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312 Or. App. 171

K. E. J. v. Jessee

Court of Appeals of Oregon

Decided June 3, 2021

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Court of Appeals of Oregon · decided 2021-06-03

Applies OR 107 § 107.700 · OR 107 § 107.710 · OR 107 § 107.716 · OR 107 § 107.718

Affirmed · Decided 2021-06-03

                                171

              Submitted April 2, affirmed June 3, 2021


                          K. E. J.,
                  Petitioner-Respondent,
                             v.
               Joshua Blackwell JESSEE,
                 Respondent-Appellant.
               Marion County Circuit Court
                  20PO04650; A174312
                           
492 P3d 1264


  Jennifer K. Gardiner, Judge pro tempore.
  Joshua B. Jessee filed the brief pro se.
  No appearance for respondent.
  Before Lagesen, Presiding Judge, and James, Judge, and
Kamins, Judge.
  PER CURIAM
  Affirmed.
172                                                      K. E. J. v. Jessee

           PER CURIAM
         Respondent appeals the entry of an amended Family
Abuse and Prevention Act (FAPA) restraining order issued
against him under ORS 107.700 to 107.735. He contends
that the trial court improperly found the qualifying circumstances to continue the order despite contradictory evidence
in the record. We review the court’s legal determinations for
legal error and its findings of fact for any evidence in the
record to support those findings. Buell v. Buell, 
366 Or 553, 564
, 
466 P3d 949
 (2020). We affirm.
        Petitioner was granted an ex parte FAPA order
under ORS 107.718(1). Respondent contested the entry of the
order and requested a hearing under ORS 107.718(10). After
the hearing, the trial court continued the order under ORS
107.716(3)(a),1 which provides that
      “[t]he court may continue any order issued under ORS
   107.718 if the court finds that:
     “(A) Abuse has occurred within the period specified in
   ORS 107.710(1);
      “(B) The petitioner reasonably fears for the petitioner’s
   physical safety; and
      “(C) The respondent represents a credible threat to the
   physical safety of the petitioner or the petitioner’s child.”
         Here, petitioner testified that, within 180 days of
filing the petition, respondent behaved violently on multiple occasions. First, on one occasion, respondent had gotten
so angry at petitioner that he punched and kicked a door
in front of their four-year-old daughter until the door was
destroyed. On another occasion, respondent punched a wall
in the couple’s bedroom due to his insistence that petitioner
was having an affair. In the same time frame, respondent
woke petitioner up in the middle of the night and threw
her phone at the wall, creating a hole in the wall and shattering the phone. He then immediately took their daughter to Montana for a week (the first of two occasions that
    1
      Petitioner filed her petition and was granted the FAPA order on June 1,
2020. Thus, we apply the current version of ORS 107.716(3), which was amended
by the legislature in 2019 and became effective May 22, 2019. See Or Laws 2019,
ch 144, § 1.
Cite as 
312 Or App 171
 (2021)                             173

he took the child to Montana without petitioner’s consent).
Petitioner also testified that respondent tracked petitioner’s whereabouts by planting devices in her purse and car,
changed her passwords to her email accounts and deleted
her emails, and continued this behavior even after he was
served with divorce papers. Although respondent’s testimony contradicted those facts, the trial court expressly discredited his testimony and credited petitioner’s version of
events. Gladd v. Lucarelli, 
310 Or App 835, 838
, 
486 P3d 860
 (2021) (explaining that “it is for the trial court to make
the necessary credibility determinations  and, if there
is any evidence to support the trial court’s findings, we are
bound by those findings”).
         In reviewing the record, we conclude that there was
legally sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s factual findings, which in turn support the court’s conclusion
that respondent placed petitioner in fear of imminent bodily
injury within 180 days prior to the petition, that petitioner
reasonably fears for her physical safety, and that respondent
poses a credible threat to petitioner. ORS 107.716(3)(a).
        Affirmed.

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