¶1In the Supreme Court of Georgia
¶2 Decided: August 10, 2021
¶3 S21A0877. VIVIAN v. THE STATE.
¶4 MCMILLIAN, Justice.
¶5 Nathaniel Vivian appeals his convictions for felony murder and
¶6related crimes in connection with the shooting death of Daniel
¶7Zeitz. 1 Vivian contends on appeal that the trial court erred in failing
¶8 1 Zeitz was killed on September 12, 2014, and on September 22, 2014, a Fulton County grand jury indicted Vivian and Kayla Dixon in connection with Zeitz’s death, charging them jointly with malice murder and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. Vivian and Dixon were re-indicted on December 5, 2014, and charged jointly with malice murder (Count 1), felony murder (Count 2, predicated on armed robbery, and Count 3, predicated on aggravated assault), armed robbery (Count 4), aggravated assault (Count 5), possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (Count 6), and cruelty to children in the third degree (Count 7). Dixon entered a guilty plea to reduced charges prior to trial, and her convictions and sentences are not part of this appeal. Vivian was tried before a jury from August 15 to 17, 2016, and convicted of all counts except malice murder. The trial court sentenced Vivian to serve life in prison on each count of felony murder, ten years in prison for armed robbery, and twelve months in prison for cruelty to children, all to run concurrently with one another. The trial court also sentenced Vivian to five years on the firearm-possession charge, to run consecutively to Count 2, but suspended that sentence, and merged the aggravated assault conviction into the felony murder conviction under Count to advise him of his right to represent himself at trial and asserts
¶9that he received ineffective assistance of counsel based on his trial
¶10counsel’s failure to (1) object to the introduction of his and his co-
¶11defendant’s cell phones as exhibits at trial; (2) object to an alleged
¶12non-unanimous verdict on the charge of possession of a firearm
¶13during the commission of a felony; (3) challenge the grand and petit
¶14jury composition; and (4) request a jury instruction on mere
¶15association. We conclude that there is no merit to these arguments,
¶16but because the trial court erred in sentencing Vivian on two
¶17separate counts of felony murder, we vacate those convictions and
¶18remand the case to the trial court for resentencing.
¶19 The evidence at trial showed that on the afternoon of
¶20September 12, 2014, Vivian texted Zeitz to inquire about a
¶212. As discussed further in Division 3, because the trial court erred in sentencing Vivian on both felony murder convictions, we are vacating his convictions and remanding the case to the trial court for resentencing. Vivian filed a timely motion for new trial on August 18, 2016, and amended that motion through new counsel on January 4, 2019, and June 13, 2019. The trial court denied the motion for new trial as amended on September 3, 2019. Vivian filed a timely notice of appeal, and his appeal was docketed to the April 2021 term of this Court and submitted for a decision on the briefs.
¶22 2 PlayStation 4 gaming console that Zeitz had listed for sale on
¶23Craigslist. The two men arranged to meet that night at Zeitz’s
¶24apartment in Sandy Springs. At around the same time, Kayla Dixon,
¶25who was Vivian’s girlfriend, texted Vivian, “U wanna rob him,” and
¶26Vivian replied, “Yea.” Over the next two hours, Vivian and Dixon
¶27texted each other to discuss how they would rob Zeitz, including who
¶28would hold the gun they planned to bring with them, with Vivian
¶29suggesting that Dixon hold the gun and Dixon suggesting that
¶30Vivian point the gun at Zeitz.
¶31 Around 9:12 p.m. that night, Vivian texted Zeitz to say he was
¶32outside Zeitz’s apartment, and Zeitz replied by text to say that he
¶33was “[c]oming out now.” Vivian later told the police that when Zeitz
¶34came to the car, Vivian took the gaming console from him. Zeitz then
¶35grabbed Vivian’s steering wheel, and Dixon shot the gun, injuring
¶36Vivian’s hand. Vivian and Dixon left the scene and drove to
¶37Northside Hospital to get medical treatment for Vivian.
¶38 Around 9:30 p.m., Sandy Springs Police officers responded to a
¶39“person-down” call and discovered Zeitz lying dead in the parking
¶40 3 lot of his apartment complex. Meanwhile, a Brookhaven Police
¶41officer responded to a report of a patient with a gunshot wound to
¶42the hand at Northside Hospital. The Brookhaven officer identified
¶43the patient as Vivian and asked him what had happened. Vivian
¶44said that he had been shot at an apartment complex in Brookhaven
¶45(the “Brookhaven apartment”). Vivian told the officer that he was
¶46not sure who had shot him, that Dixon had driven him to the
¶47hospital, and that she was outside in the hospital parking lot.
¶48 The officer arranged to meet Dixon in the parking lot. Dixon
¶49arrived for the meeting in Vivian’s car and appeared to be very
¶50distressed as she exited the car with her child. The officer observed
¶51a large amount of blood inside the car and asked Dixon what
¶52happened. Dixon replied that Vivian had been shot in the hand in
¶53the Brookhaven apartment’s parking lot. Dixon said that she had
¶54taken a gun out of the glovebox, dropped it, and then put it back,
¶55and that she might have shot the gun but was not sure. She told the
¶56Brookhaven officer that the gun was in the car’s glovebox. The officer
¶57then returned to the hospital and obtained Vivian’s written
¶58 4 permission to search the car. During that search, the police
¶59recovered a gun from the glovebox and a PlayStation gaming console
¶60from the trunk.
¶61 When a Brookhaven Police detective spoke with Vivian inside
¶62the hospital about his injuries, Vivian first told the detective that he
¶63and Dixon had gone to the Brookhaven apartment to pick up some
¶64of Dixon’s friends, and that while speaking with some men there,
¶65Vivian heard a gunshot, jumped back in his car, and only later
¶66realized he had been shot. However, Vivian eventually admitted to
¶67taking a gaming console and said that Dixon had shot him
¶68accidentally as they were trying to leave the scene. After Vivian
¶69revealed that the shooting occurred at Zeitz’s apartment in Sandy
¶70Springs, the detective contacted the Sandy Springs police and
¶71transferred the case to them.
¶72 Vivian and Dixon were subsequently taken into custody and
¶73transported to the Sandy Springs Police Headquarters. During an
¶74interview there with a Sandy Springs Police detective, Vivian
¶75admitted that he and Dixon planned to steal the PlayStation. It was
¶76 5 during this interview that Vivian said that when he took the
¶77PlayStation console, Zeitz grabbed the steering wheel of Vivian’s
¶78car, and Dixon fired the gun. Police recovered Vivian’s cell phone
¶79from his pocket and discovered messages between Vivian and Zeitz
¶80relating to the sale of the PlayStation on Craigslist. In addition to
¶81the text messages, an analysis of Vivian’s phone revealed a “fake
¶82number texting app”2 and a September 5, 2014 internet search for
¶83“how to rob someone.”
¶84 The medical examiner testified that Zeitz suffered a gunshot
¶85wound to the right side of his neck, resulting in his death, and the
¶86gun found in Vivian’s car was later matched to a shell casing found
¶87at the scene of Zeitz’s shooting.
¶88 1. Vivian first asserts that the trial court erred by failing to
¶89conduct a hearing on his request for new counsel and advise him
¶90that he had the right to represent himself at trial if he was
¶91dissatisfied with his appointed counsel.
¶92 2The evidence showed that such an app generates a fake number that appears on a text recipient’s screen in place of a phone’s assigned number, and Vivian’s texts appeared under a fake number on Zeitz’s phone. 6 Prior to jury selection on the scheduled trial date, Vivian
¶93requested a hearing for new counsel. When the trial judge asked
¶94Vivian to state his complaint with his appointed trial counsel, Vivian
¶95replied, “Well, for one I just found out about this trial on Wednesday
¶96[the day before]. That’s not enough time to prepare for a trial.” The
¶97judge responded it was trial counsel, not Vivian, who had to prepare
¶98for trial. Vivian then said that he would have liked for his family to
¶99have been here “and stuff like that.” After the trial judge explained
¶100that the first day would primarily involve selecting a jury and that
¶101Vivian’s family was welcome to come for the rest of the trial, Vivian
¶102replied, “All right.” And when the trial judge asked Vivian if he had
¶103any other complaints, Vivian stated, “That’s it for right now.”
¶104 The trial judge then told Vivian that he was always welcome to
¶105hire a lawyer, but the trial had been specially set, the jury was
¶106waiting, and they were prepared to go forward. In response, Vivian
¶107asked, “What are my options?” The trial judge replied that Vivian
¶108had the option to proceed to trial, where he was facing an overall life
¶109sentence plus five years, or to seek to negotiate a guilty plea before
¶110 7 the trial began. However, the trial court indicated that the trial
¶111would begin shortly because it had been specially set, jurors were
¶112present, and the proceedings were already running late. Vivian
¶113responded: “Okay. We can go ahead.”
¶114 Vivian argues, citing Nelson v. State, 274 S2d 256 (Fla. Dist.
¶115Ct. App. 1973), that the trial court erred in failing to inform him that
¶116he also had the option of representing himself at trial. According to
¶117Vivian, following the reasoning set forth in Nelson, the State of
¶118Florida now mandates that a defendant receive a hearing upon
¶119request to determine whether he is being adequately represented.
¶120He asserts that defendants in Georgia likewise are entitled to a
¶121hearing to determine whether they can discharge appointed counsel,
¶122even if that means a defendant must represent himself. Therefore,
¶123he contends that after determining that Vivian was being
¶124adequately represented, the trial judge should have informed Vivian
¶125that he had a right to represent himself. We disagree.
¶126 The right of a criminal defendant to self-representation is
¶127guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United States
¶128 8 Constitution. 3 See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819 (III) (A)
¶129(95 SCt 2525, 45 LE2d 562) (1975); Burney v. State, 309 Ga. 273, 279
¶130(2) (845 SE2d 625) (2020); Wiggins v. State, 298 Ga. 366, 368 (2) (782
¶131SE2d 31) (2016).
¶132 To avail himself of this right, a defendant must clearly and unequivocally assert his desire to represent himself. If an unequivocal invocation is made, it must be followed by a hearing to ensure that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waives the traditional benefits associated with the right to counsel and understands the disadvantages of self-representation so that the record will establish that he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open.
¶133Burney, 309 Ga. at 279-80 (2) (citation omitted). But in the absence
¶134of a clear and unequivocal expression of a desire for self-
¶135representation, the trial court is not required to hold a hearing. See
¶136id.; Oliver v. State, 305 Ga. 678, 680 (2) (827 SE2d 639) (2019).
¶137 Here, Vivian made no assertion of a desire to represent himself
¶138 3Vivian raises this claim solely under the Florida court’s interpretation of the Sixth Amendment in Nelson, and we therefore consider Vivian’s argument in the context of the U.S. Constitution. However, we note that the Georgia Constitution also provides a defendant the right to self-representation. See Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Par. XII (“No person shall be deprived of the right to prosecute or defend, either in person or by an attorney, that person’s own cause in any of the courts of this state.”). 9 at trial. To the contrary, Vivian asked for a hearing for “new
¶139counsel.” Therefore, the trial court was not required to hold a
¶140hearing to address the issue of self-representation in this case.
¶141Vivian has not identified, nor could we locate, any binding authority
¶142requiring trial courts in this State to inform a defendant sua sponte
¶143of the option to represent himself when he or she merely asks for
¶144new counsel, and we see no reason to adopt Nelson. Accordingly, we
¶145discern no error.
¶146 2. Vivian further argues that the trial court erred in failing to
¶147grant his motion for new trial based on his claims of ineffective
¶148assistance of trial counsel. None of his claims has merit.
¶149 To prevail on such claims, a defendant must show that his trial
¶150counsel’s performance was deficient and that, but for such deficient
¶151performance, there is a reasonable probability that the result of the
¶152trial would have been different. See Strickland v. Washington, 466
¶153U.S. 668, 687 (III) (104 SCt 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984). To prove
¶154deficient performance, Vivian must establish that his counsel
¶155“performed at trial in an objectively unreasonable way considering
¶156 10 all the circumstances and in light of prevailing professional norms,”
¶157Lofton v. State, 309 Ga. 349, 360 (6) (846 SE2d 57) (2020), and in
¶158doing so, he “must overcome the strong presumption that trial
¶159counsel’s conduct falls within the broad range of reasonable
¶160professional conduct.” Kilpatrick v. State, 308 Ga. 194, 201 (7) (839
¶161SE2d 551) (2020) (citation and punctuation omitted). To show a
¶162reasonable probability of a different trial result, as required to
¶163establish the requisite prejudice under Strickland, Vivian must
¶164demonstrate “a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the
¶165outcome [of his trial].” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 (III) (B). If Vivian
¶166fails to establish either prong of the Strickland test, we need not
¶167examine the other. See id. at 687 (III); DeLoach v. State, 308 Ga.
¶168283, 288 (2) (840 SE2d 396) (2020).
¶169 (a) Vivian first claims that his trial counsel rendered ineffective
¶170assistance by failing to object to the admission of his and Dixon’s cell
¶171phones at trial because the only authentication provided for the cell
¶172phones was through hearsay evidence.
¶173 The State introduced the two cell phones into evidence through
¶174 11 the testimony of a Sandy Springs Police investigator. The prosecutor
¶175asked the investigator how he recognized the two exhibits
¶176containing the cell phones, and the investigator replied that he
¶177recognized them through handwritten labels noting the case number
¶178and descriptions reading “Dixon Cell Phone” and “Vivian Cell
¶179Phone.” Vivian asserts that the handwritten labels were hearsay
¶180and that the investigator testified that the lead investigator on the
¶181case gave the investigator the phones while the investigator was
¶182preparing warrant applications to search the devices. Therefore,
¶183Vivian asserts that the investigator lacked any independent,
¶184personal knowledge regarding the cell phones, and his trial counsel
¶185should have objected to the investigator’s testimony about what the
¶186lead investigator told him.
¶187 At the hearing on the motion for new trial, Vivian’s appellate
¶188attorney asked trial counsel whether she objected to the
¶189introduction of the cell phones, and she replied that she did not
¶190believe she had. But trial counsel was never asked to explain why
¶191she did not object, and Vivian offered no other evidence to show that
¶192 12 the lack of an objection was not a reasonable strategic decision. “In
¶193the absence of evidence to the contrary, counsel’s decisions are
¶194presumed to be strategic and thus insufficient to support an
¶195ineffective assistance of counsel claim” if not patently unreasonable.
¶196Lanier v. State, 310 Ga. 520, 526 (3) (b) (852 SE2d 509) (2020)
¶197(citation and punctuation omitted). See also Mitchell v. State, 290
¶198Ga. 490, 492 (4) (a) (722 SE2d 705) (2012) (where appellant fails to
¶199make a showing to overcome this presumption, “he has failed to
¶200show deficient performance” (citation omitted)).
¶201 Moreover, pretermitting whether the cell phones were properly
¶202authenticated, Vivian’s claim of ineffective assistance fails because
¶203he does not argue, must less demonstrate, that the State could not
¶204have provided additional foundational support for the admission of
¶205the cell phones if his counsel had objected. And as this Court
¶206previously held, “refraining from objecting to foundational matters
¶207that can be readily cured is not an unreasonable strategy.” Hayes v.
¶208State, 298 Ga. 98, 105 (2) (c) (779 SE2d 609) (2015). See also Wallace
¶209v. State, 296 Ga. 388, 393 (4) (d) (768 SE2d 480) (2015) (claim of
¶210 13 ineffective assistance of counsel based on failure to object for lack of
¶211foundation fails where defendant “made no showing that a proper
¶212foundation could not have been laid if any additional foundation was
¶213necessary”). Therefore, Vivian has failed to establish ineffective
¶214assistance of counsel on this ground.
¶215 (b) Vivian next asserts that his trial counsel was ineffective in
¶216failing to file a demurrer to Count 6, charging possession of a firearm
¶217during the commission of a crime, and to object to the trial court’s
¶218instruction to the jury regarding that charge, which Vivian contends
¶219allowed the jury to return a non-unanimous verdict.
¶220 However, Vivian failed to raise any claims of ineffective
¶221assistance of counsel on these grounds in his motion for new trial,
¶222as amended, or at the hearing on that motion, which presented his
¶223first opportunity to do so, and the trial court did not rule on these
¶224grounds; therefore, these issues are not preserved for appellate
¶225review by this Court. See Lopez v. State, 310 Ga. 529, 535 (3) (e) (852
¶226SE2d 547) (2020) (claim of ineffective assistance of counsel not
¶227preserved for appeal where it was not raised at defendant’s first
¶228 14 opportunity); Elkins v. State, 306 Ga. 351, 361 (4) (a) (830 SE2d 217)
¶229(2019) (failure to raise claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel
¶230“at the earliest practicable moment” waives the issue for appellate
¶231review).
¶232 (c) Vivian further contends that his trial counsel was deficient
¶233in failing to challenge the composition of his grand and petit juries,
¶234because the juries were selected from a list that this Court
¶235determined in Ricks v. State, 301 Ga. 171 (800 SE2d 307) (2017),
¶236violated the Court’s Jury Composition Rule (the “Rule”).4 Vivian
¶237notes that he was indicted by the grand jury on December 5, 2014,
¶238and Ricks determined that Fulton County violated the Rule for a
¶239period of time including that date. See 301 Ga. at 189 (5) (a), 191-92
¶240(5) (c). Vivian also asserts that the trial jury was selected from a
¶241defective list because he was tried in 2016 and the jury list was not
¶242 4 This Court adopted the Rule to effectuate the Jury Composition Reform Act of 2011, Ga. L. 2011, p. 59. See Ricks, 301 Ga. at 173 (1). The full text of the current version of the Rule can be found on this Court’s website. See https://www.gasupreme.us/wpcontent/uploads/2019/04/JURY_COMPOSITION_RULE_2019-04-11.pdf.
¶243 15 updated until after the Ricks decision in 2017.
¶244 But as Vivian notes, our decision in Ricks was issued in 2017,
¶245over seventeen months after Vivian was indicted and approximately
¶246nine months after he was tried and convicted.5 It is well settled that
¶247“[t]he standard for effectiveness of counsel does not require a lawyer
¶248to anticipate changes in the law or pursue novel theories of defense.”
¶249Brooks v. State, 309 Ga. 630, 637 (2) (847 SE2d 555) (2020) (citation
¶250and punctuation omitted). See also Esprit v. State, 305 Ga. 429, 438
¶251(2) (c) (826 SE2d 7) (2019) (“A criminal defense attorney does not
¶252perform deficiently when he fails to advance a legal theory that
¶253would require an extension of existing precedents and the adoption
¶254of an unproven theory of law.” (citation and punctuation omitted)).
¶255Accordingly, this claim of ineffective assistance of counsel lacks
¶256merit.
¶257 (d) Vivian also argues that his trial counsel was ineffective in
¶258 5Although Vivian did not ask his trial counsel at the motion hearing why she chose not to challenge the jury panels, trial counsel testified, in response to questioning by the State, that at the time of Vivian’s trial, which was before Ricks was issued, she had never heard of a successful challenge to jury composition under the Rule. 16 failing to request a jury instruction on “mere association.” Vivian
¶259asserts that if his trial counsel had requested that instruction, the
¶260jury would have been informed that it was not authorized to find a
¶261person guilty by mere association with another person who
¶262committed the crime unless the evidence shows beyond a reasonable
¶263doubt that the associated person actually perpetrated or
¶264participated in the crime. See Suggested Pattern Jury Instructions,
¶265Vol. II: Criminal Cases, § 1.43.31. Pretermitting whether Vivian’s
¶266counsel performed deficiently in failing to ask for such a charge,
¶267however, Vivian’s claim of ineffective assistance fails because he
¶268cannot show the requisite prejudice under Strickland.
¶269 The trial court charged the jury on the presumption of
¶270innocence, the State’s burden to prove each element of the crimes
¶271charged beyond a reasonable doubt, party to a crime, and the lack of
¶272a presumption of criminal intent. Those instructions included that
¶273“[a] person is a party to a crime only if that person directly commits
¶274a crime or intentionally helps in the commission of the crime or
¶275intentionally advises, encourages, counsels or procures another to
¶276 17 commit a crime” and that “[f]acts and circumstances that merely
¶277place upon the defendant a grave suspicion of the crimes charged or
¶278that merely raise a speculation or a conjecture of the defendant’s
¶279guilt are not sufficient to authorize a conviction of the defendant.”
¶280We conclude that the trial court’s charge, when viewed as a whole,
¶281was an accurate statement of the applicable law, and the “mere
¶282association” charge would have added little, if any, to these
¶283instructions. Moreover, the evidence that Vivian was a knowing
¶284participant in the armed robbery, including his texts with Dixon
¶285planning the crimes, was strong. Under these circumstances, Vivian
¶286has failed to show a reasonable probability that his trial would have
¶287ended more favorably for him had trial counsel requested a charge
¶288on “mere association.” See Hood v. State, 303 Ga. 420, 427 (2) (b)
¶289(811 SE2d 392) (2018) (where the trial court’s charge adequately
¶290instructed the jury on the legal principles involved in the omitted
¶291charge, appellant failed to demonstrate a reasonable probability
¶292that his trial would have ended more favorably had counsel
¶293requested an additional charge); Robinson v. State, 278 Ga. 836, 838
¶294 18 (5) (607 SE2d 559) (2005) (trial court was not required to sua sponte
¶295charge the jury on “mere association” where jury instructions were
¶296applicable to issues and evidence at trial, and they substantially
¶297covered the same principles involved in the omitted charge).
¶298Therefore, Vivian cannot establish his claim of ineffective assistance
¶299of counsel on this ground.
¶300 3. Finally, we conclude, and the State concedes, that the trial
¶301court erred in sentencing Vivian to a life sentence on each of his two
¶302felony murder convictions when there was only one victim in this
¶303case. See Martin v. State, 308 Ga. 479, 484 (3) (841 SE2d 667) (2020);
¶304Coe v. State, 274 Ga. 265, 266 (2) (553 SE2d 784) (2001). Instead,
¶305one of the two felony murder verdicts was vacated by operation of
¶306law. See McCoy v. State, 303 Ga. 141, 144 (3) (810 SE2d 487) (2018).
¶307“And . . . the decision as to which of the felony murder verdicts
¶308should be deemed vacated—a decision that may affect which other
¶309verdicts merge and thus what other sentences may be imposed—is
¶310left to the discretion of the trial court on remand[.]” Martin, 308 Ga.
¶311at 484 (3). Therefore, we vacate Vivian’s convictions for felony
¶312 19 murder and remand the case to the trial court for resentencing in
¶313accordance with this opinion. See id.; Cowart v. State, 294 Ga. 333,
¶314336 (2) (751 SE2d 399) (2013).
¶315 Judgment affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded with direction. All the Justices concur, except Colvin, J., not participating.
¶316 20