¶1 NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and official text of the opinion.
¶2In the Supreme Court of Georgia
¶3 Decided: January 18, 2023
¶4 S22A1081. RIDLEY v. THE STATE.
¶5 PINSON, Justice.
¶6 Kentrick Ridley was convicted of malice murder and related
¶7crimes in connection with the shooting death of Rico Bynum. 1 On
¶8appeal, Ridley contends that the evidence was not sufficient as a
¶9matter of due process to support his convictions, that the trial court
¶10 The crimes occurred on April 25, 2016. In August 2017, Ridley was 1
¶11indicted by a Fulton County grand jury for malice murder, felony murder, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. At the conclusion of a jury trial held November 28 through December 3, 2018, Ridley was found guilty on all four counts. Ridley was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole for the malice-murder count and a consecutive term of five years probated for the firearm-possession count. The remaining counts were vacated by operation of law or merged for sentencing purposes. Prior to his sentencing, Ridley filed a premature motion for new trial, which ripened upon the entry of the final disposition on January 2, 2019. See Southall v. State, 300 Ga. 462, 464-467 (1) (796 SE2d 261) (2017). Through new counsel, Ridley amended his motion for new trial in February 2022. After a hearing in April 2022, the trial court denied the motion on May 13, 2022. Ridley filed a timely notice of appeal on May 23, 2022, and an amended notice of appeal on May 24, 2022. The appeal was docketed to the August 2022 term of this Court and was thereafter submitted for a decision on the briefs. failed to fulfill its role as the “thirteenth juror,” and that the trial
¶12court erred by allowing the prosecutor to make certain statements
¶13during her closing argument. But the record shows that the evidence
¶14was sufficient to support Ridley’s convictions and that the trial court
¶15exercised its role as the thirteenth juror. And most of the closing-
¶16argument statements that Ridley challenges were proper comments
¶17on the defense’s failure to present evidence—made with express
¶18reference to the fact that the burden of proof rests “completely” with
¶19the State—while the remaining statement at issue properly asked
¶20the jury to draw a reasonable inference supported by undisputed
¶21evidence. So we affirm Ridley’s convictions and sentences.
¶22 1. Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdicts, the
¶23evidence at trial showed as follows. In the early morning hours of
¶24April 25, 2016, Bynum was shot and killed on Grand Avenue in
¶25Fulton County. The shooting was witnessed by Theresa Scruggs and
¶26Robert Green, both of whom testified at trial.
¶27 (a) Scruggs testified that, as of April 2016, she was homeless,
¶28addicted to crack cocaine, and working as a prostitute. She became
¶29 2 friends with Bynum, a pimp, after she began buying drugs from him.
¶30Although Bynum wanted to have a romantic relationship with her,
¶31Scruggs initially refused because Bynum was married and living
¶32with his wife.
¶33 Scruggs then met Ridley. They began a sexual relationship,
¶34and she moved in to Ridley’s apartment. But within two or three
¶35days, Bynum, who had kicked his wife out of his home, convinced
¶36Scruggs to come live with him. Scruggs testified that Ridley “wasn’t
¶37happy” about her leaving.
¶38 According to Scruggs, the shooting occurred five or six days
¶39after she left Ridley for Bynum. During those five or six days, Ridley
¶40texted her constantly, asking her to come back, and he also called
¶41her, saying on one occasion that she “ha[d] until Monday to come
¶42back.” About two or three days before the shooting, after seeing
¶43Ridley’s text messages to Scruggs, Bynum called Ridley and warned
¶44him not to come back to that side of the neighborhood, “[i]f he knew
¶45what was good for him.”
¶46 On the night of April 24, Scruggs and Bynum walked from their
¶47 3 home to the Express Zone gas station at the end of Grand Avenue.
¶48While Bynum stayed at the gas station to sell crack, Scruggs and
¶49another woman walked down the street, where they came across a
¶50man whom Scruggs ultimately joined in his car. The man, Albert
¶51Remler, told her he was a contractor, and, because Scruggs was
¶52interested in construction work, she gave him her name and phone
¶53number. She ultimately performed a sexual act in exchange for $10
¶54in cash plus a $20 check.
¶55 Scruggs returned to the gas station and gave Remler’s $20
¶56check to Bynum. They went to a nearby check-cashing business but
¶57were unable to cash the check. They then walked back towards the
¶58gas station and encountered Robert Green, who joined them. After
¶59walking together for some distance, Green asked to talk to Scruggs,
¶60and the two turned around and walked away from Bynum down
¶61Grand Avenue.
¶62 As Scruggs was walking with Green, Ridley appeared “from out
¶63of nowhere” with a gun. Scruggs asked what was going on, and
¶64Ridley responded, waving the gun and “hollering” that “nobody
¶65 4 threatens me. . . . [Y]ou choose him over me, and he calls me
¶66threatening me.” Trying to defuse the situation, Scruggs told Ridley
¶67she would leave with him. By this time, Bynum had started walking
¶68toward them. Ridley greeted Bynum with, “What’s up man,” and
¶69then began firing the gun. Bynum fell to the ground with a fatal
¶70gunshot wound to the neck.
¶71 Ridley and Green ran from the scene. Scruggs first tried to talk
¶72to Bynum, and then she fled when she realized he wasn’t breathing.
¶73Within a few minutes, she was intercepted by Ridley and Green, who
¶74were in Ridley’s truck. Ridley pointed his gun at Scruggs and said,
¶75“[Y]ou can either die here with him or you can get in.” Scruggs got
¶76in the truck. Ridley drove to a motel, where Green sold Ridley’s gun.
¶77The trio then collected their belongings and left town for Memphis.
¶78 Scruggs and Ridley stayed in Memphis until December 2016,
¶79when Ridley was apprehended by law enforcement officials. Scruggs
¶80testified that while they were in Memphis, Ridley would not let her
¶81leave his presence. She tried to escape twice, but failed each time.
¶82She did not contact the police during this time because she was
¶83 5 afraid.2
¶84 Surveillance videos from the check-cashing business, the gas
¶85station, and Atlanta Police Department street cameras corroborated
¶86various details of Scruggs’s account of the events leading up to the
¶87shooting. In particular, the videos captured Ridley and Green
¶88walking in the area at 1:04 a.m. on April 25, less than 30 minutes
¶89before police were notified of Bynum’s shooting.
¶90 (b) Green testified that he had become friends with Ridley after
¶91repairing Ridley’s truck. On the night of the shooting, Ridley asked
¶92Green to look at a problem with his truck, and after doing so, Green
¶93rode with Ridley to see whether the problem was fixed. They ended
¶94up at the Express Zone.
¶95 According to Green, at some point after they arrived at the gas
¶96station, Scruggs walked up to them, followed by a man. Ridley and
¶97the man argued, and Ridley then shot the man. Green walked away
¶98and was soon picked up by Ridley. They drove off, Green sold
¶99 2Scruggs did manage to leave Memphis in May 2016 for a brief time but then allowed Ridley to retrieve her, and the pair stopped in Atlanta for a brief time on their way back to Memphis. 6 Ridley’s gun, and he, Ridley, and Scruggs left town for Memphis.
¶100Green testified that he had previously cleaned Ridley’s gun, a .45-
¶101caliber automatic handgun.
¶102 Investigators never found the gun used in the shooting, but
¶103they recovered six cartridge cases and one bullet from the crime
¶104scene, all of which were .45-caliber. A GBI firearms examiner
¶105testified that the six cartridge cases had all been fired from the same
¶106.45-caliber gun. The firearms examiner also testified that the three
¶107bullets recovered from Bynum’s body were .45-caliber too, and that
¶108they had been fired from the same gun as the bullet found at the
¶109scene.
¶110 (c) The lead investigator in the case, Detective Michael Young,
¶111testified about the investigation and how his team had identified
¶112and located Scruggs and Ridley. The $20 check Scruggs and Bynum
¶113had tried to cash was recovered from Bynum’s pants pocket; this
¶114check led Detective Young to Remler, who still had the check stub
¶115on which Scruggs had written her name and phone number.
¶116Detective Young contacted Scruggs and arranged to meet with her
¶117 7 under the guise of needing help with a construction job. After
¶118revealing that he was a detective, Young interviewed Scruggs, and
¶119she identified Ridley as the shooter. Detective Young confirmed that
¶120surveillance videos and other evidence corroborated key aspects of
¶121Scruggs’s account.
¶122 2. Ridley contends that the evidence was not sufficient to
¶123sustain his convictions as a matter of constitutional due process.
¶124Ridley asserts that the witnesses the State presented were not
¶125credible, notes that no physical evidence directly linked Ridley to the
¶126shooting, and contends that the State failed to connect him to the
¶127murder weapon. Ridley also points out that he never admitted to
¶128shooting Bynum, and that no video or audio recording showed that
¶129he was the shooter.
¶130 When assessing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence
¶131as a matter of constitutional due process, the evidence presented at
¶132trial is viewed in the light most favorable to the verdicts to
¶133determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the
¶134defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of all the crimes of
¶135 8 which he was convicted. See Jones v. State, 304 Ga. 594, 598 (2) (820
¶136SE2d 696) (2018) (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (III)
¶137(B) (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979)). In making this
¶138determination, we do not evaluate witness credibility, resolve
¶139inconsistencies in the evidence, or assess the weight of the evidence;
¶140these tasks are left to the sole discretion of the jury. See Walker v.
¶141State, 296 Ga. 161, 163 (1) (766 SE2d 28) (2014). The jury’s verdicts
¶142will be upheld as long as some competent evidence, even if
¶143contradicted, supports each fact necessary to make out the State’s
¶144case. See Jones, 304 Ga. at 598 (2).
¶145 Applying this standard here, the evidence was sufficient to
¶146support Ridley’s convictions for malice murder and possession of a
¶147firearm in connection with that crime. 3 Both Scruggs and Green
¶148testified that they saw Ridley shoot Bynum. Surveillance footage
¶149showed Ridley in the area of the shooting shortly before it occurred.
¶150There was evidence that Ridley possessed a gun of the same caliber
¶151 3 As noted above, the felony-murder count was vacated by operation of law, and the aggravated-assault count merged with the malice-murder count. 9 as the cartridge cases and bullets recovered from the scene and from
¶152Bynum’s body. Ridley had recently been threatened by Bynum and
¶153had a clear motive for committing the shooting. And immediately
¶154after the shooting, Ridley fled Atlanta for Memphis. This evidence
¶155was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find Ridley guilty beyond
¶156a reasonable doubt of these crimes. See, e.g., Coates v. State, 310 Ga.
¶15794, 98 (849 SE2d 435) (2020) (evidence was sufficient to sustain
¶158convictions where eyewitnesses identified defendant as the shooter
¶159and defendant fled country immediately after the crimes); Jackson
¶160v. State, 288 Ga. 213, 214 (1) (702 SE2d 201) (2010) (evidence was
¶161sufficient to sustain convictions where eyewitnesses identified
¶162defendant as the shooter and there was evidence that defendant had
¶163a motive to commit the shooting).
¶164 3. Ridley next contends that the trial court abused its
¶165discretion by failing to exercise its role as the “thirteenth juror” in
¶166considering his motion for new trial.
¶167 “Even when the evidence is legally sufficient to sustain a
¶168conviction, a trial judge may grant a new trial if the verdict of the
¶169 10 jury ‘is contrary to . . . the principles of justice and equity,’ OCGA §
¶1705-5-20, or if the verdict is ‘decidedly and strongly against the weight
¶171of the evidence.’ OCGA § 5-5-21.” Drennon v. State, 314 Ga. 854, 860
¶172(2) (__ SE2d __) (2022) (citation and punctuation omitted). When
¶173these so-called “general grounds” are properly raised in a timely
¶174motion for new trial, the trial judge must “exercise a broad discretion
¶175to sit as a ‘thirteenth juror.’” Id. (citation and punctuation omitted).
¶176This role requires the judge to consider matters typically reserved
¶177to the jury, including conflicts in the evidence, witness credibility,
¶178and the weight of the evidence. See id.
¶179 The trial court performed its thirteenth-juror role here. This is
¶180plain from the face of the order denying Ridley’s motion for new trial.
¶181In that order, the court expressly states that it “re-examine[d] . . .
¶182the weight of the evidence and the credibility of witnesses, as an
¶183independent fact-finder” and that, having done so, it “decline[d] to
¶184grant a new trial on these general grounds.” So the record refutes
¶185Ridley’s contention that the court failed to fulfill its role as the
¶186thirteenth juror. See Strother v. State, 305 Ga. 838, 843 (3) (828
¶187 11 SE2d 327) (2019). And the merits of the trial court’s decision on the
¶188general grounds are not subject to our review: “this Court does not
¶189sit as an arbiter of the general grounds, which are solely within the
¶190discretion of the trial court.” Id. (citation and punctuation omitted).
¶191This claim therefore fails.
¶192 4. Ridley also contends that the trial court abused its
¶193discretion in overruling his objections to certain statements the
¶194prosecutor made during closing arguments. He claims that several
¶195of the prosecutor’s statements improperly shifted the burden of proof
¶196to the defense, and that one statement argued facts not in evidence.
¶197Ridley is correct that these arguments are reviewed for abuse of
¶198discretion. See Moore v. State, 307 Ga. 290, 297 (5) (835 SE2d 610)
¶199(2019). We take each of these two arguments in turn.
¶200 (a) On several occasions during closing argument, the
¶201prosecutor noted for the jury that the defense had the same power
¶202to subpoena witnesses as the State. This point was responsive to the
¶203defense’s efforts throughout the trial to cast doubt on the State’s
¶204case by highlighting its failure to present testimony from various
¶205 12 people who, the defense claimed, would have had information
¶206relevant to the investigation. On the first occasion, the prosecutor
¶207stated:
¶208 The one thing I want to tell you that’s real important is that the burden is on the State to prove [guilt] beyond a reasonable doubt. The defense has absolutely no burden whatsoever to do anything. They don’t have to do anything. The burden is completely on us, but the State has subpoena power to make people come to court. Given a subpoena they have to come to court. Bring your evidence with you. They have the exact same subpoena power.
¶209Ridley’s trial counsel objected on the ground of “shifting the burden.”
¶210The objection was overruled, and the prosecutor continued to press
¶211the point. Later in her closing, the prosecutor returned to this topic:
¶212 [The] State’s not hiding anything from you. I told you in opening. Not putting up a bunch of witnesses who were not present and didn’t see the murder. The defense counsel asked . . . a bunch of questions of what would they . . . have said. If these witnesses were going to exonerate [Ridley] they could have subpoenaed [them.]
¶213Again, trial counsel objected based on burden-shifting, and the
¶214objection was overruled.
¶215 At another point, the prosecutor stated:
¶216 13 Do you know what the defense is other than hey, the State didn’t put up four witnesses that never saw the homicide. Yeah, that’s right. The State didn’t bring four people that never saw the homicide. So that’s the defense, attacking the State. Well, somebody murdered this man. Somebody murdered Rico Bynum, right. He was gunned down.
¶217Trial counsel objected, arguing that “the State is implying that we
¶218have to give the person who committed the murder.” The objection
¶219was overruled, and the prosecutor went on:
¶220 The burden is on the State to prove this to you beyond a reasonable doubt. The defense doesn’t have to prove someone else did it. But ladies and gentlemen, I’m allowed to ask you who else did it? What other evidence is there that anyone other than Kentrick Ridley did this? The State has proven it to you beyond a reasonable doubt.
¶221 Ridley now contends that the trial court abused its discretion
¶222in overruling these objections, asserting that the prosecutor’s
¶223statements had the effect of communicating to the jury that the
¶224defense did bear some burden of proof.
¶225 A prosecutor has “wide latitude in the conduct of closing
¶226argument, the bounds of which are in the trial court’s discretion.”
¶227Moore, 307 Ga. at 297 (5) (citation and punctuation omitted). And
¶228where the defense presents no evidence to rebut the evidence of
¶229 14 guilt, it is not improper for the prosecutor to point out that fact to
¶230the jury. See Kilgore v. State, 300 Ga. 429, 432 (2) (796 SE2d 290)
¶231(2017) (an argument that the defense has failed to rebut or explain
¶232the State’s evidence does not amount to improper burden-shifting);
¶233McCord v. State, 268 Ga. 842, 843 (3) (493 SE2d 129) (1997) (same).
¶234The prosecutor’s statements here were proper comments on the
¶235defense’s failure to present evidence, made with express reference to
¶236the fact that the burden of proof rests “completely” with the State.
¶237So these statements were well within the bounds of proper closing
¶238argument, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
¶239overruling Ridley’s objections to them.
¶240 (b) At one point during her closing argument, apparently
¶241trying to rebut the defense’s argument that Scruggs’s account of
¶242walking off with Green down Grand Avenue just before the shooting
¶243was not believable, the prosecutor stated:
¶244 I’m sorry to have to do this, but if you’re a prostitute and a strange man say[s] hey, let’s go to the really real dark area by the wood in exchange for money for sex does your –
¶245 15 Trial counsel objected on the ground that the remark stated facts
¶246not in evidence. The court responded by directing the jury to
¶247“remember the evidence to the best of your collective ability.” The
¶248prosecutor went on:
¶249 I’m not talking about evidence, ladies and gentlemen. The defense got up here and said it was unreasonable for Rico Bynum to let Theresa Scruggs walk off with [Green]. My argument is perfectly reasonable because if you’re the pimp you’re watching the guy and the girl walk off together to the dark area what do you think is going to happen over there if you’re the pimp.
¶250 Ridley contends that the trial court abused its discretion by
¶251allowing the prosecutor to argue facts not in evidence. See OCGA §
¶25217-8-75 (“Where counsel in the hearing of the jury make statements
¶253of prejudicial matters which are not in evidence, it is the duty of the
¶254court to interpose and prevent the same.”). But the wide latitude
¶255afforded to a prosecutor making a closing argument includes the
¶256leeway to draw reasonable inferences from the evidence. See Styles
¶257v. State, 308 Ga. 624, 629 (3) (842 SE2d 869) (2020). The prosecutor’s
¶258statement asked the jury to draw a reasonable inference—supported
¶259by the undisputed evidence that Scruggs was a prostitute and
¶260 16 Bynum was a pimp—as to why Scruggs would have walked away
¶261with Green without any objection from Bynum. See Varner v. State,
¶262285 Ga. 300, 301 (2) (c) (676 SE2d 189) (2009) (prosecutor’s reference
¶263to victim as a “battered woman” was a permissible inference from
¶264the evidence). So the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
¶265overruling Ridley’s objection to the prosecutor’s statement.
¶266 Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur, except LaGrua, J., disqualified.
¶267 17