defendant, challenging the
trial court’s grant of summary judgment in defendant Yamaha’s favor on claims
arising from decedent Ronald Laux’s alleged exposure to asbestos in motorcycle
brake-friction materials. The trial court granted defendant’s motion for summary
judgment, concluding that there was insufficient evidence that decedent was
exposed to Yamaha asbestos. On appeal, plaintiff argues that a statement made
by defendant’s corporate representative in which he explained that “asbestos-free
friction materials began to surface in the market sometime in the 1970s,” allows
a factfinder to infer that Yamaha’s brake-friction materials contained asbestos
during the relevant time period. Held: The Court of Appeals concluded that, even
after drawing all objectively reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to
plaintiff, there was insufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact
that decedent was exposed to asbestos from Yamaha brake-friction materials.
    Affirmed.




    Kelly Skye, Judge.
   James S. Coon argued the cause for appellant. Also on
the briefs was Thomas, Coon, Newton and Frost.
   Dean E. Aldrich argued the cause for respondents. Also
on the brief was Aldrich Eike, P. C.
Cite as 
310 Or App 190
 (2021)                      191

  Before Ortega, Presiding Judge, and Shorr, Judge, and
Powers, Judge.*
   POWERS, J.
   Affirmed.
   Shorr, J., dissenting.




______________
   * Shorr, J., vice Linder, S. J.
192                                       Laux v. Akebono Brake Corp.

    POWERS, J.

          In this civil case, plaintiff appeals from a limited
judgment for defendant, challenging the trial court’s grant
of summary judgment in defendant’s favor on claims arising
from decedent Ronald Laux’s alleged exposure to asbestos
in motorcycle brake-friction materials.1 In her first amended
complaint, plaintiff brought negligence and strict-productsliability claims against numerous defendants alleged to be
suppliers or manufacturers of asbestos-containing materials, including Yamaha Motor Company, Ltd. and Yamaha
Motor Corporation, U.S.A. (collectively “Yamaha”), the only
defendant that is a party to this appeal.2 The trial court
granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that there was insufficient evidence that decedent
was exposed to Yamaha asbestos. We affirm.
         Summary judgment is proper where “the pleadings,
depositions, affidavits, declarations, and admissions on file
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact.”
ORCP 47 C. No genuine issue of material fact exists if,
“based on the record before the court viewed in a manner
most favorable to the adverse party, no objectively reasonable juror could return a verdict for the adverse party.” 
Id.
Given that standard, we describe the evidence in the light
most favorable to plaintiff, the nonmoving party, and draw
all objectively reasonable inferences in her favor. Greer v.
ACE Hardware Corp., 
256 Or App 132, 134
, 
300 P3d 202
(2013).
         Decedent jointly owned and worked at Fred’s
Honda, a motorcycle shop in Corvallis, Oregon, from 1961
to 2014. In 2014, he was diagnosed with mesothelioma,
which plaintiff asserted was caused by exposure to asbestos in brakes and other motorcycle parts during decedent’s
    1
      Ronald Laux died shortly after he and his wife, Marilee Laux, initiated this
action. After decedent’s death, his wife was appointed personal representative of
decedent’s estate; thus, we refer to her as plaintiff, even though she brings claims
on behalf of herself and in her capacity as the estate’s representative. We refer to
Ronald Laux as decedent.
    2
      For convenience, we use the terms “Yamaha” and “defendant” interchangeably to refer jointly to Yamaha Motor Company, Ltd. and Yamaha Motor
Corporation, U.S.A.
Cite as 
310 Or App 190
 (2021)                           193

tenure at Fred’s Honda. Specifically, plaintiff alleged that
replacing brake linings in motorcycles created airborne
asbestos dust that mechanics like decedent would breathe
when they removed old brakes and when they abraded new
brakes. In a deposition, decedent’s business partner Fred
Watkins, averred that two to four brake jobs were performed a day at Fred’s Honda during the 1960s and five to
six brake jobs a day during the 1970s. During the relevant
time period, Watkins further averred that about 10 percent
of the motorcycles serviced at Fred’s Honda were Yamaha
motorcycles.
         After the parties engaged in discovery, defendant
moved for summary judgment. Defendant argued that
plaintiff lacked sufficient evidence to support a claim that
decedent was exposed to an asbestos-containing product
manufactured, distributed, or supplied by defendant. In
support of its motion, defendant quoted excerpts from decedent’s deposition in which decedent testified that he could
not recall doing any repair work on Yamahas and that he
“wasn’t involved in that brand.” Further, defendant argued
that Yamaha motorcycles were only a small percentage
of the motorcycles serviced at Fred’s Honda and that the
majority of Yamaha repair work was done at a different
store location where decedent did not work. Finally, defendant asserted that there was no evidence that Fred’s Honda
obtained its brake products from authorized Yamaha dealerships or that defendant supplied products containing
asbestos.
         Plaintiff remonstrated that, although decedent
could not recall a specific incident where he worked on a
Yamaha motorcycle in his deposition, decedent and Watkins
testified that they worked on several types of motorcycles
at Fred’s Honda, including Yamahas; therefore, it was
likely that decedent “worked on Yamahas over his extended
career.” Regardless, plaintiff argued that, decedent’s son,
who also worked at Fred’s Honda, testified that decedent
walked through the shop regularly and breathed in brake
dust whenever other mechanics were working. Additionally,
plaintiff provided excerpts from the deposition of Caleb
Chesser, defendant’s corporate representative, in which
Chesser noted that he could not confirm whether there were
194                                     Laux v. Akebono Brake Corp.

any Yamaha models that had asbestos-free brakes before
1990.3
           The trial court granted defendant’s motion:
       “Having considered the oral arguments and written
   submissions of the parties, this Court finds that Plaintiff
   has not established the requisite product identification,
   and that Defendants Yamaha Motor Co., Ltd. and Yamaha
   Motor Corporation, U.S.A. are entitled to prevail as a matter of law. Plaintiff presented sufficient evidence from which
   an inference can be drawn that Fred’s Honda serviced
   Yamaha motorcycles while Ronald Laux was employed
   there. However, Plaintiff has not presented admissible
   evidence from which an inference can be drawn that the
   specific Yamaha motorcycles serviced at Fred’s Honda
   were equipped with asbestos-containing brakes. Thus,
   Defendants Yamaha Motor Co., Ltd. and Yamaha Motor
   Corporation, U.S.A.’s Motion for Summary Judgment is
   hereby GRANTED.”
The trial court entered a limited judgment in favor of defendant, and plaintiff subsequently filed this appeal from that
limited judgment.
         On appeal, plaintiff contends that the trial court
erred in granting summary judgment to defendant, arguing
that the court erred in determining that she failed to present “evidence from which an inference can be drawn that
the specific Yamaha motorcycles serviced at Fred’s Honda
were equipped with asbestos-containing brakes.” Plaintiff
asserts that, to defeat defendant’s summary judgment
motion, she was not required to show that all of the Yamaha
motorcycles repaired at Fred’s Honda had asbestos brake
linings; rather, under Griffin v. Allis-Chalmers Corp. Product
Liability Trust, 
240 Or App 137, 142
, 
246 P3d 483
 (2010), she
needed to show only the presence of Yamaha asbestos in
decedent’s workplace. In support of her claim that Yamaha
brake-friction materials contained asbestos during the relevant time period, plaintiff relies on inferences drawn from

    3
      Plaintiff also argued that another defendant named in the complaint supplied Yamaha with brakes containing asbestos during the relevant time period,
which plaintiff alleged she could connect to specific Yamaha models worked on at
Fred’s Honda. Plaintiff, however, has not renewed that argument on appeal and,
therefore, we do not consider it.
Cite as 
310 Or App 190
 (2021)                                                  195

an excerpt of Chesser’s deposition in which he explained
that “asbestos-free friction materials began to surface in the
market sometime in the 1970s.” That statement, according
to plaintiff, allows a factfinder to “infer that Yamaha brake
linings contained asbestos until at least the 1970s.” 4
         In response, defendant argues that the trial court
properly granted summary judgment because “a juror could
not conclude—without impermissible speculation—that all
Yamaha motorcycle products serviced at [decedent’s] workplace contained asbestos.” Defendant asserts that, under
Greer, because plaintiff did not identify a specific Yamaha
motorcycle brake product that contained asbestos, plaintiff was required to prove that during the timeframe that
plaintiff was exposed to Yamaha motorcycle brake products
“all Yamaha motorcycle brake products contained asbestos.”
(Emphasis omitted.) Responding to plaintiff’s reliance on
Chesser’s statement, defendant contends that “Mr. Chesser’s
one line cannot support an inference that all, or even some,
Yamaha motorcycle brake products contained asbestos
before the referenced time in the 1970s.” Defendant argues
that, because “Chesser did not testify that any brake product prior to the 1970s actually contained asbestos, nor was
Mr. Chesser able to provide any information about which
motorcycles might have had brake products from any given
third-party vendor,” plaintiff cannot rely on his statement
to create a genuine issue of material fact without relying on
impermissible speculation. Accordingly, defendant argues
that plaintiff “presume[s] the existence of asbestos in all
brakes,” but has “provided no evidence regarding the composition of Yamaha motorcycle brakes during the 1960s.”

     4
       Although plaintiff cited and quoted other portions of Chesser’s deposition
in her response to defendant’s motion for summary judgment, she did not specifically quote the statement that she now relies on to argue that an objectively
reasonable factfinder could infer that Yamaha brake linings contained asbestos
until the 1970s. In a footnote in its answering brief, defendant notes that plaintiff
did not raise that specific argument before the trial court but does not otherwise
assert that plaintiff’s argument is unpreserved. Because both parties raised, and
the trial court considered, during the summary judgment proceedings the portion of Chesser’s deposition that is now at issue on appeal, we do not have independent preservation concerns. See Vokoun v. City of Lake Oswego, 
189 Or App 499, 508
, 
76 P3d 677
 (2003), rev den, 
336 Or 406
 (2004) (noting that we have an
“independent obligation to determine whether an argument advanced on appeal
was preserved”).
196                              Laux v. Akebono Brake Corp.

         In her reply brief, plaintiff elaborates on why
Chesser’s statement regarding the existence of “asbestos-free friction materials” is sufficient to raise a genuine issue
of material fact:
       “A reasonable juror could find that defendant’s witness,
   Mr. Chesser, in making the statement that ‘asbestos-free
   friction materials began to surface in the market sometime
   in the 1970s,’ meant that, before sometime in the 1970s, all
   motorcycle brake friction materials contained asbestos. As
   a matter of language and logic, that is what Mr. Chesser’s
   statement means. If friction materials free of asbestos
   ‘began to surface in the market’ at a particular time, then,
   before that time, asbestos-free materials had not yet ‘surfaced in the market,’ that is there were no asbestos-free
   materials motorcycle brake friction materials available.
   That is not only a permissible inference from Mr. Chesser’s
   statement; it is the most logical inference.”
(Footnote omitted.)
         The legal principles governing this case are well
settled. As we have previously explained in Griffin, “[t]o survive a motion for summary judgment in a products liability and negligence case involving asbestos, a plaintiff needs
to establish the presence of the defendant’s asbestos in the
plaintiff’s workplace[.]” 
240 Or App at 142
. Once a plaintiff
establishes the presence of asbestos, “that fact is sufficient
to create a jury question as to whether the presence of that
asbestos played a role in the occurrence of the plaintiff’s
injuries.” 
Id.
 (internal quotation marks omitted). If a “defendant in an asbestos-liability case moves for summary judgment on the ground that the plaintiff cannot establish that
he or she was exposed to specific asbestos products for which
the defendant is responsible, the plaintiff has the burden
of producing product identification evidence in opposition to
the summary judgment motion.” Greer, 
256 Or App at 140
(internal quotation marks omitted).
          As an initial matter, although decedent did not specifically recall working on Yamaha motorcycles, there is sufficient evidence in the summary judgment record to reasonably infer that Fred’s Honda serviced Yamaha motorcycles
during decedent’s employment. See Austin v. A. J. Zinda Co.,
196 Or App 262, 270
, 
101 P3d 819
 (2004), rev den, 
338 Or 374
Cite as 
310 Or App 190
 (2021)                               197

(2005) (noting that, regardless of whether the plaintiff could
establish that he personally handled the defendant’s flex
connectors, he “would nevertheless be entitled to prevail [on
summary judgment] if a trier of fact could reasonably find
that [the plaintiff] was injuriously exposed in the workplace
to asbestos fibers as a result of other employees’ handling of
[the defendant]-supplied flex connectors”). Thus, the question in this case is whether evidence in the summary judgment record would allow an objectively reasonable finder of
fact to conclude that Yamaha brake-friction materials contained asbestos during the time decedent worked at Fred’s
Honda. More specifically, the question presented is whether
Chesser’s statement that “asbestos-free friction materials
began to surface in the market sometime in the 1970s,” is
sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether defendant’s brake-friction materials contained asbestos during
the relevant time period.
         We conclude that, even after drawing all objectively
reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to plaintiff, Chesser’s statement provides insufficient evidence from
which a factfinder could reasonably infer that decedent was
exposed to asbestos from Yamaha brake-friction materials.
Chesser’s statement, viewed in the context of his full testimony, is insufficient.
         In Chesser’s deposition, plaintiff’s counsel questioned Chesser about various Yamaha models throughout
the years in question and confirmed whether or not Yamaha
still had information on those motorcycles:
      “Q. Okay. No information … regarding models from
   the 1960s?
      “A. So regarding models that were made in the 1960s,
   that’s correct. There’s—that information doesn’t exist anymore at [Yamaha].
      “Q. Okay. Why don’t you walk me through then
   what—with respect to this first page, what—what—what
   you learned.
      “A. Okay.
      “Q. And I want to make sure I understand it before we
   kind of move through this.
198                               Laux v. Akebono Brake Corp.

       “A. So we talked about the 1960s. For the 1970s,
   there’s some information still available, but it’s incomplete.
   It’s sort of spotty. But we also know that asbestos-free friction materials began to surface in the market sometime in
   the 1970s.
       “So with—without a document where we can confirm if
   the friction material had asbestos or not, we can’t definitively rule it out. We can’t—
      “Q. When you say the ‘market,’ what do you mean by
   the ‘market’?
      “A. So from my own research, I found in that Phantom
   Rider catalog that there are asbestos-free friction material
   that goes back to some ’70s models Yamaha.
      “…
      “Q. Okay. And is Phantom Rider—is this a—is there
   any association between Phantom Rider and any of the
   Yamaha entities?
      “A. No. No, this is nothing that—this was my own personal research outside of Yamaha.
      “…
     “Q. So … is this like a trade publication for the
   motorcycle industry, basically?
      “A. It’s a catalog that was produced to sell aftermarket
   parts—
      “Q. Okay.
      “A. —for motorcycle riders.”
         Chesser’s statement about asbestos-free friction
materials beginning to surface in the market in the 1970s
is insufficient to create a genuine issue of fact under the
circumstances of this case. As an initial matter, at no point
during Chesser’s deposition did he directly confirm the presence of asbestos in Yamaha brake-friction materials during
the time that decedent worked at Fred’s Honda. Instead,
plaintiff relies on a series of inferences that may be drawn
from Chesser’s statement. In that regard, plaintiff’s argument relies on two related but distinct inferences: first, all
brake-friction materials before the 1970s contained asbestos; and second, all Yamaha brake-friction materials must
Cite as 
310 Or App 190
 (2021)                                                  199

have contained asbestos before the 1970s. As explained
below, plaintiff’s argument necessarily relies on too great of
an inferential leap.
         Chesser grounded his statement in his observations
derived from a motorcycle catalog from 1983—Phantom
Rider—with no direct connection to Yamaha. Indeed,
Chesser acknowledged that the catalog was produced to
sell aftermarket parts for a number of different motorcycle
brands, not just Yamaha. Without other evidence to establish the presence of asbestos in Yamaha brake-friction materials, an objectively reasonable juror has no basis, without
resorting to impermissible speculation, for inferring that
there was asbestos in Yamaha brake-friction materials
before the 1970s.5
         Consistent with our previous asbestos-liability cases,
a plaintiff cannot rely on the generalized notion that asbestos is present in the industry to survive summary judgment.
On the contrary, in our cases in which the summary judgment record created a genuine issue of material fact, that
record contained some evidence of asbestos in the defendant’s product. See, e.g., Austin, 
196 Or App at 269-70
 (relying on an affidavit pursuant to ORCP 47 E averring that
an expert would testify that the use, removal, and replacement of asbestos-containing products, including the “flex
connectors” at issue in the case would release asbestos in
the air throughout the workplace); Abendroth v. Asbestos
Corporation, Ltd., 
201 Or App 705, 712
, 
120 P3d 535
 (2005)

    5
      After oral arguments in this case, plaintiff filed a supplemental memorandum of additional authorities arguing that
    “[a]sbestos has long been, and in some cases still is, a component of motor
    vehicle brake friction parts. E.g., 29 CFR 1910.100, Appendix F (automotive
    brake best practices to protect against asbestos exposure). However, because
    the presence of asbestos in motorcycle and other motor vehicle brake parts
    is a well-established and presumed fact in asbestos litigation, there is no
    direct statement in the summary judgment record in this case that ‘there
    was asbestos in motorcycle brake friction parts.’ ”
As defendant’s response to that memorandum observes, plaintiff acknowledges
that there is “no direct statement” in the summary judgment record that the
brake-friction parts at issue in this case contained asbestos. That is, even if we
agreed that there is a history of asbestos being present in brake-friction parts,
that generalized history falls short of creating an issue of fact regarding the presence of asbestos in Yamaha brake-friction parts during the period that decedent
worked at Fred’s Honda.
200                            Laux v. Akebono Brake Corp.

(reversing the grant of summary judgment where there was
a genuine issue of material fact on the question of exposure
to asbestos where the plaintiff was exposed to the defendant’s taping compounds that the defendant admitted contained asbestos during the relevant time period); West v.
Allied Signal, Inc., 
200 Or App 182
, 191 n 3, 
113 P3d 983
(2005) (noting that the vice president and part-time salesperson for the defendant testified in his deposition generally
about the defendant’s sale of gloves and acknowledged that
the defendant sold “asbestos gloves”).
         For example, in Perman v. C. H. Murphy/Clark-Ullman, Inc., 
220 Or App 132, 135
, 
185 P3d 519
 (2008), the
defendant moved for summary judgment, contending that
the plaintiff had been unable to adduce evidence that the
decedent had been exposed to any asbestos-containing products distributed by the defendant. In support of its motion,
the defendant submitted a declaration from a former
employee denying that the defendant ever sold any gloves,
“much less any asbestos-containing gloves” to the plaintiff’s
employer. 
Id. at 141
. Defendant also submitted a declaration from an expert witness, who stated that, based on his
research about welding gloves and mittens available to decedent, some of those “contained asbestos” and others included
other fabrics like fiberglass and flame-retardant cotton.
Id. at 136
.
          In response, the plaintiff submitted excerpts of
the decedent’s deposition testimony in which the decedent
described the type of gloves he used during his employment
and that he “believed the material [in the gloves] was asbestos.” 
Id.
 The plaintiff also submitted a declaration from a
coworker who stated that “during their employment, he and
decedent were required to wear ‘asbestos gloves.’ ” 
Id.
 The
trial court granted the defendant’s motion for summary
judgment and on appeal we reversed. We held that, even
though the defendant proffered evidence that he never sold
gloves, decedent’s testimony was sufficient to preclude summary judgment. 
Id. at 141
. We concluded that the decedent’s
deposition testimony created a genuine issue of material
fact, because the decedent had testified that the defendant
supplied “silver gloves,” the decedent believed that the “silver gloves” contained asbestos, and the decedent was a
Cite as 
310 Or App 190
 (2021)                             201

“long-time welder and sheet metal worker, who was familiar
with other products containing asbestos.” 
Id.
         Unlike any of these cases, the summary judgment
record in this case does not contain evidence that Yamaha’s
brake parts contained asbestos. Further, we respectfully
disagree with the dissenting opinion’s reliance on the negative implications drawn from Chesser’s statements that
asbestos-free materials “began to surface” in the 1970s and
that those materials were “introduced” during that time
period. First, as noted earlier, Chesser reached his conclusion based on an aftermarket catalog. Not only was that
catalog issued a decade after the time period in question,
it was not specific to Yamaha products. Second, his statements are too vague for an objectively reasonable factfinder
to reasonably infer—rather than guess or speculate—that
Yamaha’s brake products contained asbestos. As Chesser
explained, he could not provide “absolute confirmation” of
asbestos but could not rule it out either. He explained, “So I
just don’t know one way or the other.” Accordingly, because
there was insufficient evidence to create a genuine issue
of material fact that defendant’s brake-friction materials
contained asbestos, the trial court correctly granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment.
        Affirmed.
        SHORR, J., dissenting.
         I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion.
This case presents a close question on whether there is
evidence in the record from which a reasonable factfinder
could conclude that decedent Ronald Laux was exposed
to asbestos from Yamaha motorcycle brake parts over his
50-plus year career working at Fred’s Honda from 1961 to
2014. I agree with the majority’s recitation of the facts and
applicable law. I also agree with the majority’s conclusion
that a reasonable factfinder could find that Fred’s Honda
serviced Yamaha motorcycle brake parts during decedent’s
career at the shop. My only disagreement is with the majority’s conclusion that, even when viewing the evidence in the
light most favorable to plaintiff (the representative for decedent’s estate) and drawing all reasonable inferences in her
202                                Laux v. Akebono Brake Corp.

favor, a reasonable factfinder could not find that Laux was
exposed to asbestos from Yamaha brake-friction materials.
I would reach the opposite conclusion and, for that reason,
would reverse the trial court’s grant of summary judgment
to defendants Yamaha Motor Company, Ltd. and Yamaha
Motor Corporation, U.S.A. (defendants).
         The majority opinion sets forth the relevant facts
in the record. I will not repeat or add to them here save one
exception. Our disagreement revolves around the deposition
testimony of Caleb Chesser, a corporate representative for
Yamaha Motor Corporation, U.S.A. As the majority notes,
Chesser testified that “[w]e … know that asbestos-free
friction materials began to surface in the market sometime
in the 1970s” and that “there [is] asbestos-free friction material that goes back to some ’70s models Yamaha.” Chesser
then testified more on this topic:
      “Q. … For the 1970s, on page 5, there’s an indication
   in your notes [that] asbestos-free friction materials [were]
   introduced in this time.
       “Now, were those just introduced in the general marketplace at this time or is there a specific source of information
   to indicate that Yamaha introduced asbestos-free friction
   materials in the 1970s?
      “A. Well, I researched by models. I don’t know if—if
   Nori could point to a specific model in the ’70s that didn’t
   have asbestos. But, again, we know that it existed or it—it
   began to be sold—
      “Q. Okay.
      “A. —in that time frame, and so he couldn’t—he
   couldn’t rule it out that the possibility is there that it could
   be asbestos-free.”
Chesser was later presented with the names of certain
Yamaha models and testified as follows:
      “Q. For all of these models, is there anything prior to
   1990 in writing confirming an asbestos—an asbestos-free
   brake on a Yamaha motorcycle?
      “A. Before 1990?
      “Q. Correct.
      “A. I don’t believe so.”
Cite as 
310 Or App 190
 (2021)                             203

There is an entirely reasonable, nonspeculative inference
that can be drawn from Chesser’s testimony that asbestos-free brake materials “began to surface” in the 1970s and
that those materials were “introduced” during that time
period. See State v. Hedgpeth, 
365 Or 724, 732
, 
452 P3d 948
 (2019) (stating in a different context involving a criminal defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal that facts
may be established based on reasonable inference but not
impermissible speculation). That inference is that it was the
standard at Yamaha and throughout the industry for brake-friction materials to contain asbestos before the introduction
of asbestos-free brake materials beginning in the 1970s and
going forward. A factfinder might not draw that inference or
find for plaintiff on that issue, but it would be reasonable on
this record for the factfinder to do so.
         This is a case where there perhaps could have been
a better summary judgment record with more direct evidence regarding the presence of asbestos in Yamaha brake
parts during the relevant time frame. However, because a
factfinder could still draw a reasonable inference regarding
the presence of asbestos in Yamaha brake parts during that
time, I respectfully dissent from the majority and would
reverse the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to
defendants.

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