415
Argued and submitted November 9, 2020, affirmed May 12, 2021
E. H.,
Petitioner-Respondent,
v.
Joseph BYRNE,
Respondent-Appellant.
Marion County Circuit Court
19PO10999; A173164
487 P3d 869
Respondent appeals a judgment continuing a sexual abuse protective order
(SAPO). Under ORS 163.760 to 163.777, a person may obtain a SAPO if the person
has been subjected to sexual abuse by someone who is not a “family or household
member” and the person fears for their physical safety if a restraining order is
not entered. Petitioner obtained a SAPO against respondent, which respondent
contested, and, after a hearing, the trial court continued the SAPO. Respondent
argues that the trial court erred in doing so, because petitioner did not meet
the statutory requirements. First, respondent contends that his and petitioner’s
consensual kissing on the night that he raped her gave rise to a “sexually intimate relationship” that made him and petitioner “family or household members”
for SAPO purposes. Second, respondent argues that the evidence was legally
insufficient to support the trial court’s finding that petitioner reasonably feared
for her physical safety with respect to respondent without the restraining order.
Held: The trial court did not err in continuing the SAPO. Petitioner and respondent were not “family or household members” for SAPO purposes, and the evidence was legally sufficient to support the trial court’s physical-safety finding.
Affirmed.
Heidi O. Strauch, Judge pro tempore.
Jason E. Thompson argued the cause for appellant. Also
on the brief was Thompson Law, LLC.
Rachael A. Federico argued the cause for respondent.
Also on the brief were Rachel M. Hungerford and Legal Aid
Services of Oregon.
Before Armstrong, Presiding Judge, and Tookey, Judge,
and Aoyagi, Judge.
AOYAGI, J.
Affirmed.
416 E. H. v. Byrne
AOYAGI, J.
Petitioner sought a restraining order against
respondent pursuant to ORS 163.760 to 163.777, on the basis
that she had been subjected to sexual abuse by someone who
was not a family or household member and that she reasonably feared for her physical safety if a restraining order was
not entered.1 Such a restraining order is commonly known
as a “sexual abuse protective order” or “SAPO,” although
that term does not appear in the statutes themselves.
Respondent contested the restraining order, and, after a
hearing, the trial court continued it. On appeal, respondent
contends that the trial court erred in doing so because petitioner did not meet the requirements for a SAPO. We affirm.
FACTS
This is our first time construing the SAPO statutes. We agree with the parties that our standard of review
for a SAPO is the same as it would be for a Family Abuse
Prevention Act (FAPA) restraining order or a stalking order.
That is, we are bound by the trial court’s express and implied
factual findings if they are supported by any evidence in the
record, and we review the trial court’s legal conclusions for
errors of law. See H. L. P. v. Jones, 309 Or App 108, 109,
481
P3d 415 (2021) (standard of review for stalking protective
order); J. V.-B. v. Burns,
284 Or App 366, 367,
392 P3d 386
(2017) (standard of review for FAPA restraining orders).
A detailed recitation of the underlying facts would
not benefit the bench or bar, so we discuss only those facts
necessary to explain our legal conclusions.
Petitioner and respondent met online through a
dating app. They decided to meet in person and did so on a
Friday night at 9:15 p.m. They met at a bar, where they had
drinks, and then petitioner drove respondent to her apartment, where she offered him food and drink. They consensually kissed on the couch. Respondent then violently raped
petitioner for several hours. He repeatedly used physical
force, including hitting petitioner, pinning her down, and
strangling her with a belt. At one point, respondent, who
1
The SAPO statutes were amended in 2020, but those amendments are not
material to the issues on appeal. We therefore cite the current statutes.
Cite as 311 Or App 415 (2021) 417
was a medical student, reminded petitioner, who had previously mentioned having a genetic condition that increases
her risk of joint dislocation, that she was “weak and fragile
and that he could dislocate [her] joints if he wanted.” He
also told her at other times that he could do whatever he
wanted. Petitioner did not know if respondent would let her
live and just focused on surviving the night. Eventually,
petitioner ran to the bathroom and, upon emerging, found
respondent dressed and ready to leave. She drove him to
his car shortly before 1:30 a.m. Respondent told petitioner
before leaving that he hoped to hear from her and see her
again.
Petitioner has been “terrified” since that night. She
was terrified to go to the police, because police investigations
take a long time and respondent knows where she lives and
goes to school, and she was afraid that respondent would
come hurt her. Petitioner was also afraid to leave her house,
for fear that respondent would hurt her dog to get back at
her. However, petitioner saw her doctor on the Monday after
the rape, and the doctor encouraged her to make a police
report, so she did. She has since “lived in constant fear”
of respondent. Meanwhile, respondent “unfriended” petitioner on the dating app on which they met, and they have
had no further contact since the night of the rape. To petitioner’s knowledge, respondent has not come to her home or
school, tried to contact her, or posted anything about her
online.
About five weeks after the rape, petitioner filed for
a SAPO. See ORS 163.763 (petition procedure). Consistent
with the statutory procedures, petitioner initially appeared
ex parte, the trial court entered a SAPO, respondent contested the SAPO, and the trial court then held a noticed
hearing, after which it continued the SAPO. See ORS 163.765
(ex parte hearing procedure); ORS 163.767 (contested hearing procedure). In continuing the SAPO, the court expressly
found petitioner credible. Respondent appeared at the hearing through counsel and did not testify.
ANALYSIS
Prior to 2013, the only types of restraining orders
generally available to sexual assault victims in Oregon were
418 E. H. v. Byrne
FAPA orders, which are available against family or household members,2 and stalking protective orders, which are
available against nonfamily and nonhousehold members
but require repeated unwanted contact.3 The SAPO law was
enacted in 2013 to fill a perceived gap in Oregon law, by
making restraining orders available to sexual assault victims who did not meet the requirements for a FAPA order,
in that they did not have a family or household relationship
with the perpetrator, and who did not meet the requirements for a stalking protective order, in that there had been
a single incident of sexual abuse without repeated unwanted
contacts. House Bill (HB) 2779 (2013); Audio Recording,
House Committee on Judiciary, HB 2779, Mar 12, 2013,
at 00:01:12 (statement of Rep Sara Gelser), https://olis.leg.
state.or.us (accessed Apr 22, 2021); Audio Recording, Joint
Subcommittee on Public Safety, HB 2779, May 13, 2013,
at 00:43:03 (statement of Sybil Hebb, Oregon Law Center),
https://olis.leg.state.or.us (accessed Apr 22, 2021).
The SAPO law is codified at ORS 163.760 to 163.777.
The key substantive provision is ORS 163.763, which
provides:
“(1) A person who has been subjected to sexual abuse
and who reasonably fears for the person’s physical safety
may petition the circuit court for a restraining order if:
“(a) The person and the respondent are not family or
household members;
“(b) The respondent is at least 18 years of age; and
“(c) The respondent is not prohibited from contacting the person pursuant to a foreign restraining order as
2
A person may seek a FAPA restraining order if the person has been the
victim of “abuse” by a family or household member within the preceding 180 days
and “is in imminent danger of further abuse from the abuser.” ORS 107.710(1); see
also ORS 107.705(1) (defining “abuse” as certain acts “between family or household members”); ORS 107.718(1) (regarding required findings).
3
A person may seek a stalking protective order if someone has intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly engaged in “repeated and unwanted contact” with
the person or an immediate family or household member of the person, thereby
“alarming or coercing” the person; it is objectively reasonable for the person to
have been alarmed or coerced by the contact; and the contact has caused the
person reasonable apprehension about their own personal safety or that of an
immediate family or household member. ORS 30.866(1).
Cite as 311 Or App 415 (2021) 419
defined in ORS 24.190, an order issued under ORS 30.866,
124.015, 124.020, 163.738 or 419B.845 or an order entered
in a criminal action.
“(2)(a) A petition seeking relief under ORS 163.760 to
163.777 must be filed in the circuit court for the county in
which the petitioner or the respondent resides. The petition may be filed, without the appointment of a guardian
ad litem, by a person who is at least 12 years of age or
by a parent or lawful guardian of a person who is under
18 years of age.
“(b) The petition must allege that:
“(A) The petitioner reasonably fears for the petitioner’s
physical safety with respect to the respondent; and
“(B) The respondent subjected the petitioner to sexual
abuse.
“(c) The petition must include allegations made under
oath or affirmation or a declaration under penalty of
perjury.
“(d) The petitioner has the burden of proving a claim
under ORS 163.760 to 163.777 by a preponderance of the
evidence.”
Thus, to qualify for a SAPO, it must be the case
that (1) the petitioner and the respondent are not “family or
household members,” a defined term that we discuss shortly;
(2) the respondent is at least 18 years old; and (3) there are
no other qualifying no-contact orders. ORS 163.763(1). And,
to obtain a SAPO, the petitioner must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the petitioner (1) was subjected
to sexual abuse, as statutorily defined,4 by respondent; and
(2) reasonably fears for petitioner’s physical safety with
respect to the respondent if a SAPO is not entered. ORS
163.763(2).
4
“Sexual abuse” means “sexual contact” with a person who either “does not
consent to the sexual contact” or “is considered incapable of consenting to a sexual act under ORS 163.315, unless the sexual contact would be lawful under ORS
163.325 or 163.345.” ORS 163.760(2). “Sexual contact” is “any touching of the sexual or other intimate parts of a person or causing such person to touch the sexual
or other intimate parts of the actor for the purpose of arousing or gratifying the
sexual desire of either party.” ORS 163.305(6); see ORS 163.760(3) (adopting ORS
163.305’s definition of “sexual contact”).
420 E. H. v. Byrne
If the petitioner has filed a petition in accordance
with ORS 163.763, and the trial court finds that the petitioner was subjected to sexual abuse and finds that it is objectively reasonable for a person in the petitioner’s situation to
fear for their physical safety if a SAPO is not entered, then
the trial court is to enter an order restraining the respondent from contacting the petitioner and from intimidating,
molesting, interfering with, or menacing the petitioner or
attempting to do so. ORS 163.765(1).
In this case, respondent raises two specific legal
challenges to the trial court’s continuation of the SAPO
after he contested it. First, he argues that he and petitioner
are “family or household members,” based on the consensual kissing that occurred before the rape, such that ORS
163.763(1)(a) precludes petitioner from obtaining a SAPO
(but potentially makes her eligible to seek a FAPA order).
Second, he argues that the evidence was legally insufficient
to support the trial court’s finding that petitioner reasonably fears for her physical safety with respect to respondent.
We readily reject respondent’s first argument. The
SAPO law adopts FAPA’s definition of “family or household
members.” ORS 163.760(1) (adopting the definition of “family or household members” in ORS 107.705). Under that
definition, “family or household members” means spouses;
formers spouses; adult persons related by blood, marriage,
or adoption; persons who are cohabiting or have cohabited
with each other; persons “who have been involved in a sexually intimate relationship with each other within two years
immediately preceding the filing by one of them of a petition
under ORS 107.710”; and unmarried parents of a child. ORS
107.705(4).
It is undisputed that petitioner and respondent are
not spouses, former spouses, unmarried parents of a child,
or related. It is also undisputed that they have never cohabited. But respondent argues that, because he and petitioner
consensually kissed before the rape, they were “involved in
a sexually intimate relationship” in the two years immediately preceding petitioner’s filing of the SAPO petition. That
argument fails. A brief period of consensual kissing shortly
before a rape does not establish the existence of a “sexually
Cite as 311 Or App 415 (2021) 421
intimate relationship” for FAPA or SAPO purposes, and we
disagree with respondent that anything in our case law supports his position that it does. Although there is room to
debate exactly what is necessary to create a “sexually intimate relationship” as that term is used in ORS 107.705(4)(e),
this case falls well outside any gray area. A brief period of
kissing is not a “relationship,” and, although kissing may
be “intimate” in nature, kissing alone does not give rise
to a “sexually intimate” relationship, as that term would
commonly be understood. See Webster’s Third New Int’l
Dictionary 2082 (unabridged ed 2002) (defining “sexual”);
id. at 1184 (defining “intimate”). Nothing in the statutes
suggests that the legislature intended “sexually intimate
relationship” to include a brief period of consensual kissing
by two people who just met. Petitioner and respondent are
not “family or household members” for SAPO purposes.5
That brings us to respondent’s second argument:
that the evidence was legally insufficient to support the
trial court’s finding that petitioner reasonably feared for her
physical safety with respect to respondent if a SAPO was not
entered. After hearing the evidence, the trial court made an
express finding on that point. In doing so, it explained that
credible evidence established a violent and controlling sexual encounter that put petitioner in reasonable fear that she
was going to be killed and during which respondent demonstrated a lack of respect for her “personal autonomy, for her
bodily autonomy, and for the sanctity of her home.” In that
context, the court viewed respondent’s departing statement
5
We note that the definition of “family or household members” in ORS
107.705(4)(e) specifically refers to people “who have been involved in a sexually
intimate relationship with each other within two years immediately preceding
the filing by one of them of a petition under ORS 107.710.” (Emphasis added.) A
“petition under ORS 107.710” is a FAPA petition. Both parties assume that, as
applied to a SAPO, the definition should be understood to refer to people who
have been involved in a sexually intimate relationship with each other within
two years immediately preceding the filing by one of them of a SAPO petition
under ORS 163.763. Although we agree that that is likely what the legislature
intended, there is at least some tension between the legislature’s intent and the
actual text of ORS 107.705(4)(e). See ORS 174.010 (when construing a statute, we
are “not to insert what has been omitted, or to omit what has been inserted”).
Given our disposition, we need not resolve that issue today. For present purposes,
we assume without deciding that petitioner would have had to seek a FAPA,
rather than a SAPO, if she had been in a “sexually intimate relationship” with
respondent in the two years prior to filing her SAPO petition.
422 E. H. v. Byrne
that he hoped to see petitioner again as “indicat[ing] for his
part certainly a desire for further encounter when the initial encounter was deeply and profoundly troubling and violent.” Under the circumstances, the court found that it was
objectively reasonable for someone in petitioner’s situation
to fear for her physical safety.
Analogizing to case law regarding FAPA restraining orders and stalking protective orders, respondent argues
that the evidence was legally insufficient to find that petitioner had an objectively reasonable fear for her physical
safety. Respondent emphasizes that he has not contacted
petitioner since the rape. He describes the rape as a “remote
and isolated” incident. In response, petitioner points out that
a SAPO does not require repeated incidents of unwanted contact (as would be required for a stalking protective order) or
an imminent danger of further abuse (as would be required
for a FAPA order).6 She emphasizes the brutality of the sexual assault, that it occurred in her own home, that respondent used physical force, that he expressly threatened that
he could exploit her medical condition to physically injure
her if he wanted, that he knows where petitioner lives and
where she goes to school, and that respondent’s final words
were to articulate his desire to see petitioner again.
As noted, ORS 163.765(1) imposes an “objective”
reasonableness requirement with respect to petitioner’s fear
for her physical safety if a SAPO was not entered. On this
record, we conclude that the evidence was legally sufficient
for the trial court to make the finding that it did. The fact
that there was a single incident of sexual abuse is not dispositive, because only one incident is required for a SAPO.
Rather, the question is whether the totality of the circumstances made it objectively reasonable for petitioner to fear
for her physical safety. That there was only one incident of
6
During a hearing on HB 2279, a representative for the Oregon Criminal
Defense Lawyers Association suggested that “the standard for further future
harm, threat, should be more in alignment with the language of the FAPA and
elder abuse,” i.e., an imminent danger of further abuse (ORS 107.710(1) (2013)) or
an immediate and present danger of further abuse (ORS 124.010 (2013)). Audio
Recording, House Committee on Judiciary, HB 2779, Mar 12, 2013, at 00:34:24
(statement of Gail Meyer), https://olis.leg.state.or.us (accessed Apr 22, 2021). The
legislature did not make that change, indicating that the statutory differences
were intentional.
Cite as 311 Or App 415 (2021) 423
sexual abuse is certainly relevant to that inquiry. But so too
are the facts that the one incident was violent, that respondent used physical force to effectuate and prolong the sexual
abuse, and that respondent expressly asserted his ability to
exploit petitioner’s medical condition to physically injure her
if he wanted and to otherwise hurt her if he wanted. Also
relevant is the fact that respondent is a virtual stranger to
petitioner, such that the only basis to assess how he might
act in the future is the “deeply and profoundly troubling and
violent” way in which he acted during their one in-person
encounter, a reality to which the trial court alluded in
discussing respondent’s parting remark about wanting
to see petitioner again. Under the circumstances, there
was sufficient evidence to allow the trial court’s objectivereasonableness finding. The trial court did not err in continuing the SAPO.
Affirmed.