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www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
01/20/2023 09:04 AM CST
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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
313 Nebraska Reports
STATE V. SULLIVAN
Cite as 313 Neb. 293
State of Nebraska, appellee, v.
Ty W. Sullivan, appellant.
___ N.W.2d ___
Filed January 20, 2023. No. S-22-266.
1. Administrative Law: Statutes: Appeal and Error. The meaning and
interpretation of statutes and regulations are questions of law for which
an appellate court has an obligation to reach an independent conclusion
irrespective of the decision made by the court below.
2. Sentences: Probation and Parole. It is important to raise any objections to the conditions of post-release supervision when they are first
announced, and any alleged deficiency should be brought to the sentencing court’s attention at the outset.
3. Sentences. A sentence validly imposed takes effect from the time it is
pronounced, and any subsequent sentence fixing a different term is a
nullity.
4. Sentences: Probation and Parole. The State cannot seek changes
to the conditions of post-release supervision in the absence of new
circumstances.
5. Sentences: Probation and Parole: Collateral Attack: Appeal and
Error. Neb. Ct. R. § 6-1904 (rev. 2016) cannot be used to collaterally
attack a sentence and effectively eliminate the deadline to appeal.
Appeal from the District Court for Seward County: James C.
Stecker, Judge. Affirmed as modified.
Korey L. Reiman, Seward County Public Defender, for
appellant.
Douglas J. Peterson, Attorney General, and Kimberly A.
Klein for appellee.
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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
313 Nebraska Reports
STATE V. SULLIVAN
Cite as 313 Neb. 293
Heavican, C.J., Miller-Lerman, Cassel, Stacy, Funke,
Papik, and Freudenberg, JJ.
Heavican, C.J.
INTRODUCTION
Ty W. Sullivan appeals from the district court’s order adding to the conditions of his post-release supervision before
his anticipated release from the Department of Correctional
Services. Sullivan argues that the State needed to prove new
circumstances to warrant modification of the terms of the post-release supervision order under Neb. Ct. R. § 6-1904(B) (rev.
2016). Because this appeal presents a question of first impression as to the interpretation of § 6-1904 governing pre-release
modification of post-release supervision orders, we granted
the State’s petition to bypass the Nebraska Court of Appeals
pursuant to Neb. Ct. R. App. P. § 2-102(B) (rev. 2022). 1 For
the reasons set forth below, we affirm, as modified, the district
court’s post-release supervision order.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The State filed an initial information against Sullivan containing two counts of first degree sexual assault of a child, two
counts of third degree sexual assault of a child, and two counts
of felony child abuse, all enhanced with habitual criminal allegations. Pursuant to a plea agreement, Sullivan pleaded no contest to one count of felony child abuse, and the State dismissed
the other five counts. The plea agreement included conditions
that the State would not allege Sullivan was a habitual criminal
and that Sullivan did not have to register as a sex offender.
At the plea hearing, the State presented its factual basis for
the count of felony child abuse, which included allegations that
Sullivan would walk into the bathroom while his stepdaughters
were showering, that he engaged in sexual contact by touching their breasts, and that he performed digital penetration.
1
See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 24-1106(2) (Cum. Supp. 2022).
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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
313 Nebraska Reports
STATE V. SULLIVAN
Cite as 313 Neb. 293
Sullivan maintained that the sexual assault charges were false.
The court accepted Sullivan’s plea to one count of felony child
abuse and ordered a presentence investigation report to be
completed by the Office of Probation Administration. 2
At sentencing, Sullivan again maintained that the initial
allegations were false and that he did not commit the sexual assault offenses as the State originally charged. Sullivan
pointed to a letter written by a friend of his now ex-wife.
Sullivan’s ex-wife and his stepdaughters moved into this
friend’s house after they made their initial allegations of
Sullivan’s conduct. In her letter, the friend disclosed that
Sullivan’s ex-wife admitted to making up the sexual abuse
allegations and convincing the stepdaughters to lie because his
ex-wife wanted to get back at Sullivan after she discovered
that Sullivan had committed adultery. Sullivan also pointed to
a deposition transcript of his ex-wife, in which she invoked
her Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination and
refused to answer questions, as well as to multiple requests for
protection orders that contained conflicting allegations.
The district court, after considering that Sullivan received the
benefit of a favorable plea agreement, noting that Sullivan was
“habitual [offender] eligible,” and previously noting that his
probation had been revoked in an unrelated matter, sentenced
Sullivan to a term of 3 years’ imprisonment in the Department
of Correctional Services, followed by a term of 18 months’
post-release supervision. The court’s order for post-release
supervision adopted the Office of Probation Administration’s
recommendation contained in the presentence investigation
report. Neither party objected to the sentence, and no appeals
were filed.
As the anticipated date of Sullivan’s release from the
Department of Correctional Services neared, a post-release
supervision plan was prepared. The Office of Probation
Administration reviewed Sullivan’s original post-release
2
See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-2261 (Cum. Supp. 2022).
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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
313 Nebraska Reports
STATE V. SULLIVAN
Cite as 313 Neb. 293
supervision order and filed an application to change the order
under
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-2263(3) (Reissue 2016). Relevant to
this appeal, the application sought to add the following conditions to the order: (1) follow 12 standard conditions specific
for sex offenders, (2) obtain an “Adult[s] Who Sexually Harm
evaluation” and follow all resulting recommendations, and (3)
comply with real-time “GPS monitoring.”
At the hearing on the application, Sullivan objected wholesale to the addition of the conditions of his post-release
supervision. Sullivan specifically objected to all of the sex
offender specific conditions, except the condition that he have
no contact with the victims. The State called a specialized
probation officer to testify that probationers are supervised
according to what they have done, and not by what they have
been convicted of. From the viewpoint of this officer, the conditions specific to sex offenders were appropriate to add to the
court’s order because the police reports related to Sullivan’s
initial charges stated facts that were sexual in nature. Neither
the probation investigation officer who prepared Sullivan’s
presentence investigation report, nor the probation navigator
who prepared Sullivan’s post-release supervision plan, testified. Over Sullivan’s objections, the court added the conditions
included in the Office of Probation Administration’s application to its order of post-release supervision under § 6-1904(B),
rather than under § 29-2263(3). Sullivan appeals.
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
Sullivan assigns that the district court erred by adding to the
conditions of his post-release supervision as a matter of law
and that the State failed to provide sufficient evidence of new
circumstances to support the additions.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
[1] The meaning and interpretation of statutes and regulations are questions of law for which an appellate court has an
obligation to reach an independent conclusion irrespective of
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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
313 Nebraska Reports
STATE V. SULLIVAN
Cite as 313 Neb. 293
the decision made by the court below. 3 Claim-specific standards of review apply to an appeal of an order that modifies or
eliminates, or adds to conditions of probation. 4
ANALYSIS
As an initial matter, we note that the district court was correct
that § 6-1904, and not § 29-2263(3), controlled the proceeding
below. Because Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-2246(4) (Cum. Supp.
2022) provides that the definition of “probation” includes post-release supervision for the purposes of the Nebraska Probation
Administration Act, the procedure set forth in § 29-2263(3) is
applicable to post-release supervision. However, § 29-2263(3)
only applies during the term of probation and does not provide
authority for the modification or elimination of any of the
conditions imposed on the probation or the addition of further
conditions authorized by
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-2262 (Cum.
Supp. 2022) when an offender is still incarcerated and not yet
a probationer.
Chapter 6, article 19, of the Nebraska Supreme Court
Rules, promulgated under Neb. Const. art. 5, § 1, and
Neb.
Rev. Stat. § 29-2249 (Reissue 2016), provides rules for probation practices governing the trial courts of this State. Section
6-1904(B) provides a procedure for the district court to consider modification to its post-release supervision order based
upon information regarding an offender’s performance and
programming while incarcerated and the risks and needs
related to the offender complying with the conditions of his
or her post-release supervision as sentenced, along with the
needs and services of the community. It is this rule that was
applicable to the proceeding below and governs our review of
Sullivan’s appeal.
3
In re App. No. P-12.32 of Black Hills Neb. Gas, 311 Neb. 813,
976 N.W.2d
152 (2022).
4
See State v. Paulsen, 304 Neb. 21,
932 N.W.2d 849 (2019).
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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
313 Nebraska Reports
STATE V. SULLIVAN
Cite as 313 Neb. 293
On appeal, Sullivan argues that the State needed to prove
new circumstances by clear and convincing evidence to warrant adding to the terms of the post-release supervision order.
Sullivan cites to opinions of this court, 5 contending that under
§ 6-1904, like § 29-2263, 6 any objections by the State to the
post-release supervision order based on information available at the time of sentencing needed to have been brought
to the court’s attention when they were first announced at
sentencing. Sullivan contends that the State is under the same
obligations that we have found applicable to defendants and
probationers. We agree.
[2] We found in State v. Phillips 7 that the defendant’s
objections on direct appeal to the conditions of post-release
supervision imposed at sentencing were waived because the
defendant did not sufficiently preserve them. Then in State v.
Paulsen, 8 we affirmed the district court’s denial of a probationer’s motion to modify the terms of his probation because
all of the probationer’s allegations in support of modification were known at the time of sentencing. We noted that all
of the probationer’s arguments challenging the terms could
have been made on direct appeal, and we restated that it is
important to raise any objections to the conditions of post-release supervision when they are first announced. We also
noted that any alleged deficiency should be brought to the
sentencing court’s attention at the outset. Ultimately, we held
in Paulsen that modification of probation conditions under
§ 29-2263(3) is not an opportunity to collaterally attack the
sentencing judgment or to reassess whether initial conditions
were erroneous.
5
State v. Reames, 308 Neb. 361,
953 N.W.2d 807 (2021); State v.
Paulsen,
supra note 4; State v. Dill,
300 Neb. 344,
913 N.W.2d 470 (2018); State v.
Phillips, 297 Neb. 469,
900 N.W.2d 522 (2017).
6
See, also, State v. Kennedy, 299 Neb. 362,
908 N.W.2d 69 (2018).
7
State v. Phillips, supra note 5.
8
State v. Paulsen, supra note 4.
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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
313 Nebraska Reports
STATE V. SULLIVAN
Cite as 313 Neb. 293
[3] A sentence validly imposed takes effect from the time
it is pronounced, and any subsequent sentence fixing a different term is a nullity. 9 There is no challenge that Sullivan’s
sentence, including the initial conditions of his post-release
supervision, was validly imposed. 10 Sullivan’s sentence, which
included the conditions of his post-release supervision, was
pronounced at his sentencing hearing. Those initial conditions
reflect the sentencing court’s determination of what the State’s
penological interests required. 11
While aspects of a criminal sentence are quite static, similar
to § 29-2263(3), § 6-1904 creates an exception to the general
rule and allows a court to make adjustments to the conditions
of post-release supervision as changing circumstances warrant
before an offender’s release from the custody of the State. 12
Section 6-1904 provides the sentencing court with an opportunity to consider modification to its post-release supervision
order based upon the individualized post-release supervision
plan from the Office of Probation Administration for the purpose of transitioning individuals across levels of supervision
to, ultimately, discharge them. 13 Under § 6-1904(B) and (C),
these individualized plans are to include information regarding any programming the offender may have completed while
incarcerated and an updated assessment of the offender’s needs
and risks as the offender’s post-release supervision begins “to
better accomplish the primary goal of probation—‘to insure
that the offender will lead a law-abiding life.’” 14 To the
9
State v. Kidder, 299 Neb. 232,
908 N.W.2d 1 (2018). See, also, State v.
Thomas, 229 Neb. 635,
428 N.W.2d 221 (1988); State v. Holmes,
221 Neb.
629,
379 N.W.2d 765 (1986); State v. Vernon,
218 Neb. 539,
356 N.W.2d
887 (1984).
10
See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-105 (Cum. Supp. 2022).
11
See State v. Heaton, 225 Neb. 702,
407 N.W.2d 780 (1987).
12
See State v. Paulsen, supra note 4.
13
See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-2252(11) (Cum. Supp. 2022).
14
State v. Paulsen, supra note 4,
304 Neb. at 27,
932 N.W.2d at 854 (quoting
§ 29-2262(1)).
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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
313 Nebraska Reports
STATE V. SULLIVAN
Cite as 313 Neb. 293
extent the State argues that modification is mandatory upon
an application and recommendation of the Office of Probation
Administration, we reject that argument. Whether modification
is warranted is determined by the sentencing court. 15
[4,5] Analogous to our prior decisions, 16 we now hold that
the State cannot seek changes to the conditions of post-release
supervision in the absence of new circumstances. The State did
not object to the conditions of Sullivan’s post-release supervision at the time of sentencing, nor did the State file an appeal
as to Sullivan’s sentenced conditions of post-release supervision. We recognize that the State’s options to appeal from a
sentencing condition are not the same as those available to a
criminal defendant, but the State’s authority must be exercised
in accordance with those options and in the time and manner as
required by law. The State cannot collaterally attack Sullivan’s
sentence under the guise of a pre-release modification of
his post-release supervision conditions, and to hold otherwise
would allow § 6-1904 to “effectively eliminate the deadline to
appeal a criminal sentence.” 17 Thus, § 6-1904 cannot be used
to collaterally attack a sentence and effectively eliminate the
deadline to appeal.
At the hearing below, the only new circumstance contained
in Sullivan’s post-release supervision plan and testified to by
the specialized probation officer was an interview with the
victims’ mother that she was concerned Sullivan would contact the victims in this case. Sullivan did not object to the sex
offender specific condition that he have no contact with the victims. Therefore, the change to the district court’s post-release
15
See § 6-1904(D). See, also, State v. Lee, 237 Neb. 724,
467 N.W.2d 661
(1991); State v. Heaton, supra note 11.
16
See, State v. Paulsen, supra note 4 (holding motion to modify conditions
of probation cannot be used to collaterally attack sentence); State v.
Phillips, supra note 5 (holding defendant must specifically object to
conditions of post-release supervision at sentencing in order to sufficiently
preserve them for direct appeal).
17
State v. Paulsen, supra note 4,
304 Neb. at 32,
932 N.W.2d at 856.
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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
313 Nebraska Reports
STATE V. SULLIVAN
Cite as 313 Neb. 293
supervision order adding this condition is affirmed. All other
conditions added to the post-release supervision order are a
nullity and are of no effect. We modify the post-release supervision order to delete those other conditions.
CONCLUSION
Sullivan’s sentence was validly imposed when it was pronounced; hence, the pronounced conditions of Sullivan’s post-release supervision are still in effect. Because the State is under
the same obligations that we have previously held applicable
to defendants and probationers, the district court’s order is
affirmed only to the extent that Sullivan have no contact with
the victims in this case during the term of his post-release
supervision.
Affirmed as modified.
