434
Argued and submitted November 18, 2020, affirmed July 21, 2021
In the Matter of the Compensation of
Cassandra Sumner, Claimant.
SAIF CORPORATION
and Cooper Hollow Residential Services,
Petitioners,
v.
Cassandra SUMNER,
Respondent.
Workers’ Compensation Board
1800863; A171463
495 P3d 205
SAIF Corporation and employer, Cooper Hollow Residential Services, seek
review of an order of the Workers’ Compensation Board, contending that the
board erred in determining that claimant’s injury arose out of and occurred
during the course and scope of her employment. Held: Claimant, who works for
employer as a project manager for a residence for disabled adults and is regularly on call, was injured in a car accident while driving to meet her supervisor
with cash so that he could buy pizzas for employer’s holiday party. Although, at
the time of the accident, claimant had taken the day off and was on her way to
do some holiday shopping, substantial evidence supports the board’s determination that the intended employment detour to drop off cash with her supervisor
brought claimant within the course and scope of her employment. Substantial
evidence also supports the board’s finding that, at the time of the injury, claimant
was on an errand that was “within the reasonable bounds of her employment as
a project manager,” and, therefore, the board’s conclusion that the risk of injury
during that task was a risk of her employment.
Affirmed.
Beth Cupani argued the cause and filed the briefs for
petitioners.
R. Adian Martin argued the cause and filed the brief for
respondent.
Before Armstrong, Presiding Judge, and Aoyagi, Judge,
and Sercombe, Senior Judge.
ARMSTRONG, P. J.
Affirmed.
Cite as 313 Or App 434 (2021) 435
ARMSTRONG, P. J.
SAIF Corporation and employer Cooper Hollow
Residential Services seek review of an order of the Workers’
Compensation Board, contending that the board erred in
determining that claimant’s injury arose out of and occurred
during course and scope of her employment. We conclude
that the board did not err and therefore affirm.
Employer manages homes for disabled adults. Claimant works as a program manager for employer, managing
two homes in Monmouth, Oregon. Her duties include scheduling and coordinating staffing, training staff, budgeting, and ensuring compliance with state and federal law.
Claimant’s two homes in Monmouth are located about a
mile apart, and claimant drives between them. Claimant’s
normal work hours are from 8:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m., Monday
through Friday, but she is on call for emergencies or licensing
visits or inspections, leading to overtime hours. Claimant is
allowed to “flex” her hours, meaning that she can take time
off with permission if she has previously worked overtime.
On the day of her injury, claimant had permission
to use flex time to have the day off for some holiday shopping. But that morning, claimant received a text from her
supervisor asking her to come to employer’s main office
in Dallas to help wrap gifts for employer’s holiday party.
Claimant agreed and spent about an hour at the Dallas
office wrapping gifts. Claimant’s supervisor also came to the
office while claimant was there, then drove to McMinnville
to check on a residence. He intended to then drive to West
Salem to buy some pizzas for the holiday party.
After wrapping gifts, claimant left the office to
resume her errands. While en route to Salem, claimant
received a cellphone call from a coworker asking if she could
meet the supervisor in Rickreall on her way to Salem and
give him petty cash for the pizzas. Claimant agreed, but,
because she had already left Dallas, she decided not to
return to the office for petty cash and planned instead to
give the supervisor her own cash for the pizzas and then
seek reimbursement. The board found that the practice of
using one’s own cash to purchase work necessities was not
encouraged by employer but also was not forbidden, and
436 SAIF v. Sumner
claimant often spent personal funds on residents’ needs and
then requested reimbursement.
The accident occurred when claimant was driving
east of Dallas on Ellendale Road toward Rickreall and
Salem. Before the exit to Rickreall, a utility vehicle merged
onto Ellendale Road from Fir Villa Road and struck claimant’s car on the passenger side, pushing it into a third vehicle. Claimant suffered a low back injury as a result of the
accident and filed a claim, which SAIF denied on the ground
that the injury did not arise out of and in the course of claimant’s employment. Claimant requested a hearing.
An injury is compensable if it “arise[s] out of” and
occurs “in the course of employment.” ORS 656.005(7)(a).
The “arising out of” prong requires a causal link between
the worker’s injury and his or her employment. Krushwitz
v. McDonald’s Restaurants, 323 Or 520, 525-26,
919 P2d 465
(1996); Norpac Foods, Inc. v. Gilmore,
318 Or 363, 366,
867
P2d 1373 (1994). The “in the course of” prong concerns the
time, place, and circumstances of the injury. Krushwitz,
323
Or at 526; Norpac,
318 Or at 366. The two prongs are parts
of a single “work-connection” inquiry, that is, whether the
relationship between the injury and the employment is sufficient that the injury should be compensable. Krushwitz,
323
Or at 526; Norpac,
318 Or at 366. Both prongs must be satisfied to some degree, and neither is dispositive. Krushwitz,
323 Or at 531; Norpac,
318 Or at 366. The work-connection
test may be satisfied if the factors supporting one prong of
the statutory test are minimal while the factors supporting the other prong are substantial. Krushwitz,
323 Or at
531 (citing Phil A. Livesley Co. v. Russ,
296 Or 25, 28,
672
P2d 337 (1983)). Together, the “arising out of” and “in the
course of” prongs provide an analytical tool for determining
whether the causal connection between the injury and the
employment is sufficient to warrant compensation. Andrews
v. Tektronix, Inc.,
323 Or 154, 161-62,
915 P2d 972 (1996).
An administrative law judge (ALJ) upheld SAIF’s
denial of claimant’s claim, but the board reversed the
ALJ’s order. In determining that claimant’s injury arose
out of and occurred in the course of her employment, the
board cited claimant’s on-call status. The board found
Cite as 313 Or App 434 (2021) 437
that claimant’s work duties were not limited to her regular working hours and included completing special tasks or
errands for employer. The board also found that, in assisting a coworker, claimant was complying with employer’s
encouragement that an employee be a “team player.” Thus,
although claimant was not scheduled to work on the date
of injury and had not been directed by employer to bring
money to her supervisor, the board concluded that claimant
was within the reasonable bounds of her employment at the
time of the injury, that claimant’s work exposed her to the
risk of being injured during an errand, and that the injury
arose out of and in the course of claimant’s employment.
SAIF and employer seek judicial review, contending
that the board erred. We review the board’s conclusion that
claimant’s injury arose out of and was within the course
and scope of her employment for legal error. ORS 183.482(8);
Compton v. SAIF Corp., 195 Or App 329, 333,
97 P3d 669,
rev den,
337 Or 669 (2004). We review the board’s findings for substantial evidence and substantial reason. ORS
656.298(7); ORS 183.482(8)(c).
To determine whether an injury occurs “in the
course of” employment, the court determines if the time,
place, and circumstances of the injury justify connecting the
injury to the employment. Robinson v. Nabisco, Inc., 331 Or
178, 186,
11 P3d 1286 (2000). An injury takes place in the
course of employment if it occurs “while the worker reasonably is fulfilling the duties of the employment or is doing
something reasonably incidental to it.” Fred Meyer, Inc. v.
Hayes,
325 Or 592, 598,
943 P2d 197 (1997).
SAIF contends that claimant was not in the course
of her employment at the time of the accident, because she
was on a personal errand and not working or at a place
where she was expected to be at the time of the injury.
Claimant responds that, in light of her on-call
status and employer’s encouragement of teamwork, at the
moment that claimant agreed to the co-worker’s request to
deliver cash to the supervisor, she was engaged in a task
for employer that brought her within the course of her
employment.
438 SAIF v. Sumner
SAIF replies that delivering her own money to the
supervisor was not within claimant’s job, because employer
had not directed her to undertake it. Further, SAIF contends that the errand was of no benefit to employer, who had
not requested money from claimant and whose policy did
not authorize employees to take direction from coworkers
or to use their own money for work-related expenses. See
SAIF v. Fortson, 155 Or App 586, 592,
964 P2d 293 (1998)
(explaining that “[w]e have in the past considered the benefit to the employer of the conduct that injured the claimant when evaluating whether the injury was connected with
work” but adding that that determination is not dispositive).
Indeed, employer notes, when the supervisor came to the
location of the accident, he declined to accept claimant’s
money for the pizza and instead went to the office for petty
cash.
We agree with the board’s conclusion that claimant
was in the course of her employment. Claimant’s task—
delivering cash to her supervisor—was clearly work-related.
The board found that, although employer did not favor
employees spending their own money for work, employer did
not have a rule prohibiting employees from using their own
money and was even aware that the conduct occurred occasionally. That finding is supported by substantial evidence.
And, as claimant correctly notes, the fact that the task had
not been requested—or may even have been prohibited—
does not necessarily take it outside the course of employment, if it was the type of activity that can be understood
to be connected to the employment. See Andrews, 323 Or
at 165 (an employee’s violation of an employment rule does
not render the claim noncompensable). As we held in SAIF
v. Scardi,
218 Or App 403, 411,
180 P3d 56, rev den,
345 Or
175 (2008), an activity need not be directed by an employer
for it to be work related. Nor is it required that the employee
be compensated for engaging in the activity. See, e.g., Iliaifar
v. SAIF,
160 Or App 116, 122,
981 P2d 353 (1999) (injury
occurred in the course of employment even though claimant
was off work and unpaid at the time of the injury). Injuries
can be work related even if they occur in the performance of
duties that are off the employer’s premises and not within
the claimant’s typical job duties.
Id.
Cite as
313 Or App 434 (2021) 439
Thus, although claimant’s supervisor had not asked
her to bring him cash—and likely would not have authorized her to use her own money—at the time of the injury,
claimant was on an errand that was of a type that would
be undertaken within her job and that was work related.
Indeed, although it was to be her day off, claimant had earlier responded to the supervisor’s request to come to the
office to wrap holiday gifts. And the evidence supports the
board’s finding that helping a coworker with a work-related
task was encouraged by employer. The fact that claimant
was driving on the same road as her personal trip at the
time of the accident does not detract from the work-related
nature of the errand, which brought her within the course of
her employment.
We also conclude that substantial evidence supports the board’s determination that claimant’s injury arose
out of claimant’s employment. A worker’s injury arises out
of the employment if it originates from a risk to which the
work exposes the worker. Legacy Health Systems v. Noble,
250 Or App 596, 600-01,
283 P3d 924 (2012). Employer contends that, because claimant had not yet altered her route
to drive to Rickreall at the time of the accident, the injury
did not originate from a risk of her employment. However,
although claimant was on the same road at the time of
the accident, she had interrupted her personal trip for
employer’s errand. The board found that, at the time of the
injury, claimant was on an errand that was “within the reasonable bounds of her employment as a project manager,”
and, thus, the risk of injury during that task was a risk of
her employment. That finding is supported by substantial
evidence and substantial reason. We therefore affirm the
board’s order that claimant’s claim is compensable.
Affirmed.
