¶1In the Supreme Court of Georgia
¶2 Decided: August 10, 2021
¶3 S21A0779. WALKER v. THE STATE.
¶4 LAGRUA, Justice.
¶5 Appellant Hezekiah Walker was convicted of felony murder
¶6and other offenses in connection with the May 2018 shooting death
¶7of Samuel Davis, IV. 1 On appeal, Appellant contends that (1) the
¶8 1 The crimes were committed on May 16, 2018. Appellant was indicted by a Fulton County grand jury on September 19, 2018, on one count of malice murder; two counts of felony murder; one count of aggravated assault; one count of criminal attempt to sell marijuana; and one count of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. At a jury trial held in March 2019, Appellant was acquitted of malice murder and found guilty of all other counts. On April 1, 2019, Appellant was sentenced to life in prison for felony murder, a consecutive five-year term for criminal attempt to sell marijuana, and a second consecutive five-year term for the firearm-possession count. The second felony murder count was vacated by operation of law, and the aggravated assault count merged into the first felony murder count. Appellant filed a motion for new trial on April 1, 2019, which he amended through new counsel on March 6 and July 31, 2020. Following a hearing held on October 22, 2020, the trial court denied the motion for new trial in an order entered on December 15, 2020. The trial court granted Appellant an out-of-time appeal on February 2, 2021, and Appellant filed a notice of appeal that same day. The appeal was docketed to the April 2021 term of this Court and was thereafter submitted for a decision on the briefs. evidence was insufficient to support his convictions and to overcome
¶9his justification defense; (2) the prosecutor’s closing argument
¶10violated his right to a fair trial; (3) the trial court erred by excluding
¶11certain photographs of the victim offered by the defense while
¶12allowing the State to offer a different photograph of the victim; and
¶13(4) trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance in various respects.
¶14We see no error, and thus we affirm.
¶15 Viewed in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdicts, the
¶16evidence presented at trial established that, at 2:15 a.m. on May 16,
¶172018, Davis was shot and killed in the parking lot of a Shell gas
¶18station in Fairburn. Two of Davis’s friends, who were interviewed
¶19by police at the scene, described the shooter as a heavy-set man with
¶20dreadlocks who fled in a red Mustang with white stripes. In the
¶21parking lot, crime scene investigators found ten nine-millimeter
¶22shell casings, eight .40-caliber shell casings, a counterfeit $100 bill,
¶23and an iPhone, which was later determined to be Davis’s. Davis died
¶24from multiple gunshot wounds. The bullets and bullet jacket
¶25recovered from Davis’s body were later determined to have been
¶26 2 fired from a nine-millimeter pistol. Ballistics testing determined
¶27that all of the nine-millimeter shell casings had been fired from a
¶28single weapon and, likewise, all of the .40-caliber shell casings had
¶29been fired from a single weapon.
¶30 Witness Christopher Stodghill, a close friend of Davis, testified
¶31that he had been with Davis and another friend, Cerdon Abeny,
¶32during the day and evening preceding the shooting. At some point
¶33during the evening, Davis arranged to buy some marijuana. The
¶34trio drove to a Waffle House for this purpose, but the seller never
¶35showed up. Stodghill and Abeny then dropped Davis off at Davis’s
¶36apartment and drove to the Shell gas station across the street. After
¶37exiting the car, Stodghill noticed a man with dreadlocks, whom he
¶38recognized as having previously sold marijuana to Davis; the man
¶39had a gun tucked under his arm. Stodghill went into the gas
¶40station’s convenience store and was soon joined by his brother,
¶41Daniel, and another friend, Chalyne Tolbert, who had just arrived
¶42at the gas station. While they were in the convenience store, they
¶43heard gunshots coming from outside. Stodghill ran out to find Davis
¶44 3 face down in the parking lot next to the convenience store. Daniel
¶45also ran outside, saw Davis on the ground, and returned fire with a
¶46.40-caliber handgun in the direction of the shooter, who fled in a red
¶47Mustang.
¶48 Video from the gas station’s security camera, which was played
¶49at trial, shows a red Mustang with white stripes driving up to a gas
¶50pump at 2:12 a.m. A man, identified as Appellant, gets out of the
¶51front passenger side, walks out of the frame, and then walks back
¶52and begins pumping fuel. Another man, identified as Davis, is seen
¶53approaching the gas station on foot and walking up to Appellant.
¶54The men walk to the side of the convenience store, outside the view
¶55of the camera. Seconds later, Appellant comes into view, rapidly
¶56backing up and firing shots. Appellant jumps into the Mustang,
¶57which speeds off. Immediately after the shots are heard, a man
¶58identified as Daniel exits the store, surveys the scene, and begins
¶59firing at the fleeing Mustang. A man identified as Stodghill runs
¶60over to Davis.
¶61 4 Stodghill confirmed during his testimony that the video also
¶62shows him removing a gun from Davis’s lower body. Stodghill
¶63testified that this gun was his, that he removed it from either Davis’s
¶64pocket or a fanny pack and gave it to Tolbert, and that Tolbert then
¶65ran from the scene. He acknowledged that he had initially failed to
¶66tell investigators about removing the gun and that it was only after
¶67questioning by an investigator several months later that he
¶68admitted having done so.
¶69 Davis’s girlfriend, Sydni Jordan, testified that she drove Daniel
¶70and Tolbert to the gas station on the night of the shooting and that
¶71she stayed in the car while they went inside to buy drinks and
¶72snacks. While she sat there, she saw Davis walk past the car with
¶73a man and shortly thereafter heard shots and saw gunfire.
¶74 South Fulton Police Detective Terrence Jackson testified that
¶75the call log from Davis’s cell phone showed the last received call was
¶76at approximately 2:05 a.m. The associated phone number was listed
¶77in Davis’s contacts as “plug,” which, Detective Jackson testified, is
¶78street slang for a drug dealer. Detective Jackson ran the phone
¶79 5 number through a police database, which linked the number to
¶80Appellant. From a photographic lineup shown on the morning of the
¶81shooting, Stodghill identified Appellant as the man with dreadlocks
¶82he had seen before entering the convenience store, and Jordan
¶83identified Appellant as the man she had seen walking with Davis
¶84just before the shooting.
¶85 Appellant admits that he shot Davis but claims he did so in
¶86self-defense. At trial, the defense theory was that Davis lured
¶87Appellant to the gas station with the intent to rob him and
¶88brandished a gun first. Appellant testified that he met Davis a few
¶89weeks before the shooting, that Davis contacted him on May 15
¶90about purchasing marijuana, and that, because he was “picky” about
¶91those he did business with, he was planning to meet Davis only “to
¶92get to know him more” and took no marijuana with him to the
¶93meeting. According to Appellant, when he arrived at the gas station,
¶94Davis approached and invited him to “take a walk.” Davis ushered
¶95Appellant over to the side of the convenience store, where Davis
¶96pulled out what looked like a $100 bill with one hand and a gun with
¶97 6 the other. Appellant pulled his gun and fired, then ran back to his
¶98red Mustang, where his girlfriend Tamyah Clark was waiting. With
¶99gunshots hitting the car, Clark drove off. The next day, Appellant
¶100drove to a wooded area and threw his gun into the woods.
¶101 Clark admitted that she knew Appellant was a marijuana
¶102dealer. She testified, however, that she had not seen any drugs in
¶103the car or in Appellant’s possession on the night of the shooting and
¶104had not overheard Appellant’s phone conversations that evening.
¶105Clark admitted that they did not call the police after leaving the
¶106scene. On cross-examination, Clark testified that Appellant told her
¶107during a post-arrest phone conversation to give a police statement
¶108saying that she had seen a gun in Davis’s possession at the gas
¶109station. Clark refused because she was unsure of what she had seen.
¶110That jail phone call was recorded, and the recording was played for
¶111the jury.
¶112 The jury also heard a recording of Appellant’s jail phone
¶113conversation with his friend Michael Dixon. In the recording,
¶114Appellant can be heard telling Dixon that Clark saw him “weigh that
¶115 7 sh*t up” before they left for the gas station, and Dixon remarks that
¶116Clark knew they were going to the gas station to “sell weed” and
¶117“make a transaction.”
¶118 1. Appellant contends that the evidence was insufficient to
¶119overcome his justification defense and support his convictions. We
¶120disagree.
¶121 When evaluating the sufficiency of evidence, we must determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. In making that determination, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, and we put aside any questions about conflicting evidence, the credibility of witnesses, or the weight of the evidence, leaving the resolution of such things to the discretion of the jury. As long as there is some competent evidence, even if contradicted, to support each fact necessary to make out the State’s case, the jury’s verdict will be upheld.
¶122Thomas v. State, __ Ga. __ (1) (858 SE2d 504, 507) (2021) (citations
¶123and punctuation omitted).
¶124 Here, Appellant admits that he shot Davis. Thus, the only
¶125question as to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting Appellant’s
¶126convictions for felony murder and firearm possession was whether
¶127the shooting was committed in self-defense. Although Appellant
¶128 8 testified that he fired his gun only after Davis brandished his, the
¶129jury was entitled to disbelieve this testimony, and ample
¶130corroborating evidence exists to support the convictions. See
¶131Daughtie v. State, 297 Ga. 261, 263-264 (2) (773 SE2d 263) (2015).
¶132Though it is undisputed that Davis had a gun on his person at the
¶133time of his encounter with Appellant, there was no evidence – apart
¶134from Appellant’s own testimony – that Davis drew the gun. It is
¶135clear that Davis never fired his gun, as the ballistics evidence
¶136established that only two guns were fired, and the surveillance video
¶137showed that the second shooter was Daniel, not Davis. Further,
¶138Stodghill testified that the gun he removed from Davis’s body was
¶139either in Davis’s pocket or in his fanny pack. The jury was thus
¶140authorized to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant was not
¶141acting in self-defense at the time he shot Davis. See Carter v. State,
¶142310 Ga. 559, 561-562 (1) (b) (852 SE2d 542) (2020) (affirming jury’s
¶143rejection of appellant’s self-defense claim); Shaw v. State, 292 Ga.
¶144871, 872 (1) (742 SE2d 707) (2013) (“[T]he jury is free to reject the
¶145defendant’s claim that he acted in self-defense.”).
¶146 9 The evidence was also sufficient to support Appellant’s
¶147conviction for criminal attempt to sell marijuana. Appellant
¶148admitted that he was a marijuana dealer, that Davis contacted him
¶149about purchasing marijuana, and that he agreed to meet Davis on
¶150the night of the shooting. Although Appellant contends that he had
¶151no plans to sell marijuana to Davis that night, the jury was
¶152authorized to disbelieve this assertion, particularly in light of
¶153Stodghill’s testimony that Davis was attempting to buy marijuana
¶154that night and Appellant’s recorded remarks about “weighing that
¶155sh*t up” before leaving for the gas station. See Daughtie, 297 Ga. at
¶156263-264 (2).
¶157 Accordingly, the evidence presented at trial was sufficient as a
¶158matter of constitutional due process to authorize a rational jury to
¶159find beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant was guilty of all the
¶160crimes of which he was convicted. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S.
¶161307, 319 (III) (B) (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979).
¶162 2. Appellant contends that a remark made during the State’s
¶163closing argument amounted to prosecutorial misconduct.
¶164 10 Specifically, the prosecutor argued:
¶165 To acquit this man, you’re going to have to disregard everything that you heard in this case; you’re going to have to disregard the law because the evidence supports wholeheartedly that this defendant went there to that gas station to sell this victim weed. . . . And so to acquit this man would mean that you would have to violate your oath as jurors in following the law and looking at the facts in a fair and impartial manner. Because if you do that, the only reasonable conclusion is that he’s guilty of all counts.
¶166(Emphasis supplied.) Appellant contends that this statement was
¶167improper and prejudicial and violated his rights to due process and
¶168a fair trial. However, as Appellant concedes, he failed to object to
¶169this statement at trial. Accordingly, Appellant has waived appellate
¶170review of this alleged error. See Gates v. State, 298 Ga. 324, 328 (4)
¶171(78 SE2d 772) (2016) (the failure to object during closing arguments
¶172waives appellate review – even for plain error – of alleged errors
¶173therein). See also Keller v. State, 308 Ga. 492, 497 (2) (a) (842 SE2d
¶17422) (2020) (noting that this Court has declined to extend plain error
¶175review outside a narrow range of issues absent statutory authority).
¶176 3. Appellant contends that the trial court erred by allowing the
¶177State to introduce an in-life photograph of Davis while declining to
¶178 11 allow the defense to offer its own in-life photographs of Davis.
¶179During Stodghill’s testimony, the State offered into evidence a
¶180photograph of Davis wearing a graduation cap and gown and holding
¶181a diploma, which the trial court admitted over the defense’s
¶182relevancy objection. Appellant’s trial counsel then sought to offer
¶183five images, apparently from a social media feed, depicting Davis
¶184holding cash and a handgun and flashing what could be
¶185characterized as gang signs. Counsel stated that he was offering
¶186these images “as an in-life photo of the deceased” but stated further
¶187that, “anticipating the State’s argument that [they] go to character,”
¶188that objection should fail because “that’s a door that the State has
¶189already opened” by offering the graduation photograph. The State
¶190objected, and the trial court declined to admit the images, finding
¶191that, to the extent they were offered as in-life photographs, they
¶192were cumulative of the State’s in-life photograph, and to the extent
¶193they were offered as character evidence, they were unduly
¶194prejudicial and did not satisfy the applicable requirements of the
¶195 12 Georgia Evidence Code, see OCGA §§ 24-4-404 (a)2 and 24-4-405.3
¶196Later, after an exchange in which Stodghill testified that he and his
¶197 2 OCGA § 24-4-404 (a) provides:
¶198 (a) Evidence of a person’s character or a trait of character shall not be admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity therewith on a particular occasion, except for: (1) Evidence of a pertinent trait of character offered by an accused or by the prosecution to rebut the same; or if evidence of a trait of character of the alleged victim of the crime is offered by an accused and admitted under paragraph (2) of this subsection, evidence of the same trait of character of the accused offered by the prosecution; (2) Subject to the limitations imposed by Code Section 24-4-412, evidence of a pertinent trait of character of the alleged victim of the crime offered by an accused or by the prosecution to rebut the same; or evidence of a character trait of peacefulness of the alleged victim offered by the prosecution in a homicide case to rebut evidence that the alleged victim was the first aggressor; or (3) Evidence of the character of a witness, as provided in Code Sections 24-6-607, 24-6-608, and 24-6-609.
¶199 3 OCGA § 24-4-405 provides:
¶200 (a) In all proceedings in which evidence of character or a trait of character of a person is admissible, proof shall be made by testimony as to reputation or by testimony in the form of an opinion. (b) In proceedings in which character or a trait of character of a person is an essential element of a charge, claim, or defense or when an accused testifies to his or her own character, proof may also be made of specific instances of that person’s conduct. The character of the accused, including specific instances of the accused’s conduct, shall also be admissible in a presentencing hearing subject to the provisions of Code Section 17-10-2. (c) On cross-examination, inquiry shall be allowable into relevant specific instances of conduct. 13 friends carried guns only for their protection and not to rob people,
¶201trial counsel again sought admission of the images. Pointing out
¶202that the text shown on the social media feed used the term “jug” –
¶203street slang for “robbery” – counsel argued that Stodghill “opened
¶204the door” to admission of the images, which “completely
¶205contradict[ed]” Stodghill’s testimony. The trial court, noting that
¶206trial counsel had earlier conceded that the text on the images would
¶207likely have to be redacted as lacking foundation, again ruled the
¶208images inadmissible.
¶209 We have held generally that, in a murder case, “a photograph
¶210of a victim in life may be relevant to prove an element of the corpus
¶211delicti, that is, that the person alleged to have been killed is actually
¶212dead.” Ragan v. State, 299 Ga. 828, 832 (3) (792 SE2d 342) (2016)
¶213(punctuation omitted). We have also noted, however, that “certain
¶214steps must be taken to ensure that the tenuous probative value of a
¶215victim-while-in-life photograph is not subsumed by [its] substantial
¶216prejudicial impact.” Id. In this regard, we have encouraged the
¶217State to use photographs depicting the victim alone and to proffer
¶218 14 them through witnesses other than the victim’s relatives. See
¶219Lofton v. State, 309 Ga. 349, 355 (2) (b) (846 SE2d 57) (2020). Here,
¶220the State followed these prescriptions, proffering its photograph of
¶221Davis, pictured alone, through Stodghill, a non-family member.
¶222Thus, to the extent Appellant now challenges the admission of the
¶223State’s photograph, we see no abuse of discretion.
¶224 Appellant also contends, however, that because the photograph
¶225of Davis wearing a cap and gown was essentially “good character”
¶226evidence, he should have been allowed to offer his five images under
¶227OCGA § 24-4-404 (a) (2). As an initial matter, we do not accept
¶228Appellant’s characterization of the State’s photograph as “good
¶229character” evidence; the mere indication of Davis’s graduation was
¶230not offered or argued as evidence of any particular character trait,
¶231and thus the photograph’s admission did not, as Appellant argues,
¶232open the door to the admission of evidence of Davis’s alleged bad
¶233character.
¶234 In addition, while it is true that evidence of a “pertinent trait”
¶235of a victim’s character may be admissible under OCGA § 24-4-404
¶236 15 (a), Appellant never identified any particular character trait the
¶237images were offered to establish. Moreover, “as a general rule,
¶238character evidence of a victim is limited to reputation or opinion[.]”
¶239Mohamud v. State, 297 Ga. 532, 536 (3) (773 SE2d 755) (2015). See
¶240also OCGA § 24-4-405 (a). The images Appellant sought to admit
¶241constitute neither reputation nor opinion evidence. And while
¶242evidence of specific instances of conduct may be admissible under
¶243OCGA § 24-4-405 (b) where the character trait sought to be proven
¶244“is an essential element of a charge, claim, or defense,” id., Appellant
¶245never argued at trial that these images were being offered for this
¶246purpose, and they would not have been admissible on this basis in
¶247any event. See Griffin v. State, 309 Ga. 860, 873 (5) (b) (849 SE2d
¶248191) (2020) (a victim’s violent character is not an essential element
¶249of a self-defense claim). Thus, the photographs were not in a form
¶250that was admissible under OCGA § 24-4-405 (a) or (b), and the trial
¶251court did not abuse its discretion in excluding them. 4
¶252 4We do not address – as Appellant raised below, but not on appeal – whether the images might have been admissible as impeachment evidence. 16 4. Appellant also contends that his trial counsel rendered
¶253constitutionally ineffective assistance in various respects. To
¶254establish ineffective assistance, a defendant generally must show
¶255both that his counsel’s performance was deficient and that this
¶256deficient performance prejudiced him. See Strickland v.
¶257Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (III) (104 SCt 2052, 80 LE2d 674)
¶258(1984). Deficient performance requires a showing that counsel
¶259discharged his responsibilities in an “objectively unreasonable way
¶260considering all the circumstances and in the light of prevailing
¶261professional norms.” Thomas v. State, 303 Ga. 700, 702 (2) (814
¶262SE2d 692) (2018) (citation and punctuation omitted). Prejudice is
¶263shown by demonstrating “a reasonable probability[,] sufficient to
¶264undermine confidence in the outcome[,] that, but for counsel’s
¶265alleged unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would
¶266have been different.” Miller v. State, 285 Ga. 285, 286 (676 SE2d
¶267173) (2009) (citation and punctuation omitted). “If either Strickland
¶268prong is not met, this Court need not examine the other prong.”
¶269Palmer v. State, 303 Ga. 810, 816 (IV) (814 SE2d 718) (2018).
¶270 17 (a) Appellant first contends that his trial counsel was
¶271ineffective for failing to “properly introduce” Appellant’s in-life
¶272photographs of Davis. Specifically, Appellant maintains that the
¶273photographs would have been admitted if counsel had offered them
¶274again after Appellant testified that Davis was the aggressor in their
¶275encounter and thus presented prima facie evidence of self-defense.
¶276However, as we have already held, the photographs were not
¶277admissible as character evidence because they were neither
¶278reputation nor opinion testimony and because they did not provide
¶279proof of any element of Appellant’s self-defense claim so as to be
¶280admissible under OCGA § 24-4-405 (b). This claim is therefore
¶281meritless. See Coggins v. State, 275 Ga. 479, 481 (3) (569 SE2d 505)
¶282(2002) (counsel’s failure to assert non-meritorious claim does not
¶283constitute deficient performance).
¶284 (b) Appellant next contends that trial counsel was ineffective
¶285for failing to investigate the criminal histories of the State’s
¶286witnesses and, specifically, to discover that, at the time of trial,
¶287Stodghill had charges pending against him in Fulton County for
¶288 18 theft by receiving and misdemeanor tampering with evidence.
¶289According to evidence presented at the motion for new trial hearing,
¶290the latter charge alleged that Stodghill had removed a weapon from
¶291the scene of a suicide. Appellant claims that evidence that Stodghill
¶292may have previously removed a gun from a crime scene, because of
¶293its similarity to Stodghill’s conduct at the crime scene here, would
¶294have supported a finding that Davis was carrying a gun at the time
¶295of the shooting and thus supported Appellant’s self-defense claim.
¶296Appellant also claims that evidence of these pending charges would
¶297have been useful in impeaching Stodghill generally.
¶298 Although it is true that evidence of pending charges may be
¶299relevant to show a witness’s bias, Appellant has presented no
¶300evidence that Stodghill had any agreement with the State as to his
¶301pending charges or any reason to shade his testimony in favor of the
¶302State. Because there is no evidence of any nexus between Stodghill’s
¶303pending charges and his testimony at Appellant’s trial, Appellant
¶304can show no prejudice from trial counsel’s failure to discover and
¶305attempt to impeach Stodghill with evidence of the pending charges.
¶306 19 See Colzie v. State, 289 Ga. 120, 124 (3) (710 SE2d 115) (2011)
¶307(where there was no evidence of any deal or hope of a deal between
¶308witness and prosecution, counsel was not ineffective in failing to
¶309impeach witness with evidence of pending charges). Similarly, given
¶310that Stodghill admitted taking a gun from Davis’s body, there was
¶311no prejudice in trial counsel’s failing to present evidence that he was
¶312charged with doing so on another occasion. See Wesley v. State, 286
¶313Ga. 355, 358 (3) (h) (689 SE2d 280) (2010) (counsel’s failure to
¶314present cumulative evidence does not result in prejudice).
¶315 (c) Appellant contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for
¶316failing to object in several instances during the State’s closing
¶317argument. At the outset, we note that “[a] prosecutor is granted
¶318wide latitude in the conduct of closing argument, . . . . [and] [w]ithin
¶319that wide latitude, [he] may comment upon and draw deductions
¶320from the evidence presented to the jury.” Gaston v. State, 307 Ga.
¶321634, 640 (2) (b) (837 SE2d 808) (2020) (citation and punctuation
¶322omitted). In addition, “[w]hether to object to a particular part of a
¶323prosecutor’s closing argument is a tactical decision, and counsel’s
¶324 20 decision not to make an objection must be patently unreasonable to
¶325rise to the level of deficient performance.” Smith v. State, 296 Ga.
¶326731, 735-736 (2) (b) (770 SE2d 610) (2015). Here, trial counsel
¶327testified at the motion for new trial hearing that his general practice
¶328was to refrain from objecting during closing arguments unless the
¶329prosecutor’s transgressions were “egregious” or “repeated.”
¶330 (i) Appellant first points to counsel’s failure to object to the
¶331prosecutor’s statement that he had “prosecuted enough drug dealers
¶332to know” how dangerous drug transactions can be. Given that
¶333Appellant himself testified that he was in the business of selling
¶334marijuana, there was nothing improper about the prosecutor’s
¶335reference to drug dealers, and because there is nothing surprising
¶336about the assertion that drug transactions are dangerous, counsel
¶337could have reasonably chosen not to object to the prosecutor’s
¶338comment, even if it was objectionable. See Rich v. State, 307 Ga.
¶339757, 762 (3) (838 SE2d 255) (2020) (attorney’s decision not to object
¶340to isolated improper remark during closing may be “a valid exercise
¶341of his or her professional judgment”).
¶342 21 (ii) Appellant next points to counsel’s failure to object when
¶343the prosecutor referred to Appellant as a “psychopath.” This
¶344statement was made in direct response to trial counsel’s closing
¶345argument, in which counsel had referred to Daniel as a “psychopath”
¶346for “running to the gunfight” after hearing the first gunshots. At the
¶347motion for new trial hearing, trial counsel testified that he did not
¶348object to the prosecutor’s “psychopath” reference because he himself
¶349had used that term first, and because he did not find the prosecutor’s
¶350argument to be very effective. Counsel’s decision not to object in this
¶351instance was reasonable and affords no basis for a finding of
¶352deficient performance. See Jackson v. State, 281 Ga. 705, 708 (6)
¶353(642 SE2d 656) (2007) (counsel’s decision not to object during closing
¶354argument was a “matter[ ] of reasonable trial strategy” that did not
¶355support an ineffectiveness claim).
¶356 (iii) Appellant next challenges counsel’s failure to object when
¶357the prosecutor cited Appellant’s remark to Dixon about “weigh[ing]
¶358that sh*t up” and argued that this was a reference to “weighing up”
¶359marijuana. Given that Dixon responded to Appellant’s remark with
¶360 22 a reference to “sell[ing] weed,” and given the evidence that Appellant
¶361was a drug dealer and had communicated with Davis about selling
¶362marijuana on the night of the shooting, the prosecutor’s statement
¶363represented a reasonable inference from the evidence. Trial counsel
¶364was thus not deficient in failing to object in this instance. See
¶365Arnold v. State, 309 Ga. 573, 577 (2) (a) (847 SE2d 358) (2020)
¶366(where there was evidentiary basis for inference made during
¶367closing argument, counsel’s failure to object did not give rise to
¶368ineffectiveness claim).
¶369 (iv) Finally, Appellant contends that trial counsel was
¶370ineffective in failing to object to the prosecutor’s statement that
¶371acquitting Appellant would require the jurors to “violate [their]
¶372oath.” See Division 2 above. Though made in the context of an
¶373argument about the weight of the evidence, this remark comes
¶374uncomfortably close to – and may well cross over – the boundaries
¶375of permissible argument. See United States v. Young, 470 U. S. 1,
¶37618 (IV) (105 SCt 1038, 84 LE2d 1) (1985) (stating that an exhortation
¶377to the jury to “do its job” “has no place in the administration of
¶378 23 criminal justice”). However, in light of all the evidence presented
¶379and the isolated nature of the remark, even assuming we were to
¶380conclude that the remark was improper and that trial counsel’s
¶381failure to object was objectively unreasonable, we cannot say that,
¶382had trial counsel objected, there is a reasonable probability that the
¶383result of Appellant’s trial would have been different. See
¶384Richardson v. State, 304 Ga. 900, 902-903 (2) (b) (823 SE2d 321)
¶385(2019) (while prosecutor’s remark during closing was “troubling,”
¶386defendant could not demonstrate prejudice from counsel’s failure to
¶387object). Accordingly, Appellant’s ineffectiveness claim in this regard
¶388fails. 5
¶389 Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur, except Colvin, J., not participating.
¶390 5We also conclude that any cumulative prejudice from the deficiencies assumed in Division 4 (b) and (d) (iv) does not create a reasonable probability that the result of the proceedings would have been different in the absence of the deficiencies alleged. See Wilkins v. State, 308 Ga. 131, 141 (6) (839 SE2d 525) (2020). 24