¶1In the Supreme Court of Georgia
¶2 Decided: June 1, 2021
¶3 S21A0424. WALKER v. THE STATE.
¶4 NAHMIAS, Presiding Justice.
¶5 Appellant O’Shaye Walker was convicted of felony murder,
¶6armed robbery, attempt to purchase marijuana, and a firearm
¶7offense in connection with the shooting death of Taquahn Jackson.
¶8In this appeal, he argues that the trial court erred by failing to
¶9instruct the jury on misdemeanor possession of marijuana as a
¶10lesser-included offense and by giving an overbroad instruction on
¶11the attempt to purchase marijuana charge. He also contends that
¶12his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to object
¶13to the admission of certain statements made by Appellant and a
¶14detective during Appellant’s recorded interview. We affirm. 1
¶15 1The crimes occurred on November 12, 2014. In March 2015, a Fulton County grand jury indicted Appellant for malice murder, three counts of felony murder, armed robbery, aggravated assault, criminal attempt to purchase 1. The evidence presented at trial showed the following.
¶16Shortly before 1:00 p.m. on November 12, 2014, Melissa Douse heard
¶17a loud bang and gunshots outside her apartment in Union City. She
¶18ran outside and saw that a Chevrolet Monte Carlo – Jackson’s
¶19mother’s car, which he was using that day – had crashed into her
¶20car. Douse saw two men inside the Monte Carlo; the driver (who was
¶21later identified as Jackson) looked unconscious, and the passenger
¶22(who was later identified as Appellant) appeared to be wounded. She
¶23went inside to call 911; when she returned, she saw a third man
¶24helping Appellant out of the car. When the third man saw Douse, he
¶25dropped Appellant and ran into the woods down a path that
¶26connected the apartment complex with another complex where
¶27marijuana, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. Appellant was tried from May 3 to 5, 2016, and the jury found him not guilty of malice murder but guilty of the other charges. The trial court sentenced Appellant to serve life in prison for felony murder based on aggravated assault, 20 consecutive years for armed robbery with 10 years probated, five concurrent years for attempt to purchase marijuana, and five consecutive years probated for the firearm offense. The remaining counts were vacated or merged. Appellant filed a timely motion for new trial, which he later amended with new counsel. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied the motion in June 2019. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal, which he later amended. The case was docketed to the term of this Court beginning in December 2020 and submitted for decision on the briefs.
¶28 2 Appellant’s mother lived. The third man was never identified. When
¶29Douse approached Appellant, he told her that “the guy that was
¶30unconscious on the driver side tried to rob him and shot him and not
¶31to tell the officers about the guy that ran off in the woods.”
¶32 Law enforcement and emergency medical personnel then
¶33arrived on the scene. Jackson, who had been shot five times, was
¶34pronounced dead. 2 He was wearing a Versace belt and Giuseppe
¶35Zanotti shoes and had $110 in his back pocket.3 A 9mm pistol was
¶36found between Jackson’s feet in the Monte Carlo, along with two
¶379mm cartridge cases that had been fired from that pistol. Five .40-
¶38caliber shell casings that could not have been fired from the 9mm
¶39pistol were also found inside the car. There was a bag of marijuana
¶40and a scale in the back seat. Appellant was found lying on the
¶41ground about 30 feet from the car, near another bag of marijuana
¶42 2 The medical examiner who conducted Jackson’s autopsy testified that although Jackson would have died within minutes, he “would . . . have still been maybe . . . mobile and able to grab for something” like a gun after he was shot. 3 Jackson was an aspiring rap artist who had recently signed a record
¶43deal and made money performing shows.
¶44 3 and a .40-caliber cartridge; he had a gunshot wound to his stomach.
¶45Both bags of marijuana weighed slightly less than an ounce.
¶46 Appellant told police officers at the scene, including lead
¶47Detective Gloria Hodgson, that he was buying marijuana from
¶48Jackson when Jackson robbed and shot him, and he shot Jackson in
¶49response. When asked where his gun was, Appellant claimed that
¶50he had thrown it into the bushes nearby, but the gun was never
¶51found. Appellant was taken to the hospital for surgery. Before he
¶52was moved into the operating room, he told an investigator, “I shot
¶53him, but I don’t know if he dead,” or “I don’t know if he dead, but I
¶54shot him”; after a pause, Appellant added, “and I got the weed from
¶55him.”
¶56 Text messages and call records from Appellant’s cell phone
¶57showed that at 11:43 a.m., he had sent Jackson a text saying, “I need
¶58an oz for 275.” Jackson asked for an address, and Appellant texted
¶59him the address of the apartment complex in Union City. After
¶60several more texts clarifying the address and four phone calls, the
¶61last communication between the two phones was a call from
¶62 4 Jackson’s phone to Appellant’s phone at 12:54 p.m. Douse called 911
¶63to report the shooting at 1:00 p.m. Other text messages showed that
¶64several weeks before the shooting, Appellant offered to sell Jackson
¶65a .40-caliber pistol.
¶66 After Appellant was released from the hospital, Detective
¶67Hodgson and Detective Cliff McClure interviewed him at his
¶68mother’s apartment; the interview was audio-recorded, and parts of
¶69it were later played for the jury. Appellant told the detectives that
¶70he met Jackson in October 2014, when Jackson approached him
¶71outside a gas station and offered to sell him marijuana; Appellant
¶72bought $10 worth, and they exchanged phone numbers. They later
¶73exchanged text messages, but they did not meet again in person
¶74until the day of the shooting.
¶75 Appellant claimed that before Jackson arrived at the
¶76apartment complex, Jackson “kept asking me was I by myself.”
¶77Appellant said that once Jackson arrived:
¶78 I got in the car with him. We shook hands and he had the weed right there on his lap and he was like, do you have the money. I like, yeah. I like, do you have a scale? And
¶79 5 he was like, yeah. So, he was like, he gave me the weed and it looked off. So, I like, I need a scale. Like, just show me the money so I know you got it. So, I pulled out the money and then next thing you know he, I’m thinking he pulling out a scale, but he pulls out the gun and then that’s when I tried to reach for the gun. Then that’s when he shot me. And that’s all, that’s all I can remember.
¶80 Later in the interview, Appellant said that while they were in
¶81the Monte Carlo, he paid Jackson $275 for the marijuana, but he
¶82could not tell the detectives in which pocket Jackson put the money
¶83(and the only money found at the crime scene was the $110 in
¶84Jackson’s back pocket). Appellant first denied having a gun at the
¶85scene, but he later admitted that he had a gun and claimed that he
¶86did not know where it ended up after he threw it into the bushes.
¶87Appellant also repeatedly claimed that he did not know who the
¶88third man was that Douse saw dragging Appellant away from the
¶89Monte Carlo.
¶90 2. At trial, Appellant requested a jury charge on misdemeanor
¶91possession of an ounce or less of marijuana as a lesser-included
¶92 6 offense of attempt to purchase marijuana. 4 The trial court denied
¶93the request, and Appellant objected to the omission of the
¶94instruction after the court charged the jury. We see no error.
¶95 “‘[T]o authorize a jury instruction on a lesser included offense,
¶96there must be some evidence in the record that the defendant
¶97committed that offense.’” Stepp-McCommons v. State, 309 Ga. 400,
¶98403 (845 SE2d 643) (2020) (citation omitted). Where the evidence
¶99shows either the commission of the greater offense as charged or the
¶100commission of no crime at all, an instruction on a lesser-included
¶101offense is not required. See id. “‘Whether the evidence was sufficient
¶102to warrant the requested instruction is a legal question, which we
¶103review de novo.’” Id. (citation omitted).
¶104 Appellant argues that based on the evidence that the police
¶105found him at the scene near a bag containing less than an ounce of
¶106 4 OCGA § 16-13-30 (j) generally makes it a felony for “any person to possess, have under his or her control, manufacture, deliver, distribute, dispense, administer, purchase, sell, or possess with intent to distribute marijuana.” OCGA § 16-13-2 (b) says that “[n]otwithstanding any law to the contrary, any person who is charged with possession of marijuana, which possession is of one ounce or less, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor[.]”
¶107 7 marijuana, the jury could have concluded that his purchase of the
¶108marijuana had been completed by the time of the shooting and, at
¶109that point, he was merely in possession of marijuana. 5 Under this
¶110theory, however, Appellant possessed the marijuana only because
¶111he had completed the commission of the greater offense of
¶112attempting to purchase it. See OCGA § 16-4-2 (“A person may be
¶113convicted of the offense of criminal attempt if the crime attempted
¶114was actually committed in pursuance of the attempt . . . .”). Indeed,
¶115the evidence indicated that Appellant possessed the marijuana
¶116because he either purchased it from Jackson or he robbed Jackson
¶117after meeting him to purchase it. There was no evidence that
¶118Appellant possessed the marijuana when he arrived at the meeting
¶119or that he obtained possession without completing the commission
¶120of a charged greater offense. Thus, the trial court did not err by
¶121 5 At trial, Appellant’s counsel presented this theory that Appellant had already completed the purchase as part of an argument that Appellant was not committing a felony when he shot Jackson to defend himself. See OCGA § 16- 3-21 (b) (2) (“A person is not justified in using force [for self-defense] if he . . . [i]s attempting to commit, committing, or fleeing after the commission or attempted commission of a felony[.]”). The jury was instructed on self-defense.
¶122 8 declining to instruct the jury on possession of marijuana as a lesser-
¶123included offense. 6
¶124 3. Appellant argues next that the trial court’s charge to the jury
¶125on the attempt to purchase marijuana count exceeded the scope of
¶126the indictment. In its final jury charge, the trial court read the
¶127indictment to the jurors, including the following:
¶128 Count seven charges [Appellant] with criminal attempt to purchase marijuana. On the 12th day of November, 2014, with intent to purchase marijuana did perform an act which constitutes a substantial step toward the commission of said crime, to wit: meeting with Taquahn
¶129 6 At trial and on appeal, Appellant has relied on Johnson v. State, 296 Ga. App. 697 (675 SE2d 588) (2009), for the proposition that possession of a controlled substance is always a lesser-included offense of the purchase of the same controlled substance. See id. at 699 (“We see no logical distinction between the purchase of a controlled substance and the sale of a controlled substance for purposes of charging possession as a lesser included offense.”). The Court of Appeals’s statement in Johnson that there is no “logical distinction” between sale and purchase in this context is overbroad at best. We need not decide whether Johnson was correctly decided, however, because its unusual facts are distinguished from the facts of this case. In Johnson, the defendant sheriff’s deputy testified that she did not intend to purchase or pay for the marijuana she was found with; she claimed that she was given a change purse containing a small amount of marijuana, and when told that the purse contained drugs, she placed it in the evidence crate of her patrol car and drove straight to the sheriff’s house to report the incident, only to be stopped and arrested en route. See id. at 697-698. In this case, by contrast, there was no evidence to support a finding that Appellant possessed the marijuana except intentionally as a result of a charged greater offense. We also need not decide today whether there are any circumstances in which possession of marijuana could be a lesser-included offense of attempt to purchase the same marijuana.
¶130 9 Malik Jackson at 5300 State Route 138 in Union City, Georgia to purchase marijuana from Taquahn Malik Jackson.
¶131The court later instructed:
¶132 A person commits the offense of criminal attempt to purchase marijuana when that person, with intent to commit the purchase of marijuana, performs any act that constitutes a substantial step toward the commission of the crime of the purchase of marijuana. Under the laws of Georgia, it is unlawful for any person to possess, have under his control, purchase, sell or possess with intent to distribute marijuana.
¶133(Emphasis added.) When instructing the jury on the related felony-
¶134murder count and on the firearm-possession count, the court again
¶135referred to the marijuana count as “criminal attempt to purchase
¶136marijuana.” And when discussing the verdict form, the court
¶137explained:
¶138 If, after considering the testimony and evidence presented to you, together with the charge of the court, you should find and believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant in Fulton County, Georgia, on the dates in the indictment, did commit the offense or offenses charged, as alleged in the indictment, you would be authorized to find the defendant guilty.
¶139 10 Appellant did not object to these instructions at trial, but he now
¶140argues that the italicized language was improper based on the
¶141principle that “‘a jury instruction [that] deviates from the indictment
¶142violates due process where there is evidence to support a conviction
¶143on the unalleged manner of committing the crime and the jury is not
¶144instructed to limit its consideration to the manner specified in the
¶145indictment.’” Pippen v. State, 299 Ga. 710, 713 (791 SE2d 795) (2016)
¶146(citation omitted).
¶147 Because Appellant did not raise this claim at trial, we review
¶148it only for plain error, meaning that he must show that “the alleged
¶149instructional error was not affirmatively waived; was clear and
¶150obvious, rather than subject to reasonable dispute; likely affected
¶151the outcome of the trial; and seriously affected the fairness,
¶152integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Knighton v.
¶153State, 310 Ga. 586, 591 (853 SE2d 89) (2020). “An appellant must
¶154establish all four elements of the test in order to demonstrate plain
¶155error, so satisfying this test is difficult, as it should be.” Id. (citations
¶156and punctuation omitted). Appellant’s claim was not affirmatively
¶157 11 waived, and we can assume without deciding that the trial court
¶158clearly erred in its one mention of unlawful acts involving marijuana
¶159with which Appellant was not charged, because his claim fails on
¶160the third part of the plain error test.
¶161 “[W]hen we are presented with a claim that a particular
¶162instruction is misleading, ‘[w]e do not evaluate jury charges in
¶163isolation, but rather consider them as a whole to determine whether
¶164there is a reasonable likelihood the jury improperly applied a
¶165challenged instruction.’” Carpenter v. State, 305 Ga. 725, 728 (827
¶166SE2d 250) (2019) (citation omitted). In this case, the jury
¶167instructions as a whole – which included reading the indictment,
¶168instructing the jury to decide if Appellant was guilty of the offenses
¶169charged “as alleged in the indictment,” and referring to the charged
¶170marijuana offense no less than eight times in terms of a “purchase”
¶171of marijuana – left no doubt that the jury could find Appellant guilty
¶172only if the State proved that he had attempted to purchase
¶173marijuana as charged. Thus, the alleged error did not likely affect
¶174the outcome of Appellant’s trial, and he has failed to demonstrate
¶175 12 plain error. See, e.g., Pippen, 299 Ga. at 713-714 (holding that the
¶176appellant failed to establish that the trial court’s mention of an act
¶177not charged in the indictment likely affected the outcome of the
¶178proceedings because the court read the indictment to the jury and
¶179instructed the jurors that they could find the defendant guilty of the
¶180charged crime only if they found that she committed the offense as
¶181alleged in the indictment).
¶182 4. Finally, Appellant argues that his trial counsel provided
¶183ineffective assistance by failing to object to certain statements made
¶184by Appellant and Detective McClure during Appellant’s interview.
¶185We disagree.
¶186 At trial, after the State indicated its intention to introduce into
¶187evidence Appellant’s audio-recorded interview with the detectives at
¶188his mother’s house, Appellant’s counsel moved to redact the last part
¶189of the interview, starting at page 18 of the interview transcript
¶190through the end of the transcript on page 24. This part included
¶191statements made by Appellant and Detective McClure about
¶192Appellant’s job status, disability checks, father, and “thug life.”
¶193 13 Appellant’s counsel argued that the statements were irrelevant,
¶194improper and prejudicial character evidence, and hearsay, and that
¶195the officers were “editorializing.” In response, the trial court directed
¶196the redaction of some of the objected-to statements, instructing the
¶197prosecutor to mute the recording and to redact the portion of the
¶198interview transcript from page 19, line 2 through page 20, line 1 that
¶199included the statements about Appellant’s disability and “thug life.”
¶200When the prosecutor tendered the redacted interview into evidence,
¶201Appellant’s counsel objected again, asserting that the redaction
¶202should have continued past page 20 to the end of the interview. 7
¶203 Appellant now argues, as he did in his motion for new trial,
¶204that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to
¶205object to seven statements made during the interview on the
¶206grounds that they were irrelevant, prejudicial, and bad character
¶207evidence. 8 See OCGA §§ 24-4-401, 24-4-403, 24-4-404 (a). To prove
¶208 7 The interview transcript was given to the jury for reference while the recording was played and it was entered into the record, but it was not sent back with the jury during deliberations. 8 In one sentence in his brief, Appellant also asserts that these
¶209statements were hearsay and improper comments on the evidence. To the
¶210 14 ineffective assistance of counsel, Appellant must show that his
¶211counsel’s performance was deficient and that the deficient
¶212performance resulted in prejudice. See Strickland v. Washington,
¶213466 U.S. 668, 687 (104 SCt 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984).
¶214 To show deficient performance, Appellant must prove that his lawyer performed his duties in an objectively unreasonable way, considering all the circumstances and in the light of prevailing professional norms. In particular, decisions regarding trial tactics and strategy constitute deficient performance only if they were so patently unreasonable that no competent attorney would have followed such a course. To establish prejudice, Appellant must prove that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s deficiency, the result of the trial would have been different.
¶215Carter v. State, 310 Ga. 559, 562 (852 SE2d 542) (2020) (citation
¶216omitted). “We need not address both parts of the inquiry if Appellant
¶217makes an insufficient showing on one.” Barboza v. State, 309 Ga.
¶218319, 326 (845 SE2d 673) (2020).
¶219extent Appellant is actually arguing that his trial counsel should have made certain hearsay and improper-comment objections, those arguments were not preserved for review on appeal because he did not make them in his amended motion for new trial filed by his appellate counsel. See Cross v. State, 309 Ga. 705, 710 n.6 (848 SE2d 455) (2020) (“[W]here a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel was not raised at the earliest practicable moment, it is not preserved for appellate review.”).
¶220 15 (a) Five of the seven statements to which Appellant asserts
¶221trial counsel should have objected were on pages 18 to 21 of the
¶222interview transcript, which is part of the interview to which counsel
¶223did object at trial. Because counsel did in fact object on the same
¶224grounds now asserted, those statements cannot be the basis for an
¶225ineffective assistance claim. See Slaton v. State, 303 Ga. 651, 653
¶226(814 SE2d 344) (2018) (explaining that a claim that counsel
¶227performed deficiently based on counsel’s failure to perform in a
¶228particular way lacks merit where counsel actually performed in that
¶229way). 9
¶230 (b) The two remaining statements were as follows. First,
¶231Detective McClure said to Appellant, “Your mom said you weren’t
¶232living here. She wouldn’t let you stay here ‘cause you didn’t have a
¶233job.” Appellant replied, “yeah.” Second, when discussing further
¶234treatment for his gunshot wound, Appellant said, “I was supposed
¶235to go [to the doctor] yesterday but I don’t have no insurance.”
¶236 9 Appellant does not enumerate as error the trial court’s ruling on the objections that trial counsel made.
¶237 16 As to the first statement, Appellant’s unemployment was
¶238relevant to his motive for the charged armed robbery. See Priester v.
¶239State, 309 Ga. 330, 333 (845 SE2d 683) (2020) (explaining that
¶240evidence regarding a lull in the appellant’s drug-dealing business
¶241was relevant to his motive for attempting to rob the victim). And the
¶242statement that Appellant could not live with his mother and did not
¶243have a job was not unfairly prejudicial or improper character
¶244evidence. See Snipes v. State, 309 Ga. 785, 793 (848 SE2d 417) (2020)
¶245(holding that the appellant had not shown how testimony that she
¶246“‘wasn’t working or nothing’” was “evidence of her bad character or
¶247otherwise prejudicial”). Thus, an objection to this statement would
¶248have failed, and “Appellant’s trial counsel did not perform
¶249deficiently by failing to make a meritless objection.” Carter, 310 Ga.
¶250at 564.
¶251 Trial counsel also did not perform deficiently by failing to object
¶252to the second statement. Appellant has not explained how a passing
¶253statement about his lack of medical insurance was harmful to him.
¶254Instead, at the hearing on the motion for new trial, trial counsel
¶255 17 acknowledged that the statement about insurance could have
¶256engendered sympathy from the jury because Appellant was unable
¶257to continue to have his gunshot wound treated. Thus, a competent
¶258lawyer could reasonably have chosen not to object to the statement.
¶259See Jones v. State, 300 Ga. 543, 546 (796 SE2d 659) (2017) (holding
¶260that a reasonable lawyer may decide not to object to statements that
¶261may create sympathy for his client). Accordingly, Appellant has
¶262failed to show that his trial counsel’s performance was deficient.
¶263 Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur, except LaGrua, J., disqualified.
¶264 18