526
Submitted September 1, 2020, reversed July 28, 2021
In the Matter of J. D. J.,
a Person Alleged to have Mental Illness.
STATE OF OREGON,
Respondent,
v.
J. D. J.,
Appellant.
Clackamas County Circuit Court
19CC02621; A171312
496 P3d 1095
Appellant was committed to the custody of the Mental Health Division for a
period not to exceed 180 days based upon the trial court’s finding that she was
unable to provide for the basic personal needs necessary to avoid serious physical
harm in the near future and was not receiving the care necessary to avoid such
harm. On appeal, she argues that (1) she is entitled to reversal because the proceedings below were not recorded; and (2) assuming that the parties’ agreed narrative statement about what transpired below is sufficient for appellate review,
the state failed to present legally sufficient evidence to support the commitment.
Held: In light of the state’s burden to prove the basis for commitment and the particular arguments that were presented in the case, the agreed narrative statement allowed the Court of Appeals to conduct meaningful review, and the court
limited its consideration to those parts of the narrative statement on which the
parties actually agreed. As for the merits of the commitment order, the record
before the court was not sufficient to prove that appellant’s inability to appreciate
and take care of her medical needs was likely to result in serious physical harm
in the near future.
Reversed.
Colleen F. Gilmartin, Judge pro tempore.
Joseph R. DeBin and Multnomah Defenders, Inc., filed the
brief for appellant.
Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman,
Solicitor General, and E. Nani Apo, Assistant Attorney
General, filed the brief for respondent.
Before Lagesen, Presiding Judge, and James, Judge, and
Kamins, Judge.
LAGESEN, P. J.
Reversed.
Cite as 313 Or App 526 (2021) 527
LAGESEN, P. J.
Appellant was committed to the custody of the
Mental Health Division for a period not to exceed 180 days
based upon the trial court’s finding that she was unable to
provide for the basic personal needs necessary to avoid serious physical harm in the near future and was not receiving
the care necessary to avoid such harm. See ORS 426.005
(1)(f)(B). On appeal, she argues that (1) she is entitled to
reversal because the proceedings below were not recorded;
and (2) assuming that the parties’ agreed narrative statement about what transpired below is sufficient for this
court’s review, the state failed to present legally sufficient
evidence to support the commitment. We reject appellant’s
argument that the lack of a recording itself entitles her to
reversal in this case, but we agree that the record before
us does not support the commitment order. Accordingly, we
reverse.
Record on appeal. The record we have is by and
large the product of “technical difficulties with the recording equipment” in the trial court. Because of those “technical difficulties,” the parties filed an agreed narrative statement in lieu of a transcript of the proceedings below. See
ORS 19.380 (“In lieu of or in addition to a transcript, the
parties may prepare an agreed narrative statement of the
proceedings below or parts thereof.”); ORAP 3.45 (“If the
parties agree to a narrative statement in lieu of or in addition to a transcript and the parties are able to reconstruct
the statements and testimony of the judge, parties, counsel,
witnesses, and others present at the proceeding, the narrative statement shall follow as nearly as practicable the form
prescribed for transcripts in ORAP 3.35; otherwise, the
statement may be in narrative form.”).
The agreed narrative statement begins by identifying “Exhibit 1” as having been admitted at the commitment
hearing. Exhibit 1 is a two-page excerpt from a precommitment investigator’s report. The first page describes the
“mental status” examination of appellant, including that
appellant’s thoughts were “tangential and demonstrated
limited insight into need for on-going care”; it states that
“[i]nitial diagnostic impression is Bipolar 1 Disorder based
528 State v. J. D. J.
on records review and presentation. [Appellant] exhibits
sleep disruption, irritability, labile mood, pressured speech,
disorganization of thought, hyper-religiousness, hyper sexuality, and persecutory paranoia involving her ex-husband
and thoughts of his desire to kill her.” The second page
recites the investigator’s recommendation—essentially, that
appellant was unable to provide for her basic needs and
should be committed because she “is experiencing sleep disruption, irritability, labile mood, pressured speech, disorganization of thought, hyper-religiousness, hyper sexuality,
persecutory paranoia that leave her unable to safely navigate
her multiple healthcare needs.” (Emphasis added.)
After referring to Exhibit 1, the agreed narrative
statement provides the following review of the evidence and
of appellant’s closing argument:
“The treating psychiatrist diagnosed her as of May 13,
2019, with Bipolar Type I, manic. Appellant had decreased
need for sleep, pressured speech, flight of ideas, hypersexual,
religious ideas, delusional thoughts about her ex-husband,
conspiracies, labile mood, screaming and yelling at night
and impulsive behavior. She was not violent and had no
self harm behavior. Appellant denied that she has a mental
health disorder. She had initially refused olanzapine, but
did take it the night before the hearing. She had been taking Depakote since 5/11. Appellant said that she would take
her medications until she felt rested and then would stop
taking them. She had taken multiple medications today for
her physical ailments. At this time she still has significant
symptoms of mania and it could take at least 2 weeks to
stabilize to move to a less restrictive setting. Appellant
had a number of medical issues including congestive heart
failure, breast cancer, hypothyroidism, hypertension, and
lupus. In January 2019, she was too weak to call 911, but
was able to yell loud enough for a neighbor to hear her and
call an ambulance. The ambulance took appellant to the
hospital. She was in the intensive care unit. She was not
attending appointments with her primary care physician.
The psychiatrist was concerned for her fragile health and
chronic pain secondary to lupus.
“Her outpatient therapist also testified he had known
her for 2 years. She had a history of bipolar. She had made
significant improvements with therapy. The therapist was
not familiar with her living conditions until about 4-5
Cite as 313 Or App 526 (2021) 529
weeks ago. He checked on her at home on May 2 and her
home ‘was a disaster.’ There were many tripping hazards
throughout the home. She lives alone with a service dog.
She relies upon neighbors to help but they were concerned
about their ability to help. She was not attending appointments. She gets meals on wheels. She gets some help with
food from neighbors. The psychiatrist was concerned about
appellant missing medical and therapy appointments.
“The investigator testified that she would be able to
return to her residence. Appellant gets SSD and alimony.
Between May 9 and 14 she had some indication of paranoia, delusions and tangential thoughts. She was focused
on her dog. Her mood was labile.
“In closing argument, defense counsel argued that the
state failed to meet its burden of proof because she had sufficient income to pay her expenses, she had a place to live,
she was taking her medication for her physical medical
problems and she was willing to continue with outpatient
treatment.”
(Footnotes omitted.)
The “agreed” narrative statement also identifies two
points on which the parties were unable to agree: (1) whether
there was testimony as to appellant nearly dying from renal
problems; and (2) whether her outpatient therapist testified that he did not see grandiosity, delusional behavior, or
paranoia.
Lack of audio record as grounds for automatic reversal. In appellant’s first assignment of error, she contends
that, notwithstanding the agreed narrative statement, the
trial court “violated appellant’s right to due process by conducting a completely unrecorded civil commitment hearing,
and also seeks reversal under ORS 19.420(3),” which provides for reversal “as justice may require” in the case of loss
or destruction of audio records. Appellant argues that the
agreed narrative statement is insufficient because it is “not
reasonable to expect the parties to agree on who said what
over the course of an entire hearing,” as reflected by their
inability to agree about certain testimony.
In response, the state asserts that the agreed narrative statement adequately protects appellant’s rights to
due process and meaningful appellate review; according to
530 State v. J. D. J.
the state, in view of its burden to prove the basis for commitment, the parties’ inability to reach agreement on the
testimony at issue would “only impact the state’s ability to
defend the commitment; it would not hinder appellant’s ability to argue that the evidence was insufficient to support
that commitment.”
We agree with the state that, in light of its burden
and the particular arguments that have been presented in
this case, the agreed narrative statement allows us to conduct meaningful review. For purposes of review, we take into
account only those parts of the narrative statement on which
the parties actually agree—a fundamental aspect of an
“agreed narrative statement” under ORS 19.380. (Emphasis
added.) And, as our resolution of appellant’s second assignment of error will demonstrate, our review of the sufficiency
of the evidence based on the agreed narrative statement and
referenced exhibit is adequate to protect appellant’s rights.1
We therefore reject appellant’s first assignment of error and
turn to the merits of the commitment order.2
Evidentiary sufficiency. In her second assignment
of error, appellant argues that the state failed to present
sufficient evidence to support the order of commitment.
Specifically, she argues that the state failed to present evidence to support a finding that her condition at the time of
the hearing was such that she was at risk of serious physical
harm in the near future. “To meet that standard, the state
must prove that the person ‘is unable to provide for his or
1
If the matters subject to disagreement were potentially dispositive in favor
of appellant—for instance, the state’s evidence would be legally sufficient but for
the disputed testimony—our analysis of this assignment of error would be different. But, in this case, appellant is not disadvantaged by the inability of the
parties to agree, considering that she is entitled to reversal based on the record
that the state agrees is sufficient for our review.
2
We appreciate how difficult it is to reconstruct the record of proceedings,
especially when a considerable amount of time has passed between the hearing
and the discovery that the recording has been lost. Although we ultimately conclude that the parties’ narrative statement is sufficient for our review, we note
that, when possible, a more detailed recitation of agreed-upon facts or, when facts
are disputed, the opposing testimony, will generally facilitate our review function
better than a more generalized summary, an observation that is consistent with
ORAP 3.45’s directive that narrative statements should resemble transcripts
when possible. See ORAP 3.45 (providing that the “narrative statement shall
follow as nearly as practicable the form prescribed for transcripts in ORAP 3.35;
otherwise, the statement may be in narrative form”).
Cite as 313 Or App 526 (2021) 531
her basic personal needs in a way that leaves the person
at nonspeculative risk of serious physical harm—meaning
that the person’s safe survival will be compromised—in the
near future.’ ” State v. R. L. M.,
309 Or App 545, 548-49,
482
P3d 201 (2021) (quoting State v. M. A. E.,
299 Or App 231,
240,
448 P3d 656 (2019)).
We agree with appellant that the record before us
is not sufficient to satisfy that standard. Exhibit 1 and the
agreed narrative statement list “a number of medical issues
including congestive heart failure, breast cancer, hypothyroidism, hypertension, and lupus” that appellant “had,” and
there is evidence that she was taken to the intensive care
unit in January 2019. However, the exhibit and narrative do
not reflect which, if any, of those health conditions were the
reason that she was hospitalized at that time, which was four
months before the commitment proceedings, or the severity
of those conditions at the time of the commitment proceedings.3 And, although the record indicates that appellant was
not going to medical appointments and failed to appreciate
her health issues, there is no evidence in the record as to
the stage of her medical conditions, the treatment she was
receiving, or the risks from neglecting any treatment.4
For that reason, we conclude that the state failed to
prove that appellant’s inability to appreciate and take care
of her medical needs was likely to result in serious physical harm in the near future. See R. L. M., 309 Or App at
550 (describing “long line of cases recognizing that, for purposes of a basic-needs civil commitment, the evidence must
establish not only that a person’s inability to attend to a
basic need risks the person suffering an adverse medical
3
In fact, there is some indication in the trial court file (in the medical examiners’ reports) that appellant had a history of breast cancer.
4
In addition to Exhibit 1 and the agreed narrative, the state relies on facts
drawn from the reports of the medical examiners that were filed under ORS
426.120. Assuming that the facts recited in those reports are properly before us
in this procedural posture, the descriptions of appellant’s medical conditions in
those reports do not change our view that the state failed to present sufficient
evidence of a risk to appellant’s safe survival in the near future as a result of her
mental disorder. One of the examiner’s reports indicates that appellant “gave
a history of nearly dying with renal problems earlier this year,” but it does not
otherwise discuss the cause of the renal failure or provide a nonspeculative basis
for concluding that any of her conditions, left untreated, would result in renal
failure or other serious health conditions in the near future.
532 State v. J. D. J.
consequence, but also how soon that adverse consequence
is likely to occur” (emphasis omitted)); id. at 552 (reversing
commitment order where state failed to show that appellant’s “failure to take his Afib medication was likely to
result in his death (or other serious physical harm) in the
near future”). Simply put, maybe because of the lack of audio
recording, maybe because of the lack of evidence, this record
lacks sufficient detail about appellant’s conditions and the
risks that they posed to her at the time of the hearing to
support a rational determination that appellant’s mental
disorder compromised her near-term safe survival at the
time of the commitment hearing.
Reversed.
