J-S08012-24
2024 PA Super 74
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
BRIAN EARL LAUGHMAN :
:
Appellant : No. 1315 MDA 2023
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered August 31, 2023
In the Court of Common Pleas of Adams County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-01-CR-0001156-2021
BEFORE: OLSON, J., MURRAY, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
OPINION BY OLSON, J.: FILED: APRIL 17, 2024
Appellant, Brian Earl Laughman, appeals from the judgment of sentence
entered on August 31, 2023. We affirm.
The trial court ably summarized the underlying facts of this case:
On November 22, 2021, Appellant pled guilty to one count of
fleeing or attempting to elude a police officer and one count
of driving under suspension.[1] On January 4, 2022,
Appellant was [] sentenced to [three to 23 months’] partial
confinement at the Adams County Adult Correctional
Complex (ACACC) with a concurrent term of [three] years’
probation.
On June 30, 2023, the Commonwealth filed a Motion for
Revocation [of Appellant’s Parole and Concurrent Probation,]
based on multiple violations for possessing and using
non-prescribed controlled substances. Specifically, in its
Motion for Revocation, the Adams County Department of
Probation Services note[d] that Appellant provided a urine
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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
1 75 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3733(a) and 1543(b)(1)(i), respectively.
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sample that was positive for cocaine on February 9, 2023,
and also signed an acknowledgement admitting to having
consumed cocaine on June 29, 2023, in violation of
probation.
Additionally, it was revealed to the Revocation Court at
sentenc[ing] that Appellant consumed shots of moonshine in
the presence of probation officers to avoid providing a urine
sample for testing on August 31, 2023.[fn.1] Thereafter,
Appellant was given a sentence of “partial confinement and
[was] recommitted to serve the balance of his sentence of
one year and eight months at the ACACC,” and “a concurrent
sentence of 36 months of probation.” Notably, the
Revocation Court added a “no alcohol” condition at [the]
request of Probation “based on conduct that Probation
personally witnessed.”2
[fn.1] At sentencing on the Revocation, Appellant’s
Probation Officer explained “[Appellant] thought it would
be in his best interest to consume alcohol because it
moved through his system faster. . . . [It] was also the
basis for another violation of the positive cocaine because
[Appellant] believed that the cocaine was in the
moonshine that [Appellant] had consumed. [N.T.
Violation Hearing, 8/31/23, at 6].
Trial Court Opinion, 10/20/23, at 1-2 (some footnotes and capitalization
omitted).
Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. He raises one claim to this
Court:
Whether the sentencing court manifestly abused its
discretion by imposing an unreasonable special condition,
specifically a prohibition on alcohol, when there was no nexus
to the condition and the underlying offense?
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2 During the recommitment and resentencing hearing, Appellant specifically
objected to the fact that the trial court added the “no alcohol” condition to the
terms of his probation. N.T. Violation Hearing, 8/31/23, at 4-5.
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Appellant’s Brief at 4.3
On appeal, Appellant claims that the trial court abused its discretion at
sentencing, when it imposed the probationary condition that Appellant must
refrain from using alcohol. According to Appellant, the “no alcohol” provision
is unreasonable, as it “has no nexus to the underlying facts of the original
offense.” See Appellant’s Brief at 11. Appellant’s claim challenges the
discretionary aspects of his sentence. See Commonwealth v. Carr, 262
A.3d 561, 567 (Pa. Super. 2021) (holding: a claim that a probationary
condition is “unreasonable due to the lack of a nexus between it and
Appellant’s crime and rehabilitative needs” is a challenge to the discretionary
aspects of a sentence).
We note that, in an appeal following the revocation of probation, our
scope of review includes discretionary aspects of sentencing claims.
Commonwealth v. Cartrette, 83 A.3d 1030, 1042 (Pa. Super. 2013) (en
banc). With respect to our standard of review, we have held that “sentencing
is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the sentencing judge, whose
judgment will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion.”
Commonwealth v. Ritchey,
779 A.2d 1183, 1185 (Pa. Super. 2001).
Moreover, pursuant to statute, Appellant does not have an automatic right to
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3 Appellant raised a second issue in the statement of questions involved
section of his brief. See Appellant’s Brief at 4; Pa.R.A.P. 2116. However,
Appellant expressly abandoned the second issue in the argument section of
his brief. See Appellant’s Brief at 18 (declaring that the second issue “is not
ripe for appeal and is therefore forfeit[ed]”).
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appeal the discretionary aspects of his sentence. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(b).
Instead, Appellant must petition this Court for permission to appeal the
discretionary aspects of his sentence. Id.
As this Court has explained:
[t]o reach the merits of a discretionary sentencing issue, we
conduct a four-part analysis to determine: (1) whether
appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal, Pa.R.A.P. 902,
903; (2) whether the issue was properly preserved at
sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and modify sentence,
Pa.R.Crim.P. [708(E)]; (3) whether appellant's brief has a
fatal defect, Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) whether there is a
substantial question that the sentence appealed from is not
appropriate under the Sentencing Code, 42 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 9781(b).
Commonwealth v. Cook, 941 A.2d 7, 11 (Pa. Super. 2007); see also
Commonwealth v. Kalichak,
943 A.2d 285, 289 (Pa. Super. 2008) (“when
a court revokes probation and imposes a new sentence, a criminal defendant
needs to preserve challenges to the discretionary aspects of that new sentence
either by objecting during the revocation sentencing or by filing a [motion to
modify] sentence”).
Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal and properly challenged the
discretionary aspects of his sentence at the resentencing hearing. See N.T.
Violation Hearing, 8/31/23, at 4-5. Further, although Appellant did not include
a “concise statement of the reasons relied upon for allowance of appeal with
respect to the discretionary aspects of a sentence,” as required by
Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 2119(f), the Commonwealth did
object to this failure. See Commonwealth’s Brief at 1-14. Therefore,
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Appellant’s non-compliance with Rule 2119(f) does not preclude our review of
Appellant’s discretionary aspects of sentencing claim. See Commonwealth
v. Bonds, 890 A.2d 414, 418 (Pa. Super. 2005) (“in the absence of any
objection from the Commonwealth, we are empowered to review claims that
otherwise fail to comply with Rule 2119(f)”). Finally, as this Court held, “a
claim that a particular probation condition is not reasonable due to the lack of
a nexus between the restriction and the rehabilitative needs of the defendant”
presents a substantial question. Carr,
262 A.3d at 567. Therefore, we may
address the merits of Appellant’s discretionary aspects of sentencing claim.
This Court has explained:
As a general matter, the sentencing court is charged to
impose a sentence that is “consistent” with “the protection of
the public, the gravity of the offense as it relates to the
impact on the life of the victim and on the community, and
the rehabilitative needs of the defendant.” 42 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 9721(b). Our standard of review in this context is
well-established:
Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of
the sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed
on appeal absent a manifest abuse of discretion. In this
context, an abuse of discretion is not shown merely by an
error in judgment. Rather, the appellant must establish,
by reference to the record, that the sentencing court
ignored or misapplied the law, exercised its judgment for
reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, or arrived
at a manifestly unreasonable decision.
Commonwealth v. Shugars, 895 A.2d 1270, 1275 (Pa.
Super. 2006). “The rationale behind such broad discretion
and the concomitantly deferential standard of appellate
review is that the sentencing court is in the best position to
determine the proper penalty for a particular offense based
upon an evaluation of the individual circumstances before it.”
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Commonwealth v. Walls, 926 A.2d 957 (Pa. 2007). In
conducting our review, this Court must also “have regard”
for: (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the
history and characteristics of the defendant; (2) the
opportunity of the sentencing court to observe the defendant,
including any presentence investigation; (3) the findings
upon which the sentence was based; and (4) the
Pennsylvania Sentencing Guidelines. 42 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 9781(d)(1)-(4).
Carr, 262 A.3d at 567-568.
The case at bar concerns the discretion afforded a sentencing court
when imposing conditions of probation. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9763 declares that,
when a trial court sentences a defendant to probation, the trial court must
“specify at the time of sentencing the conditions of probation.” 42 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 9763(a). As we have explained:
With specific reference to probation conditions, the
sentencing court is required to impose “reasonable
conditions” that “it deems necessary to ensure or assist the
defendant in leading a law-abiding life.” 42 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 9754(c). The scope and substance of probation conditions
is governed by 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9763(b), which provides a
non-exhaustive list of potential conditions. Pursuant to a
catchall provision in this statute, the sentencing court is
generally empowered to impose probation conditions that
require a defendant “to do things” that are “reasonably
related to rehabilitation.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9763(b)(15). This
Court has interpreted this statutory rubric as follows:
A probation order is unique and individualized. It is
constructed as an alternative to imprisonment and is
designed to rehabilitate a criminal defendant while still
preserv[ing] the rights of law-abiding citizens to be
secure in their persons and property. When conditions
are placed on probation orders they are formulated to
insure or assist a defendant in leading a law-abiding life.
Moreover, as long as conditions placed on probation are
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reasonable, it is within a trial court's discretion to order
them.
Commonwealth v. Hartman, 908 A.2d 316, 320 (Pa.
Super. 2006) (internal citations omitted). Thus, “[w]hile
sentencing courts have discretion to impose conditions of
probation, such conditions must be reasonable and devised
to serve rehabilitative goals, such as recognition of
wrongdoing, deterrence of future criminal conduct, and
encouragement of law-abiding conduct.” Commonwealth
v. Hall, 80 A.3d 1204, 1215 (Pa. 2013).
Carr,
262 A.3d at 568.
Appellant claims on appeal that the trial court abused its discretion when
it imposed the probationary condition that Appellant must refrain from using
alcohol. In particular, Appellant claims the “no alcohol” provision is
unreasonable as it “has no nexus to the underlying facts of the original
offense.” See Appellant’s Brief at 11; see also Appellant’s Brief at 4 (claiming
that the “no alcohol” probationary condition is unreasonable, as there “was no
nexus to the condition and the underlying offense”).
In support of his claim, Appellant cites to our opinion in Carr, where we
held that the “sentencing court erred and abused its discretion by imposing
an unreasonable and inappropriate probation condition restricting [the
defendant’s] use of various electronic devices and the Internet.” Carr, 262
A.3d at 571. Specifically, in Carr, we held that the trial court’s probationary
condition was unreasonable, as: “[t]here [was] no evident nexus between the
crime to which [the defendant] pled guilty and the restrictions upon his ability
to use computers, smartphones, and the Internet;” the trial court relied upon
unproven charges against the defendant as “proof” that the defendant needed
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to be precluded from using computers and the Internet; and, the
“indiscriminate ban could negatively impact [the defendant’s] ability to better
himself.” Id. at 569-572; see also Commonwealth v. Houtz,
982 A.2d 537
(Pa. Super. 2009) (holding: where “there [was] no evidence that [the
defendant] used the computer/Internet for sexually explicit material involving
minors or that she used the computer/Internet as a source to establish and
cultivate inappropriate relationships” during the underlying crimes, the trial
court’s probationary condition, restricting the defendant from using computers
and the Internet, was an abuse of discretion, as there were no facts “which
would allow this Court to conclude that such a restriction [was] reasonably
related to [the defendant’s] rehabilitation”). According to Appellant, Carr and
Houtz mandate that we vacate the contested probationary condition because
Appellant “was charged [with] and [pleaded] guilty to fleeing or eluding an
officer and driving on a suspended license. There is no nexus between the
additional condition of no alcohol and the underlying facts of the offense
because no facts alleged in the criminal complaint include alcohol use/abuse.”
Appellant’s Brief at 15. Appellant’s claim fails.
At the outset, the Judicial Code empowers a sentencing court to attach
such probationary conditions that “it deems necessary to ensure or assist the
defendant in leading a law-abiding life.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9754(b). The only
restrictions on the sentencing court’s power are: 1) the conditions must be
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authorized by 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9763;4 2) the conditions must be “reasonable;”
and, 3) the trial court must “deem[ the conditions] necessary to ensure or
assist the defendant in leading a law-abiding life.” See id.; see also
Commonwealth v. Hall, 80 A.3d 1204, 1215 (Pa. 2013) (“[w]hile sentencing
courts have discretion to impose conditions of probation, such conditions must
be reasonable and devised to serve rehabilitative goals, such as recognition
of wrongdoing, deterrence of future criminal conduct, and encouragement of
future law-abiding conduct”).
Thus, contrary to Appellant’s claim, there is no explicit statutory
requirement that there be a “nexus between the crime to which [the defendant
was convicted]” and the probationary condition. Rather, Carr and Houtz
looked to the facts of the underlying crimes because those cases: came to
this Court on direct appeal from the underlying convictions and concerned a
restriction on computers and the Internet, which are ubiquitous products and
services in today’s society and (though potentially subject to abuse) can also
be used “to make positive changes” in a defendant’s life. See Houtz, 982
A.2d at 541. Further, in both Carr and Houtz, this Court looked to the
underlying facts of the defendant’s crimes for the sole purpose of determining
whether the probationary condition was “reasonably related to [the
defendant’s] rehabilitation.” See
id. (emphasis added); see also
id.
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4 Again, Section 9763 contains a “catchall” provision, which allows a court to
order that the defendant “do other things reasonably related to rehabilitation.”
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9763(b)(15).
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(“there is no evidence that [the defendant] used the computer/Internet for
sexually explicit material involving minors or that she used the
computer/Internet as a source to establish and cultivate inappropriate
relationships;” therefore, in the direct appeal from the underlying convictions,
we held that there was an “absence of any facts . . . which would allow this
Court to conclude that [a restriction on computers and the Internet was]
reasonably related to [the defendant’s] rehabilitation”).
The case at bar, however, comes to this Court after re-sentencing from
a probation violation and concerns a prohibition from alcohol. In assessing
the reasonableness of this provision, we are not limited to determining
whether there was a nexus between the older, underlying crimes and the
probationary condition. Rather, we must look broadly at whether the condition
is ”reasonably related to [Appellant’s] rehabilitation” – which is an inquiry that
necessarily encompasses the more recent facts of Appellant’s probation
violation. See Commonwealth v. Starr, 234 A.3d 755, 763-764 (Pa. Super.
2020) (looking to the facts underlying the defendant’s probation violation to
determine whether the probationary condition was reasonable and
individualized). Therefore, Appellant’s claim on appeal – which is based solely
upon the contention that there “was no nexus [between the probationary]
condition and the underlying offense” – necessarily fails.
Moreover, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion
when it imposed the probationary condition that Appellant refrain from using
alcohol. In the case at bar, the trial court fashioned Appellant’s “no alcohol”
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probationary condition from the “catchall” probationary condition, found at 42
Pa.C.S.A. § 9763(b)(15). This provision declares:
The court may attach any of the following conditions upon
the defendant as it deems necessary:
...
(15) To do other things reasonably related to
rehabilitation.
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9763(b)(15).
As the trial court explained, Appellant’s “no alcohol” probationary
condition was: 1) “reasonably related to [Appellant’s] rehabilitation” (and,
thus, authorized by Section 9763), 2) “reasonable,” as Appellant had violated
both his parole and his concurrent term of probation by abusing cocaine that,
Appellant claimed, was found in his moonshine, and Appellant also attempted
to avoid complying with his probation officer’s demands by drinking alcohol
until the probation officer finally left; and, 3) deemed by the trial court to be
“necessary to ensure or assist the defendant in leading a law-abiding life.”
The trial court explained:
The “no alcohol” condition here is [] tailored to allow
Appellant to stay on track during the rehabilitation process as
part of probation, while clearly bearing a nexus to
[Appellant’s] probation violations. . . . Considering Appellant
[] consumed alcohol in an attempt to intentionally avoid
complying with his probation requirements[,] it is clear that
the Revocation Court added a condition to Appellant's
probation that was carefully assessed in response to
Appellant's changing rehabilitative needs and to encourage
Appellant to live a law-abiding lifestyle. The Revocation Court
was firmly within its broad discretion to impose those
conditions necessary to facilitate Appellant's rehabilitation
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after assessing his needs, whether based on the facts of the
underlying offense or those needs highlighted by violations of
probation conditions.
...
Given that the probation condition added by the Revocation
Court in this case was carefully assessed and imposed in
response to Appellant's changing needs during his
rehabilitation process and based on conduct and violations of
probation, there is clearly a nexus between these offenses
and the conditions imposed in response. Likewise, the impact
and practical burden of that added condition is not so
burdensome as to impair Appellant's ability to better himself
or otherwise hinder the rehabilitation process when analyzed
in the greater scheme of Appellant's probation. Quite the
opposite – the “no alcohol” provision was added to make it
easier for Appellant to successfully complete probation. A
prohibition on the kind of activity or substance that has made
it difficult for Appellant to succeed on probation is precisely
calculated (and well-within the [trial court's] discretion to
impose) to serve the purpose noted in section 9763(b) of
aiding in Appellant's rehabilitation.
Trial Court Opinion, 10/20/23, at 7-8 and 9-10 (footnotes omitted).
We agree with the trial court’s well-reasoned analysis and conclude that
the trial court was within its discretion when it ordered that Appellant refrain
from using alcohol as a condition of his probation. Appellant’s claim on appeal
thus fails.
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Judgment of sentence affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.
Judgment Entered.
Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 4/17/2024
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