State v. Walden

¶1In the Supreme Court of Georgia

¶2 Decided: May 3, 2021

¶3 S21A0210. THE STATE v. WALDEN.

¶4 PETERSON, Justice.

¶5 Carly Walden is charged with malice murder and other crimes

¶6for the April 28, 2019, shooting death of her mother, Andrea Walker,

¶7at Walker’s home. On that date, Walden called police and reported

¶8a shooting; she claimed an unidentified man was responsible.

¶9Walden was transported to the county sheriff’s office, where she

¶10made statements to an investigator before being provided warnings

¶11pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (86 SCt 1602, 16 LE2d

¶12694) (1966). On Walden’s motion, the trial court suppressed those

¶13statements, while declining to suppress others that she had made

¶14earlier in the day. The State has appealed the trial court’s ruling in

¶15advance of trial. When — as here — a trial court makes no explicit

¶16findings in ruling on a motion that does not require such findings to be made, we presume that the trial court implicitly made all the

¶17findings in support of its ruling that the record would allow. But the

¶18record in this case does not allow the findings that would be

¶19necessary to conclude that Walden was in custody when she made

¶20the statements at issue, and so we reverse the trial court’s

¶21suppression of Walden’s statements.

¶22 “Miranda warnings must be administered to an accused who is

¶23in custody and subject to interrogation or its functional equivalent.”

¶24State v. Troutman, 300 Ga. 616, 617 (1) (797 SE2d 72) (2017). This

¶25requirement arises “when a person is (1) formally arrested or (2)

¶26restrained to the degree associated with a formal arrest.” Id.

¶27Whether the circumstances in a particular case amount to custody

¶28is assessed objectively. “Thus, the proper inquiry is how a reasonable

¶29person in [Walden]’s shoes would have perceived [her] situation.” Id.

¶30“In determining whether a suspect is in custody, we must consider

¶31the totality of the circumstances without regard for the subjective

¶32views of the suspect or the interrogating officer.” Licata v. State, 305

¶33Ga. 498, 501 (1) (826 SE2d 94) (2019). Although there is no one

¶34 2 dispositive factor, important considerations include “the location of

¶35the questioning, its duration, statements made during the

¶36interview, the presence or absence of physical restraints during the

¶37questioning, and the release of the interviewee at the end of the

¶38questioning.” Id. (quoting Howes v. Fields, 565 U.S. 499, 509 (132

¶39SCt 1181, 182 LE2d 17) (2012)).

¶40 Whether a defendant was in custody for purposes of Miranda

¶41is a mixed question of fact and law. See Troutman, 300 Ga. at 617.

¶42We apply de novo the relevant legal principles to the facts, and we

¶43accept the trial court’s findings on disputed facts and credibility of

¶44witnesses unless clearly erroneous, and construe the evidence most

¶45favorably to uphold the findings and judgment of the trial court. See

¶46Davis v. State, 307 Ga. 625, 627 (2) n.4 (837 SE2d 817) (2020);

¶47Troutman, 300 Ga. at 617. Where, as here, the trial court was not

¶48required to make explicit factual findings or credibility

¶49determinations on the record, and in fact did not do so, we assume

¶50that the trial court implicitly resolved all disputes of fact and

¶51credibility in favor of its ruling, and we generally accept such

¶52 3 implicit factual findings unless clearly erroneous. See Cain v. State,

¶53306 Ga. 434, 438 (2) (831 SE2d 788) (2019) (assuming that trial court

¶54credited testimony of officers over defendant where trial court ruled

¶55that defendant’s statement was voluntary without making explicit

¶56factual findings). But “when, as here, the controlling facts are not in

¶57dispute, because they are discernable from a video, our review is de

¶58novo.” Licata, 305 Ga. at 500 (1) n.2.

¶59 Here, the interactions between Walden and law enforcement

¶60officers were documented by a series of video recordings, which

¶61showed the following. Deputy Davon Sydnor arrived at the victim’s

¶62home at about 7:26 a.m. on the morning of the shooting, following

¶63other officers, in response to a 7:10 a.m. 911 call. A few minutes after

¶64Deputy Sydnor’s arrival, Walden followed him toward his vehicle,

¶65carrying a cell phone. She sat in the back seat of the vehicle as she

¶66talked to Deputy Sydnor, while he stood by the open door of the car.

¶67Highly agitated, she claimed that some men she had brought home

¶68from a party that night had tried to rape her and her mother. Deputy

¶69Sydnor asked her a number of questions about the men, their

¶70 4 descriptions, their vehicle, and which way they may have escaped,

¶71although his interest on that point faded somewhat when she

¶72mentioned that female companions of the men had danced on top of

¶73the ceiling fan.

¶74 Shortly thereafter, Deputy Sydnor received instructions over

¶75his radio to “detain” Walden, stop talking to her, and bring her in to

¶76the sheriff’s office. It does not appear from the video recording that

¶77Walden noticed the instruction that she be “detained,” however,

¶78because she was talking in a focused and intense manner when that

¶79message came across the radio and continued her intense talking

¶80even after the message had been transmitted. In contrast, a short

¶81time later another radio message came through that mentioned

¶82taking Walden to an interview room at the sheriff’s office so she

¶83could compose herself (but made no mention of detaining her).

¶84During this message, Walden leaned forward to listen. Deputy

¶85Sydnor eventually motioned for Walden to stop talking, visually

¶86checked her for weapons, and asked her to fasten her seat belt. He

¶87also told her that she was “not in any type of trouble” “right now.”

¶88 5 Deputy Sydnor advised Walden, “We’re going to take a ride to the

¶89sheriff’s office, OK?” Walden nodded and said, “OK.” Deputy Sydnor

¶90got into the driver’s seat before stating, again, “You and I are going

¶91to take a ride to the sheriff’s office, OK?” Walden responded, “Yes.”

¶92They headed to the sheriff’s office at around 7:40 a.m.; the drive took

¶93less than 12 minutes. Walden was not handcuffed as they proceeded

¶94to the sheriff’s office, and she retained the cell phone that she had

¶95been carrying. Deputy Sydnor asked her no questions about what

¶96happened as he drove, although he told her to put her seat belt back

¶97on when she removed it and to stop moving around.

¶98 Upon arrival at the sheriff’s office, Deputy Sydnor helped

¶99Walden look for the cell phone, which had briefly gone missing, at

¶100times turning his back to her as she stood in the parking lot. At one

¶101point, he told her not to touch him and to stop moving around.

¶102Walden remained unhandcuffed as she and Deputy Sydnor moved

¶103around the sheriff’s complex, seeking access to an interview room.

¶104She retained the cell phone for some time as they sat in an interview

¶105room waiting for an investigator, although Deputy Sydnor told her

¶106 6 to slide the phone across the table after she insisted that it was not

¶107hers. As they waited, with the door open, Deputy Sydnor did not

¶108question Walden about the circumstances surrounding her mother’s

¶109death. When Walden volunteered information or asked questions,

¶110Deputy Sydnor largely did not respond or told her to wait for

¶111investigators. Walden did not physically attempt to leave the room

¶112while waiting for the investigator, she cannot be heard on the video

¶113recordings asking if she could leave, and Deputy Sydnor cannot be

¶114heard telling her that she could not leave.

¶115 After Walden and Deputy Sydnor waited for about 40 minutes

¶116in the interview room, Investigator Clinton French entered the

¶117room. Investigator French asked Walden whether the phone on the

¶118table was hers, and stepped out to secure it when she claimed that

¶119it did not belong to her. Investigator French returned and asked

¶120Deputy Sydnor to step out before beginning the interview at around

¶1218:45 a.m. At no time prior to beginning the interview can

¶122Investigator French be heard on the video recording of their

¶123interaction telling Walden that she could not leave. Investigator

¶124 7 French asked some preliminary questions, but did not provide

¶125Miranda warnings, before asking Walden to tell him what

¶126happened. She then spoke for less than six minutes, during which

¶127time she said that she had accidentally shot her mother.

¶128Investigator French stopped the interview and stepped out of the

¶129room. Walden never asked or attempted to leave the interview room

¶130during the time she was speaking with Investigator French.

¶131 Deputy Sydnor returned to the interview room a few minutes

¶132later to sit with Walden; he did not ask her questions about the

¶133shooting and left the door open. During this time, Walden attempted

¶134to get up from her chair at several points, and Deputy Sydnor told

¶135her not to get up. Left alone for a while, she opened the door and

¶136attempted to walk out; Deputy Sydnor asked her what she was doing

¶137and she said she was “getting away from you.” Deputy Sydnor

¶138directed her back in the room and told her to sit down and stay in

¶139the room.

¶140 Investigator French returned to the interview room more than

¶141three hours later. After some preliminary questions apparently

¶142 8 designed to evaluate Walden’s lucidity, Investigator French read

¶143Miranda warnings to her before attempting to interview her a

¶144second time. Walden promptly asked for an attorney, and

¶145Investigator French ended the interview. About two hours later, at

¶146around 3:00 p.m., Walden was placed in handcuffs and escorted out

¶147of the interview room.

¶148 After being indicted, Walden filed a motion to suppress the

¶149statements that she made to officers on the date of her arrest. At the

¶150hearing on her motion, Walden’s counsel narrowed the suppression

¶151motion to the statements Walden gave in the interview room (all of

¶152which preceded the Miranda warnings), and agreed that the only

¶153issue was whether she was in custody during that interview. Walden

¶154withdrew all of the other issues raised by the motion to suppress her

¶155statements, including the voluntariness of her statements. Walden

¶156testified at the hearing that she had not wanted to sit in the

¶157backseat of Deputy Sydnor’s vehicle or walk to the interview room

¶158with him, but she believed that she was in custody and had no

¶159choice. She claimed that she asked to leave when she got to the

¶160 9 interview room, and tried to leave prior to her interview with

¶161Investigator French, but was told repeatedly that she could not go:

¶162 Q BY [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: When you got to the CID room prior to your interview with Investigator French did you ask to leave, did you try to leave?

¶163 A Yes, I tried to leave and I was told repeatedly by Deputy Sydnor that I could not leave, that I could not go and so.

¶164But she contradicted that testimony on cross-examination:

¶165 Q BY [THE PROSECUTOR]: You didn’t ask to leave during the time that you were waiting for Investigator French to arrive the first time, did you?

¶166 A No, I did not because I was trying to help with the investigation that was going on at my home. So I was there trying to help them, the officers with anything that was going on at the home.

¶167 Q You wanted to help, you wanted to tell them what you knew?

¶168 A Yes.

¶169 The trial court made no oral findings at the hearing and asked

¶170the parties to submit letter briefs. The trial court later entered an

¶171order granting Walden’s motion to the extent it sought suppression

¶172of any statements she made in the interview room. The trial court’s

¶173order did not contain any findings or explanation for this ruling. The

¶174 10 State appeals this ruling.

¶175 The State argues on appeal that the trial court erred by

¶176suppressing the statements that Walden made in the interview

¶177room. The State contends that Walden was not in custody at the

¶178time she gave the statement to Investigator French in which she

¶179admitted shooting her mother (claiming that it was accidental), and

¶180that Miranda warnings were not required. We agree with the State

¶181that the record does not support a conclusion that Warden was in

¶182custody at the time in question.

¶183 Walden emphasizes that she was never told that she was free

¶184to leave, a factor that may support a determination that a defendant

¶185was in custody for purposes of Miranda. See, e.g., Troutman, 300

¶186Ga. at 617-618 (1) (where record supported trial court’s findings that

¶187defendant was kept at the police station in a non-public area for

¶188nearly nine hours, was interviewed three times, was never advised

¶189that he was free to leave, and was explicitly told he was not allowed

¶190to leave, this Court could not say that trial court erred in

¶191determining that a reasonable person in defendant’s position would

¶192 11 have believed that he was in custody); State v. Folsom, 286 Ga. 105,

¶193108 (1) (686 SE2d 239) (2009) (trial court did not err in concluding

¶194that a reasonable person would believe he was in custody where the

¶195record supported the trial court’s findings that defendant was never

¶196told he was free to leave, was kept either under surveillance or in a

¶197closed interrogation room for six hours, was explicitly told that the

¶198evidence pointed at him, and was essentially required to come to the

¶199police station by officers who waited at his home and ensured that

¶200he arrived at the police station by following him), overruled on other

¶201grounds by State v. Abbott, 303 Ga. 297, 303-304 (3) (812 SE2d 225)

¶202(2018). But this factor alone is not dispositive. See, e.g., Teasley v.

¶203State, 293 Ga. 758, 762-763 (3) (a) (749 SE2d 710) (2013) (trial court

¶204did not err in concluding that appellant was not in custody where

¶205detective testified that appellant was never told that he could not

¶206leave and never asked to leave; no mention of whether appellant was

¶207affirmatively told that he was free to leave); Henley v. State, 277 Ga.

¶208818, 820 (2) (596 SE2d 578) (2004) (concluding that the trial court

¶209did not err in admitting appellant’s pre-Miranda statement where

¶210 12 appellant voluntarily agreed to ride with the officers to the police

¶211station to answer questions, while noting that whether appellant

¶212was a suspect is not dispositive, without discussing whether

¶213appellant was told that he was free to leave), overruled on other

¶214grounds by Vergara v. State, 283 Ga. 175, 178 (1) (657 SE2d 863)

¶215(2008). Moreover, a video recording of Walden’s encounter with

¶216Deputy Sydnor shows that, as he prepared to transport her to the

¶217sheriff’s office, Deputy Sydnor told Walden that she was “not in any

¶218type of trouble.” Such a statement may indicate to a defendant that

¶219he or she is not in custody for purposes of Miranda. See McAllister

¶220v. State, 270 Ga. 224, 226-228 (1) (507 SE2d 448) (1998) (trial court

¶221authorized to find that defendant was not in custody where

¶222investigator assured defendant “that he was not under arrest or

¶223being detained” and that he was free to leave at any time).

¶224 Walden also emphasizes that the trial court made its ruling

¶225after hearing live testimony and having the opportunity to evaluate

¶226the credibility of the relevant witnesses. But she also acknowledges

¶227that, as noted above, a law enforcement officer’s subjective views

¶228 13 about whether a person being interrogated is in custody are

¶229irrelevant to a trial court’s evaluation of whether the person is

¶230actually in custody for purposes of Miranda. And the actual mindset

¶231of the person being questioned is irrelevant to whether that person

¶232is in custody, as well. See J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261,

¶233271 (131 SCt 2394, 180 LE2d 310) (2011). Thus, we are concerned

¶234with not what was in the mind of Walden or the law enforcement

¶235officers whom she encountered, but with what they said and did, all

¶236of which was captured on video. Walden did testify that she tried to

¶237leave the interview room and was told that she could not. But the

¶238video evidence contradicts her testimony, clearly showing that

¶239Walden never physically attempted to walk out of the interview

¶240room before she gave the statements in question to Investigator

¶241French. At no time prior to the statements at issue can Deputy

¶242Sydnor or Investigator French be heard on the recordings telling

¶243Walden that she was not free to leave. It generally is difficult to hear

¶244some of Walden’s words on the recordings, and Deputy Sydnor

¶245occasionally ignored some of what Walden said or responded by

¶246 14 telling her that she needed to wait for an investigator. But we have

¶247found no point on the recordings of Walden’s time with Deputy

¶248Sydnor or Investigator French before she gave the statements in

¶249question in which she spoke words that reasonably could be

¶250interpreted as a request to leave, and she identifies no such point.

¶251To the extent that the trial court’s ruling was based on an implicit

¶252finding that Walden was told that she could not leave the interview

¶253room prior to making the statements at issue, that finding was

¶254clearly erroneous.

¶255 Walden’s entire encounter with law enforcement, up to and

¶256including her interaction with Investigator French, is documented

¶257on video recordings that include audio, allowing this Court to review

¶258that evidence de novo. That evidence is insufficient to support the

¶259trial court’s ruling. Walden agreed to ride to the police station to

¶260answer questions, a factor that weighs in favor of finding that she

¶261was not in custody. See Henley, 277 Ga. at 820 (2). Walden was not

¶262handcuffed or otherwise restrained, and she waited less than an

¶263hour to speak to the investigator. Walden claims that Deputy Sydnor

¶264 15 impeded her exit because he was in uniform, armed, and seated next

¶265to the door, and the exit was not obviously accessible. But the door

¶266to the interview room clearly remained open while they waited, and

¶267Deputy Sydnor did not sit in front of the doorway. And although

¶268Walden emphasizes that she was interviewed in an interrogation

¶269room, by an investigator, without any family members present,

¶270these factors by themselves would not support a finding that she was

¶271in custody. See, e.g., Sosniak v. State, 287 Ga. 279, 280-282 (1) (A)

¶272(1) (695 SE2d 604) (2010) (defendant who was handcuffed and taken

¶273to sheriff’s office in patrol car, whereupon handcuffs were removed

¶274and he was told he was not under arrest and questioned in an

¶275unlocked interview room for two hours, was not in custody),

¶276disapproved on other grounds by Budhani v. State, 306 Ga. 315, 328

¶277(2) (c) (830 SE2d 195) (2019).

¶278 Considering the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that

¶279the evidence did not authorize the trial court’s implicit

¶280determination that a reasonable person in Walden’s situation would

¶281believe that she was in custody when she was subjected to

¶282 16 questioning by Investigator French prior to being given Miranda

¶283warnings. We thus conclude that the trial court erred in concluding

¶284that Walden’s pre-Miranda statements to Investigator French were

¶285due to be suppressed. We affirm the order to the extent that the trial

¶286court declined to suppress any other statements that she made.

¶287 Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part. All the Justices concur.

¶288 17