Knighton v. State

FINAL COPY

               S20A1195. KNIGHTON v. THE STATE.


      NAHMIAS, Presiding Justice.

      Appellant Quran Knighton was convicted of malice murder and

possession of a knife during the commission of a felony in connection

with the stabbing death of Markice Harris. Appellant contends that

by twice interrupting his counsel’s closing argument to provide

instructions to the jury, the trial court committed plain error and

denied him his constitutional right to a fair trial, and that his trial

counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to object to the

interruptions and instructions. We affirm.1



      1 Harris was killed on May 19, 2016. In July 2016, a Newton County

grand jury indicted Appellant for malice murder, felony murder, aggravated
assault, and possession of a knife during the commission of a felony. At a trial
from October 17 to 19, 2017, the jury found Appellant guilty of all charges. The
trial court sentenced him to serve life in prison for malice murder and five
consecutive years for the knife offense; the remaining counts were vacated or
merged. Appellant filed a timely motion for new trial, which he amended with
new counsel in June and July 2019. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial
court denied the motion in December 2019. Appellant filed a timely notice of
appeal, and the case was docketed to this Court’s August 2020 term and orally
argued on September 15, 2020.
     1. Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdicts, the

evidence presented at Appellant’s trial showed the following. In May

2016, Appellant, who was then 16 years old, was friends with Harris,

who was 18. On May 19, however, they argued during a group text

conversation after Appellant accused Harris of lying about where

Harris lived. Following a protracted dispute through the group text

messages, Harris sent a text saying that he and Appellant should

have a fist fight.

     Around 5:30 p.m., Harris sent Appellant a text saying that he

was outside Appellant’s house and wanted to fight. Two hours later,

Appellant responded that he had been asleep, and Harris sent a text

saying that they could meet tomorrow. Harris then sent Appellant

texts saying, “no funny sh**”; “leave that dam[n] pocket knife in the

house”; “You try sum funny I’ll try sum funny”; and “I’m really

[fixing to] just kill yo Sh** . . . better hop[e] I can control myself.”

Appellant and Harris eventually agreed to meet later that night.

Appellant then sent texts to a female username (which unbeknown

to Appellant was actually used by Harris) saying that Harris was a

                                   2
liar. When Harris (through the female username) sent a text saying,

“don’t fight [Harris],” Appellant responded “Imma shoot him And his

momma” and “We [fixing to] get ready to go to his house and light

that Sh** up.”

     Briana Mosley, a 17- or 18-year-old relative who lived with

Appellant, gave the following account in her trial testimony. Later

that evening, she walked with Appellant to Harris’s gated

subdivision, where they waited for Harris outside the gate. When

Harris arrived, he walked toward Appellant and punched him.

Appellant then took off his jacket and started fighting with Harris.

They fell to the ground, where Harris began punching Appellant and

banging his head against the ground. Mosley tried to intervene, and

one of Harris’s neighbors who was driving out of the subdivision

stopped his car and asked if Mosley needed help.2 Appellant and

Harris stopped fighting, stood up, and began to walk away from each

other, and the neighbor drove away.



     2 The neighbor testified that he saw Harris fighting with a “girl” and a

“smaller boy,” who was bloody and “the more battered of the two [males].”
                                      3
     Appellant then told Mosley that he needed to get his jacket,

and as he walked back toward Harris, Harris said something and

they began to fight again. Mosley got out her cell phone to call for

help; when she looked up, she saw that Harris had what she thought

was a pocket knife. Appellant and Mosley tried to take the knife

away from Harris. As Appellant wrested it away, Mosley’s hand was

sliced. Appellant then pushed Mosley out of the way and began

slashing the knife at Harris. Harris said to Mosley, “You got stabbed,

too,” before he ran a few steps and fell to the ground. As Appellant

fled, Mosley saw that Harris was not responsive. She called her

grandfather on her cell phone and ran to her house after he told her

to go there to call the police. Appellant arrived at the house about

five minutes after Mosley; he then threatened to kill himself with a

kitchen knife, which she took away from him.

     Another family member called 911, and responding officers and

medical personnel soon arrived at Appellant’s house. Appellant

came out with his hands up, and Mosley led the responders to

Harris, who had died from stab wounds. Officers searched the scene

                                  4
of the fight and Appellant’s house for the knife used to kill Harris,

but it was never recovered.

     A responding officer observed that Appellant had scrapes and

bruises but no significant injuries. When the officer asked Appellant

if he was injured, he replied only that he “had some bruises and

scrapes.” Medical responders then checked him over and cleared him

to be transported to the sheriff’s office. A few hours later, an

investigator took photos of Appellant’s injuries, which included

several scrapes and some bruises and swelling, but Appellant did

not report any stab wounds and the investigator did not observe any

stab wounds or any significant amount of blood on Appellant.

     Investigators interviewed Mosley that night. She told them

that she saw Harris with the knife first; that she did not know

whether it belonged to Appellant or Harris; and that she said to

Appellant after the stabbing, “I have to tell on you.” The next

morning, Mosley met with two probation officers in connection with

an unrelated case. She told the officers that after Harris repeatedly

banged Appellant’s head on the ground during the fight, she and

                                  5
Appellant went back to their house, where Appellant got a knife and

then returned to the subdivision’s entrance to confront Harris.3

      The medical examiner who performed Harris’s autopsy

testified that he had several incised (cutting) wounds: one on the

back of his head that penetrated his skull; one on his back; two on

the left side of his chest; and one on his finger, which the examiner

characterized as a defensive wound. Harris also had four stab

wounds: one on the right side of his face; one on his chest that

perforated his heart; and two on the right side of his body, one of

which punctured his right lung. In addition, he had abrasions on his

hands, right shoulder, back, and knees. The medical examiner

concluded that the blade of the knife used to stab Harris was at least

five-and-a-half inches long.

      Appellant testified, claiming that he stabbed Harris in self-

defense. He gave the following account of the day of the incident. He

agreed to meet Harris but did not believe that they were actually


      3 Both probation officers testified about what Mosley told them. Mosley

testified that she did not tell the officers that Appellant returned to their house
to get the knife.
                                        6
going to fight. When Harris arrived, he punched Appellant and they

began fighting; after the neighbor spoke to them, they stopped

fighting and Appellant turned to walk home; but when he went back

to get his jacket, Harris hit him. Appellant then saw that Harris was

holding a “pocket knife,” which Appellant recognized because he had

seen Harris buy it sometime earlier. Harris tried to stab Appellant,

who was scared and believed that Harris was going to kill him.

Appellant pulled the knife away from Harris, who was still trying to

fight him, and the next thing he remembered was “going crazy” and

Harris walking away. Appellant dropped the knife and ran straight

home, where he threatened to kill himself with a kitchen knife.4

Appellant claimed that on the day after he was arrested, he

discovered that he had a stab wound on his side. He also claimed

that he did not own a knife, and Mosley testified that she had never

seen Appellant carrying a knife.


      4  When asked on cross-examination why Mosley had testified that
Appellant arrived home five minutes after her, he claimed that she had not
seen that he was already in the house because he was upstairs using the phone
to call his stepfather. The prosecutor later argued that Appellant actually did
arrive later, using the time to throw the murder weapon in a nearby lake.
                                      7
      Appellant does not challenge the legal sufficiency of the

evidence supporting his convictions. Nevertheless, in accordance

with this Court’s waning practice in murder cases, we have reviewed

the record and conclude that, when viewed in the light most

favorable to the verdicts, the evidence presented at trial and

summarized above was sufficient to authorize a rational jury to

reject Appellant’s claim that he killed Harris in self-defense and to

instead find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes of

which he was convicted. See Jackson v. Virginia, 

(III) (

, 61 LE2d 560) (1979). See also Shaw v. State, 

 (

) (2013) (“‘[I]ssues of witness credibility

and justification are for the jury to decide, and the jury is free to

reject a defendant’s claim that he acted in self-defense.’” (citation

omitted)).5

      2. Shortly after beginning his closing argument, Appellant’s


      5 We remind litigants that this Court will end its practice of considering

the sufficiency of the evidence sua sponte in non-death penalty cases with cases
docketed to the term of court that begins in December 2020. See Davenport v.
State, 

 (4) (

) (2020). The Court began assigning
cases to the December term on August 3, 2020.
                                       8
counsel said:

           This case, as I sort of mentioned in the beginning
     boils down to one thing: Do you believe from the evidence
     that [Appellant] brought this knife to the fight and
     attacked Mr. Harris with it, or do you believe that Mr.
     Harris brought the knife and in the fight [Appellant] took
     it away from him? You might think that well, maybe he
     did, but maybe is not enough. The State has to prove, the
     State has to prove that [Appellant] brought the knife to
     the fight and it was his knife.

The trial court interjected, “Counsel, that’s simply not true,” and

asked the lawyers to approach the bench. The bench conference was

not transcribed. When it concluded, the court addressed the jury:

           Let me say what I said to them up here. At the
     moment of the stabbing the issue is formed who did the
     stabbing; secondly, was [it] justified who did the stabbing
     under the laws of self defense. There will be other laws I
     give you about other things, so his statement that if you
     found that the victim brought the knife to the fight that
     ends your determination is what I was saying is not
     accurate. It’s at the time of the stabbing those two things
     I told you; is that clear to everybody? Okay. You may
     proceed.

     Appellant’s counsel resumed his closing argument, clarifying

that “[i]f you . . . find that [Appellant] had to take the knife away

from him, Mr. Harris[,] to protect and save his life, you would have

to acquit.” Counsel proceeded to argue that Mosley was credible and
                                 9
that the probation officers were not credible and then said:

          They have got to show, they got to somehow show
     that my client, it wasn’t self defense, that he had a knife,
     you know, when I said a minute ago it turns on who
     brought the knife, well it turns on how, I will say it a little
     better, how [Appellant] got the knife. When the
     Government knows, the Government knows that this
     case, that that’s the most critical point in the whole case
     and that’s why they didn’t —

The court interrupted:

          Counselor, I will again say, it doesn’t matter how he
     got the knife, it’s when the stabbing occurred, was the
     defendant justified in using self defense as the defense?
     You said it’s how he got the knife. It’s not how he got the
     knife; am I — is everybody clear on that? Okay. You can
     go ahead.

Appellant’s counsel then continued his argument, primarily

asserting that Appellant acted in self-defense because he reasonably

believed that Harris was going to kill him.

     In this Court, Appellant contends that the trial court’s two

instructions to the jury amounted to plain error; that the court’s

interrupting closing argument to provide those instructions denied

him his constitutional right to a fair trial; and that his trial counsel

provided ineffective assistance by failing to object to the


                                   10
interruptions and instructions. We will address each of these claims

in turn.

     (a) Appellant argues first that the trial court essentially

instructed the jury to ignore evidence that Harris brought the knife

to the fight and attacked Appellant with it. He asserts that the

court’s first instruction told the jury to focus only on the moment of

the stabbing and that the second instruction said that how

Appellant got the knife was irrelevant. As Appellant acknowledges,

his trial counsel did not object to the instructions, so we review this

claim for plain error, meaning that we will reverse the trial court

only if the alleged instructional error was not affirmatively waived;

was clear and obvious, rather than subject to reasonable dispute;

likely affected the outcome of the trial; and seriously affected the

fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. See

Stripling v. State, 

 (

) (2018). See also

OCGA § 17-8-58 (b). An appellant must establish all four elements

of the test in order to demonstrate plain error, see Stripling, 

, so satisfying this test “‘is difficult, as it should be.’” Hood v.

                                   11
State, 

 (

) (2018) (citation omitted).

     The trial court’s first instruction was prompted by defense

counsel’s argument that “the State has to prove that [Appellant]

brought the knife to the fight and it was his knife.” As Appellant

candidly concedes in his brief, that assertion was a misstatement of

the law, because the State was not required to demonstrate that

Appellant owned the knife used in the killing or brought that knife

to the fight in order to disprove beyond a reasonable doubt his claim

of self-defense. Although at a trial the State must disprove a

defendant’s claim of self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt, see

Gardhigh v. State, 

 (

) (2020), “‘there

is no requirement that [the State] prove its case with any particular

sort of evidence.’” Dobbins v. State, 

 (

)

(2020) (citation omitted). In many cases, a defendant has been found

guilty of murder and the conviction upheld on appeal even when

there was some evidence that he disarmed the victim and then used

the victim’s weapon in self-defense. See, e.g., Parks v. State, 

 (

) (2016); Ruffin v. State, 

 (

) (2014); Jimmerson v. State, 

 (

) (2011).

     And although the trial court could have dealt with counsel’s

misstatement in a number of ways, the court was authorized to

interrupt his closing argument to prevent his continuing to misstate

the law and to correct any confusion that he may have caused the

jury. See Davis v. State, 

 (

) (1975) (“It

has long been within the realm of a judge’s authority to correct

misstatements made by counsel as to what the law is.”). See also

Venturino v. State, 

 (

) (2019)

(explaining that “attorneys are not permitted to misstate the law to

the jury”); Battle v. State, 

 (

)

(2019) (concluding that after defense counsel objected to the

prosecutor’s misstatements of the law during his closing argument,

the trial court took “appropriate corrective action” by admonishing

the prosecutor and instructing the jury on the points that had been

misstated); Jones v. State, 

 (

) (1899)

(holding that when defense counsel asserted in argument that if the

                                13
victim had used a certain vile epithet, the defendant would be

justified in fatally stabbing him, the trial court did not err by

interjecting to instruct the jury that there was no such law and that

no opprobrious words or abusive language could justify a killing).6

      The trial court then explained that the jury would have to

make a determination of whether Appellant acted in self-defense

“[a]t the moment of the stabbing,” and that a finding that Harris

brought the knife to the fight would not end that determination.

Those were accurate statements of the law. Even if the jury found


      6 We note, however, that particularly when opposing counsel does not

deem a misstatement of the law worthy of objection, the trial court may not be
required to interrupt the closing argument to correct the misstatement. See
Venturino, 

 (holding that misstatements of the law are “outside
the purview of OCGA § 17-8-75,” which requires the trial court to interpose
and prevent counsel from making in front of the jury only “ ‘statements of
prejudicial matters which are not in evidence’”). See also Varner v. State, 

 (

) (2019) (explaining that counsel may have
valid strategic reasons for not objecting to opposing counsel’s argument
misstating the law). Among other things, the court might see how the other
party addresses the misstatement during argument or might wait for the final
jury instructions to address the issue. See, e.g., Varner, 

 (holding
that a misstatement of law during closing argument caused no prejudice where
the court instructed the jurors that the court would charge them on the law
and correctly instructed them on the law at issue during the final charge).
Nevertheless, the possibility or even the preferability of dealing with an issue
differently when viewed in hindsight does not render a court’s decision in the
moment at trial an abuse of the court’s broad discretion to supervise the
proceeding.
                                       14
that Harris brought a knife to the fight, in order to determine that

Appellant acted in self-defense, the jury would have to find — among

other things — that he reasonably believed that it was necessary to

defend himself against Harris’s “imminent use of unlawful force.”

OCGA § 16-3-21 (a) (emphasis added). See also Rammage v. State,

 (

) (2020) (“[T]he doctrine of

reasonable fear does not apply to any case of homicide where the

danger apprehended is not urgent and pressing, or apparently so, at

the time of the killing.” (citation and punctuation omitted; emphasis

added)); Jimmerson, 

 (explaining that “‘[a] homicide

is not justified if the force used by the defendant exceeds that which

a reasonable person would believe was necessary to defend against

the victim’s unlawful act,’” so if a defendant uses excessive force to

kill a victim after disarming him, the defendant may be found guilty

of murder (citation omitted)).

     Thus, the trial court correctly instructed the jury to determine

whether Appellant acted in self-defense at the time of the stabbing.

And although Appellant argues otherwise, nothing in this

                                 15
instruction told the jury to disregard evidence pertaining to the time

before and after the stabbing. The court instead properly directed

the jury not to confine its determination of self-defense to the issue

of whether Harris brought the knife to the fight. Accordingly, we see

no obvious error in the first instruction. See Stripling, 

.

       A closer question is presented by the trial court’s second

instruction, which was given in response to defense counsel’s

contentions that the State was required to show that Appellant “had

a knife,” that the case “turn[ed] on” how Appellant got the knife, and

that the State knew that how Appellant got the knife was “the most

critical point in the whole case.” Although the latter two statements

were not improper when considered in isolation, the first statement

essentially repeated the argument that the court had already

correctly deemed inappropriate. See Styles v. State, 

(

) (2020) (“A closing argument is to be judged in the

context in which it is made.” (citation and punctuation omitted)).

The court was therefore authorized (but, again, not required) to

                                 16
interrupt counsel to provide a second instruction to the jury. See

Davis, 

.

     Unlike the first instruction, which the trial court gave after

time for reflection during a bench conference with counsel, this time

the court immediately said, “[I]t doesn’t matter how [Appellant] got

the knife, it’s when the stabbing occurred, was [he] justified in using

self defense,” and “It’s not how he got the knife . . . is everybody clear

on that?” The court’s statement about the knife not “matter[ing]”

incorrectly suggested that all of the evidence about how Appellant

got the knife was irrelevant, and the court’s asking if the jury was

“clear on that” emphasized that point. Those parts of the instruction

were inartful, but viewed in light of the instruction that preceded

them and the jury instructions as a whole, we conclude that they did

not rise to the level of obvious or harmful error. See Foster v. State,

 (

) (2019) (explaining that an allegedly

erroneous jury instruction must be evaluated “in the context of the

instructions as a whole”).

     To begin, it appears that the court’s second instruction —

                                   17
which started with, “Counselor, I will again say” — was an attempt

to restate the first instruction. Both instructions correctly informed

the jury that it had to make the determination of whether Appellant

acted in self-defense at the time of the stabbing. The first

instruction, however, said that a finding that Harris brought the

knife to the fight would not “end[ the jury’s] determination” of self-

defense, while the second instruction went a step further, saying

that whether Harris or Appellant brought the knife to the fight did

not “matter.” That difference in language is problematic, but

Appellant did not bring this concern to the court’s attention during

the trial, and given the other similarities in the two instructions, the

court (as well as the parties and the jury) might well have viewed

the second instruction as a reiteration of the first one it had given.

See Cheddersingh v. State, 

 (2) (

)

(2012) (explaining that under the plain error test, the error must be

so obvious that “‘the trial judge and prosecutor were derelict in

countenancing it, even absent the defendant’s timely assistance in

detecting it’” (quoting United States v. Frady, 

 (102

                                  

, 71 LE2d 816) (1982))).

     Moreover, during its final charge of the jury after the closing

arguments, the trial court fully and accurately instructed on

justification, self-defense, no duty to retreat, and excessive force.

The court also repeatedly directed the jury to consider all of the

circumstances of the case, saying that the facts are for the jury to

determine “from all of the evidence presented” and “given all of the

circumstances of the case”; that the jurors must acquit Appellant if

their minds are unsettled after giving consideration “to all the facts

and circumstances of this case”; that the jury must determine

whether or not the killing was done “in circumstance[s] that would

be justifiable”; and that the standard for self-defense “is whether the

circumstances were such they would excite . . . the fears of a

reasonable person.” These instructions were repeated nearly

verbatim when the trial court recharged on justification after the

jury requested clarification about the charge. The jury was therefore

fully informed that it was to consider all of the circumstances and

evidence in the case.

                                   19
     In sum, the trial court’s statement about the knife not

“matter[ing],” when evaluated in the context of the first instruction

and the charge as a whole, did not create a clear and obvious error

beyond reasonable dispute with respect to the jury’s understanding

that it was to consider all of the evidence presented at trial in

determining whether Appellant acted in self-defense when he fatally

stabbed Harris. See, e.g., Jackson v. State, 

 (

) (2019) (holding that after considering the charge as a

whole, the trial court’s “unfortunate slip-of-the-tongue” resulting in

one improper instruction on malice murder would not have misled

or confused the jury and did not amount to plain error); Jackson v.

State, 

 (

) (2018) (concluding that the

trial court’s failure to give a separate instruction on proximate

causation was not an obvious error because the jury charge as a

whole adequately instructed on the element of causation for the

crimes of which the defendant was convicted); Hood, 

(holding that the alleged errors in jury instructions on justification

were not obvious when viewed in light of the instructions as a

                                 20
whole).7

      For the same reasons, Appellant has not shown that, but for

the trial court’s isolated improper statement, there is a reasonable

probability that the outcome of the trial would have been more

favorable to him. See, e.g., Jackson, 

 (holding under

plain error review that because the charge as a whole would not

have misled or confused the jury, the trial court’s one incorrect

instruction was not harmful); Hood, 

 (holding that the

appellant could not show that the trial court’s failure to provide

additional jury instructions regarding his justification defense likely

affected the outcome of his trial, because the instructions as a whole

provided the jury with sufficient direction to evaluate that defense).

Accordingly, Appellant has not met his high burden of establishing


      7 In support of his argument that the trial court committed plain error

by giving the two instructions, Appellant cites several cases in which there was
some evidence that a defendant killed a victim in self-defense after they
struggled over a weapon. See, e.g., Jackson v. State, 

 (

) (2007); Koritta v. State, 

 (

) (1994). Those
cases hold nothing, however, about jury instructions on self-defense of the sort
at issue in this case, and to the extent Appellant argues that they demonstrate
the jury’s duty to examine all of the circumstances in determining whether a
defendant acted in self-defense, we have just explained that the trial court
repeatedly instructed on that duty during its final charge.
                                      21
plain error.

      (b) Appellant next contends that the trial court deprived him

of a fair trial because the two interruptions and instructions

prevented his counsel from making a full closing argument. We may

assume without deciding that this claim is preserved for appellate

review, because Appellant has not shown that his right to a fair trial

was violated.

     The trial court’s interruptions and instructions did not

preclude Appellant’s counsel from robustly arguing that Harris

brought the knife to the fight and used it to attack Appellant.

Indeed, counsel focused his closing argument on the evidence that

Harris brought the knife to the fight and attempted to discredit the

evidence that Appellant went back to his house to get the knife.

Counsel argued that Mosley, “the only eye witness,” told

investigators and testified at trial that Harris “brought the knife to

the fight and had the knife first,” which was a “huge problem” for

the State’s case. Counsel also asserted that the prosecutor did not

inform the jury that Mosley told the same story to investigators that

                                 22
she told at trial. In addition, counsel argued that the probation

officers who testified that Mosley said that Appellant went back to

their house to get the knife were not credible, because the officers

did not have Mosley write and sign a statement and because it would

have taken Appellant about 20 minutes to go home to get the knife

while Harris waited for them to resume their fight, which was

implausible. Counsel discussed the law of self-defense and

repeatedly argued that the State could not prove that Appellant had

the knife first; that Harris “brought [the] knife to the fight” and

“tried to kill” Appellant, who was afraid and fought “to save his life”;

and that Appellant had “the right to not retreat” and to respond with

lethal force “to stop [Harris].”

     Appellant has not established that the trial court prevented his

counsel from fully arguing his theory of self-defense. Thus,

Appellant has not shown that the court violated his right to a fair

trial. See, e.g., Terrell v. State, 

 (

)

(1999) (holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by

preventing defense counsel from arguing “that the State had

                                   23
something to hide,” because the “court has discretion to determine

the range of proper closing argument” and counsel was permitted to

and did argue that the State did not adequately investigate the case

and that its witnesses were not credible), disapproved on other

grounds by Willis v. State, 

 (

) (2018);

Massey v. State, 

 (

) (2000) (holding that

the trial court did not abuse its discretion in restricting the

defendant’s closing argument by admonishing defense counsel not

to misstate the law).8

      (c) Finally, Appellant claims that his trial counsel provided




      8 Relying on cases holding that prejudice to a defendant is presumed

when the trial court errs by violating the statutory requirement that counsel
be given two hours for closing argument in a murder case, see, e.g., Ricketts v.
State, 

 (

) (2003), Appellant asserts that we
should presume prejudice in this case. But those cases do not apply here,
because Appellant does not argue and the record does not indicate that the
trial court improperly limited the amount of time for closing argument. Also,
to the extent Appellant asserts that certain remarks during the prosecutor’s
closing argument exacerbated the alleged errors in the trial court’s
interruptions and instructions, his counsel did not object to those remarks, so
the issue is not preserved for review on appeal, even under a plain error
standard, see Norman v. State, 

 (

) (2016), and
Appellant does not enumerate as error that his trial counsel provided
ineffective assistance in this respect.

                                      24
ineffective assistance by failing to object to the trial court’s

interruptions and instructions. To prevail on this claim, Appellant

must prove both that his counsel’s performance was professionally

deficient and that he was prejudiced as a result. See Strickland v.

Washington, 

 (

, 80 LE2d 674) (1984).

To establish deficient performance, Appellant must show that

counsel performed his duties in an objectively unreasonable way,

considering all the circumstances and in the light of prevailing

professional norms. See 

. To prove prejudice, Appellant

must demonstrate a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s

deficient performance, the result of the trial would have been

different. See 

. We need not address both parts of the

Strickland test if Appellant makes an insufficient showing on one.

See 

.

     Appellant claims first that his trial counsel provided ineffective

assistance by failing to object to the interruptions and instructions

on the ground that the trial court prevented him from making a full

closing argument. Because we concluded in Division 2 (b) above that

                                  25
the court did not err in that respect, counsel did not perform

deficiently by failing to make such an objection. See Smith v. State,

 (

) (2020) (“‘[D]eficient performance is

not shown by counsel’s failure to raise a meritless objection.’”

(citation omitted)).

     Appellant argues next that his trial counsel was ineffective for

failing to object to the trial court’s instructions on the ground that

they told the jury to ignore evidence that Harris brought the knife

to the fight. As discussed in Division 2 (a) above, the trial court

initially interrupted counsel’s closing argument to correct his

misstatement of the law and to provide an accurate instruction on

the law of self-defense. An objection to that instruction would have

been meritless, so trial counsel did not perform deficiently by

deciding not to object. See 

     As we also discussed above, the trial court in its second

instruction improperly said that it did not matter how Appellant got

the knife, although we have already explained why that part of the

instruction did not amount to an obvious or harmful error under

                                  26
plain error review. Even if we assume that trial counsel performed

deficiently by failing to object to that aspect of the instruction,

Appellant has not established that any such deficiency resulted in

prejudice, as “the test for prejudice in the ineffective assistance

analysis is equivalent to the test for harm in plain error review.”

Roberts v. State, 

 (

) (2019) (citation

and punctuation omitted).

     For these reasons, Appellant’s ineffective assistance claims

lack merit.

     Judgment affirmed. Melton, C. J., and Boggs, Peterson, Bethel,
Ellington, and McMillian, JJ., concur. Warren, J., not participating.



                    DECIDED DECEMBER 21, 2020.
     Murder. Newton Superior Court. Before Judge Ott.
     Brian Steel, for appellant.
     Layla H. Zon, District Attorney, Bailey R. Simkoff, Candice L.
Branche, Assistant District Attorneys; Christopher M. Carr,
Attorney General, Patricia B. Attaway Burton, Deputy Attorney
General, Paula K. Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General,
Matthew B. Crowder, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.




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