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317 Ark. 626

Thornton v. State

Supreme Court of Arkansas

Decided September 12, 1994

Supreme Court of Arkansas · decided 1994-09-12

Cited by 4 later decisions — most recently October 1996

4 state decisions

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

“Our review of challenges to the constitutionality of statutes begins with the principle that statutes are presumed to be constitutional. The burden of proving a statute is unconstitutional is upon the party challenging it. If it is possible to construe a statute as constitutional, we must do so. The norm by which we determine when a statute is void-for-vagueness is whether it lacks ascertainable standards of guilt such that persons of average intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. The law must give fair warning in definite language of the prohibited act. In addition to fair warning, a statute is also void-for-vagueness if it is so broad that it becomes susceptible to discriminatory enforcement. Nevertheless, flexibility, rather than meticulous specificity or great exactitude, in a statute is permissible as long as its reach is clearly delineated in words of common understanding. Moreover, impossible standards of specificity are not constitutionally required, even in criminal statutes. A statute will meet constitutional muster if the language conveys sufficient warning when measured by common understanding and practice. Additionally, it is not necessary that all kinds of conduct falling within the reach of the statute be particularized and the statute will not be struck down as vague only because marginal cases could be put where doubts might arise.”

quoted by 1 later decision, including Dougan v. State

Applies AR 5 § 5-60-116 · AR 5 § 5-65-102 · AR 5 § 5-65-103

Relies on Jordan v. De George · Davis v. Smith · Long v. State

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1994-09-12

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

David Newbern, Justice.

¶1It is “unlawful . . . for any person who is intoxicated to operate or be in actual physical control of a motor vehicle.” Ark. Code Ann. § 5-65-103(a) (Repl. 1993). “Intoxicated,” as defined in Ark. Code Ann. § 5-65-102(1) (Repl. 1993), includes being

influenced or affected by the ingestion of alcohol, a controlled substance, any intoxicant, or any combination thereof, to such a degree that the driver’s reactions, motor skills, and judgment are substantially altered and the driver, therefore, constitutes a clear and substantial danger of physical injury or death to himself and other motorists or pedestrians.

¶2Dennis Thornton was found to be in control of a vehicle and, upon being questioned by the arresting officer, stated he was not drunk but had been “sniffing paint.” Subsequent blood analysis showed the presence of toluene. He was convicted of driving while intoxicated.

¶3 Mr. Thornton does not question the testimony that he appeared to be intoxicated and failed a standard test in that respect at the scene of his arrest. Nor does he challenge the scientific testimony that ingestion of toluene causes disorientation, dizziness, and a slowing of motor skills. Rather, he argues that the term “intoxicant” as used in § 5-65-102(1) is unconstitutionally vague. We hold the statute gave him sufficient notice of the illegality of his conduct and thus affirm the conviction.

¶4 In Long v. State, 284 Ark. 21, 680 S.W.2d 686 (1984), a similar challenge was made to the term “intoxicated” found in the statute now codified as § 5-65-103(a). The term was defined in Ark. Stat. Ann. § 75-2502(a) (Supp. 1983), the same as it is now defined in the successor statute, § 5-65-102(1), except for inclusion in the new law of the term, “any intoxicant.” We held the former definition was sufficient because it gave fair warning to a person of ordinary intelligence of conduct which would constitute the offense described. We said, “The Constitution does not require impossible standards of specificity and a statute is sufficiently clear if its language conveys sufficient warning when measured by common understanding and practice. Jordan v. DeGeorge, 341 U.S. 223 (1951); Davis v. Smith, 266 Ark. 112, 583 S.W.2d 37 (1979).”

¶5In State v. Torres, 309 Ark. 422, 831 S.W.2d 903 (1992), we added, referring to the Davis case, “it is not necessary that all kinds of conduct falling within the reach of the statute be particularized and the statute will not be struck down as vague only because marginal cases could be put where doubts might arise.”

¶6In addition to our conclusion that §§ 5-65-103(a) and 5-65-102(1) give fair notice, standing alone, of the conduct prohibited, we note that the General Assembly has recognized toluene as an intoxicant and made it a crime to ingest it for the purpose of becoming intoxicated. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-60-116 (Repl. 1993). Mr. Thornton points out that the statute concludes, “For the purposes of this section, any condition so induced shall be deemed to be an intoxicated condition.” He contends we thus cannot transfer that definition of “intoxicated” to the law governing driving while intoxicated. We agree with that argument and cite § 5-60-116 only to show that the General Assembly has recognized toluene as an intoxicant.

¶7 Our conclusion is that the addition of the term “any intoxicant” to “alcohol, a controlled substance, or a combination thereof’ has not made the definition vague. A person of ordinary intelligence knows that the use of a substance tending to put him or her in the condition described in § 5-65-102(1) constitutes use of an “intoxicant” and that being in control of a motor vehicle shortly thereafter may violate the law.

¶8Affirmed.

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