State v. C. G. T.

                                 624

   Argued and submitted January 28, 2020, affirmed September 15, 2021


                  In the Matter of C. G. T.,
                          a Youth.
                   STATE OF OREGON,
                        Respondent,
                             v.
                          C. G. T.,
                         Appellant.
                 Marion County Circuit Court
                    17JU07483; A167621
                              

  Cheryl A. Pellegrini, Judge.
   Christa Obold Eshleman argued the cause and filed the
briefs for appellant.
   Jennifer Lloyd argued the cause for respondent. On the
brief were Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, Benjamin
Gutman, Solicitor General, and Hannah K. Hoffman,
Assistant Attorney General.
  Before DeVore, Presiding Judge, and DeHoog, Judge, and
Mooney, Judge.
  PER CURIAM
  Affirmed.
Cite as 

 (2021)                             625

        PER CURIAM
         Youth appeals a judgment adjudicating him for an
act that, if committed by an adult, would constitute unlawful use of a vehicle, ORS 164.135, and imposing restitution.
Youth took his mother’s car without permission. While
youth rode in the car, another youth, whom youth allowed
to drive, crashed into another car, damaging both vehicles.
Youth contends that the court erred in ordering restitution
for damages caused by the crash, because the crash was not
a reasonably foreseeable result of his act of taking the car
without permission. The state contends that youth failed to
preserve his argument about reasonable foreseeability; on
the merits, the state contends that the court did not err.
Having reviewed the briefing, the relevant portions of the
record, and the applicable law, we agree that youth did not
preserve the argument he makes on appeal, and we affirm.
         A more detailed discussion of the facts and our
analysis in this case would not significantly benefit the
bench, the bar, or the public. Briefly, however, we observe
that, before the juvenile court, youth raised the issue of
causation and argued that, given the undisputed and very
basic facts before the court, that question was purely a matter of law. By contrast, on appeal, youth’s argument about
causation would require an in-depth evaluation of the facts.
Youth’s argument to the juvenile court failed to notify either
the court or the state that the court’s evaluation of causation
required a very fact-specific inquiry; as a result, the factual record was not adequately developed for our review,
and the purposes of preservation were not served. Peeples
v. Lampert, 

, 

 (2008) (among
other things, “preservation fosters full development of the
record, which aids the trial court in making a decision and
the appellate court in reviewing it”). Accordingly, we affirm.
        Affirmed.