802
Submitted September 2, affirmed September 29, 2021
STATE OF OREGON,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
HANS GUENTER WULF,
Defendant-Appellant.
Washington County Circuit Court
19CR58623; A173165
500 P3d 754
Petitioner appeals a judgment of conviction for driving while suspended, ORS
811.182. He assigns error to the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence that his license was suspended, contending that the evidence was obtained
during an unlawful traffic stop for a U-turn. In defendant’s view, his U-turn in an
intersection did not violate ORS 811.365(1)(a), which regulates U-turns in intersections, meaning that there was no probable cause to stop him for it. Petitioner
argues that ORS 811.365(1)(a) only prohibits U-turns from the portions of an
intersection that are controlled by an electrical signal, and that he turned from
a lane not controlled by the signal. The state argues U-turns are prohibited at
any point within a signal-controlled intersection. Held: Correctly construed, ORS
811.365(1)(a) prohibits U-turns in any intersection with an electrical traffic control signal, unless “posted otherwise,” which was not the case here. The traffic
stop was legal, and the trial court did not err when it denied defendant’s motion
to suppress evidence that resulted from the stop.
Affirmed.
Patricia Crain, Senior Judge.
Ernest G. Lannet, Chief Defender, Criminal Appellate
Section, and Brett J. Allin, Deputy Public Defender, Office
of Public Defense Services, filed the brief for appellant.
Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman,
Solicitor General, and E. Nani Apo, Assistant Attorney
General, filed the brief for respondent.
Before Lagesen, Presiding Judge, and James, Judge, and
Kamins, Judge.
LAGESEN, P. J.
Affirmed.
Cite as 314 Or App 802 (2021) 803
LAGESEN, P. J.
Petitioner appeals a judgment of conviction for driving while suspended, ORS 811.182. He assigns error to the
trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress the evidence
that his license was suspended, contending that the evidence
was obtained during an allegedly unlawful traffic stop for a
U-turn. In defendant’s view, his U-turn in an intersection
did not violate ORS 811.365(1)(a), which regulates U-turns
in intersections, meaning that there was no probable cause
to stop him for it. We conclude otherwise and affirm.
To give legal context to the facts about defendant’s
U-turn, we start by setting out ORS 811.365(1)(a), the statutory restriction on U-turns in intersections. It states:
“A person commits the offense of making an illegal
U-turn if the person is operating a vehicle and the person
turns the vehicle so as to proceed in the opposite direction
in any of the following places:
“(a) Within an intersection where traffic is controlled
by an electrical signal. This paragraph does not apply
where posted otherwise.”
Next, we describe the facts of defendant’s U-turn,
which are not in dispute. Defendant made his U-turn in the
intersection of 185th Avenue and Stepping Stone Drive in
Beaverton, a location illustrated by the photographs defendant submitted in support of his motion to suppress, which
we have reproduced in an appendix to this opinion.1 He had
been driving north on 185th and made the U-turn so that
he could proceed south. As northbound 185th approaches
its intersection with Stepping Stone Drive, 185th has two
lanes, both of which must proceed straight through the
1
We recognize that the ensuing description of this location raises the question whether defendant’s U-turn was, in fact, in an intersection at all. Given the
physical configuration, it could easily be argued that defendant’s U-turn took
place outside the intersection of 185th and Stepping Stone. Defendant, however,
does not dispute that he was in an intersection at the time of his U-turn and for
good reason. In the memorandum in support of his motion to suppress, defendant acknowledged that, if his U-turn was not in an intersection, then it was
unlawful under ORS 811.365(1)(b), which prohibits U-turns between intersections on highways. So defendant took the position that he takes on appeal: that
his U-turn was within an intersection but was not a turn that was prohibited by
ORS 811.365(1)(a).
804 State v. Wulf
intersection. There is a traffic signal at the intersection and
a white line across both lanes before the intersection. There
is a sign at the intersection that states “stop here on red”
with an arrow pointing to the white line. Past the stop line
to the north, a third lane emerges on the left. That lane is
marked with a left arrow indicating that it is a turn lane. A
car may not enter the left-turn lane without first proceeding
past the stop line. That turn lane proceeds past the traffic
signal that controls the forward movement of traffic from
the preceding stop line. From the turn lane, at a point after
the signal, a person may turn left across the southbound
lanes into a shopping center. A concrete island divides the
southbound and northbound lanes of 185th until the end of
the left-turn lane. The end of the turn lane is not controlled
by a signal. Neither is the southbound traffic at that location
controlled by a signal.
Beaverton Police Officer Lutu witnessed defendant’s
U-turn. Lutu believed that defendant’s U-turn was illegal
because traffic in that location was controlled by the signal
at Stepping Stone. Lutu stopped defendant and, as a result
of the stop, discovered that he was driving on a suspended
license, leading to the charges in this case.
Defendant moved to suppress the evidence that he
had been driving on a suspended license. His theory was
that his U-turn did not violate ORS 811.365 and, consequently, that Lutu lacked probable cause to stop him for
a traffic violation. See, e.g., State v. Boatright, 222 Or App
406, 409,
193 P3d 78, rev den,
345 Or 503 (2008) (under
Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution, an officer
must have probable cause to believe a driver committed a
traffic violation to conduct a traffic stop). Specifically, defendant contended that, although the intersection in question
is controlled by an electrical signal, his U-turn was not
prohibited because the specific area he was in was not controlled by an electrical signal. The trial court denied the
motion, agreeing with the state that the statute prohibits
U-turns in any intersection controlled by an electrical traffic
signal.
On appeal, the parties reiterate the arguments they
made below about correct interpretation of ORS 811.365(1)(a),
Cite as 314 Or App 802 (2021) 805
which, as noted, bars U-turns “[w]ithin an intersection
where traffic is controlled by an electrical signal.” Defendant
argues that “where” is modifying the second portion of the
sentence, meaning “in a city, a U-turn is legal if it occurs
within an intersection where traffic is not controlled by an
electrical signal.” In other words, defendant argues that
U-turns are permitted at points within a signalized intersection where traffic is not controlled by the electrical signal
and is prohibited only at points where traffic is controlled
by the electrical signal. The state argues that the “where”
modifies “an intersection,” meaning U-turns are prohibited “at any point within a signal-controlled intersection.”
(Emphasis added.)
We review the trial court’s denial of defendant’s
motion to suppress for legal error. State v. Quigley, 270 Or
App 319, 320,
348 P3d 250 (2015). In this case, whether the
trial court properly denied the motion to suppress turns
entirely on the proper interpretation of ORS 811.365(1)(a).
To determine a statute’s meaning, we apply Oregon’s wellestablished framework for statutory interpretation and
examine its text and context, as well as any relevant legislative history with which we have been supplied or that we
have obtained on our own. See State v. Gaines,
346 Or 160,
171-73,
206 P3d 1042 (2009) (outlining the methodology).
As framed by the parties’ arguments, the question
before us is whether ORS 811.365(1)(a) prohibits U-turns in
any intersection “where traffic is controlled by an electrical
signal,” as the state argues, or, instead, prohibits U-turns
only within those particular locations, contained within an
intersection, where traffic is controlled by an electrical signal, as defendant argues.
Beginning with the text, the rules of grammar
weigh heavily in favor of the interpretation advanced by the
state. “Although drafters, like all other writers and speakers,
sometimes perpetuate linguistic blunders, they are presumed to be grammatical in their compositions.” Antonin
Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation
of Legal Texts 140 (2012) (footnote omitted); see State v.
English, 269 Or App 395, 399,
343 P3d 1286 (2015) (relying
on the “grammatical structure” of the statute in dispute).
806 State v. Wulf
Applying a presumption of grammatical competency to ORS 811.365(1)(a), the “where” clause is an appositive clause modifying the noun “intersection.” The Chicago
Manual of Style §§ 5.225; 5.227 (17th ed 2017). When an
appositive clause appears with no commas to separate it
from the rest of the sentence, it typically provides essential
information about the noun to which it refers. Id. at § 6.28.
That is, as a grammatical matter, the phrase “where traffic is controlled by an electrical signal” is most naturally
understood to describe the essence of the type of “intersection” in which U-turns are not permitted.
Had the legislature intended otherwise, it would
have structured the statute differently. Consistent with
principles of grammar, if the legislature had intended the
statute to mean what defendant argues it does, it would
have composed it so that “where traffic is controlled by an
electrical signal” modified a word or phrase identifying only
some subparts of an intersection. That is, the legislature
likely would have written something like this: “U-turns
are prohibited within the portions of an intersection where
traffic is controlled by an electrical signal” or “U-turns are
prohibited within in an intersection at those particular locations where traffic is controlled by an electrical signal.” But
that is not what the legislature wrote, and what it did write
conveys a different meaning.
Although context does not supply much in the way
of additional clues regarding the scope of the legislature’s
ban on U-turns in intersections, the legislative history of
ORS 811.365 confirms, as the statute’s words suggest, that
the legislature intended to prohibit U-turns in any intersection busy enough to require a traffic signal. The provision at issue was proposed in its present form by the League
of Oregon Cities (League) to the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary in February 1975. The League explained that the
purpose of the provision was to prohibit U-turns in intersections that were busy enough to require a signal: “If an
intersection has been determined to be in need of signalization then it is indicative that it has enough traffic within it
that unless otherwise posted, U-turns should be prohibited
within that intersection.” Exhibit A, Senate Committee on
Judiciary, SB 1, Feb 20, 1975 (letter from League of Oregon
Cite as 314 Or App 802 (2021) 807
Cities). The legislature adopted the League’s proposal. See
Minutes, Senate Committee on Judiciary, Feb 12, 1975, 8.
As the state observes, this “legislative history confirms that
the legislature intended to prohibit making a U-turn in any
intersection that ‘has enough traffic within it’ that it is ‘in
need of signalization.’ ”
In sum, correctly construed, ORS 811.365(1)(a) prohibits U-turns in any intersection with an electrical traffic
control signal (unless “posted otherwise,” which was not the
case here). That means that Lutu had probable cause to stop
defendant for an illegal U-turn upon observing defendant’s
maneuver at 185th and Stepping Stone. The trial court did
not err when it denied defendant’s motion to suppress evidence that resulted from the justified traffic stop.
Affirmed.
808 State v. Wulf
APPENDIX
