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311 U.S. 454

Best & Co. v. Maxwell

Supreme Court of the United States

Argued November 22, 1940.

Decided December 23, 1940.

Supreme Court of the United States · decided 1940-12-23

2 counsel of record

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

“In each case it is our duty to determine whether the statute under attack, whatever its name may be, will in its practical operation work discrimination against interstate commerce.”

quoted by 15 later decisions, including Nippert v. City of Richmond, Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp.

“not a regular retail merchant in the state,”

quoted by 2 later decisions, including 408 F. Supp. 857 - WASHINGTON STATE APPLE AD. COM'N v. Holshouser, Continental Illinois Corp. v. Lewis

Relies on Robbins v. Taxing District of Shelby Co Tennessee · Welton v. The State of Missouri · McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co.

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Affirmed · 9–0 · Decided 1940-12-23

How this case has been cited

Cited by 286 later decisions (68 by the Supreme Court) — most recently January 2025 · most notably Maryland v. Louisiana (1981), Exxon Corporation v. Governor of Maryland Shell Oil Company (1978)

25 federal appellate · 15 district · 120 state decisions — followed in 28 states

700194019501960197019801990200020102020decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

¶1]¡kr. Lorenz Reich, Jy., with whom Mr. M. James Spitzer was on the brief, for appellant.

¶2■Mr. I. M. Bailey, with whom Messrs. Harry McMullan, Attorney General of North Carolina, T. W. Bruton, Assistant Attorney General, and W. C. Lassiter were on the brief; for appellee.

¶3Mr. Justice Reed

¶4delivered the opinion of the Court.

¶5Appellant, a. New York retail merchandise establishment, rented a display room in a North Carolina hotel for several days during February, 1938, and took orders *455for goods corresponding to samples; it filled the orders by shipping direct to the customers from New York City. Before using the room appellant paid under protest the tax required by chapter 127, § 121 (e), of the North-Carolina Laws of 1937, which levies an annual privilege tax of $250 on every person or corporation, not a regular retail merchant in the state, who displays samples in any hotel room rented or occupied temporarily for the purpose of securing retail orders.1 Appellant not being a regular, retail merchant of North Carolina admittedly comes within the statute. Asserting, however, that the tax was.unconstitutional, especially in view of the commerce clause, it brought this suit for a refund and succeeded in the trial court. The Supreme Court of North Carolina reversed and then, being evenly divided on rehearing, allowed the reversal to stand.2 The prevailing opinion' characterized the tax as one on the commercial uso of temporary quarters, which in its operation did not discriminate against interstate commerce and therefore did not come into conflict with the commerce clause.

¶6The commerce clause forbids discrimination, whether forthright or ingenious.3 In each case it is our duty to *456determine whether the statute under attáck, whatever its name may- be, will in its practical operation work discrimination against interstate commerce. This standard we think' condemns the tax at bar. Nominally the stát-.ute taxes all who are not regular retail Merchants in North Carolina, regardless of whether they are residents or nonresidents. We must assume, however, on this record that those North Carolina residents competing with appellant for the sale of similar merchandise will normally be regular retail merchants. The retail stores of the state are the natural outlets for merchandise, not those who sell only by sample. Some of these local shops may, like appellant, rent temporary display rooms in sections of North Carolina where they have no permanent store, but even these escape the tax at bar because the location of their central retail store somewhere within the state will qualify them as “regular retail merchants in the State of-North Carolina.” The only corresponding fixed-sum license tax to which appellant’s real'competitors are subject is a tax of $1 per annum for the privilege of doing business.4. Nonresidents wishing to display their wares must ■either, establish themselves "as regular North Carolina retail merchants at prohibitive expense, or- else pay this $260-tax that bears-no relation to actual or probable sales but must be paid in advance no matter how Small the sales turn - out to be. Interstate commerce can hardly survive in so hostile an atmosphere. A $250 investment-in advance, required of out-of-state retailers but not of *457their real local competitors, can operate only to discourage and hinder the appearance of interstate commerce in the North Carolina retail market. Extrastate ' merchants would be compelled to turn over their North Carolina trade to regular local merchants selling by sample. North' Carolina regular retail merchants would benefit, but to the same extent the commerce of the Nation would suffer discrimination.

¶7The freedom of commerce which allows the merchants of each state a regional or national market for their goods is not to be fettered by legislation, the actual effect of which is to discriminate in favor of intrastate' businesses, whatever may be the ostensible reach of the language.5

¶8Reversed.

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