Volume 312 — United States Reports

Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1 (1941), was a decision by the United States Supreme Court in which the Court held that under American law important and substantial procedures are not substantive but rather still considered procedural, and therefore federal law applies. Sibbach followed the seminal 1938 case Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, and thus the decision whether to apply the law of the state of jurisdiction or uniform federal rules depended on whether the rule in question was procedural or substantive in nature.

Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941), is a case applying the law of conflict preemption. The United States Supreme Court held that a Pennsylvania state system of alien registration was superseded by a federal system (the Alien Registration Act) because it was an "obstacle to the accomplishment" of its goals.

United States v. Darby Lumber Co., 312 U.S. 100 (1941), was a case in which the United States Supreme Court upheld the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, holding that the U.S. Congress had the power under the Commerce Clause to regulate employment conditions. The unanimous decision of the Court in this case overturned Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918), limited the application of Carter v. Carter Coal Company, 298 U.S. 238 (1936), and confirmed the underlying legality of minimum wages held in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).

from pages 126-128 intentionally omitted] Mr. Ben F. Cameron, of Meridian, Miss., for petitioners. [Argument of Counsel from pages 129-131 intentionally omitted] Francis Biddle, Sol.

Held: on an analysis of the Massachusetts statute creating the terminal company, that any direct obligation on the part of New Haven to pay interest and taxes terminated with the rejection of the Old Colony lease which related back to the date of the petition for reorganization, since which time the trustees have not operated for their own account but for that of the former lessors.

Held: that the issues tendered by the complaint are not so simple as petitioner would have them seem.

Held: entitled the taxpayer to requested instruction on his good faith in refusing to answer. This claim of constitutional right is quite different from the claim here of a right to use a passport obtained by false representation, contrary *342 to the express words of the statute, because there was no ulterior evil purpose in mind.

Held: authorizes the Commission to proceed only against business practices employed in interstate commerce. The Commission urges that its powers are not so restricted, that it may also proscribe unfair methods used in intrastate sales when these result in a handicap to interstate competitors.

Held: were entitled to the benefit of the exclusion allowed by § 504 (b) provided the gifts were not of “future interests” to which the section denies the benefit of the exclusion. As the Government has not sought certiorari it cannot attack the judgment below, but it is free to sustain it upon any legal ground which will support it. LeTulle v. Scofield, 308 U. S. 415 , 421, 422.

Held: that the hedge clause extended its protection to later statements made by respondent like those contained in the circular.

Fashion Originators' Guild of America v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941), is a 1941 decision of the United States Supreme Court sustaining an order of the Federal Trade Commission against a boycott agreement (concerted refusal to deal) among manufacturers of "high-fashion" dresses. The purpose of the boycott was to suppress "style piracy" (unauthorized copying of original dress creations of Fashion Guild members). The FTC found the Fashion Guild in violation of § 5 of the FTC Act, because the challenged conduct was a per se violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act.

Railroad Commission v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941), was a case in which the United States Supreme Court determined that it was appropriate for United States federal courts to abstain from hearing a case in order to allow state courts to decide substantial Constitutional issues that touch upon sensitive areas of state social policy.

Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941), was a case in which the Supreme Court of the United States held that, although the government cannot regulate the contents of speech, it can place reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions on speech for the public safety. Here, the Court held that government may require organizers of any parade or procession on public streets to have a license and pay a fee.

Held: following the reasoning of Lucas v. Earl, supra, that one who is entitled to receive, at a future date, interest or compensation for services and who makes a gift of it by an anticipatory assignment, realizes taxable income quite as much as if he had collected the income and paid it over to the object of his bounty. Helvering v. Horst, 311 U. S. 112 ; Helvering v. Eubank, 311 U. S. 122 .

Held: upon a review of the statutes creating the court and defining its authority, that its jurisdiction is confined to the rendition of money judgments in suits brought for that relief against the United States, United States v. Alire, 6 Wall. 573 ; United States v. Jones, 131 U. S. 1 , and if the relief sought is against others than the United States the suit as to them must be ignored as beyond the jurisdiction of the…

Held: nevertheless, that the Government was bound to compensate the respondents for damage to all of them, and affirmed the judgment of the District Court. 2 7 Certain matters are not in dispute. The Mississippi River at the points in question is navigable. The respondent railroad is the riparian owner and, as such, its title extends to ordinary low water mark.

Held: that § 182 8 accrues, without any effect from the language of § 42, all the earnings that are includible in a partner’s return, and that since the partnership method of keeping its books did not treat unfinished business as receipts, only the earnings actually collected are a part of the partner’s distributive share under § 182. We think such a conclusion is erroneous.