Thomas v. State

¶1In the Supreme Court of Georgia

¶2 Decided: May 17, 2021

¶3 S21A0438. THOMAS v. THE STATE.

¶4 PETERSON, Justice.

¶5 Drexton Thomas appeals his convictions for malice murder and

¶6other offenses in connection with the shooting death of Jeffrey

¶7Douglas, Sr., and the aggravated assault of Jeffrey Douglas, Jr.

¶8(hereinafter, “Junior”). 1 He argues that: (1) the evidence was

¶9 1 The crimes occurred on June 28, 2013. In September 2013, a Fulton County grand jury indicted Thomas for malice murder (Count 1), three counts of felony murder (Counts 2-4), two counts of armed robbery (one against Douglas (Count 5) and one against Junior (Count 10)), aggravated assault with a deadly weapon against Douglas (Count 6), one count of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon (Count 7), two counts of aggravated assault against Junior (Counts 8 (pointing a gun at Junior) and 9 (hitting Junior with the gun)), and two counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (Count 11 for felonies committed against Douglas and Count 12 for felonies against Douglas’s son). After an October 2015 trial, a jury found Thomas guilty on Counts 1, 3, 6, 8, 9, 11, and 12, and not guilty on Counts 2, 5, and 10. Counts 4 and 7 were initially bifurcated but dismissed following the trial. In an order entered on November 6, 2015, the trial court sentenced Thomas to serve life in prison on Count 1, two concurrent twenty-year terms on Counts 8 and 9, and two five-year suspended terms for Counts 11 and 12 to run concurrently with each other but consecutively with the remaining counts. insufficient to support his convictions as a matter of federal due

¶10process, (2) the trial court abused its discretion in denying his

¶11motion for a new trial as the “thirteenth juror,” (3) the trial court

¶12abused its discretion in denying Thomas’s motion for a mistrial

¶13based on a courtroom outburst, (4) his inculpatory custodial

¶14statement was obtained in violation of his Miranda 2 rights, (5) his

¶15trial counsel was ineffective, and (6) he is entitled to a new trial on

¶16the basis of cumulative prejudice. The evidence was sufficient to

¶17support Thomas’s convictions and thus his due process and

¶18thirteenth-juror claims fail, the trial court properly handled the

¶19courtroom outburst, Thomas was given Miranda warnings before

¶20beginning his interview and the State was not obligated to give them

¶21again after a two-hour break, Thomas has shown no prejudice from

¶22any alleged ineffectiveness, and there are not multiple errors from

¶23Count 3 was vacated by operation of law. The trial court initially entered a sentence on Count 6, but later issued a corrected sentence merging Count 6 with Count 1. Thomas filed a timely motion for new trial, which he later amended. Following a hearing, the trial court denied Thomas’s motion on January 30, 2019. Thomas timely appealed; his case was docketed to this Court’s term beginning in December 2020 and submitted for a decision on the briefs. 2 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (86 SCt 1602, 16 LE2d 694) (1966).

¶24 2 which to accumulate prejudice. We affirm.

¶25 The trial evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the

¶26verdicts showed the following. Thomas and Douglas had known each

¶27other for years before June 2013. On June 27, 2013, the day before

¶28the shooting, Thomas and Douglas had an argument because

¶29Douglas believed that Thomas had been sending Douglas’s drug

¶30customers to other dealers. The next day, Douglas, his girlfriend

¶31Geraldine Thompson, and others were at Douglas’s house.

¶32Thompson’s daughter and Junior were outside when Thomas

¶33suddenly came walking up the driveway, pointed the gun at Junior,

¶34pistol-whipped him, took his money, and at one point fired a shot.

¶35Thomas instructed Junior to “go get your daddy” because “that’s who

¶36I want anyway.” Thomas backed away from Junior after a woman

¶37called out to Thomas, pleading for Thomas not to kill Junior.

¶38 Douglas came to the door and ushered Thompson’s daughter

¶39and Junior inside the house. Douglas tried to shut the door on

¶40Thomas, who was approaching, but Thomas stopped the door from

¶41closing with his foot. Thomas shot Douglas as Douglas was

¶42 3 attempting to run into the kitchen. Douglas fell to the ground, and

¶43Thomas rolled him over and took money out of Douglas’s pockets.

¶44Thomas left the scene while threatening those present that he would

¶45be back if anyone reported what he did.

¶46 By the time the paramedics arrived, Douglas was dead.

¶47Douglas had been shot in the back and was not seen with any

¶48weapons prior to the shooting. Thompson had been inside the house

¶49during the incident, heard the commotion outside, witnessed

¶50Thomas shoot Douglas, and told the police that Thomas was the

¶51shooter.

¶52 Thomas was later arrested and, after being informed of his

¶53Miranda rights, confessed to two detectives that he shot Douglas.

¶54Although Thomas initially said to one detective that he shot Douglas

¶55because Douglas and Junior pulled a pistol on him and threatened

¶56him, he told another detective that he did not see Douglas with a

¶57weapon but assumed Douglas had one because Douglas and Junior

¶58 4 had pulled a weapon on him earlier that day. 3 Thomas told the

¶59second detective that he shot Douglas because he was “pissed” and

¶60wanted payback for having a gun pulled on him. Video recordings of

¶61the interviews were played for the jury. Thomas told the detectives

¶62that he threw the gun used to shoot Douglas in a sewer drain, but

¶63the police could not find it there.

¶64 1. Thomas argues that the evidence was insufficient to support

¶65his conviction. His claim fails.

¶66 When evaluating the sufficiency of evidence, we must

¶67determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found the

¶68defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson v.

¶69Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979). In

¶70making that determination, “we view the evidence in the light most

¶71favorable to the verdict, and we put aside any questions about

¶72conflicting evidence, the credibility of witnesses, or the weight of the

¶73evidence, leaving the resolution of such things to the discretion of

¶74 3A defense witness testified that there was a separate argument on the morning of the shooting and claimed that Douglas had pulled a gun on him and Thomas that morning. 5 the [jury].” Wilkerson v. State, 307 Ga. 574, 574 (837 SE2d 300)

¶75(2019) (citation and punctuation omitted). “As long as there is some

¶76competent evidence, even if contradicted, to support each fact

¶77necessary to make out the State’s case, the jury’s verdict will be

¶78upheld.” Scott v. State, 309 Ga. 764, 766 (1) (848 SE2d 448) (2020)

¶79(citation and punctuation omitted).

¶80 Here, Junior testified that Thomas pointed a gun at him. See

¶81Rich v. State, 307 Ga. 757, 759 (1) (a) (838 SE2d 255) (2020) (“[T]he

¶82testimony of a single witness is generally sufficient to establish a

¶83fact[.]” (citation and punctuation omitted)). Thomas admitted

¶84hitting Junior with the weapon. Multiple eyewitnesses said that

¶85Thomas shot Douglas. And Thomas admitted that he shot Douglas

¶86in anger. Douglas was shot in the back and had no weapons on him.

¶87After assessing the credibility of the eyewitnesses and reviewing a

¶88video recording of Thomas’s interviews, the jury was authorized to

¶89reject any claims that Thomas shot Douglas in self-defense or with

¶90an irresistible passion resulting from serious provocation, and to

¶91find beyond a reasonable doubt that Thomas was guilty of the crimes

¶92 6 of which he was convicted. See Corley v. State, 308 Ga. 321, 322 (1)

¶93(a) (840 SE2d 391) (2020) (“[Q]uestions about the existence of

¶94justification are for a jury to decide[.]”); Anderson v. State, 248 Ga.

¶95682, 683 (3) (285 SE2d 533) (1982) (“Whether or not a provocation,

¶96if any, is such a serious provocation as would be sufficient to excite

¶97a sudden, violent, and irresistible passion in a reasonable person,

¶98reducing the offense from murder to manslaughter, is generally a

¶99question for the jury.”).

¶100 2. Thomas next argues that the trial court failed to fulfill its

¶101role as the “thirteenth juror” by failing to grant his motion for a new

¶102trial. To the extent Thomas argues that the trial court failed to

¶103exercise its discretion as the “thirteenth juror,” the record shows

¶104otherwise. In denying Thomas’s motion for new trial, the trial court

¶105cited the correct legal standards, weighed the evidence, and found

¶106that the evidence overwhelmingly supported Thomas’s guilt. See

¶107Brockman v. State, 292 Ga. 707, 714-715 (4) (b) (739 SE2d 332)

¶108(2013) (trial court’s language that evidence was not “sufficiently

¶109close” to warrant new trial shows that court exercised its

¶110 7 discretionary authority to not grant a new trial).

¶111 To the extent Thomas argues that the trial court exercised its

¶112discretion improperly, his argument presents nothing for us to

¶113review. Only trial courts have discretion to sit as the thirteenth

¶114juror. See Wilson v. State, 302 Ga. 106, 109 (II) (d) (805 SE2d 98)

¶115(2017). When asked to review the refusal to grant a new trial on such

¶116grounds, our review is limited to the Jackson v. Virginia standard,

¶117and we have already explained that the evidence was sufficient

¶118under that standard.

¶119 3. During the trial, one of Douglas’s other sons, seated in the

¶120courtroom gallery, screamed at Thomas, “You killed my daddy, man.

¶121You killed my motherf***ing daddy, man.” Thomas argues that the

¶122trial court erred in denying his motion for a mistrial based on this

¶123courtroom outburst, because multiple members of the jury indicated

¶124that the outburst caused them concern. We disagree.

¶125 A trial court generally has broad discretion in deciding whether

¶126to grant a mistrial, and great deference is afforded to a court’s

¶127determination that a mistrial was not necessary. See Blake v. State,

¶128 8 304 Ga. 747, 750 (2) (822 SE2d 207) (2018). The measures a trial

¶129court takes in response to a courtroom outburst are within the

¶130court’s discretion unless a fair trial is not possible without a new

¶131trial. See Thompson v. State, 304 Ga. 146, 154 (10) (816 SE2d 646)

¶132(2018); Green v. State, 300 Ga. 707, 710 (2) (797 SE2d 863) (2017).

¶133Generally, a trial court does not abuse its discretion when it takes

¶134“prompt, thorough, and curative action.” Thompson, 304 Ga. at 154

¶135(10) (citation and punctuation omitted). When juries are given

¶136curative instructions following such outbursts, they “are presumed

¶137to follow [them] in the absence of proof to the contrary.” Jones v.

¶138State, 305 Ga. 750, 755 (3) (827 SE2d 879) (2019).

¶139 Here, in response to the outburst, the trial court removed the

¶140relatives of the victim from the courtroom, checked with the jurors

¶141as to how they felt, and received reassurance from all of them that

¶142the outburst would not impair their ability to be fair and impartial.

¶143Even the jurors who specifically said they were concerned by the

¶144outburst expressed a desire to continue serving. After denying

¶145Thomas’s motion for a mistrial, the trial court told the jury that the

¶146 9 man who had made the outburst was excluded from the courthouse

¶147and instructed the jury to disregard the outburst. Under these

¶148circumstances, Thomas has failed to show that the trial court abused

¶149its discretion in denying a mistrial. See Thompson, 304 Ga. at 154-

¶150155 (10) (holding the trial court’s curative instruction sufficient

¶151where the court gave a lengthy curative instruction after a witness

¶152under cross-examination said repeatedly, “Y’all done killed

¶153somebody,” and “Y’all going to hell”); see also Messer v. State, 247

¶154Ga. 316, 323-325 (6) (276 SE2d 15) (1981) (concluding that the trial

¶155court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to declare a mistrial

¶156and instead giving a curative instruction after the father of the

¶157victim lunged at the defendant and screamed, “You’ll pay,” “You’re

¶158liable,” and “You’re going to get it”).

¶159 4. Thomas claims that the trial court erred in admitting his

¶160custodial statements from the second custodial interview because he

¶161was not re-advised of his Miranda rights and the detective who

¶162conducted that interview deployed “extremely coercive, combative

¶163and threatening conduct” in the interview. We disagree.

¶164 10  The record shows that Thomas had been advised of his

¶165Miranda rights prior to his first interview with one detective, and

¶166there was a break of about two hours between that interview and

¶167the second interview. There is no dispute that the second interview

¶168was merely a continuation of the first. Without more, the two-hour

¶169break between the two interviews did not require Thomas to be re-

¶170advised of his Miranda rights. See Mangrum v. State, 285 Ga. 676,

¶171678-679 (3) (681 SE2d 130) (2009) (“[T]he lack of a Miranda warning

¶172after [a two-hour] break is of no consequence, as [appellant] was

¶173advised of and waived his Miranda rights before the first interview

¶174and the second interview was part of a continuous series of

¶175interviews.” (citation and punctuation omitted)); Williams v. State,

¶176244 Ga. 485, 488 (4) (b) (260 SE2d 879) (1979) (“[T]he state was

¶177under no duty to repeat the Miranda warnings given the day before

¶178where, as here, the interviews were part of a continuing

¶179interrogation.”).

¶180 Turning to the coercion argument, the video recording of the

¶181interview plainly contradicts Thomas’s assertions. Thomas points to

¶182 11 no portion of the video recording to show that the second detective

¶183was coercive. The detective spoke calmly and never raised his voice

¶184or threatened Thomas in any way during the interview. Nothing in

¶185the video recording suggests “excessively lengthy interrogation,

¶186physical deprivation, brutality, or other such hallmarks of coercive

¶187police activity” that could render Thomas’s statements involuntary.

¶188Drake v. State, 296 Ga. 286, 291 (3) (766 SE2d 447) (2014) (citation

¶189and punctuation omitted).

¶190 5. Thomas also argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for

¶191not renewing the motion for mistrial based on the courtroom

¶192outburst and thereby not preserving the issue for appeal. We

¶193disagree.

¶194 To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel,

¶195Thomas must show both that his trial counsel’s performance was

¶196deficient and that this deficiency prejudiced his defense.

¶197See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (104 SCt 2052, 80

¶198LE2d 674) (1984). “To establish deficient performance, an appellant

¶199must overcome the strong presumption that his or her counsel’s

¶200 12 conduct falls within the broad range of reasonable professional

¶201conduct and show that his counsel performed in an objectively

¶202unreasonable way considering all circumstances and in the light of

¶203prevailing professional norms.” Smith v. State, 296 Ga. 731, 733 (2)

¶204(770 SE2d 610) (2015) (citation and punctuation omitted). To

¶205establish prejudice, an appellant must show that “there is a

¶206reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors,

¶207the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland,

¶208466 U.S. at 694. Thomas must prove both prongs of

¶209the Strickland test, and if he fails to prove one prong, “it is not

¶210incumbent upon this Court to examine the other prong.” Smith, 296

¶211Ga. at 733 (2) (citation and punctuation omitted). “In reviewing a

¶212ruling on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, we defer to the

¶213trial court’s findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous, but we

¶214apply the law to the facts de novo.” State v. Spratlin, 305 Ga. 585,

¶215591 (2) (826 SE2d 36) (2019).

¶216 Here, the trial court considered the merits of Thomas’s motion

¶217for mistrial, denied the motion, told Thomas’s counsel that she could

¶218 13 renew the motion “if something else happens,” and then gave the

¶219jury a curative instruction. Thomas does not allege on appeal that

¶220something else happened at the trial that required trial counsel to

¶221again move for a mistrial based on the courtroom outburst, but

¶222argues that trial counsel potentially failed to preserve the issue by

¶223failing to renew the motion. See Hartsfield v. State, 294 Ga. 883, 886

¶224(2) (757 SE2d 90) (2014) (concluding that the defendant waived

¶225challenge to denial of motion for a mistrial where he failed to renew

¶226his motion following the trial court’s admonishment of prosecutor

¶227and curative instruction). But even assuming that trial counsel’s

¶228failure to renew the motion was deficient performance, Thomas fails

¶229to establish prejudice. Because we have concluded that the trial

¶230court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for a

¶231mistrial, electing instead to take adequate curative measures,

¶232Thomas does not demonstrate a reasonable probability that the

¶233outcome would have been different if trial counsel had renewed the

¶234motion for a mistrial. See Hartsfield, 294 Ga. at 887 (3) (a) (because

¶235trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying motion for mistrial

¶236 14 where curative instruction was adequate, there was no prejudice

¶237from trial counsel’s failure to renew motion).

¶238 6. Lastly, Thomas argues that he is entitled to a new trial on

¶239the basis of cumulative prejudice. We disagree.

¶240 We recently recognized a new cumulative error rule in State v.

¶241Lane, 308 Ga. 10 (838 SE2d 808) (2020), whereby courts are “to

¶242consider collectively the prejudicial effect of trial court errors and

¶243any deficient performance by counsel — at least where those errors

¶244by the court and counsel involve evidentiary issues.” Id. at 14 (1).

¶245But this cumulative prejudice analysis does not apply when, as here,

¶246there are not multiple errors to consider cumulatively. See Beck v.

¶247State, 310 Ga. 491, 499 (3) n.5 (852 SE2d 535) (2020).

¶248 Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.

¶249 15