¶1 NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and official text of the opinion.
¶2In the Supreme Court of Georgia
¶3 Decided: May 31, 2023
¶4 S23A0063. PRICE v. THE STATE.
¶5 BETHEL, Justice.
¶6 A Dougherty County jury found Appellant Trevis Lavell Price
¶7guilty of malice murder and other offenses in connection with the
¶8deaths of L. C. Tumblin Jr. and Dexter Covin. 1 On appeal, Appellant
¶9 1The crimes occurred on October 13, 2016. On May 1, 2019, a Dougherty County grand jury re-indicted Appellant for two counts of malice murder (Counts 1 and 2), two counts of felony murder (Counts 3 and 4), two counts of aggravated assault (Counts 5 and 6), four counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (Counts 7 through 10), possession of cocaine with intent to distribute (Count 11), and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon (Count 12). At a jury trial held from May 20 to May 31, 2019, Appellant was found guilty of all counts. The trial court sentenced Appellant to serve life in prison on Counts 1 and 2; five years each on Counts 7, 8, and 9, to run concurrently with each other and consecutively to Counts 1 and 2; a split sentence of 20 years in prison and 20 years on probation on Count 11, to run concurrently with Counts 7, 8, and 9 and consecutively to Counts 1 and 2; and five years on Count 12, to run concurrently with Counts 7, 8, and 9. Counts 5, 6, and 10 were merged for sentencing. The trial court purported to merge Counts 3 and 4 for sentencing, but those counts were vacated by operation of law. See Malcolm v. State, 263 Ga. 369, 371-372 (4) (434 SE2d 579) (1993). On July 1, 2019, Appellant filed a motion for new trial, which he amended through new counsel on July 2, 2020. The trial court denied the challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions
¶10for malice murder and the trial court’s denial of his motion to sever
¶11the charge for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. We
¶12affirm.
¶13 1. Viewed in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdicts, the
¶14evidence presented at trial showed as follows. Around 1:30 a.m. on
¶15the night of October 13, 2016, officers with the Albany Police
¶16Department were dispatched to a residential address on a report of
¶17a possible shooting. When officers arrived, they observed one man
¶18lying in the front yard of the residence and another man lying on the
¶19front porch, both of whom had been shot. The man in the front yard,
¶20later identified as Covin, was non-responsive and not breathing. The
¶21man on the front porch, later identified as Tumblin, was moving and
¶22making noises; when asked by a responding officer who shot him,
¶23Tumblin responded, “Travis Price.” The officers testified that
¶24Tumblin “was very scared, his voice was shaky, and it was a little
¶25motion, as amended, on July 26, 2022. On August 4, 2022, Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. The case was docketed to this Court’s term commencing in December 2022 and submitted for a decision on the briefs. 2 hard to understand him.” The officers further noted that Tumblin
¶26“was kind of hysterical,” “seemed to be very faint,” “was talking in a
¶27very light voice,” and “seemed to be in excruciating pain.”
¶28Nevertheless, when the officers again asked Tumblin to identify the
¶29shooter, Tumblin repeated, “Travis Price.” Officers later learned
¶30that Tumblin and Appellant were cousins. Tumblin was transported
¶31to the hospital, where, four days later, he succumbed to an infection
¶32caused by his wounds. Covin suffered a gunshot to the head, as well
¶33as to his arm and torso; he died as a result of his injuries.
¶34 After the shootings, eyewitness Fred Armstrong identified
¶35himself to the police. According to Armstrong, Covin owed him
¶36money for repairs Armstrong had made to Covin’s vehicle, and on
¶37the night of the crimes, Covin asked Armstrong to meet him at the
¶38address where the shootings occurred to pick up the money Covin
¶39owed. When Armstrong arrived, he saw Covin’s car with Covin and
¶40Covin’s wife inside; he also saw a black Toyota Camry parked behind
¶41the residence facing the street with its headlights on. Armstrong
¶42observed Covin exit his car and approach the Camry. At that point,
¶43 3 two men exited the residence, and one called out, “Who is this behind
¶44my house this time of night?” Appellant, 2 who had stepped out of the
¶45Camry, responded, “It’s your cousin.” Appellant and Covin then got
¶46into the Camry together. Covin exited the Camry within two
¶47minutes and began walking back to his own car; before Covin could
¶48reach his car, however, Appellant exited the Camry, walked up
¶49behind Covin, and shot him. Appellant turned around and shot at
¶50the men on the front porch, then at Covin’s wife, and then toward
¶51Armstrong’s vehicle. Covin’s wife sped off, followed by Armstrong.
¶52 Based on Tumblin’s identification and the interview with
¶53Armstrong, police identified Appellant as a suspect in the shootings
¶54and, after learning that he had recently moved in with his parents,
¶55obtained a search warrant for Appellant’s room at the residence.
¶56Crack cocaine, marijuana, a scale, and razor blades were recovered
¶57during the search. One officer testified that the cocaine, which had
¶58been divided into individual bags, was packaged for distribution and
¶59 2 Armstrong was unable to identify Appellant as the shooter either when police showed him a photo lineup or at trial. 4 that the weight of the cocaine—approximately nine grams—was
¶60“not a normal user amount” and was “consistent with somebody
¶61possessing it with the intent to distribute it.” The officer also
¶62testified that the brief interaction between Appellant and Covin in
¶63the Camry before the shooting was “consistent with performing a
¶64narcotics . . . transaction in the vehicle.”
¶65 Appellant thereafter turned himself in to police and asked to
¶66speak with investigators. During the interview, 3 a video recording of
¶67which was played for the jury at trial, Appellant admitted ownership
¶68of the drugs found at his parents’ house but denied any involvement
¶69in the shootings. Appellant further acknowledged that he used
¶70several names, including Trevis Price and Travis Price. Appellant
¶71also identified two cell phone numbers he used; police later
¶72subpoenaed records associated with those phone numbers.
¶73 At trial, the State introduced phone records showing that, from
¶74October 10 to October 13, several calls were placed between
¶75 3 After receiving the warnings required by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (86 SCt 1602, 16 LE2d 694) (1966), Appellant executed a written waiver of rights. 5 Appellant’s phone and a phone associated with Covin, including a
¶76call from Covin’s phone to Appellant’s phone approximately 15
¶77minutes before the shootings. The records also reflected a series of
¶78text messages between Covin’s phone and Appellant’s phone in the
¶79days leading up to the shootings, the last of which was sent less than
¶80three hours before the crimes. In text messages exchanged the day
¶81before the shooting, Covin and Appellant negotiated and arranged
¶82for Appellant to purchase some “clean” from Covin at a price of
¶83$1,100; a police officer testified that “clean” is a “drug term” for
¶84“some really good cocaine.”
¶85 On appeal, Appellant asserts that the evidence was insufficient
¶86to support his convictions for malice murder 4 because, he says,
¶87“undisputed inconsistencies and open questions” undermined the
¶88evidence against him. Specifically, Appellant complains about the
¶89absence of police body camera footage showing Tumblin identifying
¶90him as the shooter and faults the police for failing to interview
¶91 4 Appellant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support his other convictions. 6 Tumblin at the hospital before his death. Appellant further
¶92highlights Armstrong’s inability to identify Appellant as the shooter.
¶93Finally, Appellant suggests that law enforcement’s investigation of
¶94the crimes was flawed because investigators failed to recover
¶95Appellant’s phone and because they initially believed Appellant and
¶96Covin’s drug transaction involved methamphetamine, rather than
¶97cocaine. These arguments are unavailing.
¶98 When evaluating the sufficiency of evidence, we view the
¶99evidence presented at trial in the light most favorable to the jury’s
¶100verdicts and ask whether any rational trier of fact could have found
¶101the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson v.
¶102Virginia, 443 U. S. 307, 319 (III) (B) (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560)
¶103(1979). “Our review leaves to the jury the resolution of conflicts or
¶104inconsistencies in the evidence, credibility of witnesses, and
¶105reasonable inferences to be made from the evidence,” Yarn v. State,
¶106305 Ga. 421, 423 (2) (826 SE2d 1) (2019), and “[w]e do not reweigh
¶107the evidence,” Dobbins v. State, 309 Ga. 163, 165 (2) (844 SE2d 814)
¶108(2020). “As long as there is some competent evidence, even though
¶109 7 contradicted, to support each fact necessary to make out the State’s
¶110case, the jury’s verdict will be upheld.” (Citation and punctuation
¶111omitted.) Roberts v. State, 305 Ga. 257, 259 (2) (824 SE2d 326) (2019).
¶112 Appellant’s contention that purported inconsistencies in the
¶113evidence compromised the sufficiency of the evidence is meritless.
¶114Indeed, Appellant’s argument goes to the weight and credibility of
¶115the evidence, and it is axiomatic that “[t]his Court does not reweigh
¶116evidence or resolve conflicts in testimony.” (Citation and
¶117punctuation omitted.) Williams v. State, 287 Ga. 199, 200 (695 SE2d
¶118246) (2010). Those determinations are reserved to the jury. See
¶119Yarn, 305 Ga. at 423 (2). Likewise, it is of no consequence that the
¶120State did not introduce a video recording of Tumblin’s statement or
¶121the testimony of additional witnesses identifying Appellant as the
¶122shooter. See OCGA § 24-14-8 (“The testimony of a single witness is
¶123generally sufficient to establish a fact.”); Plez v. State, 300 Ga. 505,
¶124506 (1) (796 SE2d 704) (2017) (“Although the State is required to
¶125prove its case with competent evidence, there is no requirement that
¶126it prove its case with any particular sort of evidence.”). The evidence
¶127 8 recounted above was more than sufficient to authorize a rational
¶128jury to find Appellant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of malice
¶129murder of both Covin and Tumblin. See Jackson, 443 U. S. at 319
¶131 2. In his second and final enumeration of error, Appellant
¶132asserts that the trial court erred by refusing to sever Count 11—
¶133possession of cocaine with intent to distribute—from the remaining
¶134charges. We are not persuaded.
¶135 When offenses are joined in a single indictment,
¶136 a defendant has a right to severance where the offenses are joined solely on the ground that they are of the same or similar character because of the great risk of prejudice from a joint disposition of unrelated charges. However, where the joinder is based upon the same conduct or on a series of acts connected together or constituting parts of a single scheme or plan, severance lies within the sound discretion of the trial judge since the facts in each case are likely to be unique.
¶137(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Lowe v. State, 314 Ga. 788, 791-
¶138792 (2) (a) (879 SE2d 492) (2022). “If severance is not mandatory, it
¶139is nevertheless incumbent upon the trial court to determine whether
¶140severance is necessary to achieve a fair determination of [the
¶141 9 defendant’s] guilt or innocence as to each offense.” (Citation and
¶142punctuation omitted.) Carson v. State, 308 Ga. 761, 765 (2) (a) (843
¶143SE2d 421) (2020). This inquiry requires the trial court to consider
¶144“whether, in view of the number of offenses charged and the
¶145complexity of the evidence to be offered, the trier of fact will be able
¶146to distinguish the evidence and apply the law intelligently as to each
¶147offense.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Rodriguez v. State, 309
¶148Ga. 542, 547 (2) (847 SE2d 303) (2020).
¶149 Here, the trial court found that severance was not mandatory
¶150and, after determining that the facts of the case were “relatively
¶151straightforward” and that the charges against Appellant all
¶152stemmed from his involvement in drug dealing, denied Appellant’s
¶153motion to sever. 5 On appeal, Appellant argues that severance was
¶154 5 Appellant begins this section of his brief by asserting that the trial court erred by denying “several defense evidentiary motions,” but this section includes factual and legal argument regarding only the denial of his motion to sever. Appellant goes on to vaguely complain that the trial court denied “two related defense motions concerning drug charges” against Appellant and “a defense motion to admit evidence from two witnesses who interviewed victim Tumblin in the hospital.” And he criticizes the trial court for “permitt[ing] the [S]tate to introduce . . . evidence that . . . Tumblin identified Appellant as the shooter as a ‘dying declaration.’” Beyond these generalized complaints,
¶155 10 warranted because, he says, the admission of evidence relevant to
¶156Count 11, in conjunction with other unfavorable evidentiary rulings,
¶157was “highly prejudicial” and “devastating” to his defense and
¶158precluded “unbiased consideration by the jury on the more serious
¶159offenses[.]” But Appellant points to “no evidence . . . that the
¶160combined trial of the charges confused or misled the jury[.]”
¶161(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Rodriguez, 309 Ga. at 547 (2).
¶162And in light of evidence showing that the offenses arose from
¶163Appellant’s drug-dealing activities, as well as the State’s theory that
¶164the shootings resulted from a drug deal gone awry, we cannot say
¶165that the trial court abused its discretion by denying Appellant’s
¶166motion to sever. See Jackson v. State, 314 Ga. 82, 88 (2) (874 SE2d
¶16795) (2022) (no abuse of discretion in denying motion to sever where
¶168however, Appellant offers no cogent argument, citation of authority, or citations to the record to support his bare assertion that these rulings were erroneous. Thus, to the extent Appellant seeks to challenge these additional rulings, he is not entitled to review of those claims. See Henderson v. State, 304 Ga. 733, 739 (4) (822 SE2d 228) (2018) (“It is not this Court’s job to cull the record on behalf of Appellant to find alleged errors, as appellate judges are not like pigs, hunting for truffles buried in briefs.” (citation and punctuation omitted)); Roberson v. State, 300 Ga. 632, 636 (III) (797 SE2d 104) (2017) (“It is well established that the burden is on the party alleging error to show it by the record[.]” (citation and punctuation omitted)). 11 evidence showed that crimes, which occurred over course of several
¶169days, arose from appellant’s “continuing course of criminal violence
¶170relating to his involvement in the drug trade”); Rodriguez, 309 Ga.
¶171at 547-548 (2) (severance not warranted where “charged crimes all
¶172related to [appellant’s] ongoing involvement in gang activity and
¶173drug trafficking”); Carson, 308 Ga. at 765 (2) (a) (“Severance is
¶174generally not warranted where the crimes charged occurred over the
¶175same period of time and stem from a course of continuing conduct.”
¶176(citation and punctuation omitted)).
¶177 Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.
¶178 12