State v. Britton

FINAL COPY


                S23A0102. THE STATE v. BRITTON.


      MCMILLIAN, Justice.

      Manvel Britton was charged with murder and other offenses in

connection with the fatal shooting of Eddy Leonardo.1 The State

appeals the trial court’s grant of Britton’s motion to suppress

evidence from his cell phone records obtained pursuant to a search

warrant (the “Warrant”) during the police investigation into that

death.2 The trial court found that the affidavit for the Warrant (the

“Affidavit”) contained a material misrepresentation which tainted

the entire document, and, with that misrepresentation excluded, the

Affidavit failed to establish the requisite probable cause to issue the

Warrant. The trial court further found a “discrepancy” in the



      1 Britton is charged with murder, felony murder (four counts), criminal

attempt to commit armed robbery, aggravated assault with a deadly weapon,
possession of a firearm during commission of a felony, and possession of a
firearm by a convicted felon (two counts). The case was orally argued on March
29, 2023.
      2 See OCGA § 5-7-1 (a) (4).
Affidavit that it determined affected the validity of the Warrant. The

State argues on appeal that in reaching these conclusions, the trial

court did not properly apply the law and failed to give proper

deference to the magistrate judge who issued the Warrant. We agree

and reverse for the reasons set forth below.

     The Affidavit recites the following. On February 1, 2020,

officers from the Roswell Police Department responded to a report

of a shooting at a supermarket. When the officers arrived on the

scene, they discovered Leonardo lying on the pavement in the

parking lot with a gunshot wound to his torso. The officers also

located a plastic bag containing a large sum of U.S. currency.

Leonardo was transported to the hospital where he was pronounced

dead.

     Witnesses at the scene told the police officers that they had

earlier seen an “unknown black male” exit the passenger side of a

black Dodge Charger and approach Leonardo. The man got into a

physical altercation with Leonardo, then pulled a gun out of his

waistband and fired one shot. Leonardo fell to the ground. The

                                  2
unknown man got back into the Charger on the passenger side, and

the car sped northbound on Alpharetta Highway. Based on this

information, the officers consulted a nearby stationary license plate

reader (“LPR”) to search for any vehicles matching the witnesses’

description and determined that a matching car had passed the

LPR’s location a few minutes prior to the incident. A search of other

LPRs in the area revealed that the same black Dodge Charger had

been in the vicinity of a bank where Leonardo made a stop earlier in

the day, and video footage from a fast food restaurant showed that,

approximately 15 minutes before the shooting, a black Dodge

Charger was there at the same time Leonardo purchased food from

the restaurant.3 The Charger followed Leonardo’s truck out of the

restaurant’s parking lot and onto the roadway.

     Video footage from a location across the street from the

supermarket showed Leonardo arriving there in his truck, followed

by a black Dodge Charger, which pulled in behind the truck. An



     3  Police discovered a receipt for this purchase in Leonardo’s truck,
leading them to obtain the video footage.
                                    3
unknown person then exited the Charger and appeared to head

toward the truck. That same camera recorded the Charger exiting

the supermarket’s parking lot “at a high rate of speed” and heading

northbound on Alpharetta Highway.

     The Roswell officers obtained the license plate number for the

black Dodge Charger from the LPRs and used that information to

identify the vehicle’s owner as James Travious English, Britton’s co-

defendant. The police later obtained a search warrant to obtain “call

detail records with historical cell tower and geographical location

data” for English’s cell phone number. The search warrant also

authorized the phone company to release “real time geo[graphic]

location pinging of the phone number.” From this information,

officers discovered that the movements of the phone mirrored the

movements of the Dodge Charger on the day of the shooting. Police

arrested English, and, after impounding the Charger, obtained a

warrant to search the vehicle. Britton’s fingerprints were discovered

inside the Charger, and English’s phone records showed that his

phone and Britton’s phone “had been communicating around the

                                 4
time of Leonardo’s murder.”

     On February 3, 2020, Roswell police applied for a search

warrant to T-Mobile for Britton’s phone records. The Affidavit stated

that one of the fingerprints in the Dodge Charger belonged to

Britton, who was found to have a criminal history including armed

robbery, thefts, and carrying a weapon in the commission of a felony.

The Affidavit also stated that from a review of English’s “historical

phone records[,] it was discovered that he was in extensive

communication with Britton around the time of the reported

crimes.” A Fulton County magistrate judge issued the Warrant to T-

Mobile for “[s]ubscriber information[,] call detail records,” “historical

GPS/cell tower location” records, and “real time GPS location

(pinging)” information for Britton’s cell phone.

     Britton was arrested for Leonardo’s murder on February 11,

2020, and, on November 9, 2021, he filed a motion to suppress his

cell phone location records seized pursuant to the Warrant (the “cell

phone location records”).

     Following a hearing, the trial court issued an order granting

                                   5
the motion to suppress based on its findings that the Affidavit

contained both a material misrepresentation and a discrepancy that

undercut the Warrant’s validity. Specifically, the trial court found

that the Affidavit materially misrepresented that English was in

“extensive communication with Britton around the time of the

reported crimes” because cell phone records showed that on the day

of Leonardo’s shooting English’s phone and Britton’s phone

exchanged only thirteen calls, six of those calls were missed calls,

and the remaining seven only lasted a total of two minutes and forty-

two seconds. (Emphasis in original.) The trial court further found

that this “material falsehood” tainted the entire Affidavit, and that

without this “material falsehood,” the Affidavit lacked sufficient

evidence to support probable cause because the existence of Britton’s

fingerprint in English’s car that was seized two days after the

shooting did not place him in the car at the time of the shooting and

the only description of the alleged assailant was that he was an

“unknown black male,” and “Britton was not identified as being on

the scene or being the assailant or even being a black male.”

                                 6
     The trial court also questioned the veracity of the affiant due

to a discrepancy on the face of the Affidavit. The body of the Affidavit

began with the sentence: “The undersigned[,] Charles Jackson,

being duly sworn, deposes and says: I am a Georgia certified peace

officer charged with the duty of enforcing the criminal laws . . .” but

then further in the Affidavit, it states: “I, Detective Irving, am a

sworn police [sic] in State of Georgia [sic] and am POST certified . .

. . I attest the facts and circumstances below are true and accurate

to the best of my knowledge.” (Emphasis in original.) However, the

Affidavit was then signed by “Charles Jackson.” Although the State

claimed that the change from Charles Jackson to Detective Irving

was a scrivener’s error, the trial court rejected that argument,

pointing out that the State put on no evidence to support the claim.

The trial court concluded that “[d]ue to each of these deficiencies,

either one of which would independently support this Court’s finding

[that the affiant lacked veracity], it is clear that the State has not

met its burden” to support the Warrant and ordered that all

evidence of Britton’s cell phone location information be excluded at

                                   7
trial. This appeal followed.

     1. At the outset, we recount the applicable standard of review

for analyzing a magistrate’s decision to issue a search warrant.

     A search warrant will issue only based upon an oath or

affirmation stating “facts sufficient to show probable cause that a

crime is being committed or has been committed.” OCGA § 17-5-21

(a). The magistrate’s task in determining if probable cause exists to

issue a search warrant

     is simply to make a practical, common-sense decision
     whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the
     affidavit before him, including the veracity and basis of
     knowledge of persons supplying hearsay information,
     there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of
     a crime will be found in a particular place.

Moon v. State, 

 (4) (

) (2021) (citation and

punctuation omitted). See also Copeland v. State, 

 (3)

(

) (2022) (“The probable cause test requires only a fair

probability—less than a certainty but more than a mere suspicion of

possibility—which by no means is to be equated with proof by even

so much as a preponderance of the evidence.” (citation and


                                 8
punctuation omitted)). And in analyzing probable cause, “a

magistrate may draw ‘reasonable inferences . . . from the material

supplied to him by applicants for a warrant.’” Taylor v. State, 

 (2) (

) (2018) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 

 (III) (

, 76 LE2d 527) (1983). Therefore,

“[t]he test for probable cause is not a hypertechnical one to be

employed by legal technicians, but is based on the factual and

practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and

prudent men act.” Id. at 60-61 (2) (citation and punctuation omitted).

     If a magistrate’s decision to issue a search warrant is

challenged, the trial court provides “a first level of review, guided by

the Fourth Amendment’s strong preference for searches conducted

pursuant to a warrant, and the principle that substantial deference

must be accorded a magistrate’s decision to issue a search warrant

based on a finding of probable cause.” Palmer v. State, 

,

671-72 (2) (a) (

) (2021) (citation and punctuation

omitted).

     A deferential standard of review is appropriate to further

                                   9
     the Fourth Amendment’s strong preference for searches
     conducted pursuant to a warrant. Although in a
     particular case it may not be easy to determine when an
     affidavit demonstrates the existence of probable cause,
     the resolution of doubtful or marginal cases in this area
     should be largely determined by the preference to be
     accorded to warrants.

State v. Palmer, 

 (

) (2009) (citation

and punctuation omitted). See also Taylor, 

 (2) (“even

doubtful cases should be resolved in favor of upholding a warrant”

(citation and punctuation omitted)).

      On appeal, we review the grant of a search warrant by

considering the totality of the circumstances “to determine if the

magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding that probable

cause existed to issue the search warrant.” Moon, 

 (4)

(citation and punctuation omitted). See also Gates, 

(III) (“[T]he Fourth Amendment requires no more.”). And in

reviewing the trial court’s grant of Britton’s motion to suppress in

this case, because the State elected at the hearing on the motion to

suppress to stand on the facts as averred on the face of the Affidavit

and neither party produced any witnesses to supplement the

                                 10
Affidavit, we apply a de novo review to the trial court’s application

of the law to those facts, bearing in mind the substantial deference

owed to the magistrate’s decision to issue the search warrant based

on a finding of probable cause. See Moon, 

 (4).

     2. Turning to the trial court’s first ground for granting the

motion to suppress — its finding that the Affidavit’s averment that

English “was in extensive communication with Britton around the

time of the reported crimes” was “a material and false

representation” — we are guided by the United States Supreme

Court’s decision in Franks v. Delaware, 

 (

,

57 LE2d 667) (1978). Franks explains that

     where the defendant makes a substantial preliminary
     showing that a false statement knowingly and
     intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth, was
     included by the affiant in the warrant affidavit, and if the
     allegedly false statement is necessary to the finding of
     probable cause, the Fourth Amendment requires that a
     hearing be held at the defendant’s request.

. See also Palmer, 310 Ga. at 673-74 (2) (b). Franks

further provides that if a preponderance of the evidence at the

hearing supports a finding of intentional or knowing falsehood or

                                 11
reckless disregard for the truth, the trial court must then view the

affidavit with its “false material set to one side,” and if

     the affidavit’s remaining content is insufficient to
     establish probable cause, the search warrant must be
     voided and the fruits of the search excluded to the same
     extent as if probable cause was lacking on the face of the
     affidavit.

. Under Franks, therefore, the trial court excludes

the alleged falsehood from its probable cause analysis only if the

preponderance of the evidence establishes an intentional or knowing

falsehood or a reckless disregard for the truth. See also Palmer, 310

Ga. at 674 (2) (b) (applying the preponderance of the evidence test

set out in Franks).

     Here, Britton moved to suppress his cell phone location records

under Franks, asserting that the Affidavit’s reference to “extensive

communication” between English and Britton “was false and was

known to be false and presented in reckless disregard for the truth.”

In support of his motion, Britton produced copies of English’s cell

phone records, but he did not argue to the trial court at the motion

hearing that the alleged misrepresentation was intentional,

                                   12
knowing, or reckless. No witnesses testified at the hearing, and no

other evidence was presented addressing Britton’s allegation that

the representation was “known to be false” or “presented in reckless

disregard for the truth.” The trial court determined that the

representation of “extensive communication” between English and

Britton was “a material falsehood” that “taints the entire warrant”

and showed that “the affiant in this case lacks veracity” but did not

make a determination as to whether this “falsehood” was made

knowingly, intentionally, or in reckless disregard for the truth.

      Pretermitting whether the trial court erred in finding a Franks

violation without considering whether the representation was made

knowingly, intentionally, or in reckless disregard for the truth,4 we

conclude, after applying our de novo review of the Affidavit and the

evidence presented at the hearing, that the trial court erred in


      4 As we conclude below, the phrase “extensive communication” does not

equate to a quantifiable number of contacts and is a subjective description of
the contacts such that under Franks, it is that much harder to show that the
representation was made intentionally and knowing that it was false or in
reckless disregard for the truth. However, we need not further parse this issue
because we determine that the trial court erred in finding that a
misrepresentation was made at all.

                                      13
finding that the statement that English “was in extensive

communication with Britton around the time of the reported crimes”

was a misrepresentation or falsehood.

     The only evidence presented at the hearing on this issue was

the Affidavit and a copy of English’s cell phone records. The trial

court found that there was no “extensive communication” because

there were “only” thirteen calls between English’s and Britton’s

phones on the day of the shooting; six of those thirteen were missed

calls; of the remaining seven calls, most lasted “only” three or four

seconds; all the calls combined amounted to a total of “only” two

minutes and forty-two seconds; and “only” one of the phone calls

lasted more than one minute. (Emphasis in original.)

     But the term “extensive communication” can encompass a

range of contacts during an unspecified period of time. See Merriam-

Webster Dictionary, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary

(defining “extensive” as “having wide or considerable extent” and

defining “extent” as “the range over which something extends”)

(website last accessed May 2, 2023). Although the truth or falsity of

                                 14
an objective statement concerning the date, time, number, and

duration of the cell phone calls between English and Britton might

have been discernible from the evidence presented, the truth or

falsity of the Affidavit’s statement that the communication was

“extensive” is not discernible from the evidence here, because it

reflects a subjective description of what English’s cell phone records

show.5

     Also, nothing in the Affidavit expressly limited the use of the

phrase “extensive communication” to the day Leonardo was shot.

Rather, the Affidavit referred to “extensive communication . . .

around the time of the reported crimes.” (Emphasis supplied.) The

cell phone records show that English and Britton exchanged

fourteen phone calls in an approximately seven-hour period, from

5:00 p.m. until shortly before midnight, on the day before Leonardo’s



     5   We acknowledge that under different circumstances, such as if the
records had shown only a single brief call or text message between English and
Britton, the truth or falsity of the statement may have been more easily
discernible from the evidence at the hearing. But because the cell phone
records in this case reflect a number of communications between the two,
whether that communication was “extensive” was a matter of perception and
thus a subjective determination.
                                     15
death, January 31, 2020. Thus, the cell phone records show a total

of 27 attempted and completed phone calls in an approximately 31-

hour period surrounding the shooting. Fifteen of the calls took place

before the shooting occurred, and those calls had a total duration of

over 44 minutes. Given the number of contacts between Britton and

English on the day before and the day of Leonardo’s shooting, we

cannot say based on the evidence presented that the phrase

“extensive communication” as used in the Affidavit was false.

     Accordingly, the trial court erred in determining that the

statement was a misrepresentation and a falsehood and further

erred by setting aside the statement concerning extensive

communications in conducting its probable cause analysis.6

     3. Our analysis on appeal does not end here because we must

also determine whether probable cause exists to support the



     6 The trial court further erred in conducting its probable cause analysis

to exclude not only the descriptive phrase “extensive communication,” with
which it disagreed, but also to exclude consideration of any communications
between English and Britton where the Affidavit also referenced their
communications without the modifier “extensive” and the cell phone records
clearly show that they were communicating both before and after the shooting.

                                     16
Warrant if the trial court had properly considered the averment

about the communications between Britton and English. The

Affidavit stated that eyewitnesses told police, and security footage

showed, that Leonardo was shot by someone in a black Dodge

Charger and that the shooter exited the passenger side of the car,

which supported that two people were in the car at the time

Leonardo was killed. After the black Dodge Charger was identified

by its license plate number, additional LPR data and security

footage showed that the Charger followed Leonardo’s vehicle as he

went to the bank and ordered food before proceeding to the

supermarket where the shooting occurred. English was then

identified as the car’s owner, and his cell phone records were

obtained pursuant to a search warrant. English’s cell phone records

showed that the movement of his phone mirrored the movements of

the Dodge Charger on the day of the shooting and further showed

multiple calls with Britton around the time of Leonardo’s shooting.

After police seized the Dodge Charger pursuant to a warrant,

Britton’s fingerprints were found in the car.

                                 17
     Considering the totality of the circumstances as presented in

the Affidavit and applying substantial deference to the magistrate’s

decision, as we must, we conclude that the magistrate had a

substantial basis for determining that probable cause existed to

issue the Warrant, and the trial court erred in granting the motion

to suppress on this ground. See Copeland, 

 (3)

(sufficient probable cause to authorize search warrant for cell phone

records based in part on volume of calls between defendant and his

girlfriend, who was an ex-girlfriend of the victim); Moon, 

 (4) (magistrate had substantial basis for finding probable cause

based on affidavit citing, in part, video recordings of the rental car

used in the shooting, phone records showing one of the phones

purchased by individual using the rental car had been used in close

proximity to the scene of the crime around the time of the shooting,

and defendant’s fingerprints were found on the hood of rental car).

     4. The trial court also cited a second ground for granting the

motion to dismiss, relying on what it termed “a discrepancy” in the

Affidavit.

                                 18
      Britton asserted in his motion to suppress that “the affiant’s

identity is unclear”7 and argued on appeal that, as a result, the

Affidavit is invalid on its face. At the hearing on the motion,

Britton’s attorney noted that the first page of the Affidavit begins

with the sentence, “The undersigned[,] Charles Jackson, being duly

sworn, deposes and says: I am a Georgia certified peace officer

charged with the duty of enforcing the criminal laws . . .” and that

“[t]he facts tending to establish probable cause that a crime has been

. . . committed . . . are as follows.” But the Affidavit then states:

      I, Detective Irving, am a sworn police [sic] in State of
      Georgia [sic] and am POST certified. I am employed by
      the Roswell Police Department and currently assigned
      the criminal investigations division. Obtaining and
      executing arrest and search warrants are a routine part
      of my daily job. I have been employed in law enforcement
      for almost 10 years and a sworn police officer/ detective
      for 9 years. I attest the facts and circumstances below are
      true and accurate to the best of my knowledge. The
      information was obtained through an investigation and


      7  Britton’s motion also asserted that the affiant “was not a Georgiacertified peace officer,” but he does not press this assertion on appeal. And, in
fact, Britton notes in his supplemental brief that in two other search warrant
affidavits in the record, Charles Jackson stated, “I am a POST certified
Detective in the State of Georgia. I have been a police Detective for over 6 years
and currently work for the Roswell Police Department and I am assigned to
investigate fraud.”
                                       19
     from information relayed to me through other law
     enforcement personnel.

(Emphasis in original.) Based on this language, Britton argued that

Detective Irving actually was the affiant, and because he did not

sign the Affidavit, it is invalid.

     At the hearing on the motion to suppress, the State elected to

defend the viability of the Affidavit but countered that the reference

to Detective Irving on the second page of the Affidavit was a

scrivener’s error. However, neither Detective Jackson nor Detective

Irving testified at the motion hearing, and no other evidence was

presented in this regard, which the trial court noted in rejecting the

State’s argument. The trial court ultimately concluded that the

veracity of the affiant was in question because it was unclear

whether Detective Jackson or Detective Irving was the affiant, and

also granted the motion to suppress on this alternate basis.

     We disagree with the trial court’s conclusion that the inclusion

of Detective Irving’s statement renders the Affidavit invalid on its




                                     20
face.8 Pretermitting whether the inclusion of Detective Irving’s

name in the Affidavit was the result of a scrivener’s error, the

Affidavit makes clear that Detective Jackson was its maker and that

he was averring to the information included in that document.

      On the first page of the Affidavit, Detective Jackson states

that, “being duly sworn,” he “deposes and says.” The word “depose”

in this context means “[t]o testify; to bear witness,” see Black’s Law

Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (second definition of “depose”), and the

recitation that Detective Jackson has been sworn indicates that he

was providing the information in the Affidavit under oath. See 

(defining “sworn statement” as “[a] statement given under oath; an




      8 However, we agree with the trial court that the State’s assertion of a

“scrivener’s error” required the State to produce evidence of that fact to prevail
on that theory. The State asserted at the hearing that it was standing on the
Affidavit as presented. See State v. Slaughter, 

 (

)
(1984) (“On the other hand, a search conducted pursuant to a search warrant,
regular and proper on its face, is presumed to be valid and the burden is on the
person who moves to suppress the items found to show that the search warrant
was invalid.”). But the State cannot at the same time rely on the Affidavit
alone as proof of the Warrant’s validity and also contend that the Court should
substitute “Detective Jackson” in place of “Detective Irving,” which can be
construed as an acknowledgment that the Affidavit is not correct on its face.
This issue does not affect our analysis, however, because we conclude that the
Affidavit is valid on its face.
                                       21
affidavit”). In addition, the signature page of the Affidavit expressly

identifies the affiant as Charles Jackson under the language, “I

swear or affirm that all of the information contained in this Affidavit

and all other testimony given by me under oath is true to the best of

my knowledge and belief.” A signature appears on that line, and the

magistrate judge’s signature appears below the language identifying

the affiant as “Charles Jackson.” The magistrate’s signature is

under additional language indicating that the Affidavit was “[s]worn

to and subscribed to” before her.

     Britton argues, however, that the Affidavit has not, in fact,

been signed by the affiant because the contested language appears

to indicate that Detective Irving is attesting to certain facts, the

signature is illegible, and there is no proof that Detective Irving

signed the Affidavit. But this argument ignores the magistrate’s

attestation that Detective Jackson, not Detective Irving, was the

affiant and that Detective Jackson signed the document in her

presence, which negates any ambiguity in the affiant’s signature

itself. Moreover, the Affidavit shows that Detective Jackson swore

                                    22
or affirmed that all of the information contained in the Affidavit,

which includes Detective Irving’s statement, was true to the best of

his knowledge and belief. Accordingly, the trial court erred to the

extent that it found that the Affidavit was invalid based on the

failure to identify the affiant when the face of the Affidavit showed

that the affiant was Detective Jackson. See Post v. State, 

 (1) (

) (2015) (addressing motion to recuse in a

criminal case and providing that to be legally sufficient, an affidavit

“must contain the three elements essential to a complete affidavit:

(a) a written oath embodying the facts as sworn by the affiant; (b)

the signature of the affiant; and (c) the attestation by an officer

authorized to administer the oath that the affidavit was actually

sworn by the affiant before the officer” (citation and punctuation

omitted)).

     Moreover, it is well settled that an application for a search

warrant may be supported by hearsay. See Jones v. United States,

 (

, 4 LE2d 697) (1960) (fact that

affidavit submitted in support of search warrant relied on hearsay

                                  23
was not alone sufficient to render affidavit invalid), overruled on

other grounds, United States v. Salvucci, 

 (

,

65 LE2d 619) (1980); State v. Stephens, 

 (

) (1984) (“Probable cause does not demand the certainty we

associate with formal trials.” (citation and punctuation omitted)). Cf.

Strauss v. Stynchcombe, 

 (2) (

)

(1968) (finding it well settled that probable cause to arrest may be

established by hearsay evidence). Therefore, a warrant would be

valid, even if an attesting officer swears to things in the affidavit he

heard from another officer and even if he repeats the other officer’s

statements verbatim. And such hearsay information properly may

be   provided   by   other   police     officers   participating   in   the

investigation. See Caffo v. State, 

 (2) (b) (

) (1981) (“Local law enforcement officers participating in a

common investigation are reliable informants. Information provided

by police officers, arising out of an official investigation, may be used

to establish probable cause for a search warrant.” (citation and

punctuation omitted)). Accordingly, even though the contested

                                   24
language is phrased as Detective Irving’s attestation that he, not

Detective Jackson, took the investigative steps described, Detective

Jackson’s oath swearing to the veracity of that information attests

that such actions were, in fact, taken. And under the circumstances

of this case, the magistrate could reasonably infer that Detective

Irving took the steps described and relayed the resulting

information to Detective Jackson.

     This Court addressed a somewhat analogous situation in

Dudley v. State, 

 (

) (1972). There, the police

officer applying for a search warrant attached an affidavit made by

him and also an affidavit of a federal agent stationed in Miami,

Florida, who had been working jointly with Atlanta police on the

investigation. The federal agent’s affidavit had information on

which Georgia police sought to rely in obtaining the warrant. The

defendant argued that the affidavit of the police officer, the only one

who appeared in person to obtain the search warrant, was based on

the affidavit of another, and that probable cause was not shown in

the police officer’s affidavit. We concluded that “[t]he hearsay

                                  25
information relied on by [the police officer] was mainly from fellow

officers engaged in the same investigation, and under such

circumstances the hearsay information was sufficient evidence of

probable cause for the issuance of the warrant.” 

 (7).

     Here, when Detective Jackson’s Affidavit includes information

obtained from another officer working on the investigation, the

magistrate was entitled to consider such hearsay evidence.

Therefore, we conclude that the magistrate properly could rely on

the Affidavit in determining that probable cause existed to issue the

Warrant.

     Accordingly, the trial court erred in granting Britton’s motion

to suppress on this ground.

     Judgment reversed. All the Justices concur.




                                 26
                      Decided May 16, 2023.

     Murder; motion to suppress. Fulton Superior Court. Before

Judge Edwards.

     Fani T. Willis, District Attorney, Michael S. Carlson, Kevin C.

Armstrong, Virginia L. Davis, Kelcee N. Jones-Connor, Jayna

Edwards, Assistant District Attorneys; Christopher M. Carr,

Attorney General, Beth A. Burton, Deputy Attorney General, Paula

K. Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General, for appellant.

     Lauren B. Shubow, Jessica M. Sully, for appellee.




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