Jones v. State

¶1 SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIA

¶2 November 2, 2022

¶3 The Honorable Supreme Court met pursuant to adjournment.

¶4The following order was passed:

¶5 Upon consideration, the Court has revised the deadline for motions for reconsideration in this matter. It is ordered that a motion for reconsideration, if any, including motions submitted via the Court’s electronic filing system, must be received in the Clerk’s Office by 2 p.m. on Wednesday, November 9, 2022.

¶6 SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF GEORGIA Clerk’s Office, Atlanta

¶7 I certify that the above is a true extract from the minutes of the Supreme Court of Georgia. Witness my signature and the seal of said court hereto affixed the day and year last above written.

¶8 , Clerk NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and official text of the opinion.

¶9In the Supreme Court of Georgia

¶10 Decided: November 2, 2022

¶11 S22A0425. JONES v. THE STATE.

¶12 BOGGS, Chief Justice.

¶13 Appellant Deon Jones challenges his convictions for felony

¶14murder and influencing a witness in connection with the shooting

¶15death of Scott Corwin. 1 He contends that the statute of limitation

¶16barred his prosecution for influencing a witness; that the trial court

¶17made several erroneous evidentiary rulings; that he was denied

¶18 The crimes occurred on May 29 and 31, 2004. On December 27, 2017, a 1

¶19Chatham County grand jury indicted Appellant for malice murder, felony murder based on aggravated assault, felony murder based on possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, felony murder based on attempted armed robbery, and influencing a witness. At a trial from April 16 to 23, 2018, the jury acquitted Appellant of malice murder but found him guilty of the remaining charges. The trial court sentenced Appellant to serve life in prison for one count of felony murder and ten years consecutive for influencing a witness; the other felony murder convictions were vacated by operation of law. On April 24, 2018, Appellant filed a motion for new trial, which he amended on June 12, 2019, and October 22, 2020. After an evidentiary hearing on July 6, 2021, the court denied the motion on September 20, 2021. Appellant then filed a timely notice of appeal. The case was docketed in this Court to the April 2022 term and submitted for a decision on the briefs. 1 effective assistance of counsel; and that the combined effect of the

¶20trial court’s multiple erroneous evidentiary rulings and his trial

¶21counsel’s deficient performance deprived him of a fair trial. For the

¶22reasons that follow, we reverse Appellant’s conviction and sentence

¶23for influencing a witness, but we otherwise affirm the trial court’s

¶24judgment.

¶25 1. Sometime in May 2004, Appellant, a convicted felon, bought

¶26on credit a stolen .38-caliber revolver from 16-year-old Kelly

¶27Bigham. In the early morning hours of May 29, Bigham drove

¶28Appellant to the Monterey Square area of downtown Savannah,

¶29looking for someone to rob. Scott Corwin was walking with his

¶30girlfriend, Mindy Davis, and Appellant attempted to rob him. When

¶31Corwin resisted, Appellant shot Corwin through the chest before

¶32fleeing the scene. Corwin later died from the gunshot wound at a

¶33nearby hospital.

¶34 Late on the night of May 31, 2004, Bigham asked Appellant for

¶35the money he owed her for the gun. Appellant said that he would go

¶36get some money, borrowed a car, and had Bigham drive him

¶37 2 downtown. Along the way, Appellant pulled out his gun and

¶38threatened to kill Bigham if she told anyone that he had killed

¶39Corwin, and Bigham noticed that Appellant had a fresh tattoo of a

¶40teardrop by his eye. Bigham took the teardrop to mean that

¶41Appellant had killed someone, although she thought the tattoo could

¶42also represent that Appellant had spent time in prison. Shortly

¶43before 2:00 a.m. on June 1, approximately one block from where

¶44Appellant shot Corwin, Appellant shot Charles Buskirk once from

¶45behind during another attempted robbery. Buskirk was on his front

¶46porch when he was shot, returning inside his home after

¶47investigating a noise that startled his cat. Buskirk called 911, and

¶48at the hospital, doctors removed a .38-caliber bullet from his small

¶49intestine.

¶50 Within the next few weeks, Novell Bryant, a confidential

¶51informant for the FBI, relayed to his handler a recent conversation

¶52that he had with Appellant. According to Bryant, Appellant said

¶53that he and Bigham went to downtown Savannah, where Appellant

¶54used a .38-caliber revolver that he got from Bigham to shoot and kill

¶55 3 a man during a robbery. On June 18, law enforcement officers

¶56searched Appellant’s residence, where they found a box of .38-caliber

¶57bullets that were similar to the bullet removed from Buskirk. On

¶58June 22, Bryant reported that Appellant had given the gun to a

¶59“partner” and provided the police with a phone number that the

¶60police traced to a cellphone used by Walter Moon, a convicted felon.

¶61The next day, a detective interviewed Bigham, who confirmed she

¶62had been with Appellant when he shot someone during a robbery in

¶63downtown Savannah.

¶64 Appellant then was tried in federal court for possession of

¶65bullets and a firearm as a convicted felon in connection with

¶66Buskirk’s shooting. During that trial, a boyfriend of Appellant’s

¶67sister wore to court a t-shirt bearing the words “he was a snitch” and

¶68depicting a murder scene surrounded by crime-scene tape; the

¶69boyfriend was ordered to change his shirt, but not before he had

¶70driven one of the witnesses to court and sat next to him in court that

¶71morning. Nonetheless, Appellant was convicted on all counts.

¶72Appellant was never otherwise prosecuted for Buskirk’s shooting.

¶73 4 The Corwin murder case also went cold at that point, but the record

¶74does not reveal why.

¶75 Years later, when Appellant was serving time in federal prison,

¶76his cellmate, Gregory Seabrook, jokingly challenged him about the

¶77teardrop tattoo on his face, saying it was “fake.” Appellant said that

¶78it was real, which Seabrook took to mean that Appellant had killed

¶79someone, although he thought it could also mean that someone close

¶80to Appellant had died. Later, Appellant bragged about using a .38-

¶81caliber revolver to shoot two men in downtown Savannah during

¶82attempted armed robberies. Appellant said that he shot one man

¶83who had resisted a robbery, after which Bigham went through the

¶84man’s pockets, and had shot another man on the man’s front porch.

¶85Appellant also said that he threw the gun that he used in the

¶86shootings into a sewage drain near his mother’s house.

¶87 Appellant told federal inmate Christopher Jackmon a similar

¶88story, saying that he had shot a man in downtown Savannah and

¶89that Bigham then went through the man’s pockets. Appellant said

¶90that he threw the gun in the sewer after the shooting but forgot to

¶91 5 hide the bullets. Appellant told another federal inmate, Jamaal

¶92McIntyre, that a woman drove him to a robbery during which the

¶93victim “tried him, so he popped” him, adding that McIntyre could

¶94find the story on Google. Appellant told McIntyre that he could rely

¶95on the woman not to talk. Based on the information from Seabrook,

¶96Jackmon, and McIntyre, the police restarted the investigation into

¶97Corwin’s death and swept the sewage drains near the home of

¶98Appellant’s mother, but no gun was recovered. Bigham was also

¶99reinterviewed on January 31, 2012, and she stated for the first time

¶100that Appellant had threatened her. The record does not reveal what

¶101precipitated Appellant’s eventual indictment in 2017 for Corwin’s

¶102murder.

¶103 At trial, Appellant elected not to testify in his own defense. The

¶104defense theory was that all the evidence in the case was about the

¶105Buskirk shooting but had been reshaped by the State and its

¶106criminal informants into seeming like it was evidence of the Corwin

¶107shooting. Appellant recalled one of the State’s witnesses; called one

¶108witness; and introduced one exhibit with a list of six names,

¶109 6 including both Corwin and Buskirk, which a detective had

¶110previously shown to McIntyre.

¶111 2. Appellant first contends that the statute of limitation barred

¶112his prosecution from starting in 2017 for allegedly influencing a

¶113witness in 2004. We agree.

¶114 The statute of limitation for influencing a witness ordinarily is

¶115four years. See OCGA § 17-3-1 (c) (“[P]rosecution[s] for felonies . . .

¶116shall be commenced within four years after commission of the

¶117crime . . . .”). However, because Bigham was under the age of 18 at

¶118the time of the alleged crime, the statute of limitation was seven

¶119years. See id. (“[P]rosecution[s] for felonies committed against

¶120victims who are at the time of the commission of the offense under

¶121the age of 18 years shall be commenced within seven years after the

¶122commission of the crime.”). The indictment alleged that on or about

¶123June 1, 2004, Appellant knowingly threatened Bigham with the

¶124intent to prevent her from communicating to a Georgia law

¶125enforcement officer information relating to the commission of a

¶126crime, i.e., the shooting of Corwin. See OCGA § 16-10-93 (b) (1) (C).

¶127 7 The State had until June 1, 2011, to indict Appellant for influencing

¶128a witness. But the State did not indict Appellant until December 27,

¶1292017. Thus, the statute of limitation expired more than six years

¶130before the State started its prosecution of Appellant for that offense.

¶131 The State argues that the statute of limitation was tolled for

¶132more than seven-and-a-half of the years between the alleged threat

¶133on June 1, 2004, and Appellant’s indictment on December 27, 2017,

¶134because until Bigham revealed Appellant’s threat to a law

¶135enforcement official on January 31, 2012, the crime was unknown.

¶136See OCGA § 17-3-2 (2) (“The period within which a prosecution must

¶137be commenced under Code Section 17-3-1 or other applicable statute

¶138does not include any period in which . . . the crime is

¶139unknown . . . .”). The State does not argue that any other tolling

¶140provision applies. The fatal flaw in the State’s argument is that it is

¶141well established that “the actual knowledge of a crime victim about

¶142the crime is imputed to the State for purposes of applying the tolling

¶143provision of OCGA § 17-3-2 (2).” Harper v. State, 292 Ga. 557, 559

¶144(738 SE2d 584) (2013). See also id. at 563 (“[T]he correct date to

¶145 8 apply in analyzing the statute of limitation is the date that the crime

¶146became known to the victim of the crime.”); Womack v. State, 260

¶147Ga. 21, 22 (389 SE2d 240) (1990) (“It seems to be well settled that . . .

¶148the knowledge of the victim is the knowledge of the State . . . .”

¶149(Citation omitted.)).

¶150 Contrary to the trial court’s understanding, our recent decision

¶151in Riley v. State, 305 Ga. 163 (824 SE2d 249) (2019), does not

¶152undermine this well-established rule. In Riley, the trial court ruled

¶153that the statute of limitation for burglary and possession of a knife

¶154tolled when investigators had a single fingerprint tying someone to

¶155a murder scene, but no idea to which of the “12 to 15 possible

¶156suspects” it belonged. Id. at 165 (1). Because the trial court did not

¶157consider whether the State had sufficient information to establish

¶158probable cause to arrest Riley on the nonmurder charges – thus

¶159making Riley known to the State – we remanded the case for the

¶160trial court’s consideration of that issue. Id. at 170 (3). Here, by

¶161contrast, Bigham knew about the crime the moment it was

¶162committed, so her knowledge is imputed to the State. Thus, OCGA

¶163 9 § 17-3-2 (2) did not toll the statute of limitation.

¶164 Accordingly, we reverse Appellant’s conviction and sentence for

¶165influencing a witness.

¶166 3. Appellant also contends that the trial court erred by allowing

¶167the State to introduce: (a) irrelevant evidence of a t-shirt with a

¶168threatening message worn by the boyfriend of Appellant’s sister at

¶169Appellant’s federal trial; and (b) irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial

¶170testimony by witness Gregory Seabrook that the teardrop tattoo on

¶171Appellant’s face meant Appellant had killed someone. We disagree

¶172with both contentions.

¶173 Evidence is relevant if it has “any tendency to make the

¶174existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of

¶175the action more probable or less probable than it would be without

¶176the evidence.” OCGA § 24-4-401. Generally, “[a]ll relevant evidence

¶177[is] admissible, except as limited by constitutional requirements”

¶178that do not apply here. OCGA § 24-4-402. However, OCGA § 24-4-

¶179403 (“Rule 403”) provides that “relevant evidence may be excluded if

¶180its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of

¶181 10 unfair prejudice.” Although sometimes required, “the exclusion of

¶182evidence under Rule 403 is an extraordinary remedy which should

¶183be used only sparingly.” (Citation omitted.) State v. Flowers, 307 Ga.

¶184618, 622 (2) (837 SE2d 824) (2020). Therefore, “in reviewing

¶185[evidentiary] issues under Rule 403, we look at the evidence in a

¶186light most favorable to its admission, maximizing its probative value

¶187and minimizing its undue prejudicial impact.” (Citation omitted.)

¶188Anglin v. State, 302 Ga. 333, 337 (3) (806 SE2d 573) (2017). We will

¶189not disturb a trial court’s determination as to the admissibility of

¶190evidence “absent a clear abuse of discretion.” Harris v. State, 313

¶191Ga. 225, 231 (3) (869 SE2d 461) (2022).

¶192 (a) Appellant first argues that evidence of a t-shirt with a

¶193threatening message worn by the boyfriend of Appellant’s sister at

¶194Appellant’s federal trial and ruled by the trial judge in this case to

¶195be intrinsic to the influencing-a-witness count was not relevant

¶196because, according to Appellant, “the State introduced no evidence

¶197to establish that [the boyfriend’s] alleged attempt to influence

¶198Bigham’s . . . testimony was made with the authorization of

¶199 11 [Appellant],” as required by Dukes v. State, 290 Ga. 486 (722 SE2d

¶200701) (2012) (decided under the old Evidence Code). However,

¶201Appellant concedes that Christopher Jackmon stated at trial that

¶202“[Appellant] said that he had his family member wear a t-shirt to

¶203stop snitching.” This testimony did not directly conflict with

¶204Seabrook’s testimony that Appellant never told him that Appellant

¶205ordered the boyfriend to wear the shirt. And even if Jackmon’s

¶206testimony were in direct conflict with Seabrook’s testimony, as

¶207Appellant claims, “it is the role of the jury to resolve conflicts in the

¶208evidence.” Hopwood v. State, 307 Ga. 305, 305 (835 SE2d 627)

¶209(2019). Appellant’s assertion about the evidence the State

¶210introduced is factually incorrect and his argument fails. Thus, the

¶211trial judge did not abuse his discretion in concluding otherwise.

¶212 (b) Appellant next argues that Seabrook’s testimony about the

¶213teardrop tattoo was not relevant because Seabrook admitted that

¶214the teardrop tattoo could alternatively mean that someone close to

¶215Appellant had died. However, Seabrook’s testimony corroborated

¶216Bigham’s statement in her January 2012 interview that the

¶217 12 teardrop tattoo could mean that Appellant had killed someone. And

¶218the timing of when Bigham first observed the teardrop tattoo – just

¶219a few days after Corwin’s shooting – further supported that

¶220Appellant had killed Corwin. Thus, Seabrook’s testimony clearly

¶221was relevant.

¶222 Appellant then argues based on Belmar v. State, 279 Ga. 795

¶223(621 SE2d 441) (2005), that admission of Seabrook’s testimony about

¶224the teardrop tattoo was an abuse of discretion under Rule 403. In

¶225Belmar, a case decided under the old Evidence Code, a trial court

¶226allowed evidence of a tattoo reading “12 gauge” in a case in which

¶227Belmar was accused of murdering a man with a 12-gauge shotgun.

¶228Id. at 798 (3). This Court held that the trial court had abused its

¶229discretion because the tattoo evidence was being used to show that

¶230Belmar “had a propensity to use a 12-gauge shotgun,” rather than

¶231being used for a permissible purpose, such as proving identity. Id. at

¶232799-800 (3). Here, unlike in Belmar, Appellant did not suffer any

¶233unfair prejudice. The tattoo was not used for impermissible

¶234propensity purposes because Bigham’s testimony indicated that

¶235 13 Appellant’s teardrop tattoo commemorated one of the crimes with

¶236which he was charged, shooting Corwin, rather than showing that

¶237Appellant had a propensity to murder. Appellant’s reliance on

¶238Belmar is misplaced.

¶239 The trial judge did not abuse his discretion in admitting

¶240Seabrook’s testimony about the teardrop tattoo.

¶241 4. Appellant further contends that the trial court erred by

¶242allowing the state to introduce: (a) evidence of witness Walter

¶243Moon’s “six prior convictions” 2 for the purpose of attacking Moon’s

¶244character for truthfulness; (b) photographs from a search of Moon’s

¶245residence in 2012; and (c) a post and photographs from Bigham’s

¶246Facebook page. Pretermitting whether these evidentiary rulings

¶247were in error, it is highly probable that the admission of this

¶248evidence did not affect the jury’s verdict.

¶249 Erroneous evidentiary rulings are subject to a harmless-error

¶250 2At trial, defense counsel inaccurately described the convictions at issue as “six felony convictions,” and both Appellant and Appellees also use this characterization in their briefs. However, the convictions at issue are seven sets of convictions composed of forty-seven total counts and include both misdemeanors and felonies ranging from gun possession to murder. 14 test. See Allen v. State, 310 Ga. 411, 415 (2) (851 SE2d 541) (2020).

¶251A nonconstitutional error is harmless “if the State shows that it is

¶252highly probable that the error did not contribute to the verdict, an

¶253inquiry that involves consideration of the other evidence heard by

¶254the jury.” (Punctuation and citation omitted.) Smith v. State, 313

¶255Ga. 584, 587 (872 SE2d 262) (2022). In determining whether the

¶256error was harmless, “we review the record de novo, and we weigh

¶257the evidence as we would expect reasonable jurors to have done so

¶258as opposed to viewing it all in the light most favorable to the jury’s

¶259verdict.” Finney v. State, 311 Ga. 1, 13 (3) (a) (855 SE2d 578) (2021).

¶260 Here, the evidence of Appellant’s guilt was strong. Four

¶261different informants testified that Appellant told them that he had

¶262shot and killed a man during a robbery in downtown Savannah.

¶263Three of the informants stated that Bigham was with Appellant

¶264during the robbery, despite two of them never having met Bigham.

¶265And one of the informants, Bryant, revealed this information only

¶266weeks after the Corwin shooting took place. Likewise, Bigham

¶267stated in June 2004 that Appellant had shot a man walking in the

¶268 15 middle of the street during an attempted robbery. Further, Bigham

¶269said in January 2012 that, while en route to the Buskirk shooting,

¶270Appellant had a fresh teardrop tattoo and told her that he had killed

¶271a man a few days prior. Appellant is the only apparent link between

¶272the four informants and Bigham, and he provides no explanation of

¶273how the informants and Bigham independently could come to such

¶274similar testimony.

¶275 (a) The evidence of Moon’s convictions likely had little effect on

¶276the jury’s evaluation of whether Appellant was guilty of the crimes

¶277charged. Appellant argues his case was prejudiced by “guilt by

¶278association,” suggesting that the jury might have concluded based

¶279on Appellant’s association with Moon that Appellant also might be

¶280guilty of serious crimes like murder. In support of this argument,

¶281Appellant points to the State’s repeated references to Moon in

¶282closing argument and Bryant’s testimony that Moon was a “partner”

¶283of Appellant.

¶284 However, the evidence in this record showed that Appellant

¶285and Moon had only an incidental relationship. Despite Bryant’s

¶286 16 testimony, the record provides little evidence that Moon was

¶287Appellant’s “partner” or that they were anything more than

¶288acquaintances. Of the nearly 1,700 calls appearing on Appellant’s

¶289call log from May 28 to June 18, 2004, only five, minute-long calls

¶290appear between Appellant and Moon. Moon himself testified that he

¶291merely knew Appellant through a mutual acquaintance, not that the

¶292pair were “partners” or even friends. This evidence indicates that

¶293even if Appellant called Moon to get rid of the gun that he used to

¶294shoot Corwin, such an interaction did not necessarily signify any

¶295closer relationship between Appellant and Moon.

¶296 Thus, because the evidence in the record does not establish

¶297that there was a strong association between Appellant and Moon –

¶298either personal or professional – but does point strongly to

¶299Appellant’s guilt, it is highly probable that the admission of the

¶300evidence of Moon’s convictions did not affect the verdict.

¶301 (b) The photographs from a search of Moon’s residence in 2012

¶302also likely had little effect on the jury’s verdict. The photographs in

¶303question depict the exterior of the house, a shed in Moon’s backyard,

¶304 17 Moon’s driver’s license, two cell phones, and guns and ammunition

¶305that were found during the search, including two AK-47 rifles and a

¶306pistol. As Appellant points out, none of the guns pictured were

¶307alleged to have been used by Appellant in the Corwin shooting.

¶308Further, testimony about the photographs explained that they were

¶309taken at Moon’s residence in 2012. Therefore, there was no risk that

¶310the jury might mistakenly think that the pictured guns belonged to

¶311Appellant or were used by Appellant. And because, as noted above,

¶312the relationship between Appellant and Moon was incidental and

¶313the evidence of Appellant’s guilt was strong, it is highly probable

¶314that admission of these photographs did not affect the jury’s verdict.

¶315 (c) The post and photographs from Bigham’s Facebook page

¶316also were unlikely to affect the jury’s verdict. The post, which the

¶317State introduced during its direct examination of Bigham, was two

¶318photographs from 2017 of Bigham leaning against a brick wall with

¶319a caption that included the following words interspersed with

¶320various emojis: “Murder Terrorizing Dats all dey UndA_Stand

¶321Enemies Memories iGot some Bl00dy handZ”; Bigham testified that

¶322 18 the words were lyrics from a rap song. The other photographs, which

¶323the State introduced after Bigham testified on cross-examination

¶324that “if you look at the rest of the pictures on my [Facebook] page,

¶325they’re all captions from songs,” were three uncaptioned pictures

¶326from 2015 of Bigham posing with a man standing behind her,

¶327covering her mouth, and pointing a gun and staring at the camera.

¶328 Appellant’s argument against admission of the post and

¶329photographs is based on a case decided under the old Evidence Code,

¶330Boring v. State, 289 Ga. 429 (711 SE2d 634) (2011), and rests on the

¶331observation that the State portrayed Bigham at trial as an

¶332unindicted co-conspirator of Appellant, so “the improper evidence

¶333was as harmful to [Appellant] as it would have been to Bigham if

¶334she were on trial for the same crimes.” But Appellant cites no

¶335authority to support his transitive theory of unfair prejudice under

¶336Rule 403.

¶337 Moreover, even though Appellant and Bigham were portrayed

¶338as unindicted co-conspirators, it is highly probable that admission of

¶339the post and photographs did not affect the jury’s verdict. Appellant

¶340 19 does not appear in either the post or photographs, both of which

¶341were from more than a decade after Corwin’s shooting, nor does the

¶342post’s caption reference Appellant in any way. And the photographs

¶343depict a different man than Appellant covering Bigham’s mouth.

¶344Particularly in light of the strong evidence of Appellant’s guilt,

¶345including Bigham’s own testimony, the post and photographs were

¶346unlikely to affect the jury’s verdict.

¶347 5. Appellant additionally contends that he was denied the

¶348effective assistance of counsel because of defense counsel’s failure to

¶349object when the State repeatedly insisted during its closing

¶350argument that, based on his convictions, Moon was a murderer and

¶351gun runner. Again, we disagree.

¶352 To succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel,

¶353Appellant must show both that “his counsel’s performance was

¶354professionally deficient and that he suffered prejudice as a result.”

¶355Washington v. State, 313 Ga. 771, 773 (3) (873 SE2d 132) (2022)

¶356(citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668, 687 (104 SCt 2052,

¶35780 LE2d 674) (1984)). To prove that his lawyer’s performance was

¶358 20 professionally deficient, “Appellant must demonstrate that the

¶359lawyer performed his duties in an objectively unreasonable way,

¶360considering all the circumstances in light of the prevailing

¶361professional norms.” Davis v. State, 299 Ga. 180, 182-183 (2) (787

¶362SE2d 221) (2016). To prove prejudice, Appellant must show “a

¶363reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors,

¶364the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 183

¶365(2) (citing Strickland, 466 U. S. at 694). A reasonable probability is

¶366one that is “sufficient to undermine confidence in the [trial’s]

¶367outcome.” (Citation omitted.) Neal v. State, 313 Ga. 746, 751 (3) (873

¶368SE2d 209) (2022). However, “[i]f Appellant fails to make a sufficient

¶369showing on one part of the Strickland test, we need not address the

¶370other part.” Washington, 313 Ga. at 773 (3).

¶371 Here, Appellant fails to show prejudice. As discussed in

¶372Division 4 above, the evidence of Appellant’s guilt was strong; the

¶373evidence at trial showed only an incidental relationship between

¶374Appellant and Moon; and admission of the evidence of Moon’s

¶375convictions likely had little effect on the jury’s verdict. Although the

¶376 21 State repeatedly mentioned Moon’s convictions in closing argument,

¶377Appellant has not explained why these mentions were “sufficient to

¶378undermine confidence in the trial’s outcome,” Neal, 313 Ga. at 751

¶379(3), especially when testimony by four informants and Bigham

¶380connected Appellant to the Corwin murder. Thus, Appellant has not

¶381carried his burden to prove that he suffered prejudice as a result of

¶382his trial counsel’s performance, and Appellant’s claim of ineffective

¶383assistance of counsel fails. See Walker v. State, 312 Ga. 232, 242 (862

¶384SE2d 285) (2021) (“[E]ven assuming we were to conclude that the

¶385remark was improper and that trial counsel’s failure to object was

¶386objectively unreasonable, we cannot say that, had trial counsel

¶387objected, there is a reasonable probability that the result of

¶388Appellant’s trial would have been different.”); Richardson v. State,

¶389304 Ga. 900, 903 (823 SE2d 321) (2019) (“[E]ven assuming that trial

¶390counsel was deficient for failing to object [to a ‘troubling’ statement

¶391in closing argument], Appellant has failed to demonstrate

¶392prejudice.”).

¶393 6. Appellant finally contends that he is entitled to a new trial

¶394 22 based on cumulative error. However, even assuming, without

¶395deciding, that the trial judge erred in each of the evidentiary rulings

¶396discussed in Division 4 and that trial counsel was deficient in not

¶397objecting during the State’s closing argument, Appellant has failed

¶398to demonstrate that the “combined prejudicial effect” of these

¶399individually harmless errors “requires a new trial.” State v. Lane,

¶400308 Ga. 10, 21 (4) (838 SE2d 808) (2020). Appellant did not rebut the

¶401testimony of five witnesses that he had confessed to shooting

¶402someone under circumstances matching those of Corwin’s shooting,

¶403so errors on tangential matters were highly unlikely to “so infect[]

¶404the jury’s deliberation that they denied the petitioner a

¶405fundamentally fair trial.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Id.

¶406Thus, Appellant has not carried his burden to show cumulative error

¶407requiring the granting of a new trial. See Jones v. State, ___ Ga. ___

¶408(___ SE2d ___) (Sept. 20, 2022) (slip op. at 25-27).

¶409 Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of conviction for felony

¶410murder and reverse the judgment of conviction for influencing a

¶411witness.

¶412 23  Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part. All the Justices concur.

¶413 24