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315 Or. App. 201

State v. Hager

Court of Appeals of Oregon

Decided October 13, 2021

Court of Appeals of Oregon · decided 2021-10-13

Reversed and remanded · Decided 2021-10-13

                                 201

Argued and submitted September 2, reversed and remanded October 13, 2021


                     STATE OF OREGON,
                      Plaintiff-Respondent,
                                v.
                   DUWAYN DORN HAGER,
                     Defendant-Appellant.
                   Lane County Circuit Court
                     15CR12300; A172736
                              
500 P3d 83


  Charles M. Zennaché, Judge.
   Marc D. Brown, Deputy Public Defender, argued the
cause for appellant. Also on the brief was Ernest G. Lannet,
Chief Defender, Criminal Appellate Section, Office of Public
Defense Services.
   Kirsten M. Naito, Assistant Attorney General, argued
the cause for respondent. Also on the brief were Ellen F.
Rosenblum, Attorney General, and Benjamin Gutman,
Solicitor General.
  Before Lagesen, Presiding Judge, and James, Judge, and
Kamins, Judge.
  PER CURIAM
  Reversed and remanded.
202                                             State v. Hager

        PER CURIAM
          Defendant appeals a judgment extending his term
of probation based on findings that he failed to report as
directed. He assigns error to the trial court’s decision, over
defendant’s due process objection, to permit his current probation officer to testify to written statements made by his
former probation officer in his notes about defendant. The
state responds that any error was harmless and that the
trial court properly allowed the new probation officer to testify to statements by the former probation officer.
        As an initial matter, the state has not disputed
that due process poses the same limitations on the reliance
on out-of-court statements to extend probation that it does
on the use of hearsay to revoke probation. Accordingly, we
assume without deciding that the analysis is the same in
each context.
          Turning to the question at hand, we reject the
state’s contention that any error is harmless. Contrary to
the state’s assertions, the hearsay evidence was not cumulative of other evidence and the record indicates that the trial
court likely relied on it to find that defendant violated the
terms of probation and then to extend probation based on
that finding.
          As for the merits of the due process question, we see
little difference between this matter and our recent decision in State v. Brown, 
313 Or App 283, 284-86
, 
496 P3d 701
(2021). Considering the relevant factors, the state made the
evidence central to its case, and defendant asked for confrontation. Although defendant’s former probation officer
had retired, the state made no showing that it would be difficult or expensive to call him as a witness. As for reliability
of the statements, although the court determined that the
former probation officer’s file would be admissible under the
business records hearsay exception (an assessment on which
we do not express an opinion), the documentary records
themselves were not admitted into evidence as the exception contemplates. OEC 803(6) (allowing for the admission
of “[a] memorandum, report, record, or data compilation,
in any form” otherwise meeting requirements of the rule).
Instead, defendant’s new probation officer simply testified to
Cite as 
315 Or App 201
 (2021)                            203

the contents of those records, so the business records exception is not a basis for concluding that the hearsay testimony
is reliable. See State v. Monk, 
244 Or App 152, 158
, 
260 P3d 607
 (2011) (rejecting state’s argument that testimony based
on police report was reliable where report itself had not been
admitted into evidence). Beyond that, we do not see any other
basis to conclude that the hearsay statements were so reliable that the other factors pointing toward defendant having a due process confrontation right in this circumstance
are outweighed by that reliability.
       For these reasons, we conclude that the trial court
erred in overruling defendant’s due process objection.
Because we also have concluded that the error was not
harmless, we reverse and remand.
        Reversed and remanded.

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