224
Argued and submitted December 3, 2021, affirmed January 26, 2022
STATE OF OREGON,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
ZACHARIAH MICHAEL MEACHAM,
Defendant-Appellant.
Multnomah County Circuit Court
19CR77671, 17CR11648;
A173682 (Control), A173685
504 P3d 1275
In this consolidated criminal appeal, defendant assigns error to the trial
court’s denial of his motion to suppress. Defendant contends that the denial of the
motion to suppress led to a conviction for driving while suspended, which in turn,
led to defendant being found in violation of probation. Defendant argues that a
deputy’s initial encounter amounted to an unconstitutional stop, due, in part, to
the deputy’s error in identifying defendant as another person. Held: Although
mistaken, the deputy reasonably suspected that defendant was the other person
based on use of the same vehicle, a similar appearance between defendant and
the other person’s mug shot, and defendant’s evasive behavior in the parking lot
outside the store where defendant was contacted by the deputy. Even if the initial
encounter constituted a stop, there was a sufficient basis for a stop. Therefore, the
trial court did not err by denying the motion to suppress.
Affirmed.
Steffan Alexander, Judge. (Judgment entered February 20,
2020) (A173682)
Christopher J. Marshall, Judge. (Judgment entered
February 14, 2020) (A173685)
Nora Coon, Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause
for appellant. Also on the briefs was Ernest G. Lannet,
Chief Defender, Criminal Appellate Section, Office of Public
Defense Services.
Christopher Page, Assistant Attorney General, argued
the cause for respondent. Also on the brief were Ellen F.
Rosenblum, Attorney General, and Benjamin Gutman,
Solicitor General.
Before James, Presiding Judge, and Lagesen, Chief Judge,
and Kistler, Senior Judge.
Cite as 317 Or App 224 (2022) 225
KISTLER, S. J.
Affirmed.
226 State v. Meacham
KISTLER, S. J.
Defendant appeals a judgment of conviction for felony driving while suspended (DWS) and a judgment finding
him in violation of probation. He argues that an unconstitutional stop led to his DWS conviction, which in turn led
to his being found in violation of probation. Because we
conclude that the stop was constitutional, we affirm both
judgments.
One afternoon, Multnomah County Deputy Sheriff
Farmer was on patrol in a marked police car near NE 223rd
and Glisan Streets, which he described as a “high vice area.”
While he was driving through a nearby Walgreens parking
lot, he noticed an older silver Toyota Tercel enter the lot and
drive towards him. As the two cars passed each other, the
deputy and the other driver made eye contact. Once that
occurred, the other driver “appeared to pick up speed and
accelerate rapidly away from [the deputy] through the lot
and then turn a corner … out of [the deputy’s] sight.”
The deputy found the driver’s behavior suspicious,
and he “ran” the Tercel’s license plate. In doing so, he learned
that the same Tercel had been involved in a recent drug
arrest and that there was an outstanding felony warrant
for a person (Robert Long) who had either been driving the
Tercel or a passenger in it when the drug arrest occurred.1
The deputy “pulled up [Long’s] mug shot,” which led him to
conclude that Long’s mug shot “matched the guy who was
driving the car.”
The deputy turned his car around to follow the
Tercel. After he turned the corner, he saw the Tercel “parked
right in front of the Walgreens[,] right around the corner as
if [the driver had] come around the corner [and] parked real
quick.” No one was in the car. However, the deputy spotted
the driver inside the store and went in to speak with him.
The deputy testified:
“I walked into the Walgreens. [The driver] was moving
down an aisle and I just verbally addressed him, told him
what was going on, that I thought he was this Robert Long
1
The warrant for Long appears to have been issued for an unrelated felony.
Cite as 317 Or App 224 (2022) 227
guy, I thought he had a warrant. And then he provided me
an identification card to show me who he was.”2
The state identification card that the driver gave the deputy identified the driver as Zachariah Meacham, not Robert
Long. However, the deputy testified that the driver’s use of a
state identification card was a giveaway that he did not have
a valid driver’s license, which led to the driver’s (defendant’s)
arrest and prosecution for felony DWS.
Before trial, defendant moved to suppress “all evidence … discovered pursuant to an illegal search and seizure.”3 The next day, the state told the trial court that it was
prepared to present evidence on defendant’s motion, and
the parties developed the record set out above. That record
gave rise to three potential issues: (1) was the deputy’s initial encounter with defendant in Walgreens a stop; (2) if it
was, did the deputy reasonably suspect that defendant was
Robert Long when he first spoke with him in Walgreens; and
(3) if the deputy reasonably suspected that defendant was
Long, did the deputy’s reasonable suspicion dissipate once
defendant produced identification showing he was someone
else?
After the record had been created, the state
addressed two of those issues. It argued that the deputy’s
initial interaction with defendant in Walgreens did not constitute a stop and that, when defendant offered his state
identification in response to the deputy’s questions, the deputy reasonably suspected that defendant had been driving
2
Both the deputy and defendant testified at the suppression hearing regarding (1) what the deputy said to defendant when he spoke to him initially at
Walgreens and (2) defendant’s response. The deputy’s testimony favored defendant on the first issue and the state on the second. Conversely, defendant’s testimony favored the state on the first issue and the defense on the second. Although
the trial court did not make express factual findings, it appears to have accepted
the deputy’s version on both issues. The parties appear to agree on that point,
and we quote the deputy’s version of both events.
3
After oral argument, defendant filed a memorandum of additional authorities citing State v. Oxford, 287 Or App 580, 586,
403 P3d 528 (2017), for the
proposition that his pretrial suppression motion was minimally sufficient to raise
the issues that have been litigated at trial and on appeal. Perhaps that is true.
The motion, however, could have been more helpful in framing the issues at the
hearing by identifying, for example, the specific basis that, in defendant’s view,
rendered the deputy’s stop unconstitutional. See State v. Hallam,
307 Or App 796,
800-01,
479 P3d 545 (2020) (discussing that issue).
228 State v. Meacham
without a valid license. The state did not argue that the deputy reasonably suspected that defendant was Long when he
first approached him in Walgreens.4
Defense counsel addressed all three issues in her
argument. She argued initially that, when the deputy went
into Walgreens, “there [wa]s not sufficient information at
this point to detain the person that was in the store based
on how little information [the deputy had] gathered before
deciding to go into the store and detain whoever this person
was.” She also argued that the deputy’s initial interaction
with defendant in Walgreens was sufficiently coercive that
it constituted a stop without a sufficient justification. And
she finally contended that, “even if there was reasonable
suspicion” that defendant was Robert Long when the deputy first entered Walgreens, the deputy’s suspicion “should
have been diffused as soon as he saw [defendant’s] work
ID.”5
The trial court agreed with the state that the deputy’s initial interaction with defendant in Walgreens did not
rise to the level of a stop and that a stop occurred only “after
the officer learned that the Defendant—Defendant’s license
was suspended and then asked him to accompany the officer
toward his patrol vehicle to check what level of suspension
there was.” At that point, the trial court reasoned, the deputy
had a reasonable suspicion that defendant had been driving
while suspended. The court accordingly denied defendant’s
motion to suppress. Afterwards, the court entered a judgment of conviction for felony DWS. Later, another judge
relied on the felony DWS conviction to find that defendant
had violated his probation on a separate offense.
On appeal, defendant assigns error to the trial
court’s ruling on his motion to suppress. He argues that
4
The state did not expressly concede the point. It did not address it.
5
The deputy and defendant’s testimony differed on the type of identification
that defendant initially produced. The deputy testified that defendant initially
showed him a state identification, which he said indicated that defendant lacked
a valid driver’s license. Defendant testified that he initially showed the deputy
a work identification, which his attorney argued both dissipated any reasonable
suspicion that defendant was Long and, unlike a state identification, did not suggest that defendant lacked a driver’s license. As noted above, the court appears to
have accepted the deputy’s testimony on that issue.
Cite as 317 Or App 224 (2022) 229
the trial court erroneously concluded that the deputy’s initial encounter with him in Walgreens did not constitute a
stop. See State v. Reyes-Herrera,
369 Or 54, 67-68,
500 P3d
1 (2021) (explaining when verbal statements will constitute
a stop). The state responds that the trial court’s conclusion
was correct. See State v. Backstrand,
354 Or 392, 413-14,
313 P3d 1084 (2013) (explaining when requests for identification will not rise to the level of a stop). It argues alternatively that, even if the deputy’s initial statements were
sufficiently coercive to constitute a stop, the trial court’s
ruling can be sustained on another ground—namely, when
the deputy first spoke with defendant in Walgreens, he reasonably suspected that defendant was Robert Long, who
was subject to an outstanding felony warrant. See Outdoor
Media Dimensions Inc. v. State of Oregon,
331 Or 634, 659-
60,
20 P3d 180 (2001) (explaining when a respondent can
rely on the right-for-the-wrong reason doctrine to uphold a
trial court’s ruling). Defendant replies that, as a procedural
matter, the state may not rely on the right-for-the-wrongreason doctrine because the record could have developed
differently if the state had argued at the suppression hearing that the initial encounter was supported by reasonable
suspicion. Alternatively, defendant contends that the deputy’s belief that defendant was Long was not objectively
reasonable.
We need not decide the first issue that divides the
parties—whether the deputy’s initial encounter with defendant in Walgreens constituted a stop—to resolve this case.
Even if that encounter was a stop, the deputy reasonably
suspected that defendant was Robert Long, who was subject to an outstanding felony warrant. In explaining why we
reach that conclusion, we begin with defendant’s procedural
argument that the state may not rely on the right-for-the-wrong reason doctrine because the record could have developed differently if the state had argued at the suppression
hearing that the deputy reasonably suspected defendant was
Long. See id. at 659-60 (explaining that the doctrine may be
invoked when, among other things, “the record materially
[is] the same one that would have been developed had the
prevailing party raised the alternative basis for affirmance
below”).
230 State v. Meacham
In this case, the record does not show that the
state took any action before the parties developed the evidentiary record at the suppression hearing that took the
question whether the initial encounter was based on reasonable suspicion off the table. Rather, that question remained
in play when the parties developed the evidentiary record.
Consistently, defense counsel cross-examined the deputy
on that issue.6 To be sure, after the parties had developed
the evidentiary record, the state did not argue that the deputy reasonably suspected that defendant was Robert Long
when he initially approached him in Walgreens. However,
what the state argued or did not argue after the evidentiary
record had been developed could have had no effect on either
defendant’s incentive or opportunity to develop the record on
that question.
Moreover, after the record had been developed,
defense counsel continued to argue that the deputy lacked
sufficient information to stop defendant when he first
approached him in Walgreens and that, even if the deputy
“reasonably suspected” defendant was Long when he first
approached him in Walgreens, that reasonable suspicion
dissipated when defendant produced identification showing
he was someone else. That is, defense counsel’s arguments
after the record was developed suggest that she recognized
that reasonable suspicion remained an issue at the suppression hearing despite the more limited justification that the
state had advanced for the deputy’s actions. Cf. State v. Bea,
318 Or 220, 224,
864 P2d 854 (1993) (declining to accept
state’s express concession that defendant had been stopped
unconstitutionally). Because defendant had a full and fair
opportunity to develop an evidentiary record on the reasonableness of the deputy’s suspicion, we turn to the merits of
that issue.
Defendant does not dispute that the deputy actually
suspected that he was Long. He argues only that the deputy’s
6
Defense counsel questioned the deputy’s opportunity to compare the two men
by eliciting that defendant had driven past the deputy before the deputy was able
to pull up Long’s mug shot. And counsel sought to question the deputy’s conclusion
that defendant was Long by asking whether the deputy was aware that defendant
was 13 years younger than Long. The deputy explained that he had not been aware
of that fact when he concluded that defendant matched Long’s mug shot.
Cite as 317 Or App 224 (2022) 231
suspicion was not objectively reasonable. See State v. Maciel-Figueroa,
361 Or 163, 183,
389 P3d 1121 (2017) (noting subjective and objective components of reasonable suspicion).
Three facts, however, lead us to conclude that the deputy’s
suspicion was objectively reasonable. First, when the deputy ran the Tercel’s license plate, he learned that the same
car had been involved in a recent drug arrest, that a person
named Robert Long either had been driving the Tercel or
had been a passenger in the car when the arrest occurred,
and that there was an outstanding felony warrant for Long.
Second, having pulled up a mug shot of Robert Long, the
deputy concluded that the mug shot of Long “matched” or
“look[ed] like” the person whom he had just seen driving the
Tercel. Third, when the deputy caught defendant’s eye as
their two cars passed, defendant accelerated quickly, sped
away, parked right in front of a store once he got out of the
deputy’s sight, and went into the store.
Given Long’s recent association with the same
Tercel that defendant was driving and the deputy’s observation that defendant “matched” Long’s mug shot, the deputy
reasonably suspected that defendant was Long. Cf. id. at
184 (officers reasonably suspected that the defendant was
a named individual based on the defendant’s gender and
his geographic and temporal proximity to reported criminal activity). Defendant’s evasive behavior after the deputy
caught his eye added another piece to the puzzle. To be sure,
evasive behavior, standing alone, is insufficient to establish
a reasonable suspicion that a person has committed or is
about to commit a specific crime.
Id. at 181. However, defendant’s apparent attempts to elude the deputy support the
deputy’s conclusion that defendant was the subject of an outstanding felony warrant. We accordingly conclude that, even
if the deputy’s initial encounter with defendant in Walgreens
constituted a stop, the stop was justified by an objectively
reasonable suspicion that defendant was a person who was
subject to an outstanding felony warrant.7 Because the trial
court did not err in denying defendant’s motion to suppress,
7
On appeal, defendant does not dispute that, if the initial encounter in
Walgreens was constitutionally valid, the deputy reasonably suspected that
defendant had driven while suspended once defendant produced his state identification card.
232 State v. Meacham
we affirm the judgment of conviction for felony DWS and the
judgment finding defendant in violation of his probation.
Affirmed.
