¶1In the Supreme Court of Georgia
¶2 Decided: August 10, 2021
¶3 S21A0574. TIRABOSCHI v. THE STATE.
¶4 NAHMIAS, Chief Justice.
¶5 Appellant Thomas Tiraboschi was convicted of malice murder
¶6in connection with the strangulation death of his cellmate, Chris
¶7Lowery, at the Augusta State Medical Prison. Appellant’s only claim
¶8on appeal is that the trial court erred by admitting evidence under
¶9OCGA § 24-4-404 (b) relating to his prior convictions. But any error
¶10in admitting this evidence was harmless, so we affirm. 1
¶11 1 Lowery was killed on July 6, 2013. In October 2013, a Richmond County grand jury indicted Appellant for malice murder and felony murder. His trial began on August 4, 2015, and the next day the jury found him guilty of both counts. The trial court sentenced Appellant to serve life in prison without the possibility of parole for malice murder; the court purported to merge the felony murder count into the malice murder conviction, but that count was actually vacated by operation of law. See Malcolm v. State, 263 Ga. 369, 373 (434 SE2d 479) (1993). Appellant filed a timely motion for new trial, which he later amended through new counsel in June 2019. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied the motion in September 2020. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal, and the case was docketed to this Court’s April 2021 term and submitted for decision on the briefs. 1. The evidence presented at Appellant’s trial showed the
¶12following. On July 5, 2013, Appellant and Lowery were cellmates in
¶13the medical prison. Shortly after 6:00 p.m., Lowery, who had a
¶14history of cardiac disease and several other medical conditions,
¶15complained of chest pains to prison staff. He was then examined by
¶16physician assistant Claude Lett. Lett performed an EKG on Lowery
¶17and determined that both gastrointestinal medication that Lett
¶18administered and nitroglycerin, which is a medication that relieves
¶19chest tightness, had not relieved Lowery’s chest pains. Lett then
¶20diagnosed the pains as musculoskeletal rather than related to a
¶21cardiac event and concluded that Lowery’s condition was not life-
¶22threatening. Around 9:00 p.m., Lowery complained again, and the
¶23medical staff informed the officer who received the complaint that
¶24Lowery had already been examined and that his issue was not
¶25related to his heart problems.
¶26 At around 3:00 a.m., Appellant approached the guard booth for
¶27his dormitory and, while eating a bag of chips, said to Officer
¶28 2 Zachary Quick, “Pardon me, officer, but I just killed my roommate.”
¶29When Officer Quick asked Appellant how he had killed his cellmate,
¶30Appellant said that Lowery had taken some pills, and Appellant had
¶31then “helped him” by choking him to death. When the officer asked
¶32Appellant why he had killed his cellmate, Appellant replied that
¶33Lowery had said he did not want to live.
¶34 Officer Charles Jones, the floor officer that night, came to the
¶35guard booth, and Appellant told Officer Jones that he had “killed his
¶36roommate” by choking Lowery. When Officer Jones asked Appellant
¶37why, Appellant replied that Lowery had said he was “tired of this
¶38s**t” and asked Appellant to help him kill himself.
¶39 Lowery was found lying in his cell with a bed sheet completely
¶40covering him. Lett and a nurse on the prison’s medical staff were
¶41unable to resuscitate Lowery. On their way back to the medical side
¶42of the prison, Lett and the nurse both heard Appellant mumble “I
¶43killed him” as officers escorted Appellant away from the dorms. Lett
¶44also heard Appellant say that Lowery had said, “I can’t take this s**t
¶45 3 anymore and I want to die,” so Appellant “choked him out.”
¶46According to Lett, Appellant also said that Lowery had changed his
¶47mind while Appellant was choking him and told Appellant that he
¶48did not want to die, but Appellant told Lowery, “It’s too late, we’re
¶49going to finish this.”
¶50 Dr. Daniel Brown, a medical examiner and expert in forensic
¶51pathology, performed Lowery’s autopsy. Dr. Brown noted petechial
¶52hemorrhaging on the white part of Lowery’s eyes and discoloration
¶53of the upper chest and head caused by congestion of the blood
¶54vessels, all of which was suggestive of injury from lack of oxygen.
¶55Dr. Brown also noted lacerations and contusions on Lowery’s lips,
¶56which were consistent with an object being placed on his mouth with
¶57pressure, and internal hemorrhaging in the side muscles of his neck,
¶58which was consistent with strangulation even though his hyoid bone
¶59remained intact. Dr. Brown observed that Lowery had a stent and
¶60an enlarged heart but did not see any other indications of
¶61cardiovascular problems or any evidence of a heart attack. Dr.
¶62 4 Brown concluded that the cause of Lowery’s death was mechanical
¶63asphyxia combined with smothering and that the manner of death
¶64was homicide.
¶65 Appellant did not testify at his trial. His defense theory was
¶66that Lowery might have died from natural causes rather than
¶67strangulation and smothering.
¶68 2. Appellant contends that the trial court erred by admitting
¶69evidence under OCGA § 24-4-404 (b) (“Rule 404 (b)”) relating to his
¶70prior convictions for vehicular homicide and theft by receiving.
¶71Under Rule 404 (b), “[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts shall
¶72not be admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show
¶73action in conformity therewith,” but such evidence may be
¶74admissible for other purposes, including to prove intent or absence
¶75of mistake or accident.
¶76 Over Appellant’s objection, the trial court admitted evidence
¶77relating to his prior convictions for the sole purpose of showing “lack
¶78of mistake.” Two officers testified about the 1995 incident that led
¶79 5 to Appellant’s convictions, discussing his driving in a stolen SUV for
¶80several miles during a high-speed police chase from Macon into
¶81Peach County; his intentional crash into an oncoming pick-up truck,
¶82killing its driver; and the discovery of a sawed-off shotgun in the
¶83SUV. Police dashboard camera video recordings and photographs
¶84from the crash scene, along with Appellant’s indictment, guilty plea
¶85form, and sentencing order, were also admitted into evidence. Prior
¶86to the presentation of this other-act evidence and again in the final
¶87charge, the court instructed the jury that it could consider the
¶88evidence “only to the extent that it may show the lack of mistake
¶89issue that the State is required to prove in the crimes charged in the
¶90case.”
¶91 We need not decide whether this evidence was erroneously
¶92admitted, because any such error was harmless. The test for
¶93determining whether a nonconstitutional evidentiary error was
¶94harmless is whether it is highly probable that the error did not
¶95contribute to the verdict. See Jackson v. State, 306 Ga. 69, 80 (829
¶96 6 SE2d 142) (2019). In conducting this harmless-error review, “‘we
¶97review the record de novo and weigh the evidence as we would expect
¶98reasonable jurors to have done so.’” Id. (citation omitted).
¶99 It appears that the trial court admitted the other-act evidence
¶100to show lack of mistake with the expectation that Appellant might
¶101present a defense of mistake or accident. Instead, the central
¶102disputed issue at trial was causation – Appellant’s claim that
¶103Lowery died from natural causes rather than strangulation and
¶104smothering by Appellant. As to that issue, the evidence of
¶105Appellant’s prior and dissimilar crimes was irrelevant. But it also
¶106was not unduly prejudicial, particularly in light of the trial court’s
¶107instructions limiting the jury’s consideration of the evidence to a
¶108matter that turned out to be of no importance and the fact that the
¶109jury learned that Appellant had pled guilty to his prior crimes and
¶110indeed was still in prison for them at the time of the charged crimes.
¶111See Howell v. State, 307 Ga. 865, 875 (838 SE2d 839) (2020)
¶112(considering the trial court’s instructions on the limited use of other-
¶113 7 act evidence in determining harmless error, because “[w]e ordinarily
¶114presume that jurors follow their instructions”); Kirby v. State, 304
¶115Ga. 472, 485 (819 SE2d 468) (2018) (explaining that the risk that a
¶116jury may convict a defendant not for the offense charged but for his
¶117extrinsic conduct is greater where the extrinsic conduct was not
¶118already the subject of a conviction). 2
¶119 And as to the central issue at trial, the evidence of Appellant’s
¶120guilt was overwhelming. Appellant told two officers that he had
¶121killed his cellmate by choking Lowery to death, and shortly after
¶122those confessions, two members of the prison’s medical staff heard
¶123Appellant say that he killed Lowery. Lett had determined that
¶124Lowery’s chest pains were not heart-related or life-threatening, and
¶125Lowery’s autopsy showed that his injuries were consistent with
¶126strangulation and suffocation and that there was no indication that
¶127he had suffered a heart attack, leading the medical examiner to
¶128 2 We also note that although the closing arguments were not transcribed, Appellant does not assert that the other-act evidence was emphasized (or even mentioned) by the prosecutor. 8 conclude that Lowery died from mechanical asphyxia combined with
¶129smothering.
¶130 In sum, the jury heard compelling evidence of Appellant’s guilt,
¶131and it is highly probable that the admission of the evidence relating
¶132to his prior convictions did not contribute to the jury’s guilty verdict.
¶133See Johnson v. State, 301 Ga. 277, 279-280 (800 SE2d 545) (2017)
¶134(concluding that any error in admitting testimony about a prior
¶135incident “was harmless in light of the substantial evidence of
¶136appellant’s guilt and the limited pertinence of the [other-act]
¶137testimony”). See also Rodrigues v. State, 306 Ga. 867, 871-872 (834
¶138SE2d 59) (2019) (holding that any error in admitting evidence
¶139relating to the appellant’s prior conviction for involuntary
¶140manslaughter was harmless, where the jury already knew that he
¶141was in prison at the time of the charged murder and there was other
¶142overwhelming evidence of his guilt); Jackson, 306 Ga. at 80-81
¶143(holding that the erroneous admission of evidence of a prior shooting
¶144by the appellant a decade before the charged shooting was harmless
¶145 9 in light of the other strong evidence of his guilt); Manning v. State,
¶146303 Ga. 723, 725-726 (814 SE2d 730) (2018) (concluding that any
¶147error in admitting evidence relating to the appellant’s prior
¶148convictions for aggravated assault and terroristic threats was
¶149harmless given the other substantial evidence of the his guilt).
¶150 Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur, except Colvin, J., not participating.
¶151 10