¶1 NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and official text of the opinion.
¶2In the Supreme Court of Georgia
¶3 Decided: February 21, 2023
¶4 S23A0054. HAUFLER v. THE STATE.
¶5 MCMILLIAN, Justice.
¶6 In June 2021, a jury found Chad Haufler guilty of malice
¶7murder and other crimes in connection with the shooting death of
¶8Marc Dimos. 1 On appeal, Haufler asserts that the trial court erred
¶9in failing to instruct the jury on involuntary manslaughter and in
¶10denying his pretrial motion to suppress certain statements he made
¶11 1 Dimos was killed on August 28, 2018. On January 28, 2019, a Greene County grand jury indicted Haufler for two counts of malice murder (Counts 1 and 3), felony murder predicated on aggravated assault (Count 2), felony murder predicated on aggravated battery (Count 4), possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (Count 5), aggravated assault (Count 6), and aggravated battery (Count 7). At a trial held from June 14 to 18, 2021, the jury found Haufler guilty of all counts. The trial court sentenced Haufler to serve life in prison for the first count of malice murder, plus a consecutive term of five years in prison for the firearm possession count; the remaining counts were either merged for sentencing purposes or vacated by operation of law. Haufler timely filed a motion for new trial, which he amended on February 11, 2022. Following a hearing, the trial court denied the motion on March 16, 2022. Haufler timely appealed, and the case was docketed to the term of this Court beginning in December 2022 and orally argued on December 8, 2022. in the presence of law enforcement officers. For the reasons that
¶12follow, we affirm.
¶13 The evidence presented at trial shows that Haufler and Dimos
¶14met in October 2017 on a hunting trip in Colorado and went on
¶15various hunting and fishing trips together over the following year.
¶16When Haufler began having trouble in his marriage, he asked Dimos
¶17to come stay with him at his lake house in Greene County, Georgia.
¶18Dimos agreed and flew out the next morning, on August 26, 2018.
¶19Haufler and Dimos spent all of August 26 and 27 together, fishing
¶20on Lake Oconee and eating at local restaurants.
¶21 They returned to Haufler’s home around 9:15 p.m. on the night
¶22of August 27. Throughout the night, multiple phone calls and text
¶23messages were made from Dimos’s cell phone. Around 4:15 a.m., a
¶24text message was sent to Dimos’s wife with a picture of a bottle of
¶25Captain Morgan rum and the caption “Captain Jack Sparrow.”
¶26Between 5:36 and 5:40 a.m., several FaceTime calls were made to a
¶27number saved as George Kashimer, none of which connected; at 5:41
¶28a.m., Haufler called Kashimer from Dimos’s phone and left a
¶29 2 voicemail message. The next use of Dimos’s phone was Haufler’s call
¶30to 911. At 6:34 a.m. Haufler reported that he had been the victim of
¶31a home invasion by three men and that he believed he had shot one
¶32in the head.
¶33 As Deputy Travis Heath of the Greene County Sheriff’s
¶34Department was responding to the call, he saw a man later
¶35identified as Haufler walking along the road with a gun in his right
¶36hand, which was later identified as a Glock 23 .40-caliber handgun.
¶37Haufler complied with Deputy Heath’s command to put the gun
¶38down and get in the back of the patrol car. As they drove to Haufler’s
¶39home, Haufler was “irate” and “going on about having intruders in
¶40the house and he had just shot someone.” Haufler remained in the
¶41back of the patrol vehicle while officers worked to secure the home
¶42and its perimeter. Although Haufler initially told officers that he
¶43had shot an intruder, at other times, Haufler stated that he had shot
¶44a man named “Johnny Russ” and that all of a sudden he was being
¶45choked, adding, “Thank God I had a gun in my bedroom . . . went
¶46and shot them bastards.” He also stated that his wife “might be
¶47 3 involved in this” and that they were “in a separation.” Later, Haufler
¶48said that Dimos had put him in a chokehold, that he was about to
¶49pass out but freed himself, and that he then put Dimos in a
¶50chokehold, got his gun, and shot Dimos in the head. Haufler’s
¶51statements were recorded by the patrol car’s dash-cam and played
¶52for the jury at trial.
¶53 The GBI was called to assist at the scene; they located no other
¶54people in the home and found no signs of forced entry. There were
¶55no signs of a struggle except in the basement, where officers found
¶56Dimos on a couch with a large pool of blood under his body. Officers
¶57located an unspent round near the stairs leading to the basement
¶58and another unspent round and the shell casing near Dimos’s body.
¶59They also found a holster in the master bedroom on the main floor.
¶60Haufler’s Glock handgun had a live round in the chamber and six
¶61rounds in the 13-round capacity magazine.
¶62 GBI Special Agent Brian Hargrove, an expert in bloodstain
¶63analysis and latent fingerprint development, testified that there
¶64were two separate pools of blood about fifteen to eighteen feet apart,
¶65 4 one against the far wall of the basement and the other underneath
¶66the victim’s body on the couch, with a few drops of blood connecting
¶67the pools. In the pool of blood against the wall, there was a “void”
¶68and other evidence consistent with Dimos having laid on his back
¶69while bleeding from his face long enough for the blood that flowed to
¶70the back of his head to coagulate. Near this pool of blood was a
¶71dented popcorn kettle with Dimos’s blood on one side. The blood
¶72spatter on the popcorn kettle showed that the blood was travelling
¶73away from the area with the dent. Blood spatter stains on the wall
¶74indicated that Dimos was lying on his back when he was struck in
¶75the face with the popcorn kettle. The drip trail of blood between the
¶76two pools of blood was consistent with Dimos moving across the
¶77room and settling on the couch where he was later shot in the face
¶78while in a seated position. The kickback of blood spatter indicated
¶79that Dimos was already bleeding from his face at the time he was
¶80shot.
¶81 Officers observed only minor injuries on Haufler, including a
¶82“mark” on his left cheek, a minor scratch behind his right ear, a
¶83 5 small scratch on his right ankle, a “scrape” on his right forearm, and
¶84abrasions on and around both knees. GBI Special Agent Michael
¶85Maybin testified that the abrasions below Haufler’s knees appeared
¶86to be from crawling on a hard surface and that Haufler did not have
¶87any injuries on his neck apart from some redness that appeared to
¶88be a sunburn all over his face and neck. When Haufler was
¶89photographed again three days later, a small bruise had appeared
¶90on his left arm and his left thigh, but no bruising appeared on his
¶91neck, although the redness from the apparent sunburn was still
¶92present.
¶93 The medical examiner testified that Dimos had 24 different
¶94injuries to his face that were consistent with being hit from multiple
¶95angles and were very unlikely to have been the result of a single
¶96blow or from falling. 2 The fatal gunshot wound was made from a 20-
¶97degree downward angle, indicating that the gun was elevated above
¶98 2 Dimos was diagnosed with Lewy Body Dementia in 2016, and his treating neurologist testified that Dimos’s mobility had worsened over the years and that alcohol would further hamper Dimos’s mobility, such that if he were thrown to the floor, Dimos would have had trouble getting back up.
¶99 6 Dimos’s head when he was shot.3 Because there was no stippling on
¶100Dimos’s face, the gun was a minimum of 18 inches away from his
¶101face when it was fired, and there were no burn marks or injuries to
¶102Dimos’s hand that would indicate he had any contact with the gun
¶103at the time of its discharge. 4 Dimos had blood in his airway, meaning
¶104he had likely inhaled his own blood from his facial injuries prior to
¶105the shooting. The medical examiner testified that it was highly
¶106unlikely that Dimos could have walked away or had any
¶107consciousness following the gunshot to his face. She further opined
¶108that it was highly improbable that Dimos was running toward
¶109Haufler when he was shot because Dimos would have immediately
¶110fallen forward at the time and location of the shooting. Dimos had a
¶111blood alcohol content (“BAC”) between .161 and .195 at the time of
¶112his death.
¶113 A GBI firearms examiner testified that the bullet recovered
¶114 3 Haufler is five feet and eight inches tall; Dimos was six feet and one inch tall. 4 No gunshot residue testing was done on either man’s hands due to
¶115Haufler’s admission that he had fired the gun. 7 during the autopsy was fired by a Glock .40-caliber gun, but she was
¶116not able to conclusively say that it was fired by Haufler’s gun.
¶117However, the spent shell casing located on the basement floor near
¶118Dimos was fired from Haufler’s gun. The firearms examiner
¶119explained that the Glock 23 handgun had a “drop safety,” which
¶120ensured it would not accidentally discharge if dropped, and both a
¶121trigger safety and a firing pin safety, which prevent the gun from
¶122firing unless the trigger is pulled completely back. When the
¶123firearms examiner test-fired the gun, she found no malfunctions.
¶124 In support of his defense that he may have been experiencing
¶125a blackout at the time of the shooting, Haufler called Dr. Kim
¶126Fromme, a clinical psychologist who specializes in the effects of
¶127alcohol intoxication, to testify that alcohol can cause “blackouts” or
¶128periods of time in which a person is acting consciously but not
¶129forming memories. Dr. Fromme explained that when someone
¶130experiences a blackout that person will often attempt to “fill in [the]
¶131gaps to create . . . a personal narrative . . . about what happened.”
¶132Dr. Fromme explained that because Haufler had experienced
¶133 8 blackouts in the past, as had his close relatives, he was at a high
¶134risk of experiencing blackouts when drinking, particularly hard
¶135liquor, such as tequila or rum. Based on evidence at the scene,
¶136including partially emptied bottles of hard liquor and the presence
¶137of shot glasses, Dr. Fromme opined that both men had been drinking
¶138heavily and that Haufler was likely experiencing a blackout at the
¶139time that he spoke to police.5 Relying in part on Dimos’s BAC of .161
¶140at the time of autopsy, Dr. Fromme estimated that Haufler’s BAC
¶141was .21 to .25 at the time he spoke to police, around three times the
¶142legal limit for driving. Dr. Fromme arrived at this estimate by
¶143extrapolating from Dimos’s known BAC based on the men’s relative
¶144body weights and studies that show people tend to consume alcoholic
¶145beverages in a 1:1 ratio when drinking with someone. Thus, Dr.
¶146Fromme opined, when Haufler told police that he had shot Dimos
¶147 5 Although no evidence was presented about Haufler’s actual BAC, Haufler told Deputy Heath that he had consumed “three or four drinks of Crown and Coke and maybe two shots of 1800 tequila” and that “in the meantime, [they] went down and had some pizza.”. Also, Dr. Fromme elected not to question Haufler about whether he believed that he had blacked out that night, and Haufler, who did not testify at trial, never claimed to have blacked out in his statements to police. 9 after a fight, he may have been experiencing a blackout from his
¶148alcohol consumption and may have just been extrapolating from
¶149limited evidence rather than from memory.
¶150 The defense also called Dr. Kimberly Collins, an expert in
¶151forensic pathology. Based on the circumstantial evidence from the
¶152scene, Dr. Collins testified that the gun could have discharged as the
¶153result of a struggle between Haufler and Dimos. The patterns of
¶154blood on Dimos’s hand, including blowback on the back of his hand
¶155and sparing on the palm, indicated that Dimos could have been
¶156holding the gun at the time that it discharged.
¶157 1. Haufler asserts that the trial court committed reversible
¶158error by failing to instruct the jury on involuntary manslaughter.
¶159We are not persuaded.
¶160 “[A] charge on involuntary manslaughter should be given, upon
¶161a proper request, when there is slight evidence to support it.” Moon
¶162v. State, 311 Ga. 421, 424 (2) (858 SE2d 18) (2021) (citation and
¶163punctuation omitted). “Whether the evidence was sufficient to
¶164warrant the requested instruction is a legal question, which we
¶165 10 review de novo.” Wade v. State, 304 Ga. 5, 8 (2) (815 SE2d 875)
¶166(2018).
¶167 Felony-grade involuntary manslaughter is statutorily defined
¶168as “caus[ing] the death of another human being without any
¶169intention to do so by the commission of an unlawful act other than a
¶170felony.” OCGA § 16-5-3 (a). A person commits misdemeanor-grade
¶171involuntary manslaughter “when he causes the death of another
¶172human being without any intention to do so, by the commission of a
¶173lawful act in an unlawful manner likely to cause death or great
¶174bodily harm.” OCGA § 16-5-3 (b).
¶175 The record shows that, prior to trial, Haufler requested pattern
¶176jury charge 2.10.44, “Involuntary Manslaughter, Statutory
¶177Definition.” 6 Although it is not clear from his written request
¶178whether Haufler was seeking a felony or misdemeanor involuntary
¶179manslaughter charge, at the various jury charge conferences
¶180 This pattern charge states: “For involuntary manslaughter the State 6
¶181must prove that the Defendant (1) caused the death of another person (2) without intending to (3) by committing the offense of ___________, which is defined as follows: (offense must be a misdemeanor).”
¶182 11 conducted throughout the trial, Haufler referred to reckless
¶183conduct, 7 pointing a gun at another, 8 and criminal negligence as the
¶184possible offenses that would support this charge.9 The trial court
¶185ultimately denied the request, stating that “a lawful act done in an
¶186unlawful manner cannot ever be utilized when it involves a firearm.”
¶187 On appeal, Haufler argues that this denial was error because
¶188there was slight evidence supporting both a felony and misdemeanor
¶189 7 OCGA § 16-5-60 (b) provides that “[a] person who causes bodily harm to or endangers the bodily safety of another by consciously disregarding a substantial and unjustifiable risk that his or her act or omission will cause harm or endanger the safety of the other person” is guilty of misdemeanor reckless conduct where “the disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care which a reasonable person would exercise in the situation.” 8 OCGA § 16-11-102 provides that “[a] person is guilty of a misdemeanor
¶190when he intentionally and without legal justification points or aims a gun or pistol at another, whether the gun or pistol is loaded or unloaded.” Where, however, “the pointing of a firearm places the victim in reasonable apprehension of immediate violent injury, then the felony of aggravated assault, rather than the misdemeanor of pointing a gun, has occurred.” Overton v. State, 305 Ga. 597, 600 (2) (825 SE2d 159) (2019) (citation and punctuation omitted). 9 The State asserts that Haufler failed to preserve for ordinary appellate
¶191review the issue of whether the trial court properly declined to give an instruction on misdemeanor involuntary manslaughter because he did not specifically request that charge. Based on the record before us, we conclude that Haufler made that request both in writing and during the charge conferences by orally requesting charges that would support misdemeanor involuntary manslaughter, and thus, the issue was preserved for ordinary appellate review. 12 involuntary manslaughter charge. Specifically, he argues that the
¶192jury could have found that Haufler accidentally discharged the
¶193firearm while intoxicated, constituting reckless conduct because he
¶194disregarded the substantial and unjustifiable risk that one will be
¶195unable to abide by safety precautions while under the influence of
¶196alcohol. Haufler also argues that there was sufficient evidence that
¶197he failed to take reasonable precautions in handling a firearm and
¶198thereby committed criminal negligence, enabling the jury to find
¶199him guilty of misdemeanor involuntary manslaughter. See McIver
¶200v. State, 314 Ga. 109, 122 (2) (c) (875 SE2d 810) (2022) (concluding
¶201that the mens rea required for misdemeanor involuntary
¶202manslaughter is “‘criminal negligence’” and explaining that this
¶203mens rea is more culpable than civil negligence but less culpable
¶204than the mens rea required for “‘reckless conduct’”). According to
¶205Haufler, because there was no evidence that he had any motive to
¶206hurt Dimos, the circumstantial evidence, as testified to by Dr.
¶207Collins, could support a finding that Dimos shot himself or was shot
¶208during a struggle. Also, Dr. Fromme opined that Haufler could have
¶209 13 been experiencing a blackout, so the jury could have reasonably
¶210believed that Haufler had blacked out from being so intoxicated such
¶211that his statements about intentionally shooting Dimos should not
¶212be believed and that instead the jury could have found that Haufler
¶213had shot Dimos through negligence or recklessness.
¶214 The State argues, however, that, while there need only be
¶215slight evidence to warrant a jury charge, this Court has held there
¶216must be some affirmative evidence in the record. See Soto v. State,
¶217303 Ga. 517, 520 (2) (813 SE2d 343) (2018) (“The evidence that the
¶218defendant committed the lesser offense does not need to be
¶219persuasive, but it must exist.” (citation and punctuation omitted)).
¶220According to the State, lack of evidence of something is not the
¶221standard upon which jury charges should be given. And here, the
¶222State argues, there was no evidence that Haufler was unaware that
¶223the gun was loaded or that he was negligently or recklessly handling
¶224the gun. Instead, the evidence showed that Haufler went upstairs to
¶225get the gun and intentionally shot Dimos in the face.
¶226 Pretermitting whether there was slight evidence warranting
¶227 14 an instruction on either felony or misdemeanor involuntary
¶228manslaughter, the evidence of Haufler’s guilt for the crimes of which
¶229he was convicted was substantial, and it is therefore highly probable
¶230that the failure to charge on involuntary manslaughter did not
¶231contribute to the jury’s verdict. See Shah v. State, 300 Ga. 14, 21 (2)
¶232(b) (793 SE2d 81) (2016) (“The test for determining
¶233nonconstitutional harmless error is whether it is highly probable
¶234that the error did not contribute to the verdict.” (citation and
¶235punctuation omitted)). The State presented evidence that Dimos
¶236was severely beaten with a metal popcorn kettle, resulting in 24
¶237different injuries to his face and head; that Dimos was shot from a
¶238distance of at least 18 inches while he was in a seated position,
¶239facing the shooter; and that Haufler stated multiple times that, after
¶240gaining the upper hand in a struggle with Dimos, Haufler went
¶241upstairs and retrieved his gun before shooting Dimos in the face.
¶242The ballistics evidence also supported that Haufler shot Dimos. And
¶243there was no evidence to support Haufler’s initial story that he had
¶244shot someone in the process of warding off intruders. Thus,
¶245 15 pretermitting whether the trial court erred in declining to give an
¶246involuntary manslaughter instruction, the failure to give the
¶247instruction was harmless. See Howard v. State, 307 Ga. 12, 20 (3)
¶248(834 SE2d 11) (2019). (“[A]n erroneous jury charge is not reversible
¶249unless it causes harm.” (citation omitted)). Accordingly, this
¶250enumeration of error fails. See Rogers v. State, 289 Ga. 675, 677-78
¶251(2) (715 SE2d 68) (2011) (no reversible error in failing to give
¶252involuntary manslaughter charge where there was overwhelming
¶253evidence inconsistent with appellant’s version of events but
¶254supportive of the jury’s finding him guilty of malice murder).
¶255 2. Haufler also asserts that the trial court erred in denying his
¶256pretrial motion to suppress statements he made to the deputy
¶257coroner while in the back of Deputy Heath’s patrol car about going
¶258upstairs to get his gun after someone put him in a chokehold.
¶259Specifically, Haufler argues that the statements should have been
¶260excluded because he was in custody at the time and had not been
¶261 16 advised of his rights under Miranda. 10
¶262 At the Jackson-Denno 11 hearing, Deputy Heath testified that,
¶263upon arriving at Haufler’s home, Deputy Heath told Haufler to
¶264remain in the patrol vehicle “for a safety standpoint, for his and
¶265ours” and to avoid contaminating the scene. The air conditioning
¶266remained on in the vehicle, and Deputy Heath checked on Haufler
¶267periodically, letting him stand outside the vehicle for fresh air from
¶268time to time.
¶269 Haufler offered to have handcuffs placed on him, but Deputy
¶270Heath declined to do so because he was not under arrest or detained
¶271at the time. Deputy Heath explained that he did not read Haufler a
¶272Miranda warning because “he wasn’t under questioning. . . . I was
¶273just kind of holding him for safety reasons and to make sure the
¶274scene was clear and untouched.” Deputy Heath explained that
¶275Haufler was in the back of the patrol car for approximately one hour
¶276before the deputy took him to the sheriff’s office. During that time,
¶277 10 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (86 SCt 1602, 16 LE2d 694) (1966). 11 See Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (84 SCt 1774, 12 LE2d 908) (1964). 17 Haufler spoke freely to officers around him without prompting, often
¶278sticking his hand out of the vehicle or yelling to get their attention.
¶279 Deputy Coroner Bilbo, who also worked as an EMS provider for
¶280Greene County, testified that his boss, the Greene County Coroner,
¶281asked him to speak with Haufler at the scene to complete a coroner’s
¶282report. He approached the patrol car and asked nearby officers if he
¶283could talk to Haufler, and they agreed. He explained to Haufler that
¶284he was a deputy coroner and proceeded to ask Haufler questions
¶285about what had happened. Haufler told him that Dimos had recently
¶286arrived from Ohio and that either Dimos or “another guy named
¶287Johnny Russ” had put him in a chokehold. Haufler then stated, “I
¶288don’t know who it was, but all[] I know is they put me in a chokehold,
¶289and I went for my gun.” When Deputy Coroner Bilbo asked Haufler
¶290if he had the gun in his possession at the time, Haufler responded,
¶291“No, it’s in my bedroom. I went and got it.” Haufler then confirmed
¶292that his bedroom was upstairs.
¶293 Deputy Coroner Bilbo also testified that he performed a
¶294physical and mental assessment of Haufler in his role as EMS and
¶295 18 did not identify any apparent injuries. And although Haufler was
¶296emotional and had apparently been drinking, he was able to
¶297communicate effectively and answer the questions posed to him.
¶298Deputy Coroner Bilbo confirmed that he had no arrest powers and
¶299was not a certified peace officer.
¶300 After reviewing a recording from Deputy Heath’s patrol car
¶301dash cam that included Haufler’s interactions with both Deputy
¶302Heath and Deputy Coroner Bilbo and a recording of Deputy Heath’s
¶303body camera,12 the trial court denied the motion to suppress
¶304Haufler’s statements to Deputy Coroner Bilbo about obtaining the
¶305gun. In doing so, the trial court found that Haufler was not in
¶306custody or subject to custodial interrogation; that Haufler
¶307voluntarily made statements to Deputy Heath and Deputy Coroner
¶308Bilbo, who was not a law enforcement official for purposes of
¶309 12 Agent Maybin also testified at the hearing and explained that he first spoke to the responding officers at the scene before approaching Haufler in the patrol car. When he told Haufler he wished to speak with him, Haufler was “very agreeable” and cooperative. And, after he told Haufler that they wanted to take him to the Sheriff’s Office so they could determine whether he had any injuries and document the blood stains he had on him, Haufler remained willing to cooperate. 19 Miranda; and that there was no evidence that the deputy coroner
¶310questioned Haufler at the request of law enforcement rather than to
¶311complete the coroner’s report.
¶312 “Generally, when reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion
¶313to suppress, this Court must accept the trial court’s factual findings
¶314unless they are clearly erroneous.” Hinkson v. State, 310 Ga. 388,
¶315400 (5) (b) (850 SE2d 41) (2020) (citation omitted). However, where,
¶316as here, the statement in question was recorded with both video and
¶317audio, which was made part of the record on appeal, and the parties
¶318point to no evidence beyond the recording to support their
¶319arguments, “we review de novo the trial court’s determinations of
¶320both fact and law.” Id. (citation omitted).
¶321 On appeal, Haufler argues that the trial court erred in denying
¶322the motion to suppress statements he made to Deputy Coroner Bilbo
¶323in the presence of Deputy Heath. According to Haufler, although
¶324Deputy Heath remained silent while the deputy coroner asked
¶325questions, Deputy Heath was a participant in the questioning
¶326through “his presence[] and . . . use of [his] patrol car” without
¶327 20 advising Haufler of his rights under Miranda such that Deputy
¶328Coroner Bilbo was in essence acting as a law enforcement officer in
¶329questioning Haufler. In response, the State argues that Haufler was
¶330not in custody and that government agents not primarily charged
¶331with enforcement of the criminal law, such as deputy coroners, are
¶332generally under no obligation to comply with Miranda before
¶333speaking with persons purportedly in custody. See Daddario v.
¶334State, 307 Ga. 179, 189 (3) (835 SE2d 181) (2019) (“Thus, at least
¶335where the official has not been given police powers, Miranda has
¶336been held inapplicable to questioning by school officials, welfare
¶337investigators, medical personnel, judges, prison counselors, and
¶338parole or probation officers.” (citation and punctuation omitted)). Cf.
¶339In the Interest of T.A.G., 292 Ga. App. 48, 51 (1) (a) (663 SE2d 392)
¶340(2008) (“Although an officer’s mere presence in the room, without
¶341more, might not constitute police participation,” where the evidence
¶342showed that the officer was invited to the interview after the
¶343juvenile confessed to one robbery and denied another and that the
¶344officer then advised the assistant principal on what charges would
¶345 21 be appropriate, “the juvenile court was authorized to find that the
¶346officer was more than merely present.” (emphasis supplied)).
¶347 Pretermitting whether the trial court erred in admitting
¶348Haufler’s statements to the deputy coroner, any error was harmless
¶349beyond a reasonable doubt because the statements were cumulative
¶350of similar statements Haufler made before and after his interaction
¶351with the deputy coroner. See Jones v. State, 314 Ga. 605, 616 (4) (878
¶352SE2d 505) (2022) (“A constitutional error is harmless when the State
¶353proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute
¶354to the verdict, such as when the evidence at issue is cumulative of
¶355other properly-admitted evidence or when the evidence against the
¶356defendant is overwhelming.” (citation and punctuation omitted)).
¶357Before Haufler spoke to the deputy coroner, he told Deputy Heath,
¶358unprompted, “He’s trying to choke me out, and I got the better half
¶359of him. And I, I went in to my—I started choking him out, I went
¶360and got my gun . . . And I shot him.” Then, after speaking with the
¶361deputy coroner, Haufler again, unprompted, told Deputy Heath, “I
¶362had a Glock 40 I went and got. This dude’s trying to kill me. I’m like
¶363 22 pow, pow, pow!” Approximately ten minutes later, Haufler called
¶364Deputy Heath back over to the patrol car and told him, “I think it
¶365was uh, Marc Dimos that tried to choke me out. . . . I mean, all[] I
¶366remember is he had me, and I reversed it, and somehow I got the
¶367gun, and I shot him.” Haufler also stated, “It must have started in
¶368the basement, but my gun was upstairs.” Haufler later told another
¶369officer, unprompted, “Thank God I had a gun in my bedroom.” And
¶370after Haufler agreed to be taken to the Greene County Sheriff’s
¶371Department to be interviewed, Haufler again spontaneously stated
¶372that he went and got his gun before shooting Dimos.
¶373 Thus, because Haufler made similar statements multiple
¶374times, both before and after speaking with the deputy coroner, 13 the
¶375statements he complains of are cumulative of other evidence that
¶376was properly admitted at trial, such that any error in the
¶377statements’ admission was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
¶378Accordingly, this enumeration of error fails. See Renfro v. State, 313
¶379 13 Haufler has not challenged the admission of these statements on appeal. 23 Ga. 608, 613-14 (2) (872 SE2d 283) (2022) (even if the trial court
¶380erred in admitting the appellant’s statements, any error was
¶381harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because it was cumulative of
¶382other properly admitted evidence).14
¶383 Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.
¶384 14 In our analysis we have assumed two trial court errors, one instructional and one evidentiary, and determined that each error was harmless. To establish cumulative error, an appellant “must show that at least two errors were committed in the course of the trial, and when considered together along with the entire record, the multiple errors so infected the jury’s deliberation that they denied him a fundamentally fair trial.” Pritchett v. State, 314 Ga. 767, 787 (4) (879 SE2d 436) (2022) (citation and punctuation omitted). Here, Haufler has made no argument that we should apply a cumulative error review in this context or how we should aggregate harm from a jury instruction with harm from an unrelated evidentiary decision. See Jones v. State, 314 Ga. 605, 617 (5) n.9 (878 SE2d 505) (2022) (cautioning that if an appellant seeks a new trial “based on the cumulative effect of errors outside of the evidentiary context, he would do well to explain why cumulative error should be extended beyond the evidentiary context” (citation and punctuation omitted)). However, even assuming that these presumed errors should be considered cumulatively, we conclude that Haufler has “failed to establish that the combined prejudicial effect of these errors requires a new trial.” Park v. State, 314 Ga. 733, 745 (4) (879 SE2d 400) (2022) (citation and punctuation omitted). 24